



Ce document est le fruit d’un long travail approuvé par le jury de 
soutenance et mis à disposition de l’ensemble de la 
communauté universitaire élargie. 
 
Il est soumis à la propriété intellectuelle de l’auteur : ceci 
implique une obligation de citation et de référencement lors de 
l’utilisation de ce document. 
 
D’autre part, toute contrefaçon, plagiat, reproduction illicite de 
ce travail expose à des poursuites pénales. 
 









Code la Propriété Intellectuelle – Articles L. 122-4 et L. 335-1 à 
L. 335-10 
Loi n° 92-597 du 1er juillet 1992, publiée au Journal Officiel du  






 et discipline ou spécialité
                                             Jury  :
le
Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1 Capitole)
Linda LAHLEH
29 Juin 2018
Shareholders' Best Interest in Open-End Investment Companies
A Legal Assessment of the Jordanian Law in the light of French and European
Approaches
ED SJP : Droit
Institut du Droit Privé (IDP)
M. Pierre MOUSSERON
Professeur, Université de Montpellier (rapporteur)
M. Tariq HAMMOURI
Professeur, University of Jordan (rapporteur)
M. Laurent GROSCLAUDE
Maître de Conférence, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (examinateur)













Shareholders’ Best Interest in Open-End Investment Companies 
A Legal Assessment of the Jordanian Law in the Light of French 











 « L’université n’entend ni approuver ni désapprouver les opinions 
















«Watch your thoughts; they become words. Watch your words; they become actions. Watch your 
actions; they become habits. Watch your habits; they become character. Watch your character; 






It gives me great pleasure in expressing my gratitude to everyone that supported me and had 
his or her contribution in making this work possible. 
First and foremost, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my mentor and supervisor Prof. 
Catherine GINESTET, for her continuous support of my thesis and related research; with her 
patience, guidance, motivation and immense knowledge. Without her, this thesis would not have 
been completed. I am also thankful for the excellent example she has provided as a successful 
woman and professor.  
I express my deepest gratitude to the University (UT1) and its responsible for allowing me 
the room and facilities to produce this work.  
My sincere thanks also go to Mr. Donald LEBARON the fresh eye that read this thesis from 
A to Z. Also to the Univesity of Saint Louis, for opening their doors to me by granting me the 
opportunity to access their data base, libraries and facitlities. 
My time at UT1 was made enjoyable due to my friends and PhD fellows (my Brady bunch) 
who became an integral and inseperable part of my life. The fruitful and stimulating discusions 
we shared, the insightful comments and ideas they provided me with and the fun we had working 
in the same small bureau on a daily basis. I am grateful for the time we spent together. They 
stood beside me, motived, supported and helped me with everything they have. Throughout the 
past four years, they were my source of motivation and my constent attentive listeners.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, sister, and brother in law and best 
friends for their love, encouragement and for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this 
thesis and my life in general.  
Thank you  




Part I: Structuring a Pro-Shareholder Investment Company: A Balanced and 
Protective Legal Structure 
Title one: Prior Establishment Requirements: What Shareholders need to know when 
incorporating an Investment Company 
Chapter 1: Organizational Requirements 
Chapter 2: Financial Services Requirements 
Title two: Post-Establishment Requirements: The Birth of a Financial Legal Person 
Chapter 1: Market Related Conditions: Exercising Financial Services Activities 
Chapter 2: Internal Conduct Conditions: Auto-mangement or Outsourcing  
 
Part II: Controlling the Performance of Investment Companies: Continuous or One 
Time Shareholder Protective Supervisory Obligation 
Title one: External Administrative Supervision 
Chapter 1: Identifying Institutional Strucutre of Competent Authority 
Chapter 2: Supervisory Mechanism of Competent Authority 
Title two: Internal Control: Self vs. Sub Control  
Chapter 1: Indirect Control 
Chapter 2: Direct Control 
 
 
VII List of abbreviations 
List of Abbreviations  
 
A- 
AACIF : Association Des Analystes Conseillers En Investissements Financiers 
ACAM: Autorité de Contrôle des Assurances et des Mutuelles 
ACPR: Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution 
ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
AFECEI : Association Française des Etablissements de Crédit et des Entreprises 
d’Investissement 
AFEP/MEDEF: Code de Gouvernement d’Entreprise des Sociétés Cotées 
AIF: Alternative Investment Fund 
AOA: Articles of Association 
AML/TF: Anti Money Laundry and Terrorist Financing 
AMF: Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
AMP: Accepted Market Practice 
ANACOFI-CIF : Association Nationale Des Conseils Financiers-CIF 
ANSA: Association Nationale de Société Cotée 
ASE: Amman Stock Exchange 
C- 
CA: Cour d’Appel 
Cass. : Cour de cassation 
Cass. Civ: Cour de Cassation Chambre Civile 
Cass. Com.: Cour de Cassation Chambre Commerciale 
CB: Commission Bancaire 
 
VIII List of abbreviations 
CIF : Conseillers en Investissements Financiers  
CCIFTE : Compagnie Des Conseillers En Investissement, Finance Et Transmission 
D'entreprise  
C. civ.: Code Civil 
C. com.: Code de Commerce 
CE: Conseil d’Etat 
CEA: Comité des Entreprises d’Assurance 
CECEI: Comité des Etablissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d’Investissement 
CEO: Chief Executive Officer 
CESR: Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CIC: Collective Investment Company 
CIR: Collective Investment Regulation 
CIS: Collective Investment Scheme 
CIU: Collective Investment Undertaking 
CMF: Conseil des Marchés Financiers 
C. mon. Fin : Code Monétaire et Financier 
CNCIF : Chambre Nationale Des Conseillers En Investissements Financiers 
COB: Commission des Operations de Bourse 
Cons. Cons. : Conseil Constitutionnel 
CPC : Code de Procédure Civile 
C. pén.: Code Pénal 
CPP : Code de Procédure Pénale 




IX List of abbreviations 
E- 
ECB: European Central Bank 
ECHR: European Convention of Human Rights 
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights 
EGAM: Extraordinary General Assembly Meeting 
ESA: European Supervisory Authority 
ESA 95: European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESFS: European System of Financial Supervision 
ESMA: European Securities Market Authority 
ESME: European Securities Markets Expert Group 
ESRB: European Systematic Risk Board 
EBA: European Banking Authority 
EIOPA: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
EU: European Union 
F- 
FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board 
FSB: Financial Stability Board 
FSCB: Financial Skills Certification Board 
G- 
GA: General Assembly 
GAM: General Assembly Meeting 
H- 
H3C: Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes 
HUP: Harvard University Press 
 
X List of abbreviations 
I- 
IAA: Independent Administrative Authority 
IAS: International Accounting Standard 
IC: Investment Company 
IF: Investment Fund 
IFLR: International Financial Law Review 
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IPA: Independent Public Authority 
IPO: Initial Public offering 
ISIN: International Security Identification Number 
IAS: International Accounting Standards 
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards 
J- 
JCC: Jordanian Company Code 
Jo. Cass. civ.: Jordanian Court of cassation civil chamber 
Jo. Co. admin.: Jordanian Administrative Court 
JOD: Jordanian Dinar 
JSL: Jordanian Securities Law 
JSC: Jordanian Securities Commission 
K- 
KIID: Key Investor Information Document 
M- 
MAP: Market Abuse Practice 
MC: Management Company 
 
XI List of abbreviations 
MiFID: Market for Investment in Financial Instruments Directive 
MAR: Market Abuse Regulation 
MMOU: Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
MOA: Memorandum of Association 
MS: Member State 
MTF: Multilateral Trading Facility 
N- 
NAV: Net Asset Value 
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
O- 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEIC: Open-End Investment Company 
OGAM: Ordinary General Assembly Meeting 
OJ: Official Journal of the European Union 
OPCVM: Organisme de Placements Collectif en Valeurs Mobilières 
OTC: Over-the-Counter 
OUP: Oxford University Press 
P- 
PD: Prospectus Directive 
PIT: Propriety, integrity and transparency 
Plc: Public Limited Company 
PO: Public Offering 
PSE: Paris Stock Exchange 
Q- 
 
XII List of abbreviations 
QPC: Question Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité 
R- 
RCCI: Responsable de Conformité et du Contrôle Interne 
Reg.: Regulation 
Régl. Gèn.: Règlement Général 
REO: Reassessed Expected Outcome 
RIA: Regulatory Impact Assessment 
RJDA: Revue Juridique de Droit des Affaires 
RTDF: Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier 
S- 
SA: Société Anonyme 
SAS: Société par Actions Simplifiée 
SDC: Securities Depository Center 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFS: System of Financial Supervision 
SGP: Société de Gestion de Portefeuille 
SICAF: Société d’Investissement à Capital Fixe 
SICAV: Société d’Investissement à Capital Variable 
T- 
TD: Transparency Directive 
U- 
UCITS: Undertaking for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 






01 Individuals differ though they may, yet they share basic financial goals. They seek the 
allocation of their current wealth in such a way achieving their long-term financial interest 
while taking into account their current consumption and future objectives1. They look for 
investment opportunities. They turn to companies and investment professionals to increase the 
value of their assets particularly when lacking the necessary level of financial and economic 
knowledge and awareness. Their investment horizon differs, so does their risk tolerance and 
wealth. They find a solution in a one-stop shop where they delegate their investment decision-
making to companies and professionals that generate a previously endorsed financial objective. 
Investors’ satisfaction is the key to a successful financial management. Requires strong and 
reliable institutional and legal structures. Protective, thoroughly explained and adequately 
standardized. Asset management emerges as the secret ingredient to achieving investors’ 
financial goals and their satisfaction. Through offering the expertise they lack and the financial 
foresight, they aspire for.  
02 Economic intuition. Asset management emerging as a solution to investors’ investment 
decisions is reasoned from different angles. The notion behind asset management and its 
functioning mechanism are the key for its importance and viability. The main purpose is 
providing expertise and resources that support and bring to life still assets2. From an economic 
perspective, it is based on the portfolio theory3. Generally, it pushes investors to diversity in 
order to optimize their portfolio of securities. Portfolio theory in its pure economic conception 
holds that assets should be chosen based on their interaction with one another rather than their 
isolated individual performance4. Therefore, this theory studies the method through which an 
investor could achieve the maximum expected return and the minimum level of risk from a 
                                                          
1 Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance (11th edn, McGraw Hill 
2014) 
2 Nicolas Hastings, Physical Asset Management (Springer 2010) page 14 
3 Ha  Ma ko itz, Po tfolio “ele tio     Jou al of Fi a e ; Ha es Ma li g a d “a a E a uelsso , 
The Ma ko itz Po tfolio Theo   No e er 2012 < 
http://www.math.chalmers.se/~rootzen/finrisk/gr1_HannesMarling_SaraEmanuelsson_MPT.pdf > Accessed 24 
January 2017 
4 David Scott, Wall Street Wo ds: A  A to Z Guide to I est e t Te s fo  Today’s I esto  (3rd edn, Houghton 
Mifflin 2003) page 278 
 
2 Introduction 
pooled portfolio of securities5. The expected return in this case equals the sum of the return of 
the different investments constituting the portfolio. As for the risk, it is minimized due to 
diversification. Therefore, having an overall risk smaller than the risk attached to each 
individual investment due to minimizing the spread of risk exposure generally securities face 
due to financial changes6.  
03 Asset management models. Asset management is deeply rooted in economic literature 
and theory. They classify it into four main models depending on portfolio selection. Single-
period static model, single-period stochastic model, multi-period static model and multi-period 
stochastic model. Single-period models constitute of single decision at the start of the horizon. 
According to Markowitz model, it is based on a mean-variance framework with a single nature. 
It hedges against small changes in the current state of the world. Being static means that it 
follows a conservative strategy very close to passive management, as it guarantees that assets 
and liabilities move in the same direction as deviations. It provides an immunization to the 
portfolio. The downside of this model is that any inappropriate choice of the length of time 
horizon can lead to suboptimal investment decisions7. As for the stochastic model, it guarantees 
that the portfolio has well-defined distribution of error with no precise prediction8. Multi-period 
model considers possible independencies with external factors9 and does not limit the utility 
function to a single horizon. It might address lifetime consumption. The main difference 
between the different models found in considering the single-period model as conservative and 
the capital market needs a stochastic approach while considering multi-layered horizons10. 
Therefore, multi-period stochastic model introduces dynamically managed portfolios. The 
                                                          
5 Christopher Pass and others, Collins Dictionary of Business (3rd edn, Collins 2005) 
6 Ducan Hughes, Asset Management in Theory and Practice: An Introduction to Modern Portfolio Theory (New Age 
International 2005) page 20 
7 Ba  Ka as, A ‘o ust Opti izatio  App oa h Fo  stati  Po tfolio Ma age e t  aste  thesis, Lehigh U i e sit  
2005) page 24 
8 Dimitris Be tsi as a d Dessisla a Pa ha a o a, ‘o ust Multi-period Portfolio Management in the Presence of 
T a sa tio  Costs    Co pute  a d Ope atio  esea h  
9 Ed i  Elto  a d Ma ti  G u e , The Multi-period Consumption Investment Problem and Single Pe iod A al sis  
   O fo d E o o i  Pape s ; Paul “a uelso , Lifeti e Po tfolio “ele tio   D a i  “to hasti  
P og a i g     ‘e ie  of E o o i s a d “tatisti s  
10 Do  ‘ose  a d “ta os )e ios, E te p ise-Wide Asset and Lia ilit  Ma age e t: Issues I stitutio s a d Models  
in Stavros Zenios and William Ziemba (eds), Handbook of Asset and Liability Management (Vol. 1 Theory and 
Methodology, 1st ed , Else ie  ; “ta os )e ios, Valuatio  a d Po tfolio ‘isk Ma age e t ith Mortgage-




closest concept to active management. Further asset management is legally categorized based on 
the chosen structure into two main categories. Asset management for own account (Self-
managed portfolio such as that performed by banks for their property) and that for the account 
of third party (Delegation of management to a professional third party). The management for the 
account of third party is performed either individually through a mandate or collectively through 
Collective Investment Schemes. Legal intuition in this paper stresses the structure the asset 
management follows and particularly CIS. As the regulatory framework interests in the final 
product of asset management, its performance and results of selection rather than the economic 
selection approach. 
04 Collective Investment Schemes. CIS is the management of investors’ assets by 
diversifying their risk and pooling assets on securities markets following the portfolio theory11. 
In return, investors are attributed shares or units in the established vehicle that performs the 
management and administer the relation between different participants12. CIS have three basic 
legal structures. Trust, corporate and contractual forms. At EU level, the three structures are 
accepted13. In France, merely the contractual and the corporate forms are addressed as possible 
structures for portfolio investments14. Jordanian rules also address the contractual and corporate 
forms of CIS15. The available choices of legal structure in French and Jordanian rules are 
justified in the light of their legal system. The unit trusts are a common law conception that is 
not addressed neither it is known in civil law systems. Contractual form in the sense of having a 
vehicle with no separate legal personality on its own16; a common fund managed by a 
Management Company17. Final investors own units in this fund and a contract administers the 
relation between the MC and the fund. Funds may be open or closed end18. Unit trusts are a 
long-standing conception in Anglo-Saxon law. In the framework of portfolio investments, the 
same notion of trust is used yet for commercial purposes. Where a trustee holds an identified 
                                                          
11 Article 3 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-1 
12 Pie paolo Fe a i, Colle ti e I est e t Vehi les a d Othe  Asset Ma age e t P odu ts  i  Ig azio Basile a d 
Pierpaolo Ferrari (eds), Asset Management and Institutional Investors (Springer 2016) page 31 
13 Article 1.3 UCITS Dir 
14 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-4 
15 Article 3 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
16 Mi hel “to k, La Natu e Ju idi ue des Fo ds Co u s de Pla e e t : U  Pat i oi e d Affe tatio  i  
Mélanges Gilles Goubeaux (Dalloz-LGDJ 2009) 
17 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-8-1 
18 Article 89.b JSL of 2017 
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group of assets for the benefit of the beneficiary (investors holding units in this trust) and 
having a fund manager – which occupies a fiduciary position- that makes the investment 
decisions in the trust19. In this context, unit trusts are close to the contractual form of CIS. The 
trust has a trustee having the role of a custodian and a manager that is usually a MC. In UCITS 
directive unit trusts and common funds are attributed the same governing rules. As for corporate 
form, it means having a statute creating an investment company according to company law 
whether open or closed end where investors own shares in this company. The corporate form of 
CIS is our main concern in this thesis. Particularly Open-End Investment Company.  
05 CIS role. CIS address the relation between investors in the form of unitholders or 
shareholders and the established vehicle. Further to being an intermediary between financial 
system and investors, financial system brings together economic agents with surplus financial 
resources, such as households, with those having net financial needs such as companies20. The 
system provides two main forms of financing direct and indirect. Direct meaning those with 
excess directly finance those with needs, the perfect example is a shareholder subscribing to the 
shares issued by a listed company. Indirect in the sense that requires an intermediary between 
those with surplus and those with needs, such as the role of banks in lending. Financial system 
allows investors to turn their current revenues into future consumption. CIS is a means through 
which this goal is fulfilled.  
06 Global economic importance. Research in CIS has stemmed from CIS being one of the 
most significant recent developments of financial intermediation. The reports of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicate that CIS assets 
have formed a crucial share of national income and financial assets21. The importance of the 
CIS lies in the opportunity it provides for inexperienced and small investors to participate in 
large national and international capital markets depending on the scope of commercialization of 
its shares or units. They invest on behalf of their shareholders or unitholders in financial 
markets. They pool assets and diversify the risk among different securities constituting a 
                                                          
19 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (3rd edn, Cavendish 2003) page 736 
20 D. Hughes, n (6)  page 55 
21 OECD , White Pape  o  Go e e t of Colle ti e I est e t “ he es CI“ , Financial Market Trends, 
Vol. 2005/1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fmt-v2005-art5-en page137 
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portfolio. Therefore, making CIS a safer means of private placements. In terms of the OEICs, 
they start the financial cycle by raising money through selling shares to investors. Once the 
investor becomes a shareholder, they can increase their shareholding by buying additional 
shares in the company, they decrease their share ownership through share redemption or they 
maintain their initial ownership percentage. This flexibility though deeply established in 
corporate theory it is considered a key incentive and particularity of OEICs. As the performance 
of these rights is limited neither to a specific timeline nor to a particular financial venue.  
07 OEIC shareholder. The character of shareholder offered by the OEIC holds further 
incentives in the form of rights and advantages. They are no longer mere investors. Shareholder 
is the natural or legal person who owns shares in a company that allows him to have a share in 
the profits and the loss proportionate to its participation. In addition to attributing this person 
voting rights and a level of control. This definition is linguistic, provided in language and 
business dictionaries. As for the definition of a shareholder in legal texts we take for example, 
EU Shareholders Rights Directive (2007/36) provided a definition that refers the identification 
to the discretion of Member States22. Therefore no harmonized definition. As this directive does 
not aim at creating new substantive right for shareholders rather improving the voting process. It 
was the MS wish to make straightforward referral to national rules instead of taking the exact 
wording of the Transparency Directive (2004/109). OEIC shareholders’ are seen in the light of 
this directive as long-term shareholders. They see a common value on a long-term basis and 
they do not merely investment for short-term profits23. OEIC is a vehicle that offers particularly 
retail investors the chance to access the market and maximize their long-term wealth. Therefore, 
the directive favors the communication between the company and its shareholders to enforce 
their long-term engagement in the company24. The TD provides a harmonized definition25. The 
harmonization under the TD was necessary in order to avoid differences between different 
                                                          
22 Article 2 (b) Shareholders Rights Dir. 2007/36 
23 Be oit Le ou t, L A tio ai e de Lo g Te e, Nou elle Notio  Eu op e e  i  Dossie  : Réflexions Collective sur 
la Nou elle Di e ti e D oits des A tio ai es    ‘e ue des “o i t s p. ; si ila  to the o ept of 
responsible investor that tend to be committed on a long-term basisand loyal to the companies he/she invests in; 
Steve Lydenberg, ‘espo si le I esto : Who the  a e, What the  Wa t     Jou al of Applied Co po ate 
Finance p. 44 
24 Pat i k Ba a , L Ide tifi atio  des A tio ai es  i  Dossie  : Réflexions Collective sur la Nouvelle Directive 
D oits des A tio ai es  017) 12 Revue des Sociétés 678 
25 Article 2.1 (e) TD 
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domestic rules in MS, further to hinder regulatory arbitrage. Defining the term shareholder asks 
a question on whether or not the term investor may be used as a synonym. Shareholders are in 
fact investors. Nonetheless, they hold rights and have an incentive that differs than other 
investors. Shareholders care about the rights and powers attributed by this character. Investors 
are seen more or less as creditors whose interest in the shares is the enrichment it brings and 
they neglect the power the shares may hold. The main difference between both characters is 
made in company rules. These rules attribute rights and impose obligations merely on those 
holding the character of shareholder. A certain level of protection is also provided for 
shareholders that in most cases does not extend to investors and vice versa. Notably we mention 
the prohibition of lion clauses and the intangibility of voting rights they provide a level of 
fidelity to the character of shareholders that otherwise a general investor cannot enjoy26. Both 
shareholders and investors are stakeholders in the company’s performance, being profitable or 
not. Nonetheless, this general categorization does not put both on equal footings before the 
governing legal rules. This thesis focuses on shareholders and not the other remaining 
categories of stakeholders.  
08 Codification of CIS. CIS in its early days did not have a proper regulatory framework. 
Over the years, its regulation became a necessity and a national objective. The first common 
fund dates back to 1924. MFS Investment Management created it in Boston. In the US, the 
codification of the CIS began in 1933 with the issuing of the Securities Act that regulated the 
registration and public offering of new securities including units of funds. Later in 1935 with 
the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission by the Securities and Exchange Act. 
Completed in 1940 with the Investment Company Act that laid down the industrial structure for 
mutual funds (it is the term used by the US legislature to refer to open-end investment 
companies).  In France, CIS dates back to 1945 where the closed-end investment companies 
(SICAF) was created legally. The key date for CIS in France is 1957. Where a law was issued 
introducing the legal structure of the most well-known form of CIS in France the open-end 
investment company known as SICAV. The actual application of the law and the authorization 
for the incorporation of SICAV was made in 1963 and for the common funds in 1969. At EU 
                                                          
26 François-Xa ie  Lu as, Les A tio ai es O t-Ils Tous La Qualité D'associé ? Brefs Propos Discursifs Autour Du 
Thème De L'associé Et De L'i estisseu    ‘e ue de D oit Ba ai e et Fi a ie  p.  
 
7 Introduction 
level, Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) form the main 
framework covering CIS that are suitable for retail investors. They are investment funds 
regulated at the Union level. UCITS created a safe and transparent investment environment. 
Professional and retail investors consider the label. This label provides one of the highest 
standards in asset management industry. The investment fund structure in Europe dates back to 
the 19th century, although the first attempt to regulate investment funds at a European level was 
in the 80s27. This attempt was represented through the adoption of the Directive 1985/611/EEC. 
This directive created the label UCITS. The aim of this directive was to facilitate the UCITS 
distribution across Member States while ensuring a significant level of investor protection. The 
facilitation was addressed through exporting UCITS from their home country to other MS under 
a single authorization system. Being an EU MS the French legislature transposed the directives 
adopted on EU level. The label UCITS was entered for the first time into the French national 
securities rules in 1988. The following year 1989 witnessed the creation of management 
companies.  
09 Codification in Jordan. The introduction and codification of CIS -or what is 
domestically referred to as the Collective Investment Project- into the Jordanian legal system 
dates back to 1989 (company code no. 1 of 1989). However, in 1997 some Jordanian 
commercial legislation witnessed major reform. This reform was embodied in simultaneously 
issuing a new Securities Law (no. 23 of the year 1997) and Company Code (no. 22 of 1997, in 
force until this day). The newly issued Securities Law defined the concept of ‘Investment 
Company’ and distinguished this type of Company from a Financial Services one. The 
definition laid down a framework for the IC that is similar to the currently existing one. In a 
similar manner, the then newly implemented Company Code defined an IC as a public limited 
company, whose sole objective is collective investment in securities28. Until this day, the 
definition did not undergo any amendments or replacement. The company code nonetheless 
underwent several amendments from 2002 to 2010 including the key regulatory reform that 
introduced and for the first time private shareholding companies. In 1999 Jordanian legislature 
took a step forward, and implemented a Collective Investment Regulation (No. 1 for the year 
                                                          
27 Iris Chiu, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation (Kluwer Law International 2008) 1 
28 Article 209.a JCC  
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1999),  issued for the sole purpose of providing explanations and further codification for CIS 
related matters. Jordanian securities legislation went through a major reform in 2002, which 
resulted in amending the existing law of 1997 (amending law no. 55 of 2002) that was annulled 
by a then newly issued temporary law replacing the formerly applicable Securities Law no. 76 
of 2002. This amending law changed the structure of the previous code and introduced more 
applicable, but insufficient rules that govern the IC. This temporary law remained applicable 
fifteen years without the approval of the parliament to become fully enacted positive law.  
10 CIS and economic crisis. Since the beginning of the codification of the CIS, the 
governing regulations were considered effective and thorough in comparison with other existing 
regulatory frameworks on financial markets. Nonetheless, during the latest global economic 
crisis of 2008, CIS as other financial and investment vehicles suffered a sum of the globally 
occurred damages. Investor confidence in the financial market deteriorated. To restore this 
confidence and provide higher level of investor protection particularly for retail investors, 
regulatory reforms were performed nationally and regionally to remedy occurring damages and 
foresee future potential risks. Regulatory frameworks addressing portfolio investments in all its 
forms witnessed major changes and amendments. The most noticeable amendments were the 
implementation of the Dodd Frank Act, also known as the ‘Consumer Protection Act’ in the 
United States.  The regulatory framework around UCITS investment products has been updated 
over time since its implantation with five directives and today is one of the most advanced 
frameworks for funds regulation. Simple structure and compliance with international regulatory 
standards have made UCITS successful in the investment fund industry, particularly among 
fund providers and institutional clients29. The most noticeable amendment on an EU level, post 
economic crisis, is Directive 2009/65 replacing the former UCITS directive 85/611. In addition 
to the latest Directive 2014/91 amending directive 2009/65. Following these European changes, 
French rules witnessed a wave of reform particularly the French Financial Market Authority’s 
(AMF) General Regulation in addition to the French Code de Commerce and the financial and 
monetary code to cope with the changes introduced by the newly adopted EU Directives. The 
Jordanian legislature was a little bit late in taking legislative amending measures. Two thousand 
                                                          
29 Diego Valia te, Eu ope U tapped Capital Ma ket: Rethinking Financial Integration Afte  the C isis  EU Capital 




and seventeen was the year of regulatory reforms for securities market. The Securities Law 
underwent a recent major amendment. A permanent law replaced the temporary law in 2017. 
The law today addresses directly the IC in a separate section as proposed the amending bill 
prepared by the Jordanian Securities Commission in 2010. It provides this company with a clear 
definition directly linking it to the governing rules in the company code. Another attempt was 
taken in the same year; an amending bill for the company code was put in place to reform 
particular contents and introduce for the first time the concept of corporate governance as a 
legal obligation into the code. The reform does not address the legal texts governing the IC. 
Corporate governance occupied a large portion of the regulatory reform, taking place in 2017, 
following the doctrinal work that considered one of the main reasons of the crisis is weak 
corporate governance mechanisms. A corporate governance regulation was issued for listed 
companies. Prior to this regulation corporate governance was not seen as a legal obligation. It 
was optional.  
11 Legal question. In the general theory of company law, social interest of the company 
prevails over the individual interest of its shareholders. In the scope of CIS and particularly the 
IC, the vehicle is expected to act in the best interest of its shareholders or unitholders and 
protect their interest, therefore, diverting from a globally accepted standard. This thesis aims to 
look further into this diversion and provide a better understanding to the applicability 
mechanism of such obligation. The scope of the studied applicability is the Jordanian IC legal 
framework. Therefore, this thesis asks the following key question: How is shareholders’ interest 
protected in Open-End Investment Companies?  
12 Research methodology. IC offers interests and benefits differing in risk incurred by 
shareholders emerging out of listing shares on regulated markets. Answering this question 
within the framework of a developing country with a relatively small economy requires 
understanding to which extent OEIC fulfill their obligations to achieve the aimed for investor 
protection. Two key questions pave the way to answering the main question this thesis petition. 
What is shareholders’ interest? In addition, where is it found? By understanding the localization 
and the essence of the interest, the protection mechanism avails. At first glance, the protection 
mechanism may hold three options. Firstly, be in place and satisfactory therefore no regulatory 
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reform or amendments are necessary. Secondly, inexistent meaning a regulatory reform is 
necessary to introduce the most appropriate level of investor protection. Alternatively, 
insufficient meaning having an investor protection plan in place yet, not coping with investors’ 
financial needs. Therefore, amendments should take place in the portfolio investment regulatory 
framework. Where they explore higher level of investor protection without incurring companies 
and other participants excessive operational costs and expenses that divert the reform from its 
initial purpose of balancing the double pans of the scale.  
13 Attaching shareholders’ protection under one of the previous options requires assessing 
the existing legislative framework governing the IC in Jordan. Therefore, this thesis follows the 
concept of regulatory quality. Meaning assessing the quality of regulations across a specific 
field of activity within a country. Requires analytical work concerning the given regulation, two 
approaches for the analytical work exists: direct and indirect. Direct analysis of existing 
outcome indicators on a comparative basis. Meaning having a previously assessed regulation. 
Indirect analysis through the assessment of the quality of regulatory management practices in 
relation to a range of principles of regulatory quality based on the work of regulatory 
reformers30. This thesis follows the indirect approach in deciding whether the regulatory 
framework is proportionate in the sense that it provides a response to the problem with 
minimum compliance burden. Is it effective in solving the problem and achieving the goals of 
the regulation at low cost? Studies the consistency of the different regulations, the flexibility 
and improvements of the regulation, its transparency and accessibility. Furthermore, is the 
regulation understandable and promotes an accountable environment responsive to 
shareholders’ needs, in addition to the enforceability of the regulation. Responding thoroughly 
to the questions we decided to conduct a legal assessment of the Jordanian regulatory 
framework in light of strongly established model of portfolio investment. The choice of 
reference model was made based on historical background and the influence of the corner stone 
country of civil law system, over the Jordanian legal structure. Therefore, the choice fell on the 
French model.  
                                                          
30 Ja o zo e, “., C. Choi a d C. Miguet , I di ato s of ‘egulato  Ma age e t “ ste s , OECD Wo ki g 
Papers on Public Governance, No. 4, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/112082475604  Page 8 
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14 Historical relationship. The historical relationship between Jordanian and French laws 
dates back to 1850. The influence French rules have on the current Jordanian legislative 
structure is attributable to the initial transposition of French commercial and company rules 
when Jordanian commercial rules were constructed. The transposition of French rules began 
with the Ottoman Empire. In 1850, the empire adopted a commercial law transposing the 
Napoleon Code31. This law was implemented in Arabic countries –including Jordan- falling 
under the empire’s power. The independence movements following the disappearance of the 
empire and the end of French and British mandates induced the adoption of new commercial 
laws inspired by French laws. Other Arabic countries such as Lebanon, Egypt and Syria were 
faster in the adoption of new commercial law. They directly transplanted the Napoleon code 
into a national one. Unlike these countries, the Jordanian legislature remained silent and the 
Ottoman commercial law remained in force until a reforming movement took place in 1966. 
The newly implemented law referred to both Syrian and Lebanese laws as reference models, 
which were, in their turn, influenced by French law. The adoption of a separate company law 
was based on the French inspired commercial law. Being a member of the EU referring to EU 
rules governing ICs is obligatory. Due to the influence, EU rules have on the currently existing 
portfolio investment model in France. French rules regulating portfolio investments are 
stemmed out of the EU adopted rules. The assessment aims to transpose the most effective and 
appropriate rules and theories introduced in the reference model into the Jordanian one while 
learning from the lessons of previously implemented programs in ensuring their optimal 
implementation in the Jordanian context and averting problems hindering their perfect 
execution. This research is oriented towards OEICs that are financially stable, holding a 
financial standing and not suffering any difficulties. Therefore, the research does not address 
companies in liquidation or in any form of financial difficulties. Furthermore, this research does 
not address taxation issues related to CIS returns.  
15 Plan. To perform a thorough assessment of the state of the world of the Jordanian OEIC 
regulatory framework in the light of shareholders’ interests; we had to first locate the interest of 
shareholders. The interest is born with the incorporation of the company and remains active 
throughout the legal existence of the company. The scope of the interest is wide and in order to 
                                                          
31 Fawzi Sami, Sharah Qanon Tijari (Vol 1, Dar Thakafeh 2008) page 23 
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safeguard it; protective measures should be put in place starting from the incorporation. 
Therefore, this research is divided into two main parts. The first part addresses the interest 
during the incorporation of the company up until the beginning of the performance of activities. 
The part asks questions as follows: what is the legal form of the IC? How can the choice of the 
legal form be a source of shareholders’ protection? What form of prior performance control 
does the capital market and the securities authority have? In answering these questions this part 
was divided into two main titles the first addressing prior incorporation requirements. Meaning 
the legally imposed conditions that give birth to an OEIC. These conditions generally include 
organizational and financial services related conditions. Inter alia questions of corporate 
governance, management structure, management liability and remuneration policies. The 
second title addresses post-incorporation requirements. The legal conditions that should be 
adhered to once the OEIC becomes a legal person. Therefore, adhering to market conditions in 
addition to defining its internal conduct mechanism whether auto-managed or it chooses to 
appoint an MC.  
The second part addresses the interest throughout the performance of company’s 
activities. This part calls for questions including where is the interest found and how can it be 
protected? Who is the main body responsible for maintaining the necessary level of protection? 
Do shareholders have a direct role in protecting their interests? Therefore, this part was divided 
into two titles. First addressing the external control and supervision exercised over the activities 
of the IC. It identifies the competent authority and its supervisory mechanism. Second title 
addressing the internal control companies exercise over their proper activities. Whether the 
control is exercised indirectly through complying with legally imposed obligations. 
Alternatively, direct control through private enforcement actions exercised by shareholders and 
auto internal control of the company through audit and compliance functions.  
Part I: Structuring a Pro-Shareholder Investment Company: A Balanced and Protective Legal 
Structure 
Part II: Controlling the Performance of Investment Companies: Continuous or One Time 




Part I: Structuring a Pro-Shareholder Investment Company: A Balanced 
and Protective Legal Structure 
16 CIS. Collective Investment Schemes offer a means for ordinary non professional 
individuals to invest on stock exchange, gain potentially good returns on their investments and 
beat inflation32. The CIS is often described as an investment method that allows several 
individuals to pool in their money into a portfolio. This pooling leads to a diversification in risks 
and loss. CIS enables smaller investors to gain exposure to the financial markets, which they 
would otherwise be precluded from accessing in their individual capacity. Investors can choose 
from three basic legal structures to CIS33. Corporate form (CIS is a company that trades its 
shares in securities and investors hold the character of shareholders). Trust form (CIS is a trust 
in accordance with the concept of common law and investors are beneficiaries) and contractual 
form (CIS is a contract entered into between the investment manager and the final investors in 
return for units)34. The focus of this thesis is the corporate form of CIS.  
17 Notion of company. Several general theories in legal doctrine address the notion of the 
company and its creation. The theories are divided into classical and modern35. Companies are 
best understood as the intersection of different things rather than a single thing. The 
organization and governance of the company are influenced by the surrounding economic, 
social and regulatory factors. The governance and structure should respond to the increasing 
complexity and dynamism of the market the company inhabits.  
18 Contractual theory. The most globally known classical theory addressing the company is 
the contractual one. This theory address the company as a contract entered into between 
shareholders, in accordance with the general theory of contracts addressed in the civil code. 
This theory since its appearance was not stable. The application of this theory avails in terms of 
                                                          
32 F“B, Colle ti e I est e t “ he es   < 
https://www.fsb.co.za/feedback/Documents/Collective%20Investment%20Schemes.pdf > Accessed 27 July 2017 
33 John K. Thompson and Sang-Mok Choi, Governance Systems for Collective Investment Schemes: Schemes in OECD 
Countries (Occasional Paper No. 1 – OECD 2001) 
34 Classic forms of CIS introduced by the OECD countries 
35 Paul LeCannu and Bruno Dondero, Droit des Sociétés (6th ed, LGDJ 2014) page 67 
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companies’ under-incorporation, the companies with no personality and the group of 
companies. It cannot be applied in case of unipersonal companies. This theory requires the 
existence of two persons at the incorporation. The criticism connected to this theory relates to 
the surrounding factors to the functioning of the company and statutory rules36. Companies 
follow the rule of majority. The possibility to impose decisions on minority shareholders 
through modifications of the statutes by company’s majority voting. Nonetheless, the company 
as a contract can be regulated like other forms of contracts (sale or lease). The legal rules 
interfere with their particular substance to impose minimum requirements or obligations that 
influence the freedom to contract. These regulations in most cases give more power and 
discretion to the management to operate the company rather than laying the power with the 
hands of shareholders37. This theory is supported by civil law doctrine.  
19 Institutional theory. Another classical theory emerged as a counter reaction to the former 
theory and influenced by German law. It identifies the company as an organization that justifies 
the will and object to create an institution; it further justifies the rule of majority in terms of the 
internal control, management and representation38. This theory was criticized on legal technical 
grounds. The notion of the sustainability of the institution cannot be imposed on shareholders as 
they can at any time decide to dissolve the partnership and liquidate the company.  
20 Positive law perspective. The legislatures do not necessarily take one side or the other 
between the classical theories. For example, the French legislature was neutral and shifted 
between the two theories in the definition of the company provided under civil code39. The 
French jurisprudence further supported this approach through producing decisions at one hand 
supporting the institutional theory and others supporting the contractual one40. The company in 
France is created as a contract and acts as an institution. It is neither a pure contract nor a pure 
                                                          
36 Au lie  Ba d , La Notio  de “o i t   septe e  < https://aurelienbamde.com/2016/09/27/la-
notion-de-societe/ > Accessed 10 april 2018 
37 Passive shareholders may be a counter argument to this statement. In some cases investors look for an entity to 
invest without the will to participate in the social life of the company such as the cases of the contributions in 
Public Limited Companies 
38 Edmond-Eugène Thaller, Traité élémentaire de Droit Commercial (3rd ed, 1904) ; Mau i e Hau iou, L I stitutio  
et le D oit “tatutai e    ‘ ueil de L gislatio  de Toulouse p.  
39 C. civ., art. 1832 
40 CA Paris, 26 mars 1966; Cass. 1er Civ., 15 juill. 1999, n° 97-13.303 
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institution. The company is an entity within which coexists contractual rules and intuitional 
ones. As for the Jordanian legislature, the approach was more pro-contractual. The Jordanian 
Civil Code defined the company as a contract41. The consequential relations and outcomes 
resulting out of its creation are governed by the theory of contracts.  
21 Modern theories. Legal doctrine continued the research for another inclusive theory of 
the company. A new notion was introduced called ‘contract-organization’42. This notion 
addresses the originality of company’s contract as it does not create reciprocate obligations. The 
company is a contract that has as its main aim the organization of an economic activity. Later in 
legal research, the progress of notions such as corporate governance and the economic analysis 
of law favored theories such the agency theory that considers the management and the 
shareholders as having a contractual link based on the agency concept. This notion does not 
directly address the nature of the company as a contract or institution. Rather it addresses post-
creation relations resulting out of the establishing of the company. The most favorable example 
of the application of this theory is portfolio investment vehicles. They act in the interest of their 
different investors in the process of investment optimization. The management is expected to 
present the best performance and create value. This theory is one of the most theories referred to 
in our research throughout this part.   
22 Reason for creation. Why do individuals desire the creation of the company? The answer 
is the advantages resulting out of this creation. These advantages may be legal (the creation of 
separate financial patrimony of the company than that of the shareholders), economic and 
financial (maximizing capital without the need to seek loans and limiting the financial burden to 
percentage of participation), fiscal (depending on the fiscal policy of the country of 
incorporation) or social (particularly the management of the company having the right to access 
social security benefits)43. The choice of this research is the open-end company. Open-end 
financial institutions allow the investment in various portfolios in order to diversify the risk over 
participating investors in addition to minimizing the chance of the investors missing their 
                                                          
41 Article 582 Jo. Civil Code  
42 Paul Didie , Le Co se te e t “a s l E ha ge : Co t at de “o i t    ‘e ue de Ju isp ude e 
commerciale p. 74 
43 Deen Gibirila, Droit des Sociétés (5th ed, Ellipses 2015) pages 21 and 22 
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investment44. The variability characteristic of the capital of the corporate form of CIS offers 
options to shareholders that are usually not available under the standard forms of Public Limited 
Companies. One key characteristic when creating a company is the interest mainly financial 
interest. The objective of the shareholders is maximizing their wealth with minimum risk and 
loss rates. 
23 Plan. Throughout this part, we address the interest of shareholders beginning with its 
legal birth. The incorporation of the corporate form of CIS requires following a nationally set 
incorporation process designated by the law of its home country. The incorporation takes two 
steps. The first step is the initial registration (Title one). Two main forms of registration one 
with the company controller of its country of choice (Chapter 1) and the other with the 
competent securities commission (Chapter 2). The second step relates to the operation of the 
company and the means through which investors contributions are made (Title two). Therefore, 
addressing financial market requirements (Chapter 1) and the daily operation of the company 
(Chapter 2).  
  
                                                          
44 Edward Davis and John Pointon, An Introduction to Corporate Finance: Finance and the Firm (OUP 1994) Page 
100 
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Title One: Prior Establishment Requirements: What Shareholders Need to 
Know when Incorporating a Company 
24 Incorporation. Individuals that decide to establish a company adhere to a list of 
regulatory requirements and complete the registration formalities stated by law. The formalities 
are legal procedures that give birth to a juridical person. Consequently, the company is granted a 
moral personality. This personality allows the company to act, own, dispute and perform its 
objective be it civil or commercial. It offers the company the protection of their name, domicile, 
reputation and correspondences nonetheless; it does not offer the company the right to a private 
life as physical persons do45. The personality is complemented with a separate financial 
patrimony from that of its shareholders. Companies depending on the activities they exercise 
may be required to obtain further approvals or authorization of authorities other than the 
company controller departments.  
25 Personality of Investment Companies. Investment Companies are generally incorporated 
in the same manner, and following a similar form and procedure to that of other Plc. They also 
have access to capital markets and can offer their shares for sale to the public through a 
recognized stock exchange. They can also issue advertisements offering any of their securities 
for sale46. Having particular financial activities provide these companies with more structure 
related choices than other Plc. They are also required to obtain a prior initial approval from 
competent securities authorities ahead of registering at the company controller department47. 
ICs and other financial services providers before commencing their financial activities including 
among other things portfolio investment, issuing shares or investment management, are required 
to obtain a prior approval of the competent domestic securities authority. The approval 
requirement takes various forms depending on the applicable national rules. The requirement 
                                                          
45 Cass. 1re civ., 17 mars 2016, n° 15- . ; Xa ie  Dup  de Boulois, La Pe so e Mo ale, la Vie p i e et le 
‘ f , Cass. er civ., n° 15-14.072, RDLF, 2016, h o . ; Didie  Po a hia, U e “o i t  a pas u e Vie P i e , 
Cass. 1er civ., n° 15-14.072, Revue de Droit et Partrimoine, 2017 (268), p. 60 ; business name : Cass. com., 12 mars 
1985,n° 84-17.163; Cass. com., 12 févr. 2002, n° 00-11.602, domicile : Cass. crim., 23 mai 1995, n°94-81.141, 
correspondances : Cass. crim., 26 oct. 1967, n° 66-92.255 and reputation: Cass. crim., 12 oct. 1976, n° 75-
90.239; Cass. 2e Civ., 5 mai 1993, Bull. II n°167 
46 PLC – Pu li  Li ited o pa  I o po atio  <http://www.fletcherkennedy.com/plc.html> Accessed 17 
November 2015 
47 Article 98 JSL of 2017 
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might be a mere registration (such as the registration at the SEC)48, an authorization (such as the 
case of choosing a MS in the EU)49, or a license (the case of incorporating in Jordan)50. The 
following two chapters address the incorporation process of the IC in two stages. Firstly, 
registration at the company controller (chapter 1) and secondly fulfilling the securities related 
requirements (chapter 2).  
                                                          
48 Section 8 (a) Investment Company Act of 1940 
49 Article 5 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
50 Article 3 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 3 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
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Chapter 1: Organizational Requirements 
26 Corporation. The corporation is a legal framework by which individuals conduct 
business in a more modern and structured manner51. A convenient legal entity enters into 
contracts, owns property, and may be a party in legal disputes. The corporation differs in size; 
from a publicly held one to a one-person business. Considered a creature of law (legal 
construct)52.  
27 Role of Corporation. Corporations enable their participants and components to practice 
their freedom of choice and contract, in addition to customize the structure of their 
relationships. The structure is based on a statutory framework addressed under domestic legal 
rules and judicial norms.  
28 Necessity of organizational form. There is a legal perception that states that, for a 
business to be successful it requires the corporation mystique, meaning undertaking the 
corporate form. The core issue lays in the choice of the most appropriate organizational form 
that best suits the needs of the business and the interests of its components. The organizational 
form determines legal relationship, financial rights, responsibilities and liabilities. The 
organizational form adversely affects the corporation’s performance and is connected to 
conflicts of interest, corporate governance and fiduciary duties53. It commonly falls under the 
agency theory (looking at conflicts of interests between shareholders and members of 
management); it is clearly noticeable in the management structure of the corporation.  
29 Choice of organizational form. The choice is the first step in the incorporation process. 
Meaning, choosing the most appropriate organizational form. It is a multistep process. The first 
and most common step, legally addressed, is the initial domestic registration of the business as a 
legal entity under one of the structural forms provided in national norms54. This step constitutes 
of the legal incorporation of the business where the different initial participants choose the form 
                                                          
51 Do i i ue Te , Le M the de la Gou e a e  i  Jea -Ja ues A sault, Louis d A out et Ni olas Bi ti  eds , 
M la ges e  l’ho eu  du P ofesseu  Mi hel Ge ai  (LGDJ 2015) page 797 
52 Alan Palmiter, Corporation: Examples and Explanations,  (6thed, Wolters Kluwer 2009) page 3 
53 Alf ed Joseph Wa u to , The effe t of o ga izatio al fo  of fi  pe fo a e  DPhil thesis, U i e sit  of 
Michigan 2009) Page 4-5  
54 C. com., art. R. 210-1 
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they want to follow and as a result, they become shareholders enjoying rights and exercising 
duties. The business in our case the IC follows on to the second step that relates to the choice of 
another structure; the management body. The second step involves a list of conditions should be 
fulfilled within the timeframe provided in domestic rules.  
30 Opening. IC is a business established in a similar manner to that of other businesses, 
taking into consideration the particularity of the activities this Company exercises. It is 
domestically incorporated in its country of choice; it follows the form designated by national 
rules (to be further explained in Section A). Shareholders of the IC cannot directly run the 
Company; due to various reasons that relate to the form of incorporation, the activities it 
exercises and the notion of separation of ownership and control, therefore the Company assigns 
the management to a separate body (to be further addressed in Section B). IC adheres later, as 
part of its organizational steps, to special financial procedures that relate to its activities.  
Section A: Incorporation Requirements: Founding an Investment Company 
31 The term Incorporation describes the process of structuring a new business that 
consequently becomes a recognized entity or legal person under the law of incorporation55. 
Once created, this new legal entity is treated separately from its components, potentially 
reducing the liability of the business’s shareholders while gaining at the same time other 
benefits that could help the business grow and thrive long term56. When the IC is the place of 
concern, the governing legal rules require as part of the incorporation process the registration of 
IC at national companies’ registry of its country of incorporation57. 
32 Definition of Public Limited Company. Domestic legislations stipulate that when an IC 
is incorporated, it take the form of a Public Limited Company. These legislations include but are 
                                                          
55 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th edn, Merriam-Webster Mass Market 2004) 
56 Ma k Ha es, You I . The Be efits a d Costs of I o po ati g ou  Busi ess   De e e   
<https://www.shopify.com/blog/7037600-you-inc-the-benefits-costs-of-incorporating-your-business> Accessed 17 
November 2015 
57 Articles 7.h & 209.a JCC; C. com., art. L. 210-6; C. com., art. L. 228-10; USA: Registration with SEC is required 
under the Investment Company Act, Section 8(a) filing a notification for registration takes the form N-8A, within 
three months file a registration statement Section 8 (b) – Rule 8b-5 takes the form N-1A (mutual fund registration 
form) 
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not limited to French and Jordanian company related legal rules58. The reasoning behind this 
condition is found in the definition and the object of this form of company. Plc. is the company 
whose capital consists of shares owned by a number of founders who are liable for loses in that 
proportion of their shares’ theses shares are negotiated on regulated markets59. The objects of 
Plc. differ from one company to the other; nevertheless, one of its most common objects is 
providing financial services. To be further illustrated later on in this work the object of the IC. 
As it falls under the scope of financial services.  
33 Plc. rules applicable to IC. The IC subject matter of this thesis formed a topic of major 
interest in various legal systems. Legislations when addressing this form of company took a 
short and convenient approach in generally applying the rules governing Plc. while introducing 
at the same time special rules that either exempt or produce some sort of leniency in the 
applicability of Plc. rules. The necessity of these alterations are traced back to the activity this 
company exercises comparing to other Plc. The alterations form the scope of application of the 
general rules over the IC. This Section and the following one will explain further this scope. 
34 Terminology. When referring to national laws that address the IC, it was noted that the 
Jordanian legislature faced an issue in using a single terminology to address this form of 
company. The Jordanian law provides various definitions to the IC; this difference broadened 
the scope of activity this Company is legally permitted to exercise. The IC was referred to under 
the former Securities Law of 2002 as both an IC60, and Collective Investment Company (CIC)61 
creating discrepancies in defining the applicable rules. Despite the difference in the 
terminology, the definitions of both terms are similar and can be applicable to the IC subject 
matter of this work. The new Securities Law of 2017 removed the term investment company 
and replaced it with the term CIC62; meanwhile proposing an identical definition to that 
mentioned in Company’s Law. The Collective Investment Regulation stipulated both terms (IC 
and CIC) and made the distinction between them. The Regulation linked the term CIC to the 
one mentioned under the JCC, further it addresses our Investment Company as CIC. As for the 
                                                          
58 Fawzi Sami, Sharikat Tijaryeh: Ahkam Ammah wa Khassah (Dar Thakafeh 2010) page 578 
59 Collins Dictionary of Business 2005, n (5); Article 90.a JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-1  
60Article 2 JSL of 2002; article 2 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
61Article 3 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; article 209 JCC 
62 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
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term IC, the Regulation connects it to the term defined by the former JSL of 2002. The 
definition the JSL of 2002 mentions provides objectives and purpose similar to those addressed 
in JCC. Prior to 2017, the law offered one of two solutions: the use of both terms when referring 
to the IC or applying the term Financial Services Company63, to the IC (as provided for in the 
JSL). For the purposes of this thesis, the term Investment Company shall be used and shall 
cover the different terminology used by the Jordanian Legislature64. This section illustrates the 
initial registration of the IC. The registration addresses first the formation pre-requirements 
(form and registration procedure) (Sub-section 1). Then it extensively explains the content of 
the Articles of Association (Sub-section 2).  
Sub-section 1: Formation of the Company 
35 Founding shareholders. The IC fulfills a set of general conditions as other forms of 
companies. It registers domestically at the competent company controller department of its 
country of choice. In order to have a complete initial registration the IC, among other things, 
chooses a legal form (from those introduced in the governing legal rules) and incorporation 
structure, provides the required information and documents, submits the incorporation 
application while at the same time meet the minimum number of founding shareholders set for 
companies with similar form. Founding shareholders also known as principal shareholders are 
those considered the initial owners of a company65. Usually they are the owners of the greatest 
percentages of company’s shares, and they hold the largest stake in company’s success and loss. 
Company rules impose a minimum number of founding shareholders (two shareholders) on all 
the legal forms the company may undertake, with an exception in particular cases to possible 
incorporation of a company with a sole shareholder. The French code de commerce designated a 
minimum number of founding shareholders that should not be less than seven for companies 
that trade their shares on regulated markets66. 
                                                          
63 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
64The French code de Commerce faced a similar issue when it introduced two mandatory forms for the 
incorporation of the Investment company (SICAV). This matter is further illustrated in the subsequent subsections 
when addressing the list of forms the IC can choose from at the moment of incorporation; C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-
7; C. com., art. L. 227-1 
65 Jo. Cass. Civ., 25 July 2000, n ° 470/1999 
66 C. com., art. L. 225-1 
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36 General vs special rule. The general rule for minimum number of founding shareholders 
in Plc. and subsequently the IC is having two shareholders unless the exception applies67. This 
general rule was later amended to correspond to the particularity of the IC; therefore, the 
applicable legal rules state a maximum ownership threshold and a minimum number of 
founding shareholders68. The amending rules linked the two thresholds together by requiring 
their coexistence at the moment of incorporation, further it limited the application of this 
content to banks and financial companies.  
37 Scope of Special rule. Two main issues rise in this regard; the first relates to the 
definition of the financial company and its applicability over IC. The Second issue relates to the 
possibility of distinguishing between a private and public company when referring to this 
threshold. Neither the JCC nor the Securities Law stipulate a definition for the financial 
company, the closest definition to a financial company found under the Securities Law is the 
Financial Services Company69 that may be applicable to IC. The lack of definition lays down 
two arguments; either the application of the thresholds after considering the IC a financial 
company or the non-application of the thresholds if it was assumed that the IC is not covered 
under this term.  The preferred and most acceptable argument is the one that includes the IC in 
the definition of the Financial Company. The reason behind this preference is traced back to the 
type of activities and purposes of this form of company and the similarities between them and 
those of the Banks. The second issue relating to the distinction between private and public 
company70. Generally, seen as the attempt of the Jordanian Legislature to limit the Plc. to its 
public form. This issue is closely linked to the different incorporation structures Plc. has such as 
being incorporated with or without an IPO, as this distinction is explicitly stipulated under the 
French law71. The obvious reasons behind laying down a minimum number of shareholders are 
similar in the different legislations; the particularity of the activities exercised by investment 
companies (portfolio investment and risk sharing). Pooling assets and diversifying the risk 
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Europe (Springer 2010) Page 96 
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24 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
requires a sum of assets that usually retail investors do not own individually therefore fulfilling 
the collectivity character. 
38 Plan. In order to comprehend fully the formation procedure of the IC, this sub-section is 
dedicated to the extensive analysis of the different available structural forms the IC may choose 
to undertake; while taking into consideration the different terms used to address this form of 
company (Paragraph 1). Further, this sub-section lays down the various stages of the initial 
registration process (Paragraph 2).  
§1: Choice of Structure 
39 Structure Options. The laws governing ICs provide a list of forms the IC may choose 
from when incorporated while permitting at certain levels the conversion from one form to the 
other72. The choices stated by law can be classified into two main categories one depending on 
the capital structure and the other depending on the offering of initial shares. When referring to 
the first category we note two main forms: the open-end and closed-end Investment 
Companies73. Nonetheless, a mixed structure can be further introduced; in which part of the 
capital is fixed and the other part is variable74. As for the second category, it includes the choice 
in offering Investment Companies’ shares through an Initial Public Offering (IPO)75 or that 
without an IPO76.  
40 Open-End Investment Company. The OEIC is an investment vehicle where its capital is 
variable fluctuates increasingly and decreasingly throughout the performance of the company 
without being restricted to legally required procedures; hence, it is constituted of a pool of funds 
collected from various investors for investing in securities. The managers of this company 
invest the collected capital in an attempt to produce capital gains and income for these investors 
at the same time, the company’s portfolio is structured and maintained to match the investment 
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objectives stated in the company’s prospectus77. These companies have no predetermined limit 
on size or membership and the shareholders have the right to redeem their shares anytime at 
their net asset value. 
41 Closed-end investment company. A publicly traded investment company raises a fixed 
amount of capital through an IPO78. Then it is structured, listed and traded like stock on a stock 
exchange79. This type of company has limited available shares. Further, it has set limits and 
generally, the entrance is limited to purchase from a present owner. Shareholders, unlike in 
open-end companies, do not have the right to force the company to redeem shares at their net 
asset value80. 
42 Incorporation with IPO. IPO is the first sale of stock by the company to the public81. 
This form of incorporation includes issuing securities (in the form of shares, bonds, or any other 
financial instruments) and allocating a threshold for subscription and a period for the 
underwriting by the public. In this form, the IC acquires two types of shareholders founding 
shareholders and shareholders by way of underwriting82. Both types of shareholders subscribe to 
the company yet following different manners. The founding shareholders subscribe to the 
company when fulfilling the incorporation requirements upon the registration at the company 
controller83. The shareholders by way of underwriting subscribe after the company issues an 
IPO. This difference does not generally affect the rights of shareholders connected to their 
shares; nonetheless, it grants the founding shareholders certain powers and competences up to 
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the moment when the underwriting period is over and the first General Assembly Meeting takes 
place84.  
43 Incorporation without IPO. In this form of incorporation, the company does not issue an 
IPO. The subscription to the issued shares is either performed privately by the founding 
shareholders85or a private offer is made targeting exclusive groups of investors86.The concept 
behind this form includes the case of raising capital without promoting the sale of shares to the 
public87. 
44 Different legislative perspectives. Despite the multiple options the different legislations 
provided for the legal form of ICs, this choice is slightly restricted by the legislatures. When 
referring to the French legislation we note that the French legislature addresses all the 
previously mentioned legal frameworks88. In the second book of the French Code de Commerce, 
the legislature explicitly distinguished between the Plc. (SA) that is established with an IPO and 
that established without an IPO. As for other legislations such as the EU regional UCITS 
Directive, it does not explicitly address the legal form the IC should take; this matter was left to 
be nationally determined by MS89. On the other hand, the Directive limited its scope of 
application to OEICs who raise their capital by promoting the sale of their shares to the public90. 
When we refer for example to the US legislation particularly to the Investment Company Act of 
1940 we note that a distinction is provided under Section 5.a, between the open-end (referred to 
as mutual funds) and closed-end investment companies.  
45 General Jordanian Perspective. The Jordanian legislature approached the legal form of 
the IC in a similar manner to that of other legislations with minor differences on certain levels. 
The JCC introduces the IC as a special form of Plc. The code provides two legal forms for the 
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85 C. com., art. L. 225-13 
86 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
87 Article 3.b UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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IC; it can be incorporated either as an open-end or closed-end company91. As for the other 
category provided by the French Code de Commerce (the incorporation with IPO), neither the 
JCC nor the JSL explicitly made a distinction between an IC incorporated with an IPO and that 
without an IPO. Nevertheless, when referring to the general rules governing the underwriting of 
Plc. shares stated in the JCC and those relating to the public offering addressed under the JSL, it 
can be deduced that an implicit restriction was imposed on Plc. when raising their capital. The 
restriction can be traced back to the second category (form of offering shares) of the suggested 
legal frameworks.  
46 Restrictions on raising capital. The Jordanian Securities Law defined the Public Offer as 
an offer for the sale of securities targeting more than thirty persons of the public; this offer 
includes both the public issuing and the initial public offering92. This definition is general to all 
the undertakings governed by the JSL. Yet the legislature in the law of 2002, when stipulating 
the applicable rules to the Investment Fund, introduced and for the first time two forms of offers 
for the sale of securities; the public and the private offer without further explanation or 
definition to the private offer93. The private offer is any offer that does not meet the conditions 
of the PO. Hence, the private offer is an offer for the sale of securities oriented towards a group 
of persons that do not exceed thirty94. The JCC further addresses issues relating to the threshold 
of underwriting. The subscription threshold was limited for founding shareholders to a restricted 
threshold, which cannot be exceeded. Two thresholds are addressed; one concerns banks and 
financial companies (the maximum permitted threshold is 50%) as for the other it generally 
concerns all the other Plc. with a maximum permitted threshold of 75 %95. The link between the 
threshold and the IPO is traced back to the remaining unsubscribed shares; they require future 
shareholders to underwrite them. The most obvious reasoning behind this threshold is connected 
to the duty to safeguard minority shareholders; the fact that the company is publicly traded 
proves the existence of more than one major shareholder. However, this restriction may be 
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derogated from if certain conditions are fulfilled; meaning to cover the remaining unsubscribed 
shares by the founding shareholders after the underwriting period is over96. 
47 Most appropriate form. It is noted that the different legislations have generally similar 
approaches when addressing the structural options of ICs, where the similarity is found more in 
the capital structure category rather than in the offering of initial shares. The capital structure 
category is addressed by all the previously referred to legislations. As for the second category it 
is approached differently, it has been noted that the French legislature was the only legislature 
to explicitly address this category and provide a distinction between the incorporation with or 
without an IPO in the Code de Commerce. In order to define the most appropriate form the IC 
should take and hence reform the JCC and JSL to meet this form; first, we note that the focus of 
this thesis is the OEIC. Therefore, from this point onward, the first category of the suggested 
structures will be viewed as having been concluded and no further argument will be presented. 
As for the second category, it is linked to the debate on whether or not the OEIC is considered 
as an issuer (later explained in title two of this part). The choice of whether or not an IC should 
be incorporated with an IPO was made relatively simple under the French and EU related legal 
provisions. The link between the French and the EU legislation is essential; due to the influence 
EU law, has on the domestic rules in its MS. French rules governing OEIC are stemmed from 
and coherent with the European regional UCITS directive97. As previously mentioned UCITS 
Directive limited its scope of application to open-end undertakings that offer their shares for 
public sale. The same scope exists in the French financial and monetary code98. This code 
introduces the OEIC, known as SICAV (Société d’ Investissement à Capital Variable), further it 
states that the shares of this company are subscribed to either by founding shareholders or by 
subscribers (shareholders by way of underwriting). It can be deduced from this statement that 
the SICAV under the French legislation; should be incorporated with an IPO. When referring to 
the Jordanian related legal provisions it was noted that the legislature’s approach to this 
structure, though it is implicit and similar to the French and European one, is the most 
appropriate form the OEIC can take. The reasoning is traced back to the purpose behind this 
type of company. The aim of this company is to invest in portfolios, therefore diversifying the 
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risk of shareholders. To fulfill this aim, the company cannot be limited at the time of 
incorporation to a small number of subscribers in order to pool the largest amount of assets and 
have rich financial resources. This statement is accurate only if this investment originally 
targeted retail investors and not professional ones. Hence, that brings us to the conclusion that 
the Jordanian legislature’s approach was in its place, while having in mind the later to be 
mentioned debates under which the OEIC is treated as an issuer. Nonetheless, it must be noted 
that more positive outcomes could come out of this approach for both the future incorporated 
OEICs and shareholders, if it is addressed explicitly under the rules governing OEICs and not 
the general rules applicable to all Plc. The structure chosen for the IC for the assessment 
introduced in this thesis is the OEIC that raises its capital publicly by offering its initial shares 
for sale. The choice of the structure alone is not enough; the structure should be realized through 
a formal registration of the company at its choice of domestic company registry.  
§2 : Domestic Registration 
48 National Company controller Department. The SICAV is the most widely spread vehicle 
to incorporate open-end funds in civil law countries, it may be public or private. The OEIC 
should be registered domestically at the company controller of its country of choice99. National 
company controllers prepare a special registry that includes the details of all the registered 
OEICs100. This form of registration is not limited to the OEIC, companies in general, despite 
their form, should register with the company controller101. The company controller or the 
relevant national authority in every country has a competence over the initial registration 
procedure102, briefly explained in this paragraph and later linked to the administrative 
supervision in part II. The governing legal rules address the registration obligation and the 
different stages of the registration procedure103.  
49 Registration application. The different legislations impose the registration obligation 
with general application requirements. Generally, the national legislations extensively point out 
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the content of the AOA and MOA in addition to the supplementary documents without 
mentioning the actual content of the registration application104. The governing legal rules 
merely mention a form that is provided for this purpose105. This application is linked to the 
AOA and MOA. The link is found in the legal rules addressing the supplementary documents, 
whereas both the AOA and MOA under the JCC should be joined in the submitted initial 
registration application106. The French Code de Commerce provided the same link107, as for the 
UCITS Directive no such reference is found, as we previously mentioned the Directive left all 
that concerns the initial registration of the company to the discretion of the MS. The application 
further relates to founding shareholders. These shareholders have prior registration 
responsibilities, including electing the founders committee, which supervises the incorporation 
of the company. The link between founding shareholders and registration can be traced back to 
the supplementary documents, as they should attach the minutes of meeting of the first GAM 
(of founding shareholders) to the application108. The supplementary documents should include 
the names of shareholders109; at this stage, they include one of the two forms of Shareholders 
meaning founding shareholders. Further, the documents include the name of the auditor the 
company chose for its incorporation period110. The founding shareholders sign the application 
once completed. Before the company controller, a notary or a licensed lawyer111. 
50 Result of application. Company controller exercises certain powers over the different 
stages of the initial registration. Part of this power is the decision it takes following the 
submitted registration application. Neither the Code de Commerce nor the Jordanian Company 
Code granted the company controller a direct competence to issue the final decision on the 
initial registration application. The Jordanian company controller files his recommendation of 
the complete and signed submitted application, within a set period of time, to the Minister of 
Industry and Commerce, whereas the later has the competence to decide whether to approve or 
refuse the registration of the company within the time limits designated by law. The failure to 
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issue the decision within the permitted period by the Minister, results into the automatic 
approval of the registration112. As for the French legislature, states that the clerk (Greffier) of 
the competent tribunal (Tribunal de Commerce) is the competent authority in deciding to 
approve or refuse the registration of the company at the company registry113.  
51 Company Controller powers114. The importance of the role of the Company Controller 
extends to post-registration period. Nonetheless, this role is limited in terms of the final step in 
the registration that is the approval or rejection of the incorporation. The JCC did not undermine 
the role of the Company Controller as solely the final decision is left to the Minister the review 
and recommendation of the application forms an integral part of the powers of the Company 
Controller. The Legislature went beyond the decision and provided the controller with powers 
that relate to the disclosure of information and record keeping. The disclosure addressed under 
the powers of the Company Controller relates to the discretion given to the department to 
disclose the information relating to the company except for those relating to the accounts and 
the financial statements115. Another power was granted to the Company Controller is the legal 
value attributed to the electronic copies of its issued documents, as it is linked to the 
responsibility to archive all related statements and documents of registered companies116. The 
company controller or the greffe is not considered the owner of the information they keep or 
collect117.  
52 Competent authority approving registration. The fact that the Company Controller 
Department merely reviews the initial registration applications then recommends the ones that 
fulfill all the required legal conditions, and holds the registry for the company is in a way 
limiting the powers of this department. The need for the Minister of Industry and commerce 
resolution to register a company such as the OEIC can be argued both positively and negatively. 
The downside of having such stage in the registration procedure may present the incorporation 
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procedure under the Jordanian legal system as long, time consuming, dependent and 
undermining of the competence of the individuals of the company controller department. On the 
other hand, interpreted positively for the investors to safeguard their interests in case the 
Company Controller may overlook certain non-mandatory requirements due to their minor 
influence. Hence this step is a form of supervision over the recommendation of the department 
and separate from the control exercised by the administrative courts. This power is bestowed on 
Company Controller in relation to the companies (in the form of private or public limited 
companies) that do not list their shares on regulated markets. The JSL of 2017 introduces new 
prior registration power to the JSC. A requirement that conditions the registration at the 
company controller to an initial written approval of the JSC118. This prior action provides a 
higher level of protection for future shareholders. In terms of the experience and expertise of the 
JSC’s staff in securities and financial market requirements and needs. Therefore, the IC 
undergoes a specialized preliminary examination ahead of creating its legal personality. Further, 
the law transferred the exercise of administrative and organization powers of the company 
controller mentioned under the JCC, to the JSC119. The council of JSC exercises the powers of 
the Minister and the director of the Council exercises the powers of the company controller. In 
this regard, the approval and refusal of the initial registration application remains with the 
Minister, as it does not form part of the organizational and supervisory functions.  
53 Argument more pro-shareholder. The option provided by the French legislature sounds 
more acceptable than the Jordanian general one. Involving the judicial authority in the 
incorporation steps of the company provides more confidence in the registration decision; 
nonetheless, this is merely an administrative stage. It raises the same concerns previously 
mentioned of having a longer incorporation process. If the procedure stated under the JCC is 
maintained, while taking into consideration the short time limits in issuing the decision imposed 
by the JCC, the argument relating to the length of the process may be put aside. The reason 
relates to the auto-registration in the case of no-response by the Minister of Industry and Trade 
within the set period, therefore making the maximum period to issue a decision of incorporation 
sixty days120. This exception defies the non-competence and supervision arguments; hence, the 
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necessity for the Minister’s resolution is irrelevant as the legislature moves in circles to state 
implicitly the importance of the Company Controller’s recommendation. Within the scope of 
the new power attributed to the JSC, the role of the company controller is quasi in existing later 
on in the life of the IC. This approach is positive in terms of having an extended supervisory 
power of the JSC. The activities the IC exercises requires such extension. Yet, transferring the 
powers can be negative as it puts the entire registration and later license with the JSC where no 
time limit is introduced for their written approval.  
54 Overview. The OEIC is incorporated under the Jordanian Law as a Plc. with an IPO. It 
should have a minimum number of founding shareholders who subscribe to its shares with a 
threshold not exceeding fifty percent of the initial capital. This Company should follow a two-
step incorporation process; the first step includes the choice of structure and the domestic 
registration in the company registry of its country of incorporation. As for the second step, it 
includes the registration in the relevant financial market. To cover all the bases of the initial 
incorporation (the first step), the content of the registration application should be further 
explained. Therefore, the following sub-section 2 exhaustively address the content of the AOA.   
Sub-section 2: Content of Articles of Association 
55 Definition AOA. The AOA is a document that specifies the regulations for companies’ 
operations. Its main role is allowing the constitution of the company121. AOA defines the 
company's purpose and lays out how tasks are accomplished within the organization, including 
the process for appointing directors and how financial records should be handled. A definition 
stemmed out of the legal rules designating the content of the AOA. The AOA is the internal 
rulebook that every incorporated organization acquires and adheres to. It is a future contract 
entered into between members of the company (shareholders) and company’s future 
management in addition to being an actual contract between the members themselves. The AOA 
sets out the rights and duties of both members of management and shareholders, individually or 
in meetings, certain statutory clauses in addition to other clauses chosen by shareholders to draft 
the bylaw of the company122. The AOA may be limited in content to the minimum possible. 
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Professionals to restrain as possible the statutory modifications requiring a GAM, seek this 
approach.   
56 Definition of MOA. The Memorandum of Association is the charter or the statute of the 
company; it contains all the fundamental information of the company including defining the 
object of the company. The MOA is considered a contract between the company and third party. 
It must be drawn up at the incorporation. In some legislation, it constitutes part of the official 
documents attached to the initial registration application123.  
57 Difference between AOA and MOA. Both documents are supplementary to each other 
and inter-link; nevertheless, there is a difference between them. In most cases where there is 
ambiguity or silence on the part of the MOA, the AOA interferes to explain or supplement the 
MOA124. The basis for comparison between the two documents generally relates to the meaning 
(content), importance (mandatory or not), regulation (nature) and alteration. The MOA contains 
all the fundamental information required for the incorporation of the company, including the 
powers and the object of the company, as for the AOA, it contains all the rules and regulations 
governing the company (internal administration, the procedures to achieve the object). Both 
documents are important and mandatory when a Plc. is concerned, yet the MOA has a primary 
importance and the AOA has a secondary one. The MOA defines the relation of the company 
with the rights of its members, also establishes the relationship of the company with the 
members. The AOA is more of a procedural document that defines the relation between the 
members themselves. In terms of alteration the MOA can only be altered in strict manner 
requiring special resolution and prior approvals, the AOA requires merely a special resolution 
that can be made during a GAM125. 
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58 Jordanian Law Perspective. The Jordanian Law addresses both documents the Articles 
and Memorandum of Association. The difference between these documents is invisible under 
the JCC. The Legislature put both in the same level in terms of their legal value, content and 
importance126. The alteration of either of the two documents requires a resolution made in an 
Extraordinary General Assembly Meeting127. Building on the indifference between the AOA 
and MOA stipulated in the JCC, whenever the term AOA is addressed in the current Sub-
Section or elsewhere in this paper; the term shall refer to the constitution of the company and 
shall consist of both documents.  
59 Shareholders Agreement. Shareholders may decide on a set of ground rules over and 
above the basic legislation that will govern their behavior128. A Shareholders’ agreement might 
then be in place, therefore, it is considered a private contract, or a simple partnership entered 
into between different shareholders containing the rules relating to managing and owning the 
company129. Shareholders’ Agreements closely relate to company’s AOA. All companies have 
AOA but companies are not legally required to have a Shareholders’ Agreement. This form of 
agreement is based on the freedom to contract130. The question that rises in this regard: what is 
the legal value of shareholders agreement? Does it coexist with the AOA? Shareholders 
Agreement is a contract entered into between shareholders not necessarily including the entirety 
of the assembly131. In most cases the content of which is not reported to the Company 
Controller. Therefore this contract is a private discreet agreement, generally relate to the sale 
and purchase of shares, the distribution of profits, share dilution (may contain an anti-dilution 
clause). The content of this agreement confirms with the law, AOA and the common interest of 
the different components of the company. The existence of a shareholders’ agreement may be 
beneficial. Providing shareholders with further protection in terms of containing more details 
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than those mentioned in the AOA. Protecting minority shareholders from the behaviors of 
majority shareholders132 (restrict powers of directors and majority shareholders’ harmful 
decisions cannot be forced) further to minimizing any potential business disputes133. 
Shareholders’ agreements generally remain private and confidential, they are not open to the 
public as the AOA, and therefore the co-existence may not be an issue. Shareholders should 
stipulate all the rules regulating the relation between them in the AOA without having to refer to 
any extra outsider agreement that may reflect a bad faith on their part. The French law permits 
this type of agreement and considers it as a simple contract governed by contract law rules in 
the civil code134. Further, the French law considers this agreement as having a lesser legal value 
than the statutory provisions (AOA)135. When this agreement pertains a listed company (such as 
the SICAV), the French Code de Commerce obliges the company to disclose this agreement to 
the AMF within five days following its execution136.This agreement is indefinite in duration and 
has binding effect solely among its signatories137. The question rising in this regard relates to 
the enforceability of this agreement towards third party. The general rule states that extra 
statutory agreements are obligatory inter partes138. Nonetheless, article 1199 of the French civil 
code limits this statement of obligatory nature of contracts towards its parties by stating the 
necessity of the neutrality of contracts towards voluntarily non-participating third party. 
Therefore, applying the principle of enforceability of contracts by the parties over third party139. 
The enforceability in this regard is interpreted based on the hypothesis of implicit acceptance of 
contracts. Therefore, the resulting liability of the breach of this contract is dealt with based on 
                                                          
132 The French company rules state that shareholders in publically traded companies may form associations to 
represent their interest within the company as long as they meet the set conditions including: (1) the shares have 
been registered for at least two years, (2) they hold at least 5% of the voting rights (C. com., art. L. 225-120) 
133 Jo atha  Lee,  ‘easo s h  Co pa ies should ha e a “ha eholde s Ag ee e t   Ma   
<http://www.jonathanlea.net/2013/8-reasons-why-companies-should-have-a-shareholders-agreement/> 
Accessed 7 December 2015 
134 C. civ., art. 1128 
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136 C. com., art. L. 233-11 
137 C. civ., art. 1103 
138 Cass. 1er civ., 15 nov. 1994, n° 92-18.981 
139 Cass. 1er civ., 12 oct. 2004, n° 01-03.213 
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tort rules and not contractual liability140. The Jordanian Law did not explicitly address this form 
of agreement, yet implicitly limited the regulating rules to the MOA and AOA, when the law 
required a registration formality to the AOA and MOA during the initial registration of the 
company in addition to the following modification of these documents141. 
60 Preparing AOA. Who is responsible for the preparation of the AOA? In the process of 
incorporation, the founding shareholders are responsible for the preparation of the AOA. The 
different legal rules stipulate this responsibility including the French code de Commerce142.To 
prepare the AOA the founding shareholders should follow the list of minimum contents stated 
in the governing legal rules. The list contains two forms of requirements to be included in the 
AOA; the general foundation conditions that are required by all companies despite the form 
they choose to undertake (Paragraph 1) and the special conditions that are customized to meet 
the particularity of the Investment Company (Paragraph 2).  
§1: Foundation Conditions: General Conditions of Investment Companies and Beyond 
61 General information. AOA is a document that forms the constitution of the company. 
The document introducing the initial rules structuring the consents of founding shareholders. As 
any constitution this document should contain a specific set of information that defines the 
different details of the company specially those relating to the operational process of the 
company’s daily course of work (differs from the internal policy). These details are essential to 
the incorporation and post-incorporation stages. In terms of being able to assess the financial 
standing of the company, its market history and its fitness for long-term investment goals. 
Furthermore, these details provide a clear view of the location of the company particularly, if 
the investments are performed outside its country of incorporation or the company being a 
foreigner in the investors’ home. Therefore, shareholders’ in this case can easily identify the 
geographical jurisdiction for their claims and challenges if such cases arise. The AOA contains 
among other things a set of general information that the applicable domestic rules require from 
all companies despite the form they choose to undertake. They include that information 
provided at the incorporation and stipulated specifically in the provisions of the domestic 
                                                          
140 Gaeta  Ma ai , L Opposa ilit  des Pa tes d A tio ai es    ‘e ue des “o i t s p.  
141 Article 7 JCC 
142 M. Andenas n (71) Page 65 
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company codes. The information relate to the commercial name of the company, shareholders 
details and ownership percentage, the term (duration) of the company, identifying the 
headquarters, the form of management, the signatories and possibility of having a language 
requirement143. 
62 Company name. Company name permits clients, third party and public to identify the 
company from the moment of its incorporation and throughout its existence; this name 
distinguishes one company from the other. The name referred to is the business name 
(Dénomination Sociale144) of the Plc. and subsequently the IC; it should include distinctive 
signs and derive from the objectives of the company. In some exceptional cases, the business 
name may include the name of one or more of the company’s founding shareholders, for 
example the case when the company’s main purpose is to invest in a patent145. When choosing 
the business name the companies should avoid using a name that is assigned to an incorporated 
company or similar thereto that might lead to confusion or be deceptive. Further, the name 
should not be chosen for fraudulent or illegal objectives146.  
63 Headquarter vs seat. The seat corresponds to the judicial domicile of the company. It is 
the place where the effective management and the functioning of the different organs of the 
company occur. The seat may differ from the place where the company exercises its activities. 
The necessity of a defined seat is traced back to identifying the competent court for the disputes 
in which the concerned company is involved. Further, the seat determines the nationality of the 
company and the applicable law147. Nevertheless, the Jordanian law used a different term to 
                                                          
143 Article 92.b JCC; C. com., art. L. 210-2  
144 The French Legislature made the distinction between two forms of names the company may be required to 
have. The first form is called the raison social and the other called denomination sociale. The difference between 
the two forms is found in the type of activity exercised by the company. If the company exercises civil activities 
then the company should have a social name (raison social) and if it exercises commercial activities, it should have 
a business name (denomination sociale); see: <https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/informations-et-
dossiers-entreprises/dossiers-thematiques/creation-entreprise/la-denomination-sociale.html>  Accessed 4 
December 2015 
145 Article 90.c JCC 
146 Article 5.a JCC 
147 C. com., art. L. 210-3 
C. civ., art. 1837 ; https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/informations-et-dossiers-entreprises/dossiers-
thematiques/vie-de-entreprise/transfert-de-siege.html Accessed 4 December 2015 
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address the same functions and role of the seat, the law used the term headquarters148. The term 
headquarters is not defined in the law but is identified as the place of incorporation and is linked 
to the nationality and the applicable law149, further the term headquarter was considered the 
main element in defining the domicile of the legal person150. The French legislature made the 
distinction between two forms of seat the statutory seat and the real seat151. The distinction 
between the two forms is difficult. The statutory seat may be identified through various criteria 
including the form of the company, the place of registration and the place of incorporation as for 
the real seat it may be determined as the place where the effective management is, and where 
the business decisions are presumably made152. A similar distinction is implicitly addressed 
under the Jordanian Law, in the cases relating to identifying the applicable law to foreign 
companies that has their headquarters outside the kingdom; therefore, the place where the 
activities are exercised is taken into consideration153. 
64 Definite or indefinite term. The term or duration of the company, means the period 
during which the company is expected to remain active and exercise its activities. The different 
legal regimes grant shareholders the right to decide the exact term of the company, in some 
cases this right is limited to a maximum number of years. The perfect example is the approach 
of the French legislature. The code de commerce stipulates a maximum term of ninety-nine 
years that cannot in any case be exceeded154 but can be renewed to an equivalent period155. The 
reasoning behind the limit on the duration of the company finds its place in general contract law 
rules. Under the French rules, the notion of indefinite contracts or eternal ones does not exist. 
All contracts have fixed terms even though the term ninety-nine is long enough yet it is not 
eternal. As for the Jordanian legislature he took a different but common approach of providing 
                                                          
148 Article 4 JCC 
149 Article 51.1(d) Jo. Civil Code; Cass. com., 19 févr. 1991, n° 89-13997 
150 Article 18 Jo. Code of Civil Procedures 
151 This distinction is mostly addressed in cases involving a transfer of seat, particularly when the transfer is 
executed from MS to the other. The newly issued Pol ud  de isio  o  a  EU le el o fi es to the e iste e of oth 
forms of seats yet it leaves the distinction to be internally dealt at MS level and it considers merely the statutory 
seat fo  pu poses of t a sfe ; Gil e t Pa lea i, A t Polbud : Nouvelle Faveur (Temporaire ?) à « l'Optimisation » 
des Transferts de Sièges Sociaux dans l'Union Eu op e e  (2018) 1 Revue des Sociétés p. 47 
152Cass. com., 19 Févr. 1991, n° 89-14000; Cass. crim., 31 Jan. 2007, n° 02-85089; Cass. crim., 31 Jan. 2007, n° 05-
82671  
153 Article 12.2 Jo. Civil Code 
154 C. com., art. L. 210-2  
155 C. com., art. R. 210-2 
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the shareholders with two options for the choice of duration. The company is incorporated with 
a definite or an indefinite term. The legislature further left the shareholders with full consent to 
determine the two extreme ends of the duration. The JCC stipulated that the Plc. is de facto 
incorporated for an indefinite term unless the objective behind its incorporation is to exercise a 
certain activity then it seizes to exist once the activity is performed156. 
65 Other general information. The company should also include in its AOA all the details 
that relate to its founding shareholders. These details include the name, address, nationality and 
the number of shares they hold. These details are later added to shareholders’ registry where a 
copy thereof should be provided to the company controller. The AOA should include the 
management form the company chooses to follow (in some legislation the company has a list of 
management structures that could choose from, one or two tier management). Further, the AOA 
states the signatories, meaning the persons eligible to sign on behalf of the company. The 
signatories are assigned for a limited period of time, from the incorporation and up until the 
moment the first GAM is held157. When an OEIC attaches its Articles and Memorandum of 
Association to the incorporation application, it should, while taking into consideration the 
restriction provided by law, contain among other things the name of the company, the 
headquarters, founding shareholders’ details, the term if necessary, the form of management, the 
signatories and the GAM method of convening158.  The AOA contains alongside the previously 
mentioned general information, special customized information the minimum requirement of 
which differs from one company to the other depending on the form it undertakes. This form of 
information includes defining the capital, the purpose or activities of the company, the method 
of sum distribution and the redemption of shares all of which shall be addressed in Paragraph 2. 
 
                                                          
156Article 90.d JCC 
157 Article 92.b(8) JCC 
158 Article 92.b JCC; French Law requirements: <https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/informations-et-dossiers-
entreprises/dossiers-thematiques/creation-entreprise/dossier-immatriculation-au-rcs.html?onglet=2> Accessed 5 
December 2015; AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-4 
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§2: Customized Content: What an Investment Company should Acquire 
66 Scope. AOA of the OEIC includes specially customized information that distinguishes 
the OEIC from other Plc. All Plc. requires them yet the restrictions surrounding them differ in 
the case of the IC due to the specificity of the activities it exercises. The customized content 
covers primarily capital requirement, purpose and company’s activities, distributable sums and 
the redemption of shares. The legal provisions applicable to this special content is not 
necessarily limited to the company code, they are found in the monetary codes and their related 
regulations. 
67 IC object. The constitution of the company (AOA/ MOA), stipulates the object clause. 
This clause states the purpose and the range of activities for which the company is established. 
Explains the purpose behind the incorporation. The content of this clause, whenever the 
Investment Company is concerned, is restricted to a specific purpose and certain activities. The 
common and unanimously approved main object of the IC is the collective portfolio investment 
in securities or transferable securities. The different regimes that are referred to mentioned an 
identical object for the IC, including but not limited to the European Union159, United States160, 
France161 and Jordan162. The activities that the IC could exercise relate to the licensing 
requirement imposed on this company. 
68 Activities permitted vs prohibited. IC exercises its activities in the limits of its object163. 
Therefore, the governing legal provisions make the distinction between permitted and 
prohibited activities. What is covered under both categories of activities? The answer differs 
depending on the legislation to which we are referring. Under the regional EU law, the UCITS 
Directive states that the undertakings falling within the scope of this Directive should not be 
incorporated for purposes other than the collective investment of the capital raised from the 
                                                          
159Article 1.2(a) UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
160 Certain entities were excluded from the definition of the Investment Company in Section 3 (b) (1) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940  (if they are primarily engaged in a business other than investing, reinvesting, 
holding or trading securities) 
161 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
162 Article 209.a JCC 
163Recital 48 UCITS Dir. 2009/65  
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public according to the rules laid down in the Directive164. The Directive further limits the 
activities of the concerned undertakings to those mentioned under the definition of UCITS165. 
The Directive states further restrictions by explicitly mentioning the activities the UCITS is 
allowed to exercise; including investment management, administration166 and marketing167. The 
Jordanian Legislature took a similar approach to that of the EU legislature, he limits the main 
activity of the IC to the portfolio investment in securities168, the legislature later stipulates the 
main purpose of the company that is the investment of its assets and the assets of its clients in 
the different forms of securities169. In order for the IC to remain within its object under the 
Jordanian law, it exercises certain activities including the investment management170, and 
issuing securities171. As for the prohibited activities, both the UCITS Directive and the 
Jordanian Law took similar approaches. The UCITS Directive prohibited any undertaking 
covered under its scope from acting as both an investment MC and depository172. A similar 
prohibition is mentioned in the Collective Investment Regulation173. The two legislations did 
not limit the prohibition to these activities; they extend the scope of the restriction to include 
investment thresholds and other forms of financial services174. These prohibitions relate to the 
essential obligation of the company to maintain a clean and sustainable market175, protect 
                                                          
164Recital 48 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
165Article 28 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
166 The ad i ist atio  a ti it  i ludes the follo i g fu tio s: a  legal a d fu d a age e t a ou ti g 
services; (b) customer inquiries; (c) valuation and pricing (including tax returns); (d) regulatory compliance 
monitoring; (e) maintenance of unit-holder register; (f) distribution of income; (g) unit issues and redemptions; (h) 
o t a t settle e ts i ludi g e tifi ate dispat h ; i  e o d keepi g  
167Annex II UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
168 Article 3 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
169 Article 6 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
170 Article 26 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 10 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
171 Article 98.h JCC 
172Article 35 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
173Article 31 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
174Article 102.b JSL of 2002; the newly adopted securities law of 2017 does not mention such constraints over the 
investments of CIU, the prohibition remains applicable in accordance with Collective Investment Regulation of 
1999 (Article); Article 89 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 (No uncovered sales of transferable securities) 
175 Prohibiting investments that exceed the thresholds stipulated in the law, in order to avoid any dominant 
position or later market manipulation: Article 102.b (2-5) JSL of 2002, remains applicable according to Article 
32.a,c,d,o Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
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shareholders interest especially minority shareholders and most importantly hinder conflicts of 
interest176.  
69 Minimum capital requirement. The initial share capital refers to the initial shares issued 
by the IC for the purposes of setting up the scheme before shares are offered to prospective 
investors177.The general rule states that all companies must meet the minimum capital 
requirement when incorporated. The initial capital in the case of the IC is required to safeguard 
shareholders’ interests and secure a level playing field in the market178. As other Plc. the IC 
should meet the minimum capital threshold mentioned in the governing legal rules. IC may take 
the form of an open or closed end company, this form is related to the type of capital this 
company might have. Therefore, the capital of the IC may be variable (in the open-end form) or 
fixed (in the closed-end form). The variable capital refers to the possibility to issue, redeem and 
purchase further shares at any time during the life of the company without having to follow the 
general rule on increasing and decreasing the capital. Companies with this form of capital are 
usually exempted from having or maintaining, on the long run, the minimum capital 
requirement. The fixed capital refers to having a fixed number of shares traded on regulated 
markets, can only be sold on the market and not back to the company; the shares of this capital 
cannot be redeemed at the mere request of shareholders. Unlike companies with variable capital, 
these companies are expected to retain valid the initial capital it provided in its AOA179, unless 
they decide to perform an increase or decrease following the process provided by law.  
70 General legal rule. The JCC stipulates the minimum amount of the initial authorized 
capital for all Plc. (five hundred thousand JOD180) and the minimum amount of the capital to be 
                                                          
176 Borrowing more than 10% of the value of its assets: Article 32.b Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; 
Lending or being a guarantor on behalf of others: Article 88 UCITS Directive 2009/65 
177 I. Sattout n (131); Article 2.1.k UCITS Dir. 2009/65; article 57.a,b Directive 2006/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions [2006] OJ L 177/1 
178 Recital 25 UCITS Dir. 2009/65  
179 The French rules designated a set of rules to govern the process of collecting the initial capital (C.  com., art. L. 
225-3 and following) the SICAV was exempted from the scope of these articles (C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7-3); On a 
European level the UCITS Directive addresses the minimum capital requirement when discussing the obligation of 
appointing a MC (Article 29) 
180Approximately 572,000 Euro (Exchange rate of 2018) 
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underwritten on the market (one hundred thousand181 JOD or twenty percent of the authorized 
capital whichever is more)182. The Plc. when exercising financial services should acquire a 
license permitting them to perform such services, the licensing application requires a minimum 
capital different than and exceeding that addressed under the JCC. When applying the licensing 
requirement in the case of the IC a question arises: is the IC covered in the scope of application 
of the Licensing Regulation? The IC fulfills the conditions designated for applicants for the 
license (shall be further explained in Chapter 2 and is connected to the argument of whether or 
not the IC is considered an Issuer). IC is a Plc. and performs financial services. Its activities 
include investment management; this activity is considered a financial service according to the 
Jordanian rules. The minimum capital requirement for this form of activity is one million 
JOD183. According to this explanation and due to the type of activity the OEIC exercises, it 
should have a minimum initial capital of one million JOD instead of half a million as states the 
JCC. This amount applies as long as the OEIC does not exercise any other licensed activity that 
requires a higher initial capital than the investment management184.  
71 Exemption. Another issue arises in the course of applying the minimum capital 
requirement; the law exempts the OEIC from this requirement, the reason is the variability of 
capital. The variability requires flexible legal rules that allow the redemption and issuing of 
shares without having to go through the long procedures of increasing or decreasing the capital 
commonly followed by Plc185. Meaning allowing the fluctuation of the capital without violating 
the law186. What can be deduced from this reasoning is that the OEIC is merely exempted from 
meeting the minimum capital requirement in post-incorporation stages (once it commences 
exercising its activities), therefore limiting the scope of application of the exemption. The 
legislature did not leave the exemption unrestricted. The AMF requires a minimum asset amount 
that should be acquired at all times by the OEIC (SICAV) that is equal to three hundred thousand 
Euros. Consequently, the non-compliance with this restriction and in case the amount falls 
                                                          
181Approximately 114,000 Euro (Exchange rate of 2018) 
182 Article 95.a JCC 
183 Article 4.c(3) Licensing Regulation of 2005; Approximately 1,114,000 Euro (Exchange rate of 2018); article 4.d 
(4) Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
184 Article 4.d Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 4.h Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
185 Article 209.b (3) JCC 
186 C. com., art. L. 231-1 (related to the fact that SICAV can be SAS or SA); Article 209.b (2)  JCC 
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below the prescribed one the redemption of shares is suspended187. The Jordanian rules imposed 
a similar obligation on the IC; nonetheless, the law did not define a fixed minimum liquidity. 
The required liquidity is estimated as a percentage of the net value of Company’s assets that is 
sufficient to cover the redemption requests; this percentage is defined by a special decree issued 
by the Securities Commission’s Council for this purpose188. 
72 Stating capital in AOA. OEIC should include the amount of its initial capital in its 
AOA189. The mere mentioning of the amount in the AOA is a form of indirect guarantee of the 
financial standing of the company. Further, the law states the obligation of providing a proof of 
the deposit of the said amount. The French legislature calls the deposit proof as “initial capital 
certificate”. The legislature grants the founding shareholders a limited period to effect the 
deposit. This period was shorter under the French Law than the Jordanian one. The AMF 
requires the company to provide the certificate immediately and maximum within one hundred 
and eighty days following the date of authorization190. As for the Jordanian law, it grants the 
founding shareholders three years to subscribe to the authorized initial capital191. This restriction 
is waivered to OEIC192. This waiver leaves a loophole in the law. The OEIC is not restricted to 
subscribe to the shares within a set period. It has the discretion to do so within its own 
timeframe.  
73 Other customized content. The AOA of OEIC stipulates the principles for distributing 
the distributable sums, subscribing procedures of shares, and redemption procedure, when 
applicable mention the rights attached to the different classes of shares this company might 
have193. The prospectus may also address the distribution procedure194. The AOA is the 
reference in the cases where the internal policy does not provide sufficient solutions. The role of 
the AOA in the company is the same as the constitution to other forms of legislations 
(considered the base reference, cannot be contradicted as it expresses the will of shareholders). 
                                                          
187 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-21 
188 Article 47 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
189Article 92.b(5) JCC 
190AMF, régl. gén., art. 422 -9 
191 Article 95.b JCC 
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The content of the AOA is divided into two main categories (general and special conditions). 
This categorization is not found in the actual existing samples of the AOA. Domestic legal rules 
may provide a sample or a minimum content of the AOA that include the most important 
clauses, which shareholders have the right to take into consideration or discard such as the 
sample provided by the AMF.  
74 Language requirement. Due to the importance of the AOA, the law might impose a 
language requirement. This requirement is requested in the course of protecting shareholders’ 
interest especially in cases where the company provides its services in multiple countries. In this 
case, prospective shareholders may not speak the same language as the language of the country 
of incorporation, or the case of having the target of the company as retail investors. Therefore, 
the AOA is provided in the language of the country of incorporation or exceptionally in the 
customary language in financial matters195. The language requirement is linked to the obligation 
of communicating the AOA to shareholders196. The incorporated OEIC ensures that its AOA 
contain the least the list of mandatory information provided in the law, if any of the previously 
mentioned information is not provided the company is considered in violation of the law197.  
The AOA contains a clause pertaining the chosen management structure by the company. The 
following Section B extensively address this clause.  
Section B: Management Conditions and the Proper Running of the Company 
75 General Rule. The fact that every corporation is characterized as a moral and not a 
physical person and despite the imposed responsibilities and obligations, the characterization 
refrains the company from exercising its business activities without a representative functioning 
on its behalf. These representatives are appointed as members of management or staff. 
76 Models. The organizational structure of management may take several forms when it is 
process-oriented. The doctrine identified various types198: process organization where the 
organizational structure is aligned alongside the process. This organization maximizes the 
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performance but creates duplication in functions. The other suggested type is the network 
organization; it functions like a matrix the aim is to be multidimensional when focusing on 
customers199. This organization includes the case where management organizations are persons 
in lower positions that report the transactions to case managers. Further horizontal organization 
that creates two dimensions the functional department and the process200. Adopting one type of 
these organizations especially the network organization requires the company to have expert 
and sophisticated management and clear allocation of responsibilities in order to avoid the 
confusions made in terms of roles and responsibilities. 
77 Part of AOA. Generally, the AOA exhaustively addresses the choice of the organization 
and structure of the management body. The IC is covered in this general rule. The AOA 
dedicates a part to the management body; relates to their appointment and chosen structure.  
78 Role of Management. The general duty of the management includes determining the 
broad lines of the company’s activities and ensures their implementation201.The broad line is 
determined through the implementation of an internal policy and control mechanism202, while 
adhering to the obligations imposed by law (including preparation of financial statement and 
reports)203. The management further ensures the proper execution of the decisions of the 
board204.  
79 Types of management. The typical pattern in managing stock portfolios affects its 
performance. Present two styles of management depending on the performance approach: 
passive and active. The distinction between the two styles might be possible though sometimes 
the line separating between the two becomes fuzzy. Both styles have more an economic aspect 
to them than a legal one. Hence, we shall generally introduce both styles and specify the closer 
of them to our case. The need to explain the styles arises from the nature of the IC and the fact 
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that risk and financial management form an integral part thereof. The quality of management is 
a key element in any successful operation 
80 Active management. Includes a thorough analysis and an exhaustive process that are 
used to beat the market205.This type of management has a long-term performance record 
depending on the knowledge, expertise and qualifications of its different members. This style 
uses various strategies throughout its performance such as performing technical and 
fundamental analysis to select securities or timing the market206.  
81 Passive management. Occurs when the portfolio mirrors and matches the market207. The 
simplest case of this passiveness is the fund, which is designed to replicate a well-defined index 
of stock208. This type of management does not require skilled and highly qualified management 
members. Passive management minimizes the risks to the lowest and in some cases it eliminates 
potential risks209. 
82 Plan. This Section explains the reason behind considering the active management as the 
favorable form of management for IC. The choice of management of the IC includes following 
a process of several stages, beginning with the choice of the management structure (Sub-Section 
1) and ending with fulfilling competence and expertise requirement (Sub-Section 2).  
Sub-section 1: Choice of Management Body 
83 Preview. Despite the followed model in managing a corporate through an inside or 
outside intervention, the model in most of the cases is plotted on a spectrum that is shareholder 
oriented. The management acts in the best financial interest of shareholders and the company210.  
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The governance structure differs depending on different regulating systems. The used notion is 
influenced by the governing domestic rules but might be combined with notions from other 
legal systems. The aim is to provide the most appropriate regulatory structure to a company that 
has the financial risk management as one of its main activities. The different notions are stated 
in order to cope with this company’s different financial needs. 
84 Separation of ownership and control. In companies such as the Investment one or 
generally Plc, the number of shareholders is larger than having the option of direct control and 
management of the company. Generally, the more shareholders the company has the more 
difficult it becomes for them to directly manage the company, therefore the need for a separate 
management body emerges. The control is not lost or transferred but merely divided. 
Shareholders remain in control and exercise a form of direct supervision and control over the 
management body. The concept usually paralleled with the need to assign a management body 
in Plc; is the separation between control and ownership211. Berle and Means have pointed out 
that, in the corporate system: the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of 
ownership, while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral 
part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lie 
control212. The logical outcome of this concept and the corporate development in general is 
having an ownership of wealth without appreciable control and a control of wealth without an 
appreciable ownership213.  
85 Appointing management. Having the concept of separation of ownership and control in 
mind, the IC remains a Plc. that follows a certain structure when appointing the management 
body. The structure constitutes of a set of general and specially customized conditions and 
requirements that members of the management in any Plc. should hold when hired. The 
different conditions stipulated in the governing legal rules relating to the appointing of the 
management body are illustrated in this Sub-Section. The approach is divided into two phases; 
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the first phase emphasizes on the domestically offered management structures (paragraph 1) as 
for the second phase it builds on the first one and explains the general required conditions in the 
chosen members (paragraph 2). 
§1: Available Forms of Management 
86 Structures. The management of an IC is usually depicted. Though companies often turn 
to simple legal structures, however the complexity arises from the type of relation existing 
between members of the management and the company. A question imposed in this regard; who 
can be a manager/ director of a Plc. and particularly of the OEIC? Domestic company rules 
answer this question and state the general conditions and qualifications that need to be present 
in the persons elected to management membership. The rules define the number of persons 
forming the management of the company. They address generally the Plc. with some exceptions 
and derogations to cope with the particularity of the IC. The management of the IC includes a 
general body. This body has various forms depending on the governing legislation. The forms 
include a board of directors, general manager, supervisory board or executive committee. 
Further, there are complementary or auxiliary members that include the financial advisors, they 
are appointed to cope with the specificity of the IC’s activities214. The management may be 
individual or severable depending on the type and size of the company215. 
87 French Law Perspective. In the relevant French company rules the SA (Société 
Anonyme) can choose to be managed in one of two forms. A board of directors (Conseil 
d’administration)216 or an executive committee and a supervisory board217 (Conseil de 
Surveillance et Directoire)218. The French commercial code gave every Plc. the discretion to 
choose between the two provided methods of management simply by stipulating the chosen 
method in its AOA. As a result of this stipulation, the company is exempted from complying 
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with the rules governing the other method219. Consistently the AMF General Regulation 
affirmed these components of management and referred to them as the senior management220. 
Due to the sensitivity of the business activities exercised by Plc. in general; the governing legal 
rules state the possibility to appoint another physical person to undertake the duties of a general 
manager of the company221. This position may be disregarded by the company and it may be 
held by the chairman of the board of directors222. The appointment of a chairman is obligatory 
when choosing the board of directors as the general management body of the company. The 
French company rules define the common duties that should be exercised by the management of 
any Plc. Further, they identified more special duties to be executed by the management of the 
IC223.The common duties the board of directors is responsible for; include determining the 
broad lines of the company’s business activities and ensures their implementation224. The 
chairman on the other hand organizes and oversees the work and reports issued by the board, 
further assures the functioning of the management structure of the company225. The general 
manager is entrusted to act on behalf of the company in all circumstances226. Consistently, when 
the other method of management is applied the executive committee exercises its powers and 
functions under the supervisory board227. The supervisory board is responsible for exercising all 
permanent supervision over all the activities of the company. It evaluates the financial 
statements of the company and the proposals of the management228. The supervisory board 
elects same as the board a chairman who is responsible among other things for; calling for 
meetings and conducting the discussions229. The executive committee has the broadest powers 
to act on behalf of the company230. Members of management under the French company rules 
whether a director or member of the supervisory board can have several forms. These forms 
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include being a natural person or an entity231. The natural person can be an employee (especially 
the case of having shares owned by employees)232 -they are not taken into consideration when 
calculating the number of board members for companies that list their shares on regulated 
markets- shareholder or outsider. Members of the management represent the company; this 
representation includes that before third parties233. 
88 Individual management. Notwithstanding the previously mentioned methods of 
management accorded to the IC, these options were not exhaustive. In the AMF General 
Regulation, portfolio Management Company is entitled to derogate from the rules regulating the 
management of Plc. and choose to be effectively managed by a single person234. The AMF sets 
the conditions under which a single person may direct the company. Measures and 
arrangements shall be specified to ensure sound and prudent management. 
89 Jordanian Company rules. To some extent, they are similar to the options covered by 
French rules. The difference lays in providing a sole method of management a board of 
directors235 and a general manager236. The board elects a chairman and a vice chairman from 
amongst its members. In addition, it is possible to elect more members to sign on behalf of the 
company jointly or severally (signatories)237. Similarly, the Jordanian rules defined the general 
duties and responsibilities of the chairman including considering the chairman as the 
representative of the company before third parties and the authorities, further the chairman shall 
be responsible for implementing the resolutions issued by the board238. A general manager is 
appointed, from board members 239or an outsider, the appointed person should be qualified and 
has the necessary competences to exercise the activities invested to him by the board240. When 
the general manager is appointed in a Plc. that trades its shares on regulated markets, the 
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appointment should be reported to the market241. Members of the board under the JCC may 
solely be natural persons, in this case, the legal person is a member yet a natural person 
represents it242. 
90 Size of management. Appointing the different members of the management is limited in 
terms of the minimum and maximum number. The governing legal rules did not leave the full 
discretion to companies in appointing members of management, in order to restrict any excess 
of powers and hinder any over-appointment of members that may exhaust the resources of the 
company with their high remuneration fees or disorganized decisions. The necessity of a set 
number for management is stemmed from the reason why companies have a management body. 
If the law did not limit the size of the management body, the company may have more managers 
than it needs who might hamper the course of its daily activities (especially longer decision-
making process). Further, the large number of management body may incur the company higher 
operational costs and possible excessive remuneration. This restriction is closely linked to the 
concept of separation of ownership and control, the reasoning is that the more shareholders the 
company has the more difficult it is for them to directly control the company. Therefore, the 
need for a management body emerges, the more efficient and competent and lesser (yet 
sufficient) the management is the faster and more closely risk-free decisions are. Under the 
French company rules the board of directors should have members who are not less than three 
and do not exceed eighteen243, as for the management in the second method the number of 
members for Plc. with shares traded on a regulated market should not exceed seven244. The 
supervisory board should consist of minimum three members and maximum eighteen245. As for 
the Jordanian governing rules, they stipulate that the board of directors should consist of 
members not less than three and not exceeding thirteen246. No exceptional number of board 
members is provided to companies that trade their shares on regulated markets. This leaves the 
number thirteen high in comparison with the French approach. 
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91 Term of management. The management body is appointed for a limited term of office. 
The management cannot be appointed for an unlimited term or throughout the life of the 
company, despite the rights granted to the GA in terms of dismissing the management and the 
possibility of being reelected. The fact the management is not eternal and is changeable makes 
the members keener to provide better performance that is shareholder oriented and beneficial 
especially if they would like to be reelected (provides a form of incentive for effective conduct). 
The French company rules provided a very balanced system when addressing the term of office. 
Before the amendment of 2012 French rules provided two possibilities of office terms 
depending on the method used in appointing the directors or members of supervisory board. If 
the directors or members are appointed in the MOA their term should not exceed three years yet 
if they were appointed by the GA the period should not exceed six years247. Currently the 
appointing is performed in GAM despite its form. The term should be stated in the statute and it 
should not exceed six years. Members of the management of the second structure shall be 
appointed for a term between two and six years if the term is stipulated in the MOA, and four 
years in case the MOA lacks this provision248. The reasoning behind the previously 
implemented options is traced back to the protection and control the Code de Commerce 
implicitly offered the shareholders who join this form of company in later stages. The French 
legislature further states that the management body may be reelected without stating a limit on 
the number of times they can be reelected249. The Jordanian legislature was simpler in his 
approach, the governing rules stipulate the maximum term four years without mentioning any 
minimum period or the possibility of reelection250. In legal sense, the absence of the reelection 
explicit permission does not hinder or impose such a restriction on board reelections.  
92 Age Limit. The French Legislature was unique in its approach; he addressed the age limit 
of members of management and the percentage of the members who exceed a certain age. The 
importance of this requirements lays in having a management that is up-to-date with recent and 
innovative investment approaches, in addition to having diversified decision-making processes 
(not old school ones) all of which adapted to market needs and while providing better return to 
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shareholders’ investments. Nonetheless, members of certain ages provide long experience in the 
investment field that junior and younger members do not enjoy. The age limit should be 
primarily addressed in the AOA if the AOA lacks this clause then the limits provided by law 
applies. The common used age limit was seventy and the threshold of members with this age 
should not exceed third the board251, sixty-five years is the age limit for the chairman252, the 
general manager253, and members of management in the second structure254. Members of the 
supervisory board their age limit is seventy years without exceeding third of the members255. 
French rules also addressed the equality in gender representation on the board256. Introduced in 
2011, representing an obligation on companies that trade their securities on regulated 
markets257. The choice of structure and all that relates to it in terms of the term and size when 
appointing the management body is affected by other general and specially customized 
conditions that relate to every member of the management. Every member of the management 
meets the general conditions. The following paragraph 2 illustrates these conditions.  
§2: General Appointing Conditions 
93 Guarantee the independence. The management of the company in theory seeks the 
satisfaction of shareholders expectations. This is a vice versa relation where shareholders 
depend on the management to achieve their goals in maximizing their wealth. To achieve the 
mutual aim, the governing legal rules stipulates general conditions that the management of the 
Plc. fulfils and consequently the IC. These general conditions relate to two legally imposed 
obligations on the IC that aim at hindering conflicts of interest and ensuring a transparent 
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disclosure. These conditions further guarantee to some extent the independence and proficiency 
of the different members of management258.  
94 Ownership of shares. Members of management generally own shares in the Plc. they 
direct. The ownership is effective before commencing the functions and duties. The required 
percentage is determined usually in the AOA259. This general rule is applicable to all Plc. 
including the IC under the JCC. As for the French rules, they exempt the SICAV260. This 
exemption finds its reasoning in the specialized conditions and requirements imposed on IC in 
terms of skilled and expert management (further explained in Sub-section 2). The requirements 
may not exist in one of the shareholders. Individuals usually resort to the investment in SICAV 
at the aim of maximizing their long-term wealth and lifetime savings. SICAV forms one of the 
most proper places to invest and take that long-term step. The investment decisions are made on 
behalf of the individuals meanwhile they are being consulted and informed of the performed 
activities. Theoretically speaking the company is supposed to be properly and efficiently 
operated. Achieved by having professional, prudent, accountable and credible members of 
management. The theory says who better save one’s interests than one himself. Therefore, the 
domestic legal rules designate the share ownership as a condition to management appointing, 
hence better protection and awareness of the financial situation is provided due to the existence 
of a financial motive. 
95 Reasoning for requirement. The desire to secure and protect the interests of shareholders 
and their investments are one of the main grounds and basis to the implemented domestic 
company rules. The fact that a member of management owns shares in any related or competing 
company to the concerned IC is significant therefore; the member is obliged to disclose this 
ownership upon holding the position. Concurrently, any agency model followed in the company 
includes balancing between the interests of both shareholders and management. Members of 
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management are entitled to compensation, in some companies the compensation is conducted 
through share ownership schemes261. 
96 Connection to Disclosure. Accordingly, domestic legal rules address the disclosure of 
any shares or stocks owned in a Plc. or any other company, subsidiary or parent, performing 
similar activities, or related to the concerned IC as long as the shares are listed for trading on a 
regulated financial market262. This connection and the effect of this ownership further explained 
in the Section addressing Conflicts of Interest. On the other hand, the ownership alone may not 
affect the interests of shareholders as much as the membership and involvement in the 
management of other companies does. 
97 Membership in other boards. General company rules do not require member of 
management to be fully available to direct and operate any IC263. To ensure effective, proper 
and efficient management the rules limit the maximum number of managing positions held by 
members in other companies. For example in Germany, members of the supervisory boards are 
permitted to have multiple memberships in different supervisory boards264. Under the relevant 
French rules, the natural person may not hold more than five positions as an administrator in 
different Plc. existing on the French soil265. As for the managing positions including being a 
director or a general manager, a sole position is allowed266. Overall, the number of held 
positions should not exceed five positions whether as a director, general manager or member of 
the supervisory board267. Notwithstanding the limitation provided for by the French rules, 
different rules were provided for the SICAV. The natural person may hold simultaneously up to 
five positions of management in different SICAVs established on the French territory268. Notably 
the rules governing the SICAV partially complied with the general rules by not exceeding the 
number of positions stated under which and derogating from applying the limit of administrative 
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and directing members. The positivity of derogating from the general rule is debatable as the 
degree of accountability, efficiency and productivity of management of the IC may be 
influenced when managed by occupied members, hence increasing the risk facing the interests 
of shareholders. To hinder this risk, the JCC prohibited the management of Plc. from holding 
management positions in any company that carries out similar activities or is a competitor to the 
concerned IC269. Further, the management is prohibited from exercising any activity that 
competes with that exercised by the company270. As for the board members, the law stipulates 
the maximum number of offices they are allowed to hold (three memberships in their personal 
character and three as representatives of entities without exceeding five memberships in both 
characters)271. The Jordanian company rules address the issues related to the independence and 
accountability of members of management profoundly by preventing any person holding a 
public position from becoming a member of management unless this person is a representative 
of an authority or a public corporation272. Further, the company rules prohibited the 
management members from holding a job in the company they are directing unless otherwise 
permitted in the AOA (example the case of permitting employees to be members of the 
board)273. Limiting the number of held management positions may not be enough to safeguard 
the interests of shareholders and ensure an effective operation; the Securities Commission 
imposed a disclosure obligation -on members of management- of the held management 
positions in other Plc.274. Even the disclosure may not be enough. The multi-membership may 
end up by having a management that is part of all the big corporations in the concerned market. 
The corporate governance rule insists on the concept of independence and having outsider non-
senior management directors.  
98 Reputation and moral conditions. The potential and actual members of the board are 
required to maintain clean criminal record (including any felony or misdemeanor involving 
bribery, embezzlement, theft, forgery, abuse of confidence and others)275. Further the members 
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are expected to hold a good professional reputation, the JSC have the right to request any 
information or documents that relate to the biography, record and the links the applicant has 
with other companies in order to verify the professional reputation276. 
99 Arguments for conditions. It is argued that the level of ownership of a manager indicates 
the degree of confidence in the investment plan. The fact that a manager does not own any 
shares does not undermine his involvement in or care about company’s performance. In 
addition, domestic rules required the disclosure of membership in other management bodies. 
Aimed at helping shareholders to deduce the real incentives of managers and predict potential 
conflicts of interest particularly when managers are involved in the management of other 
companies277. 
100 Transition. The IC when incorporated lays down its AOA, in which it specifies the 
management method. The method includes the choice of the management structure in addition 
to designating the signatories amongst the management members. The AOA defines the 
appointing procedure of the members of management. Upon their appointing, they fulfill the 
conditions and requirements stated by law and company’s AOA. The requirement list include; 
meeting the share ownership threshold, meeting the limit of memberships in other similar 
companies and most importantly hold the required competence, experience and expertise to 
exercise the activities of the IC. The following Sub-Section 2 shall extensively address the 
competence and expertise requirement. 
Sub-section 2: Management Competence 
101 Preview. Creative management of a corporation requires thought and action to reach an 
effective management. The enlightened management participates in creating a culture of 
leadership that provides long-term vision and policy thinking, which improves the quality of 
governance, where, the performance, suitableness and the effectiveness of the various members 
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of the management are continuously monitored278. When the matter of management is related to 
a company that faces risks and pools assets as the IC, the importance of the qualifications of 
these members emerges. The separation of ownership and control in the company is connected 
to the impact the performance of the controlling body, in our case the management, and the 
changes in this body have on the overall performance of the company. 
102 Competence requirement. Portfolio investments require skilled and experienced 
management, slightly more than other forms of companies. Any company that trades in 
financial instruments and asset management require a management body consisting of members 
that have economic and financial background to operate efficiently the company and achieve its 
goals, and set targets. Unspecialized and inexperienced persons cannot generally manage a 
financial services provider. The management in the IC is expected to make investment and other 
financial decisions that concern the assets managed by the company. The management 
speculates on where and when to invest. Therefore, domestic company and securities rules 
regulate the professional experience requirement for directors of this company. The requirement 
consists of presenting sufficient and adequate experience and reputation when performing the 
duties of management279. The aim of which is to ensure prudent and most appropriate 
management280. The experience requirement extends to include the natural persons who have 
direct or indirect influence over the management of the company, meaning acting on behalf or 
under the authority of the company281. The requirement includes the most appropriate 
experience, qualifications and knowledge to carry out the duties adhered to by these natural 
persons282. These persons include the salesperson, asset manager or the head of financial 
instruments283. Corporate governance codes went in the same direction by requiring this 
competence as it forms a key aspect in the governance284.   
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103 Effect on job opportunities. The management body of the IC must be sufficiently good 
reputed and be sufficiently experienced in relation to the type of business pursued by the 
Company285. This requirement has external affect; it can be noted in the opportunities section in 
the financial press. The job ads require skilled management that meets the minimum level of 
knowledge required in the domestic legal rules. As an example of the statement in one 
employment opportunity for a management position in a large European company, the ad stated 
that the position requires the individual whose business acumen, financial aptitude and 
professional initiative enable them to improve the organization’s performance and enhance the 
effectiveness of the individuals within. Financial aptitude and analytical skills need to translate 
into insightful corrective actions and proactive business improvement286. For the thorough 
comprehension of the competence requirement, this Sub-Section addresses this requirement in 
two stages. The first stage relates to the process of examining the competence and expertise 
(paragraph 1), as for the second stage it relates to the special members of management the IC 
assigns to facilitate the exercise of its activities and enhance the results (paragraph 2). 
§1: Examination of Competence 
104 Mandatory reporting of expertise. The individuals concerned in this thesis are 
shareholders of ICs, who are required to deal with financial instruments and risk management. 
A regular manager, director or board cannot handle the management of the OEIC. The 
particularity of this form of company requires the specialization, qualifications and specific 
qualities to exist in the person acting on Company and shareholders’ behalf. Members of 
management of the IC are to some extent obliged to possess a vast economic and financial 
background and credentials, based on thorough and appropriate theoretical education and 
practical experience. This background promotes reaching a successful and profitable operation. 
As an example of the domestic rules requiring the expertise and competence, the Jordanian 
legislature requested from the applicant company the relevant and necessary information that 
demonstrate possession of the necessary skills, expertise and qualifications by members of 
management in the IC in order for them to professionally perform their duties. It is evident that 
real knowledge by the management is needed to reach effective and successful business 
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operation. The competence requirement is a general obligation that covers all Plc.287. As for the 
expertise and special qualifications, it is an exclusive obligation imposed on the part of Plc. that 
provides financial services such as the OEIC.  The IC is obliged to inform the JSC and provide 
it with a list including the names, positions and qualifications of senior management288. Further, 
the IC when submitting its licensing application should provide the Commission with sufficient 
evidence that the management of the Company holds the necessary experience, competence, 
reputation and knowledge to exercise its activities289. The expertise and qualifications include 
that of the staff and extends to proving the possession of professional equipment and 
capabilities that permits efficient exercise of the business290. The French domestic rules that 
relate to the skilled management are mainly stated under the AMF general regulation. The 
affirmation of this requirement is made in various places in the general regulation confirming 
every time the need for professional management. The professionalism was required for the 
different members involved in running the company, such as the compliance officer, and the 
directors of the company. To ensure the effective and efficient management to which the AMF 
general regulation stipulates mandatory compliance rules291. The professionalism required by 
the AMF seeks proving that natural persons acting on behalf of or under the IC hold sufficient 
reputation, experience, expertise and knowledge in financial matters292. To verify the existence 
of the required qualifications the AMF rules create a board that certifies that these natural 
persons hold the minimum knowledge requirement to fulfill the conditions of the positions they 
are expected to hold or the activities of the Company. The board is called the “Financial Skills 
Certification Board”293. The FSCB provides the AMF upon its request with opinions addressing 
the level of knowledge possessed by the relevant members of management. The FSCB specifies 
the minimum required level of knowledge. 
105 Professional license. The expertise and competence requirement does not stop at the 
level of mere disclosure to the JSC or the AMF. The competent authority exercises a form of 
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288 Article 11 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
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control in this area through issuing professional licenses or requiring a special registration to the 
management and the remaining natural persons working for the IC. The governing Jordanian 
rules state that a registration is made at the JSC. The registration includes two forms 
administrative and technical. The administrative registration covers the persons who are hired to 
exercise administrative and management activities including board members, managers and any 
employee whose position is linked to handling securities294. As for the technical registration, it 
is linked to financial exercises including among other things investment managers or depository, 
intermediaries and issuers295. The registration procedure commences with submitting a written 
request with the securities commission supplemented with all the necessary documents296, while 
at the same time meeting all the conditions (possessing the required educational degree, having 
legal capacity and passing the technical exam)297.The AMF issues a professional license to the 
persons acting on behalf of the SICAV. For the License to be issued the applicant should fulfill 
all the professional requirements set in an AMF Instruction298. The verification of existing skills 
and appropriateness of the concerned person is conducted in advance internally by the company 
itself299. Further to that through an examination supervised by the AMF. The company ensures 
that the possessed knowledge is current and updated; otherwise it seeks the organization of 
training programs with themes that include, but are not limited to, financial instruments and 
marketing methods, financial instrument advice and business conduct of financial investment 
advisers300. 
106 Technical exam. The registration with the JSC and the issued license by the AMF are 
obtained once the applicant undergoes the technical examination conducted at the securities 
commission301, or undertook and passed at the AMF. This examination ensures that the person 
who is expected to perform the functions within an investment services provider (IC) has all the 
                                                          
294 Article 44.b(1) Licensing Regulation of 2005; no such explanation is provided in the newly implemented 
Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
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necessary and sufficient level of knowledge and qualifications to conduct these functions. The 
AMF instructions, general regulation, and the Jordanian Licensing Regulation provide a 
possibility to exempt certain persons from this obligation or waive the right to conduct the 
examination302. The procedures and process of the examination is stated in the general 
regulation and its related instructions. This examination consists of interviewing the applicants 
by a specialized and impartial jury designated by the AMF303. The jury proposes to the AMF to 
whom the professional license is issued; when it deems that, the applicant met the required 
conditions304.The Jordanian rules do not stipulate any details concerning the content or 
procedure of the examination. The legislature merely imposes the responsibility for the 
preparation of this exam by the JSC. The conclusion is that the management of the IC should be 
competent and experienced enough to manage the daily business of the Company, be able to 
make the necessary investment decisions while evaluating the percentage of risk and acquiring a 
sufficient knowledge of the type of activities exercised by the company particularly a 
comprehensive knowledge of financial instruments305. Nonetheless, the governing legal rules 
impose on the IC, alongside the expertise and competence requirement and due to the form of 
activity this Company exercises, an obligation to appoint specialized persons as consultants or 
advisors. A detailed explanation in the following paragraph 2.  
§2: Specialized Management Components 
107 Appointing an investment consultant. The specificity of the IC requires adequate, 
efficient and effective management of the investments. There is a need for professional and 
independent individuals. They form part of the management of the company and aim to ensure 
the proper exercise and implementation of the professional obligations imposed on financial 
services providers such as the IC. This need emerged from the type of business activities 
exercised and the risk faced during the performance of the financial activities. This need results 
into imposing an obligation to assign an investment consultant or advisor to be stated in the 
AOA. The importance of this person lays in his/her independence. The independence grants 
shareholders complete and clear financial analysis and advice clean of conflicts of interest or 
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certain influential factors resulting in unequal treatment or favoring the interest of one 
participant over the other. The consultant or advisor works for its clients therefore in our case 
he/she works for the company and not the management.  
108 Specifications of investment consultant. The investment advisor is any person, group or 
entity who directly through management of client assets or indirectly via written publications, 
makes investment recommendations (advisability in purchasing, investing or selling of 
securities) or conducts securities analysis in return for compensation306. The investment advice 
or recommendations the investment advisor provides form an integral part of the investment 
services attached to the financial instruments307. Both the Jordanian308and French309legislature 
imposed an obligation on the OEIC to appoint an investment advisor. Under the French 
governing rules, the investment advisor is defined as the person exercising activities including 
among other things investment advice and recommendation as an investment service and the 
advice on the supply of investment services310. The Jordanian governing rules stipulate the 
conditions for the appointing of financial advisors311. The investment advisor once appointed 
remains independent and is prohibited from accepting financial instruments from its clients312. 
109 Form. The question that arises in this regard; should the investment advisor assigned in 
the AOA of OEIC hold a certain form, structure or qualifications? The governing legal rules 
address this question in various places. The domestic French and Jordanian rules stipulate the 
form and structure of the investment advisor, as they limit the structure to either a legal entity or 
a natural person.  
                                                          
306 Section 202.a(11) Investment advisors Act of 1940; The Jordanian Securities Law provides a definition for the 
financial advisor (Article 2) that is similar to that provided under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 
307 C. mon. fin., art. L. 321-1 5°  
308 Article 209.b(1) JCC 
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110 Jordanian rules. Limit the option solely to legal entities to be assigned as investment 
advisors to the IC. This exclusiveness is implicit but repeatedly referred to in the JCC, the 
Collective Investment Regulation (CIR) and the Financial Services Licensing Regulation. The 
JCC and the CIR both stipulate that the IC assign in its AOA an investment advisor that is 
licensed as an investment manager and investment trustee313. The legal rules in the earlier 
legislation emphasize that the investment advisor is “licensed” and not registered. This 
emphasis leads to the limit of structure of the investment advisor. The reasoning behind this 
implicit limit is traced back to the Financial Services Licensing Regulation. This Regulation 
made the distinction between who is licensed and who is registered under the JSC. The 
registration merely covers natural persons working under the IC or the licensed company under 
this regulation314. As for the licensing; it includes the legal entity that exercises one of the 
activities covered in this Regulation; they include among other activities investment 
management and trusteeship315. Being a legal entity that is licensed under the Licensing 
Regulation, the investment advisor follows an incorporation and licensing process similar to that 
of the IC.  
111 French rules. French rules provide both options for the investment advisor legal entity or 
natural person316. The investment advisor registers at the special registry in the market 
authority317. The investment advisor further is a member in the association of investment 
advisors and belong to a sole association318, this association defends the interests and rights of 
investment advisors; it is authorized by the AMF to perform this function319. The AMF website 
provides a list of the authorized associations for the consultation of interested investment 
advisors320.  
                                                          
313 Article 209.b(1) JCC; Article 13.b Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
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112 Qualifications. The investment advisor once licensed or registered commences the 
exercise of its activities and functions. The governing legal rules request an ongoing compliance 
to the rules stipulating organizational and professional qualifications and competence the 
investment advisor should hold and acquire. The non-compliance with any of the qualifications 
puts the investment advisor at risk of losing his license321. The investment advisor whether as a 
natural person or the persons it appoints to carry on its business (case of legal entity322) should 
demonstrate that he/she holds the specialized education, the professional training or the 
professional experience to exercise the functions attributed to this position323. Further, every 
year they undergo a training course adapted to their activity and experience324. The investment 
advisor ensures at all times that it holds organizational qualifications including those necessary 
procedures and resources to perform its activity (such as sufficient technical resources and 
secure data storage)325 and manage conflicts of interest326.  
113 Process of business conduct. The investment advisor when creating a relation with a 
client provides the client with a document referencing the essential details the client might need 
in verifying the status of the investment advisor. The document includes among other things the 
name of the investment advisor, place of registration (case of legal entity), the name of the 
authorized association the advisor belongs to and any other status the advisor holds327. The 
advisor later provides the client with a letter of engagement that stipulates the acknowledgement 
of the client that he received the document of status328. Following this organizational procedure, 
the advisor commences its activities and provides the client with specialized advice. The advice 
is formalized in writing and includes the advisor’s proposals and the statement of the 
advantages and risks facing the client329. The information provided in the advice should be clear 
fair and non-misleading330. Further, the advisor is prohibited from disclosing to others any of the 
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information relating to its clients331. There is a presumption that the advisor is regarded as 
acting honestly, fairly, professionally and in the best interest of the client332. 
114 Jordanian approach. The Jordanian governing rules merely states the license 
requirement with no further emphasis on the duties or qualifications. Nevertheless, the business 
conduct and duties of the investment advisor can be found in the provisions addressing the 
financial activities of the investment manager333 and the investment trustee334. These duties are 
general, relate to the daily course of business of the advisor, and do not necessarily govern the 
relation between the advisor and the IC.  
115 Overview. The IC is incorporated and initially registered as a Plc, while at the same time 
adhering to the specially customized incorporation conditions that relate to its future activities 
and objectives. Under the JCC, the incorporation of the IC is covered in the general rules 
governing Plc. Yet these conditions are not at all times exhaustively explanatory or tailored to 
meet the necessities of the IC. The company accommodates between the competence of its 
management and their share ownership. The co-existence of both conditions urges the debate on 
the level of simplicity faced when appointing a member of management. Can the Company find 
an expert and competent manager among its shareholders? The issue is mostly visible in ICs 
providing their services to retail investors. Retail investors usually seek the professionalism in 
the management to compensate the lack on their part335. The legislature aim is to protect the 
non-experienced investors by granting them access to professional investment schemes and the 
right to control the destiny of their investments. The parallel existence of both the competence 
and ownership requirement may be difficult to achieve but cannot be derogated from under the 
Jordanian law. The French rules on the other hand offered a way-out of this dilemma, when the 
AMF general regulation provided the investment services provider with the option of discarding 
                                                          
331AMF, régl. gén., art. 325-9  
332AMF, régl. gén., art. 325-6 
333 Article 26 Licensing Regulation of 2005; Article 28 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; article 10 Licensing 
Bylaw of 2018 
334 Article 23 Licensing Regulation of 2005; Article 25 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; article 11 Licensing 
Bylaw of 2018 
335 The AMF general regulation distinguishes between two forms of investors; Retail and professional, further, it 
provides different incorporation related rules for each category of investors. It is a distinction based on the level of 
knowledge and experience of the investor in the financial market 
 
69 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
the management structure stated in the Code de Commerce and appoint an individual non-
shareholder manager336. This option is considered the solution if the Company faces a difficulty 
in finding an experienced shareholder who is competent enough to run the company. Yet the 
individual management may raise issues on the level of the accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness. The following Chapter 2 thoroughly explains other forms of requirements ICs 
meet due to their close connection to financial markets and financial services.  
Chapter 2: Financial Services Requirements 
116 Preview. The industry of investment funds and companies generally occupies a specific 
and often an underestimated role. The funds and companies are viewed by the different 
components of the investment and financial markets as considerably boring, full of rules 
limiting creativity and real moneymaking, further full of administrative and legal constraints. 
Regulators view ICs as in need for heavy tailored regulation that provides protection to retail 
investors and hinders the chances of them losing their money. These companies are vehicles 
through which people with different financial levels connect; they connect those who have 
money with others who need it337.  
117 Post incorporation requirements. Generally, once the company is fully incorporated with 
national company controllers it should be able to commence exercising its activities without 
further restraints. The application of this rule may be limited depending on the type of activities 
the incorporated company states in its AOA. When considering the IC that has as its sole 
objective portfolio investments, the exercise is not automatic following the incorporation -even 
though a prior approval from securities authorities may have been issued- it is restricted; an 
authorization or license is issued which permits the Company to fulfill its object.  
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118 Exercise activities. As any business activity, there must be a market within which the IC 
exercises its activities. There is always a connection between the relevant market338 and the 
activities exercised or the product traded. The IC provides financial and investment services, 
therefore the market place is the financial market where investment decisions are taken. Various 
complementary questions rise in respect of the financial services prerequisites, they include: the 
freedom to choose the market. The accessibility to the market. Whether there are exceptions to 
and exemption from these financial requirements. Therefore, the following Sections address 
financial licensing (section A) and define the concerned local market (section B).  
Section A: Licensing and Authorization 
119 Necessity of licensing. Most legislations lay down rules that oblige Plc. when 
incorporated to obtain a prior authorization or license to function within any intended financial 
market, to guarantee the coordination and to safeguard the later resulting rights and interests. 
Prior authorization and licensing in the context of incorporating an OEIC refers to the process of 
obtaining an approval from a local administrative department, concerned with companies, 
financial, securities and commercial issues, which permits the applicant company to commence 
its business activities. This authorization differs from one legislation to the other, though in 
some cases it is similar in terms of the required conditions. The reason behind requiring a prior 
authorization to exercise financial services is not explicitly addressed in the governing legal 
rules. The main legal explanation for the existence of this requirement is the protection of 
investors’ interests, particularly in our case shareholders, therefore ensuring that the participants 
are adequately resourced and trained to provide financial services339. The JSC, AMF and other 
domestic securities authorities supervise the incorporated company and insure the fulfillment of 
all the requirements related to securities transactions; including issuing, purchasing, selling or 
other forms of trading. Registering in the company registry alone might not be sufficient to 
incorporate a company that exercises financial services. This situation calls for the investigation 
of the financial standing and credibility of the applicant company in order to avoid fraudulent 
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insolvency or bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the governing legal rules confirmed and made an 
explicit statement on the need to maintain valid all the conditions of the license or the company 
risks its revocation. 
120 Application to IC. The emergence of a financial license or authorization arises from the 
particularity of the IC; it holds most of the time the savings of retail investors. These investors 
generally lack the experience, knowledge and information relating to the secure placement of 
savings or entering into the investment market340. The questions that arise in this regard include 
the following: what are the activities requiring a license? Is licensing a general rule or is it an 
exception? Why is it requested? To properly address the questions this section is divided into 
two sub-sections discussing first the forms of financial licensing (sub-section 1), then the legal 
consequences resulting out of obtaining such a license (sub-section 2). 
Sub-section 1: Forms of Financial Licensing 
121 License. A license is the legal document giving official permission to do something, it 
may be considered as a permit despite the difference in their legal consequences. From a more 
concise legal point of view, the license is a permission granted by a competent authority to 
exercise a certain privilege without which, the exercise would be considered as an illegal or 
unlawful act341, generally the privilege is granted in return for a fee342. The license is permanent 
by nature, nonetheless no person holds the absolute right to a license; in some legislations the 
license is limited to a certain number of years or connected to the existence of a character or 
certain conditions. The license is conditional and restricted in nature. 
122 Authorization. An authorization is permission. From a legal standpoint, it is used to 
empower a person with the legal right to perform an action343. The Authorization is a process 
that constitutes of endowing or conferring a person with legal power to perform a specific action 
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or activity. It could refer to a document that gives some right such as a legislation authorizing 
the operation of a person for a specific period344. The authorization is temporary in nature.  
123 An authorization vs. a license. License and authorize may be used as synonyms despite 
the existing differences between them. From a mere legal point of view, they are similar. They 
differ in their legal consequences345. In our case, the debate emerges in the difference of the 
terms used to address the second stage of the registration process of ICs, whether the Company 
is authorized or licensed to commence its financial services. The different legislations use 
different terms to address a roughly identical procedure. French and EU approaches use the 
same terminology, the legal rules address an authorization as for the Jordanian rules they state 
the term “license”. The previously mentioned definitions of both the license and the 
authorization appear to be similar nonetheless in the legal concept the license may be more 
restrictive and general than the authorization. The US approach for example was different and to 
some extent simpler; the IC does not require an authorization or a license to commence its 
financial services the Company merely files a notification for registration346 with the SEC 
followed by a registration statement347. 
124 Appropriate term. The main activity of the IC is portfolio investments therefore 
constituting a financial service. The risk associated with this form of services is at high stake, in 
the process of providing a solid protection for shareholders the license appears to be the most 
suitable option, if merely the legal restrictions, conditions and consequences are taken into 
consideration. Nonetheless, if the question is to protect shareholders while at the same time 
have an efficient but slightly faster registration process then the authorization avails as the 
suitable option. As will be further explained later in this sub-section despite the difference in the 
terms the procedure was nearly identical in both systems. This similarity provides the possibility 
to use both terms as synonyms whenever the financial registration stage of the IC is concerned. 
IC follows a financial registration procedure embodied in a financial license or authorization 
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issued by the domestic securities authority. The procedure is administrative therefore, it consists 
of several phases including filing an application and issuing an administrative decision. In this 
sub-section, the general organization of licensing application is illustrated. The sub-section 
introduces the scope of application of the financial license (paragraph 1), in addition to the 
application framework (paragraph 2). 
§1: The Organization of the Financial License 
125 Scope of application. As was earlier emphasized the IC is required to obtain a prior 
authorization from the competent authority to commence its activities. This authorization finds 
its reasoning in the type of activities ICs exercise. The IC is a form of institutional investment 
through which investors (in our case shareholders) pool their funds and hire professionals to 
manage their investments (expert management body), with each investor entitled to a 
proportional share of the net benefits of its ownership348. Therefore, the importance of the 
investor protection emerges as a major objective of the financial sector. The activities of the IC 
involve risk taking, the role of the public policy and jurisprudence is to establish and ensure a 
fixed and solid framework to control and predict future risks. An essential part of this 
framework is the preventive measures embodied in a form of prior authorization of the financial 
standings, professionalism and credibility of the institutions expected to provide financial 
services. 
126 Authorized management. In order to exercise efficiently its activities, the IC employs 
internal components (staff and management) who are competent and hold the necessary 
experience, knowledge and expertise to fulfill their duties349. The investor protection takes the 
form of a supervision that is practiced by an external body ensuring the existence of the said 
competences and expertise in the appointed components. Consequently, to the external 
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supervision the scope of application of the financial authorization extends to include the 
management and the specialized personnel the IC wishes to appoint350. 
127 General authorization obligation. Different domestic securities and financial rules 
address financial authorization requirement. The Jordanian legislature follows a similar 
approach in its securities rules. The rules impose a licensing obligation on all the companies that 
have as their main activity financial services351. These rules prohibit the exercise of financial 
activities without obtaining a prior license from the JSC352. The French legislature follows a 
similar approach and imposes an authorization obligation on the part of the ICs. The obligation 
is general and covers any company that has as its primary business portfolio management for 
third parties as is provided in the Code Monétaire et Financier. These companies obtain a prior 
authorization from the AMF353.  
128 Financial Services. Financial services constitute of all the activities that qualify as 
needing a prior financial authorization. The term “service” means a task that an individual 
performs or provides for another. The “financial service” means the process of acquiring the 
financial good354. The domestic securities and financial rules provide a definition for the 
financial services by stating the activities considered as part thereof. Financial services include 
activities and services relating to financial instruments355, or those activities exercised by 
intermediaries, trustees, investment managers, financial consultants, issuers and other similar 
undertakings356. These activities and services may be primary or secondary. Primary activities 
constitute of the services of receipt, transmission and execution of orders on behalf of third 
                                                          
350This matter was previously addressed in Chapter 1 of this Title, whereas it was illustrated that the competent 
authority issues professional licenses or requires a special registration from the management and the remaining 
personnel working for the IC 
351 Article 4.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 4.a,b Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
352 Article 3.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 3.b Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
353 Preamble of AMF instr. DOC-2008- , Authorization procedure for investment management companies, 
dis losu e o ligatio s a d pass po ti g”; AMF, Instr. DOC-2011- , P o du es d ag e t, à l ta lisse e t d u  
DICI1 et d u  p ospe tus et à l i fo atio  p iodi ue des OPCVM oo do s f a çais et des OPCVM oo do s 
t a ge s o e ialis s e  F a e  
354 I e a As u dso , What are Financial Services? How consumers and Businesses Acquire Financial Goods such 
as Loans  and  I su a e  (Finance  & Development , IMF 2011) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/03/pdf/basics.pdf> Accessed27 January 2016 
355 C. mon. fin., art. L. 321-1; C. mon. fin., art. D. 321-1  
356 Article 2.a Licensing Regulation of 2005  
 
75 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
parties, own-account trading, portfolio management, investment advice, underwriting, and 
others357. As for secondary activities, they include among other things custodianship and 
administration of financial instruments, granting credits and loans to investors, consultancy 
services provided to companies in relation to their capital structure or industrial strategy, 
investment research and analysis, and the services associated with underwriting358. As part of 
the financial activities that require a prior authorization or license are those related to 
intermediation, investment management, investment trusteeship, underwriting, safe keeper, 
margin finance and brokerage359. UCITS Directive did not provide a definition to financial 
services. When referring to other EU legislations we find that financial services are defined as 
any service of banking, credit, insurance, personal pension, investment or payment nature360. 
Another definition linked to the former one, yet addressed in different terminology relates to 
investment services and activities is mentioned under EU law. The investment services are 
considered as any service such as the previously mentioned primary activities361, which relate to 
an instrument including transferable securities, units in CIU or money-market 
instruments362.The UCITS Directive when addressing the object of the IC provided two 
categories of activities UCITS may exercise therefore requires prior authorization. They include 
a primary activity meaning the collective investment in transferable securities or in other liquid 
financial assets363. In addition to a secondary category, including services related to portfolio 
investment such as management of portfolios of investments including those owned by pension 
funds364, and none-core services such as investment advice, safekeeping and administration365.  
129 Role of competent authority. IC is required to obtain a prior authorization or license 
ahead of commencing its financial services and activities. The question that rises in this regard 
is; who issues this authorization or license? Domestic competent authorities are responsible for 
                                                          
357C. mon. fin., art. L. 321-1 
358C. mon. fin., art. L. 321-2 
359 Article 3.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 3.b Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
360 Article 2 (Council Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services [2002] OJL 271/16) 
361 Section A - Annex 1 (Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU [2014] OJL 
173/349) 
362 Section C- Annex 1 MiFID; Article 4.1.2 MiFID 
363 Article 1.2(a) UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
364 Article 6.3(a) UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
365 Article 6.2(b) UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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reviewing the authorization or license application and they issue a decision regarding this 
application within a set period of time. Who is this competent authority? The competent 
authority means the public body that carries out the duties provided for in the securities 
regulations in addition to those authorities enjoying supervisory and administrative powers that 
are financial-services oriented366. The identification of the powers, activities and components of 
these authorities shall be further explained in Part II; for the purpose of this section, the 
competent authority means the domestic securities commission. 
130 Vital Role. The competent authority has a vital role in the financial licensing and 
authorization process. National legislation addresses the scope of jurisdiction of this authority in 
both prior and post establishment stages. In terms of the prior establishment stage, the 
registration and licensing, the organization of the activities and the structure of the IC is 
governed by the competent authority367.  
131 Supervisory vs administrative power. The competent authority exercises various forms of 
powers that are stipulated in national securities regulations. These powers include among other 
things supervisory and administrative powers. As part of the supervisory powers, the competent 
authority enjoys; are organization and control of the licensed or authorized entities (including 
the IC)368. The authority supervises the activities and performance of the IC, further it ensures 
the companies’ compliance with the governing legal rules essentially the authorization 
conditions. The supervision is complemented with an administrative, disciplinary and public 
enforcement powers.  
132 Powers vs. Procedures. The authority receives the authorization or license application; it 
is then responsible for reviewing the application and issuing a decision369. In the process of 
reviewing the application, the competent authority enjoys vast power and discretion to request 
further information or documents it deems necessary370. The authority further imposes 
                                                          
366C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-1 ; Article 98 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 ; Article 7.a JSL of 2017 
367 Article 209.a JCC ; Article 15 JSL ; C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-9 ; Article 97 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
368 Article 8.b(4) JSL of 2017 
369 Article 7 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5 Licensing Bylaw of 2018; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-7 
370 Article 9.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5.s/bis Licensing Bylaw of 2018; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-6  
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application fees that applicant companies comply with371. Once the reviewing stage is over, the 
competent authority issues a reasoned decision. Decisions made by the competent authority 
include those related to licensing application and post authorization or licensing process372. In 
order to profoundly comprehend the licensing requirement the following paragraph illustrates 
the administrative procedure for financial licensing, most importantly it defines the content of 
the application, its conditions and the reviewing period.  
§2: Financial License Administrative Procedure 
133 Administrative process. The administrative process should be restricted and thoroughly 
addressed by domestic rules. This process is seen as the procedure by which the applicant 
company files the required documents with the competent authority revealing essential facts and 
information about its current financial standing, asset description and the illegibility for future 
investment activities373. The information is essential to investors when making their choice of 
the company they intend to invest in. As any administrative process, the financial approval 
requires a form or an application to be filed and a group of conditions to be met. The structure 
of the application and the medium of submission are slightly similar in the different domestic 
financial and securities rules. Due to the role of recent technologies and in the course of 
facilitating the administrative process, the domestic rules provides an electronic application 
option in addition to the paper based one374. What are the different procedural stages? 
Generally, the application procedure takes off with filling out the application form, attaching the 
required documents and full declaration of the requested information. The following stage is to 
submit the application with the competent authority and pay the application fees if requested. 
The application then enters into an ‘assess and review’ stage. Throughout this stage the 
competent authority evaluates the submitted application, ensures the existence of the entirety of 
the required documents and that the imposed conditions are fulfilled within a set period of time. 
The final stage is the decisions the competent authority reaches after reviewing the application.  
                                                          
371 Article 27.a(2) JSL of 2017 
372 Article 12 JSL of 2017; Articles 7 & 107 UCITS Dir. 2009/65  
373 Registration definition, <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/registration.asp> Accessed 3 February 2016 
374 The AMF stated in Book 4 of its GR that the authorization application of the SICAV is filed electronically (AMF, 
régl. gén., art. 411-6) therefore limiting the use of hardcopies, facilitating the administrative procedures and 
minimizing the risk of documents loss  
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134 First phase of financial licensing is submitting the application. In order to reach this 
point the applicant Company should first fill out the written form375; while at the same time 
include all the required information376.  The applicant Company attests, in the application form, 
to the validity of the provided information377. The applicant attaches the application package 
along with the application form when filed with the competent authority. The application 
package should comply with the standard package referred to in the governing legal rules378. 
The package constitutes of different categories of information general, specialized, technical 
and precautionary. The information provides a detailed presentation of the company and its 
project. Therefore, it allows an efficient supervision by the authority over company’s 
propositions; eventually reflecting the standing of the company before potential future investors.  
135 General Information. The application should include, general information identifying 
the applicant. The name of the applicant (name of the Company) and the person responsible for 
the preparation of the authorization form in case the application is filed on behalf of the 
Company. The form of the company and its initial registration number (including a proof of 
deposit of the initial capital379), the purpose of the application, the general information 
concerning headquarters, branches, offices, senior management and their domicile, shareholders 
and their holding percentages, in addition to any additional information the competent authority 
may request380.  
136 Packaged specialized information. Oriented to provide sufficient financial background 
on the applicant company and its components. They are essential for the establishment of a solid 
basis for future provided financial services. Among other things, this category of information 
includes the scope of the program of activity. The program constitutes of the form of 
management self or outsourced, the authorized instruments within the scope of activity of the 
applicant and the targeted investors within its scope (retail or professionals). In addition to, 
collective management strategies (asset allocation, stock picking, directional risks), the 
                                                          
375 C. mon. fin., art. R. 532-10; Article 47 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
376 Article 48.a JSL of 2017 
377 Article 7 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
378 AMF, instr. DOC-2011-19, art. 1; AMF, instr. DOC-2008-03, art. 1 
379 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-8 
380 Article 7 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5 Licensing Bylaw of 2018; Article 8.1, 2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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compliance and internal control guide and the investment process (including the role of the 
persons in charge, the decision-making procedures and traceability). Further to the description 
of the circuit used to channel orders, defining and updating the best execution and/or best 
selection policy, risk management, conflicts of interest policy (including persons or departments 
in charge of drafting the policy, the validation process, and the frequency of assessments and 
updates). The program addresses instruments valuation, data retention and record-keeping 
organization, financial information (preliminary assumptions for companies under 
establishment, development assumptions) in addition to a forecast of the financial statements381. 
137 Technical resources. The information that are linked and related to the management 
(portfolio monitoring, risk valuation, development and market data input procedures and other 
related tools and software)382.  
138 Precautionary information. The applicant Company should provide as part of its activity 
program an Anti-Money Laundry and Terrorist Financing (AML/TF) risk policy. This policy 
should define the persons in charge of implementing the AML/TF system, identifying and 
positioning the activities forming Money Laundry or Terrorist Financing in the organization 
chart and internal control policy, the scope of business covered within this system and the 
AML/TF procedures383. The competent authority may require as a precautionary measure, to 
provide unconditional financial guarantees to guarantee the legal commitments and 
responsibilities towards future clients384. Furthermore, the applicant company should provide 
the necessary information to clarify its reputation, records and links with other companies385. 
                                                          
381 Article 7.h-s Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5.i Licensing Bylaw of 2018; Annex  1.1 Standard Authorization 
Application Package of the AMF Instruction DOC-2008-03, 7 August 2015; Article 7.1.c UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
382 Article 8 Licensing Regulation of 2005; the newly implemented Licensing bylaw of 2018 does not address this 
fo  of esou es. This e ui e e t is i po ta t to p o e appli a t o pa s p epa atio  a d apa ilities to 
provide the activities requiring the license; Annex 1.1 Standard Authorization Application Package 
383 Annex 1.1 Standard Authorization Application Package; Article 2.c (Scope of application includes Investment 
Companies) Anti-Money Laundry and Terrorist Financing Regulation of 2010; Article 6 (main obligations) AML/TF 
Regulation of 2010 
384 Article 50 JSL of 2017 
385 Article 9.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; the newly implemented Licensing Bylaw of 2018 does not address such 
an obligation. This legal silence is interpreted negatively in terms of lea i g i esto s  i te est at stake of hoosi g 
to invest in a company that does not meet the standards or hinders conflicts of interest that may result in a breach 
of securities rules or harming investors and incurring them losses 
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139 Conditions. Alongside the information package, the applicant company should meet 
certain conditions to reach an all-star complete licensing application. The conditions relate, 
generally, to the initial registration at the company’s registry. The competent authority 
designates the conditions that allow full incorporation of a financial service provider386. The 
first condition addressed under domestic rules is the one that ensures fulfillment of the 
minimum capital requirement. Previously explained that the OEIC is obliged to meet the 
minimum capital requirement only at the moment of incorporation387. The possession and proof 
of deposit of the amount of capital set in the AOA of the IC reflects the dependence of this stage 
of organization on the earlier one (initial registration), the capital related information highlights 
the financial standing of the applicant and provides a sufficient liquidity for later cash-outs. The 
other conditions are connected to the expertise and reputation of the management body388, the 
payment of the application fees389, and providing financial guarantees390. 
140 Application fees. The licensing or authorization granted to the IC is not complementary 
nor is it free of charge. As any administrative procedure, the financial licensing requires the 
applicant to pay a fixed administrative fee differing from one financial service to the other. The 
fees may also differ depending on the nature of the filed application (initial application or 
supplementary documents)391. Both the Jordanian and French securities rules imposed a fixed 
application fee on the applicants. The Jordanian rules provided an exclusive fee for the 
investment fund392, and disregarded the IC (if IC is considered as a financial services company 
consequently it is covered in the fees applying to these companies)393. Nonetheless, it remains 
obliged to pay licensing fees according to licensing Regulation.  
141 Role of competent authority. Once the applicant prepares a complete application 
including the packaged information and the supplementary documents, the application is filed 
                                                          
386 C. mon. fin, art. L. 214-5 
387 Article 4.c, d Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 4.d,h Licensing Bylaw of 2018; Article 7.1.a UCITS Directive 
65/2009 
388 Article 4.h Licensing regulation of 2005; article 4.o Licensing Bylaw of 2018; Article 7.1.b UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
389 Article 4.o Licensing Regulation of 2005; C. mon. fin, art. L. 621-5-3 
390 Article 4.z Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 6 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
391 C. mon. fin., art. D. 621-27 
392 Article 8 Securities Commission fees Bylaw of 1999 
393 Article 6.a Securities Commission fees Bylaw of 1999 
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with the competent authority. The competent authority in its turn follows certain steps before it 
issues the final decision. These steps constitute the processing and evaluation period.  
142 Necessary vs. excessive requirements. The administrative procedure of financial 
licensing and authorization is similar to other administrative procedures; long and require a lot 
of paper work. The questions emerging in this regard: Are the required information excessive? 
What form of effect does this requirement have on the period of preparation and review: is it 
negative or positive? Previously noted that the main object of ICs is portfolio investment based 
on risk sharing. The main object is a financial service; in this form of service, the administrative 
body seeks a balance between the interests of both poles of the services (provider and recipient). 
To ensure the interests of recipients of financial services governing legal rules impose strict 
conditions and requirements that provide a thorough overview of the provider’s background. 
The strictness is derogated from when the recipient is a professional in financial services field. 
Deciding whether the financial licensing requirements are excessive or necessary is debatable. 
The financial background is important to predict future performance of the provider using 
current or assumptive numbers. The requirements may be considered excessive yet they are 
necessary to the decision of the competent authority. How else could the authority tell that the 
applicant is eligible to provide financial services? The effect on the length of the prior licensing 
procedure is not entirely negative nor positive. The applicant company when preparing the 
licensing or authorization application is in fact drafting a proposal to their insight and view of 
the business. The governing legal rules in mitigating the length of the administrative procedure 
may limit the application to an electronic form (such as French ones). As for the legal 
consequences of the licensing or authorization application, they are explained in the following 
sub-section. 
Sub-section 2: Post-Licensing Consequences: Maintaining a Valid License 
143 National perspective of evaluation. Applicant companies prepare a complete 
authorization or licensing application and files it with the competent authority. This statement 
draws us back to the role of the competent authority. The authority exercises a preliminary 
control that detects any inaccuracies or ambiguity the company may be in, ahead of 
commencing the performance. Therefore, having a key role in hindering anti-shareholder 
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interest actions. The main role of the authority commences at the official filing of the 
application, therefore it is embodied in evaluating and assessing the application leading to a 
reasoned decision. The AMF states in its general regulation multiple steps that it follows during 
this period beginning with the receipt of the application and verification of its components and 
resulting in a final reasoned decision. Once the AMF verifies the complete compliant 
application it issues an acknowledgement or receipt showing that the application package is 
officially filed394. Following that, the AMF reviews the application. During this stage, the AMF 
may request additional information; the processing stage generally ends with a decision395. The 
JSL did not provide a similar thorough explanation to the processing and evaluation stage. The 
JSL merely provides the period during which the JSC should issue its decision396. The 
designated period is sixty days following filling a complete application without providing the 
measures in case the decision was not taken on time397. The AMF provides a slightly shorter 
period; one month following the filing of the application398; if the IC appoints a MC otherwise 
the response is made three months following the submission of the application with the power to 
extend this period to three additional ones399.  
144 Restricted control. The AMF is granted a restricted control over the authorization 
decision in the case of SICAV with outsourced management. The restriction is the de facto 
authorization of the SICAV if the AMF does not respond to the application a month following 
issuing its acknowledgement of receipt400. Further, a shorter processing timeframe is imposed 
by the AMF rules in case the applicant company was comparable401, to a UCITS that was 
                                                          
394 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 2; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 3 
395 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 5; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 4 
396 Article 48.h JSL of 2017; Article 9.c Licensing Regulation of 2005;the newly implemented Licensing bylaw of 
2018 does not address the period 
397 Previously noted that in the initial registration of the Investment Company, the JCC states that in case of time 
lapse with no decision of approval of initial registration made by the Minister of Industry and Trade the company is 
de facto registered. In connection with the financial licensing no such exception was provided  
398 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-7 
399 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-7; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 2; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 4 
400AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-6 (I); AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-  I  The a k o ledge e t of e eipt stipulates a e  
deadli e fo  autho izatio , hi h a ot e lo ge  tha  the o e p e iousl  efe ed to.  
401 Known as agrément par analogie. The AMF assesses the comparability by referring, among other things, to: 
both undertakings are managed by the same MC, the reference UCITS was authorized less than eighteen months 
prior to the date of application, the reference UCITS did not undergo any changes and both undertakings have 
similar investment strateg , isk p ofile a d ope atio al ules; Oli ie  Dou eleu , La Nou elle P o du e 
d Ag e t « pa  a alogie » des OPCVM    ‘TDF  
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previously authorized by the AMF (eight business days)402. This restriction may be viewed as an 
approach facilitating the authorization of IC, and urging the rapidity in administrative decisions; 
yet the investor protection should be taken into account. No similar exceptions, restrictions or 
distinction is provided under the JSL. 
145 Evaluation period over. The main outcome of the evaluation period is the decision the 
competent authority reaches. This decision is followed by legal consequences and actions that 
the then authorized company should perform and comply with. What types of decisions the 
authority issues? What are the legal consequences of these decisions? To be answered in the 
following paragraphs. 
§1: Legalities of the Licensing Application 
146 Types of decisions. The obvious outcome of the evaluation period is a decision that the 
competent authority issues; based on the content of the application and the program of activity. 
Generally, the decisions issued by the competent authority may be negative or positive. The 
positive outcome is to grant the authorization or license, as for the negative one consists of 
refusing to authorize or license. The question emerging in this regard: why would the competent 
authority choose one decision over the other? What legal consequences this choice imposes? 
147 Positive decision. Granting the authorization requires the competent authority to examine 
among other things the AOA, the investment strategy, shares classes, the choice of depositary 
and the choice of a MC403. The reasoning behind this examination is ensuring that there is no 
legal impediment preventing the IC from exercising its activities within the regulated market. 
The competent authority when deciding to grant the authorization should notify the applicant 
company. The letter informing the then authorized company should include the authorization 
number, the date of the authorization and most importantly the scope of the authorization404. 
The scope of the authorization is based on the content of the program of activity the company 
filed with the authority. 
                                                          
402 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-6 (II); AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-7 (II) 
403 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-7 ; AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-8 
404 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 4 
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148 Notification of authorization. The letter notifying the acceptance of the authorization to 
the applicant company is issued within the timeframe designated by law. It also includes the 
information previously mentioned and often might be conditional. The competent authority may 
include a specific requirement in the notification. The requirement is aimed at safeguarding the 
balanced structure of the IC. As an example of the conditions included in the authorization are 
those relating to the effective establishment of the Company or providing the evidence that the 
application conditions are met within the given time. In case these conditions are not met, the 
authorization lapses. Once the authorization becomes effective, the Company references itself as 
an authorized IC, along with its authorization number, in its publicly available documents. This 
reference shall not, in any way be understood as a seal of quality or guarantee. The reference is 
merely for transparency and investor protection reasons. Where potential investors may verify 
the actual authorization of the company and its validity using these referencing numbers. The 
notification is made by the AMF for French ICs; no such explanation is mentioned under the 
JSL or the Licensing Regulation. The Jordanian legislature do not provide details in connection 
with the approval of licensing. The law merely addresses the time limit.  
149 No decision on time. What happens if the JSC does not issue the decision within the 
timeframe the securities rules designate? The period within which the license should be issued 
is a mere regulatory framework; meaning the licensing decisions issued after the time lapse 
stated by law (sixty days) does not in any way affect the validity of the decision. Under the 
general rule of administrative law the applicant company has the right to contest the absence of 
the administrative decision (what is also known as passive administrative decision) before 
administrative courts post submitting a written request to the authority to issue the decision405. 
The JSL, on the other hand, designated the court of first instance as the competent court406. The 
application of this designation is restricted to the cases the term competent court is used in the 
law, such as the case of conflict resolution (in terms of the compensation, penalizing and 
damages and cases of securities rules infringements). This restriction creates a debate over the 
actual competent court in the matters that relate to the JSL. The arguments revolve around the 
possibility to extend the scope of application of the term to include all the conflicts and 
                                                          
405 Article 8.h Administrative Justice Code of 2014 
406 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
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inconveniences resulting from the application of the JSL. For the purposes of this section, the 
competent court in matters relating to the absence of decision shall be the administrative court. 
Therefore, the general rule is applicable.  
150 Negative decision. The competent authority may refuse to authorize the applicant 
company407. The different legal rules address the general reasons for the refusal. Generally, a 
refusal is issued by the securities authority as a result of filing an incomplete application with 
the authority whether in connection with the initial application or the failure to present the 
supplementary documents. The authority may choose to send back the non-compliant or 
incomplete application to the applicant company; while including a reasoned decision408. The 
securities rules provide other specific reasons for the refusal to authorize; they include the case 
of absence of designation of a MC without meeting the exception capital threshold409. The non-
compliance with the conditions and requirements of the licensing by a member of the 
management in the applicant company results in a refusal410. In other cases the securities rules 
mixed between the reasons for annulment and refusal of licensing. The JSL provides the same 
reasoning for annulment and refusal in an approach that covers the post-licensing violations and 
non-compliance. An example of the reasons addressed in the JSL the violation of the securities 
rules, providing inaccurate information in the licensing application and providing evidence that 
the applicant is in fact unqualified to exercise the financial activities411.  
151 Reasoned decisions. The refusal decision in particular and other forms of negative 
decisions in general that are issued in connection with the implementation of the securities rules 
or the exercise of the competent authority’s powers should be reasoned when communicated to 
the applicants412. The UCITS Directive explicitly state that any decision taken under the laws 
                                                          
407 Article 48.h JSL of 2017; Article 9.c Licensing Regulation of 2005; In connection with the financial registration of 
the staff and management: Article 48.c Licensing Regulation of 2005; The general rule under the UCITS Dir. 
2009/65 states that the authorization of the IC is domestically determined by MS (Article 27), nonetheless the 
Directive introduced case example of the refusal to authorize (Articles 29 and 107); in the newly implemented 
licensing bylaw of 2018 no such power is mentioned 
408 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 2 
409 Article 29.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65: the exception threshold is holding a minimum initial capital of three hundred 
thousand Euros 
410 Article 58 JSL of 2017 
411 Article 60 JSL of 2017 
412 Article 107.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 4; Jo. Co. admin., 06 Oct. 2010, n° 421/2010 
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and regulations adopting this Directive is subject to a right of appeal in the courts413. Neither the 
JSL nor the Licensing Regulation explicitly state such a right; nonetheless the absence of an 
explicit rule cannot be interpreted as having a securities commission that issues final conclusive 
decisions that cannot be contested. The absence is positively interpreted meaning: the existence 
of a right to contest an administrative decision before administrative courts in accordance with 
general rules of law414. 
152 Legal consequences of decision. As a natural legal consequence of the positive decision 
is considering the applicant company as an authorized or licensed IC, therefore it may 
commence the exercise of its activities and functions415. The competent authority should inform 
the company with the authorization or license416, in addition it should inform the licensed 
company in writing with its right to commence its activities417. Previously mentioned that the 
AMF communicates a letter to the IC informing it of the authorization and its related conditions 
and content. The medium of communication is not limited in the AMF general regulation on the 
other hand the Jordanian securities rules limited the communication to the written form. The 
right to commence the activities is addressed under the JCC and is granted to the Company 
Controller to communicate it in writing to the Plc. once the controller verifies the completion of 
the incorporation procedures418. This article applies to the IC nevertheless; the complete 
incorporation of the IC requires the licensing under the JSL. The fact that the IC solely exercises 
the activity of portfolio investments extends the application of this rule to the moment of 
granting the financial license due to the inability to exercise the main activity prior to the 
license. Taking into consideration the recent amendment of the JSL that transfer organizational 
and supervisory functions of the company controller to the JSC; the power to issue such 
notification may be transferred to the JSC instead of the company controller. 
153 Creating a supervisory power. The other legal consequence resulting from the 
authorization or licensing decision is granting supervisory and administrative powers to the 
                                                          
413 Article 107.2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65  
414 Article 5 Administrative Justice Code of 2014 
415 Recital 12 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
416 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 4; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-6 
417 Article 19 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
418 Article 108.c JCC 
 
87 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
competent authority. The competent authority is not an administrative decision-maker involved 
solely in the pre-licensing decision. The role of the authority extends to post-licensing stages. 
The authority exercises supervisory and administrative powers over the licensed or authorized 
companies (to be further explained in part II). These powers include laying down rules of 
conduct that authorized companies observe; these rules ensure the compliance of company’s 
activities with duties and measures set by law419, in addition, the authority draws up prudential 
rules420. More or less, prudential rules represent a precautionary and minimum requirement that 
market participants should respect they do not hold a strong obligatory nature as that of the 
regulatory rules. The authorized or licensed company complies with securities rules, competent 
authority supervises this compliance and enjoys intervening and investigatory powers in 
connection with any suspected action that threatens the stability of the financial market or 
increases the risks of investors421. The supervision is further exercised through imposing 
communication and reporting obligation on the Company of material changes in the information 
filed earlier with the authority422. The main concern of the following parts shall be oriented 
towards the positive decision. It was discussed in this paragraph the natural legal consequences 
to the licensing decision (commencing of activities and supervisory power), all of which 
positively influences investor interest whether the investor is a founding shareholder or potential 
future shareholder. The list of consequences is ongoing and includes continuous and renewable 
ones. The following paragraph illustrates generally the requirements and the conditional nature 
of the license or authorization.  
§2: Ongoing Post-Licensing Conditions 
154 Maintain valid conditions. The authorization or license creates a continuous legal effect 
in the form of a continuous supervision over the Company. Meaning the authorization or license 
is conditional; therefore the Company complies with the conditions otherwise the authority 
intervenes with its administrative power and issues disciplinary decisions. The IC is required to 
fulfill a list of conditions to be issued a financial license or authorization. These requirements 
                                                          
419 Article 14 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
420 Article 31 UCITS Dir. 2009/65  
421 Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005; Article 60 JSL of 2017 
422 Article 80 Licensing Regulation of 2005; the newly implemented licensing bylaw of 2018 does not address the 
disclosure obligation; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 10; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 6 
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impose on the IC an obligation to maintain the conditions valid at all times423, in addition to 
holding valid the requirements during the life of the license424. The validity of the conditions 
and their existence is crucial to the licensing procedure and post-licensing stages. The inability 
of the applicant company to provide complete information and documents at the time of 
application results in voiding the submitted application425. As a natural consequence to 
maintaining a valid license or authorization is the reporting obligation imposed on the 
Company. This obligation forms an inseparable part of the general reporting obligation ICs are 
requested to fulfil during their legal existence426. The reporting obligation consists of formally 
informing the domestic securities’ authority of any change in the provided information, where 
this change may have an effect on the authorization or the license427, therefore influencing 
investment decisions current and future ones. The reporting may take the form of a declaration 
or a notification; designated depending on the nature of the modified information or 
condition428. Some changes require a prior approval of the securities commission429, as for 
others they need a mere notification of the current state. The AMF provides a procedure for the 
modification similar to that of the initial registration430.  
155 Modification procedure. It is a two-step procedure regardless of the modified 
information; nonetheless, the AMF role differs from one case to the other. The AMF presents 
two forms of procedures for the modification: the prior approval (known as mutations) and the 
immediate declaration (known as changements)431. AMF instructions identify the modifications 
that require a prior approval; they include the modifications of the program of activity 
(including those relating to the management structure, and authorized instruments), this 
modification covers the case of the reorganization and restructuring of the company432. Further, 
                                                          
423 Article 6 Licensing Regulation of 2005 (the same obligation applies to the management of the  company Article 
46, article 20.b Licensing Bylaw of 2018); article 8 Licensing Bylaw of 2018; Article 10.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
424 Article 59 JSL of 2017; C. mon. Fin., art. L. 532-9 
425 Article 9.d Licensing Regulation of 2005 (the same applies for the management of the company Article 48.d) 
426 The general reporting obligation (Disclosure) further explained in Part II  
427 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 8; C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-9-1; Article 80 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
428 C. mon. fin, art. L. 532-9-1(II) 
429 Article 5.6 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 ; article 22 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
430 AMF, instr. 2008-03, Title 2; AMF, instr. 2011-19, Chapter 1 section II (article 6 and following) 
431 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 8; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 6 
432 AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 18  
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the prior approval is requested in modifications affecting merger and acquisition operations433. 
In addition to the modification of the investment policy and strategy. As for modifications that 
request solely an immediate declaration to the AMF, they include modification of company’s 
identifications (name, contact details and statutes), the changes in the capital structure (share 
ownership, affiliates and others) in addition to the modification of the compliance officer 
system (risk controllers and company correspondents). The modification procedure begins with 
submitting a two copies application (courier or electronic) while attaching all the required 
documents (the AMF has the right to request any complementary information post this 
application)434. In case of declaration, the AMF provides a template for the declaration, the 
Companies send it filled out to the Authority435. Following this submission, the AMF verifies 
the complete documents or information then it issues a decision. The AMF decision contains an 
approval of the modification436, or decides that the modification does not require any further 
observation on its part437. The AMF may decide to issue a reasoned refusal to the modifications, 
or a notification of the impact and the eventual consequences the modifications will have on the 
issued authorization. Consequently, affecting investors’ level of protection and the investment 
environment. The AMF provides extensive explanation of the modification method in specific 
cases that relate to the change in capital ownership (major takeovers)438. In addition, the case 
where the IC delegates its financial management439.The Jordanian rules state explicitly the 
notification form440, and addresses the obligatory nature of the prior approval of the JSC for the 
modifications of the AOA441. As for other modifications, they are submitted with the JSC as a 
natural result the JSC reviews the submitted change and have the discretion to exercise its 
                                                          
433 AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 21 
434 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 9.I AMF, instr. 2011-19, arts. 15, 13.1 
435 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 10; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 17 (Declaration on GECO data base) 
436 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 9.II; AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 15  
437 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 10  
438 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 9-1; AMF, instr. 2011-19, arts. 13-2, 13-3   
439 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 10-1; The Instruction addresses two cases: the modification of the assigned entity and 
that relating to the initial assigning (delegation is limited in criteria and conditions). Both cases require an update 
of the program of activity; therefore, a mere declaration is not enough (Articles 11 and 12); AMF, instr. 2011-19, 
art. 9 
440 Article 80 Licensing Regulation of 2005 states the modifications that are communicated to the JSC. These 
modifications include those relating to company details, AOA, capital, merger and acquisition in addition to the 
cases the Company is involved in disputes before courts (whether or not a sentence is rendered)  
441 Article 98.b JSL of 2017; the newly implemented licensing bylaw of 2018 requires a prior approval of the JSC to 
the changes in the AOA, place of exercising business or branches and the change in initial capital (article 22) 
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discretionary powers to suspend or annul the license when the modification crucially affects the 
validity of such or approve the modification442.  
156 Consequential measures. Supervisory power of securities authority resulting out of 
issuing a license or an authorization provides it with general powers and competences. It 
permits the authority to impose sanctions, in addition to undertake a form of precautionary and 
disciplinary measures against the suspected company in all that concerns the legal value of the 
license or the violation of securities rules443. The securities authority, depending on the form of 
violation, issues four main decisions or undertakes four main measures in connection with the 
license. These decisions or measures include suspension, restriction, revocation and withdrawal 
of license444. The decisions directly affect the activities of the company as the IC risk being 
suspended consequently affecting shareholders’ interest and needs. The first three measures are 
addressed in the Jordanian Securities rules as for the French rules they address a sole form that 
is the withdrawal of the authorization (Retrait d’agrément). 
157 Suspension. JSC’s Council445 may decide to suspend the license of a registered IC as 
either a preliminary precautionary measure or a final decision when the securities rules are 
violated. The suspension as a preliminary or precautionary measure is resorted to in cases 
involving violations of securities rules, including incorrect information in the license 
application, performing a restricted activity or in case an evidence of the incapacity of the 
licensee is presented446. In addition to the case of having an IC, facing risks (generally financial 
ones) or the activities of which are threatening market stability447. The preliminary measure is 
taken prior to the official questioning of the concerned individual or entity448, or as a 
precautionary measure until further action by the JSC is taken449. The suspension is further 
                                                          
442 Article 49 JSL of 2017 
443 A ti le  J“L of : This A ti le add esses the ge e al po e s of the J“C s Cou il  
444 Article 12 JSL of 2017 
445 The executive body of the JSC, this council is responsible for the management of the Commission and the 
supervision of its activities (Article 10 JSL of 2017)  
446 Article 60.a JSL of 2017 
447 Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005; no such statement is addressed in the newly implemented licensing 
bylaw of 2018 
448 Article 60.c JSL of 2017 
449 Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
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imposed following a formal investigation450 or questioning451. The suspension is a temporary 
action by nature that puts the license out of service meanwhile a follow up decision is reached; 
of revoking, withdrawing, restricting or lifting the suspension off the license452. The suspension 
does not void the license; therefore, the license can be re-issued if a decision of lifting the 
suspension is taken hence reinstating the financial services capacities.  
158 Restricting a License. The financial license may be restricted for reasons including the 
violation of the securities rules, evidence of committed fraud or deception and the conviction 
before courts of committing fraud or deception in transactions involving securities453. The 
restriction may be taken following a suspension towards an IC that faces financial risks, or 
whose activities threaten the stability of the market454. A restricted license is a conditional 
license. This restriction is generally issued when valid reasons present that the IC in question 
can no longer adhere to the same standards and requirements as other financial institutions. The 
securities commission introduces a restriction to a valid license that illustrates the activities that 
can be exercised455.  
159 Revoking a License. It is a mandatory restraint imposed on a valid license. The revoked 
license is an invalid license that cannot be re-issued. The revocation of the license is reached as 
a result of an evidenced violation. The violation might be in the securities rules, license 
conditions or losing one of them456, exercising a prohibited activity, evidence of incapacity to 
exercise the licensed activity, or including invalid information in the license application457. The 
revocation of the license is generally taken as a final decision458 following a preliminary 
procedure including an investigation, a questioning459 or a suspension460.  If the IC wishes to re-
                                                          
450 Article 21.d JSL of 2017  
451 Article 60.a JSL of 2017 
452 Article 109 JSL of 2017; Article 60.d JSL of 2017; Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005  
453 Article 109 JSL of 2017 
454 Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
455 The AMF restricts financial activities of an authorized IC in the period preceding the withdrawal of the 
authorization. The Company is then permitted to perform transactions that are solely necessary to safeguard the 
interest of the clients (C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-10, AMF, régl. gén., art. 311-5)  
456 Article 6 Licensing Regulation of 2005; Article 58 JSL of 2017; article 8 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
457C. mon. fin, art. L. 532-10 ; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 24  
458 Article 60.h JSL of 2017 
459 Articles 21.d JSL of 2017;60.a JSL of 2017 
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exercise the financial activities licensed under the former revoked license, a new financial 
license should be issued. It should be noted that the financial license could be auto-revoked 
upon the request of the licensed company. Whenever the Company decides to cease its financial 
activities, the commission should be informed with the decision hence a decision of revocation 
is issued461. Once the decision of revocation, suspension or restriction is reached, the JSC 
registers this decision in the financial licensing registry462. Potential investors benefit from this 
form of registered information, whereas; the company can no longer refer to itself as a licensed 
company nor can it continue exercising its portfolio investments on the market.  
160 Withdrawal of authorization. Granting the authorization by the AMF is subject to the 
risk of withdrawal463. Securities rules identify certain elements that evoke the withdrawal, 
including the case when the concerned company is facing a financial risk, its activities might 
endanger the stability of the financial market or stakeholders’ interests or the Company no 
longer fulfils the authorization conditions464. The authorization may further be withdrawn for 
reasons relating to the exercise of activities. If the IC does not commence its activities within a 
maximum period of twelve months following the issue of the authorization or ceases the 
performance of its activities for a minimum period of six months; the AMF then has full 
discretion to withdraw the authorization. Meanwhile the withdrawal decision is in the making; 
the AMF undertakes preliminary procedures including placing the company under its 
supervision and control by assigning an administrator to manage the Company’s performance, 
in addition to restricting the performance of the Company to those transactions strictly 
necessary to safeguard clients’ interests465. During the withdrawal decision-making; the IC loses 
its character as a portfolio investment company; therefore the Company should change its 
business name (Denomination Sociale)466. The authority notifies the concerned Company of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
460 Article 82 Licensing Regulation of 2005 (When it appears that the IC is facing a financial risk or that its activities 
threaten the stability of the market) 
461 Article 61 JSL of 2017; The requirements and process for the self-withdrawal of the license are found in the 
Instructions of 24/03/2013 provided by the JSC for this purpose; French rules address the same form of withdrawal 
upo  o pa s e uest AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 23)  
462 Article 60.h JSL of 2017 
463 Article 98.2.k UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
464 C. mon. fin., art. L.532-10; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 24; Article 29.4 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
465 AMF, régl. gén., art. 311-5 
466 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-10  
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reasoned decision of withdrawal467. The authority informs the public with the decision468. The 
AMF may impose other forms of sanctions on the defaulted IC469; the sanctions may result in 
deregistering the Company (radiation)470.  
161 Renewable authorization. The licensing of the IC is neither indefinite nor automatically 
renewed or extended. The license or authorization is valid for a specific period, following which 
the license is renewed (generally on a yearly basis) and the authorization is extended. The 
request to renew or extend is not automatic; it is issued upon the request of the Company and is 
subject to the discretion of the securities authority471. The request for both renewal and 
extension should be made in writing, preceding the expiry of the license or authorization472, 
following the form provided by the securities authority while attaching all the complementary 
information and documents that the authority may require473. The securities authority examines 
the application and issues its decision (approval or refusal) within a considerable period of 
time474, during which the securities authority may request complementary information475. The 
extension or renewal of the authorization and license forms part of the continuous control and 
supervision securities authorities exercise over the IC. It provides another level of investor 
protection by verifying the current standing of the company.  
162 Connection licensing and financial market. The decisions issued by the securities 
authorities under both Jordanian and French rules are very similar. Nonetheless, the Jordanian 
legislature chose to implement multiple terms to address separate measures when in fact these 
                                                          
467 The notification should be made by registered mail with acknowledgement of receipt (AMF, régl. gén., art. 311-
5), the Company shall have the right to submit an observation within a month of the notification  
468 AMF, régl. gén., art. 311-4  
469 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-15 
470C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-12 
471 Article 49.a.b JSL of 2002 addressed the renewable nature of the license; in the newly implemented JSL of 2017 
no such referral is made. The license is not considered for life despite the gap in the new law. In applying the 
Licensing Regulation of 2005 the license remains limited in time and requires renewing on a yearly basis; the newly 
implemented Licensing bylaw of 2018 does not address the renewability of the license. The absence of a legal 
affirmation of this kind raises the debate on the eternality of the license issued by the JSC; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 
11 
472 The IC is obliged to submit the renewal request thirty days before the end of the financial year according to 
licensing regulation (before December 31st of every year); Article 10 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
473 Article 10 Licensing Regulation; Article 49.a JSL of 2002; AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 12 
474 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art.  14  
475 AMF, instr. 2008-03, art. 13; Article 10.c Licensing Regulation of 2005 
 
94 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
measures form different stages to a single measure. The withdrawal of the authorization 
contains the suspension, restriction and the revocation stages. The Jordanian legislature does not 
provide different levels of consequences to the different measures it provides. All the measures 
have the same disciplinary impact. This approach undermines the legal effect of the measures. 
Further, the Jordanian legislature in its approach does not provide definitions distinguishing one 
measure from the other. The legislature is advised to provide a global process entailing the 
different procedures instead of stating terminology without clearly allocating their utility. The 
license and authorization permit the IC to exercise its activities that principally relate to 
portfolio investments on regulated financial markets. To be able to perform the said activity and 
have access to the relevant market; the IC should be admitted as a member in this market, 
further illustrated in the following section. 
Section B: Registration in the Local Market 
163 Preview. The financial market has a vital role within any country’s economy. The market 
enables both the government and the industry to raise capital and provide a market where 
existing investors can sell and prospective investors can buy476. Investors seek financial markets 
when making their investment decisions. They balance between the rewards and the risks 
connected to the decision. Investors require a stable investment process, high level of 
confidence and efficiency. Further, they aspire for a post-investment protection and continuous 
supervision despite their level of professionalism. Markets naturally fluctuate or change in 
value. Fluctuations are inevitable they may result out of a regular economic cycle or as a result 
of irrational selling or buying; nonetheless some investors find opportunities in crisis477.  
164 Regulation aims and concept. The reliance of investors on an efficient financial market, 
in addition to the aim of ensuring the proper functioning of financial markets and investor 
protection require a regulatory approach. The main objective of the regulation is to facilitate 
efficient and fair performance of economic functions. The objective has three dimensions: the 
institutional efficiency (free access to the market), the operational efficiency (reducing 
                                                          
476 Neil Stapley, The Stock Market: A Guide for the Private Investor (Woodhead Faulkner 1986) Page 16 
477Museum of American Finance, Curriculum Guide: The Financial Markets 
<http://www.moaf.org/education/curriculum/curriculum-guide-financial-
markets/_res/id=sa_File1/Curriculum%20-%20Financial%20Markets.pdf> Accessed 12 October 2016 
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transactions costs) and the allocational efficiency (transparency and disclosure resulting in 
investor confidence)478. The regulatory approach to financial markets differs in its base of 
establishment; it might be based on the concept of transparency (fair disclosure) or introducing 
a system of enforcement (internal, external or administrative). Therefore, the financial 
regulation may be divided into a prudential regulation (safeguarding the solvency of financial 
institutions) and a conduct of business regulation (ensures honest dealings in the markets)479, 
similar to the regulatory approach of the EU. 
165 Market Participants. Market participants are those who perform directly or indirectly the 
functions of a market despite its form. Participants of a financial market are classified into three 
main broad categories according to their motive of trading: investors, brokers and dealers480. 
Investors own assets and are motivated by the returns from holding the assets. They include 
private individuals, pension funds, institutions and trusts. Brokers act as agents for investors 
they are motivated by the remuneration “commission fees” for their services. Dealers, those 
who are motivated by profiting from trading and not holding assets. In many markets exists a 
group of specialists that ensure smooth functioning of trading mechanisms, they are called 
“market makers”481. Depending on the component of the financial market, the participants may 
also include issuers (main participant of a capital market includes legal entities that issues or 
proposes to issue securities482 and trades them on regulated markets483. Issuers include listed 
                                                          
478Rudiger Veil (ed), European Capital Markets Law (Rebecca Ahmlingtr, Hart 2013) page 18 
479 Edd  W ee s h, The “t u tu e of Fi a ial “upe isio  i  Eu ope: A out “i gle Fi a ial “upe iso s, T i  
Peaks a d Multiple Fi a ial “upe iso s  [ ]   EBO‘ p.  
480 Roy Bailey, The Economics of Financial Markets (1st edn, Cambridge 2005) page 35; Alain Couret and others, 
Droit Financier (2nd edn, DALLOZ 2012) page 29 
481 A ti le . .  MiFID II defi ed a ket ake  as a person who holds himself out on the financial markets on a 
continuous basis as being willing to deal on own account by buying and selling financial instruments against that 
pe so s p op ieta  apital at p i es defi ed  that pe so . The “EC defi ed the a ket ake  as a firm that 
stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted 
price .<https://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm> Accessed 13 October 2016 
482Article 2.1.j Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] OJL 345/64 (Prospectus Dir.) 
483 Article 1.1.d Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market; Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC [2013] OJL 294/13 
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companies, banks, funds, insurance companies and others), clearing houses484, transfer 
agents485, and others.  
166 Market Access. The access to financial markets is the freedom to enter into the market 
and trade in financial goods. In financial markets, goods include financial instruments and 
securities. Investors as market participants, access financial markets directly or through 
investing in companies that perform investment on their behalf when they lack the necessary 
knowledge. A perfect example of such companies is the IC. The question asked in this regard is 
the following: how can market participants access the market? The main functions market 
participants exercise include issuing and trading in financial instruments and securities, 
therefore the participants access the market through issuing or admission to trade of securities 
(equity or debt)486. To be able to exercise the functions and freely access the financial market 
the securities law imposes a market membership requirement on market participants487. This 
membership is a form of control and supervision competent authorities exercise. In order to 
fully understand the access mechanism this section preliminary defines the proper form of 
financial markets ICs should be accessing (sub-section 1), in addition to illustrating the 
registration or membership conditions the relevant market requires the IC to hold (sub-section 
2).   
Sub-section 1: Defining the Local Market 
167 Financial market. Savings flow between investors worldwide through financial markets. 
Generally financial services providers exercise as main activity financial services that include 
trading in and issuing securities and financial instruments within an intended financial market. 
ICs form part of these financial services providers. These companies perform portfolio 
investments and similar to other Plc. they might need cash therefore they choose to borrow or 
                                                          
484 A financial institution that provides clearing and settlement services for financial instruments may be 
considered as an intermediary between buyers and sellers of financial instruments. The SEC provides two forms of 
clearing agencies: corporations and depositaries <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrclearing.shtml> 
Accessed 13 October 2016; The AMF addresses clearinghouses in Title IV of Book V of its general regulation  
485 The  sta d et ee  issue  o pa ies a d se u ities  holde s, the  a e the offi ial keepe s of e o ds < 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/how-market-works/market-participants> 
486A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 46 
487 Articles 66 & 67 JSL of 2017; C. mon. fin, art. L. 421-17; AMF, régl. gén., art. 513-1 
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dilute a fraction of ownership488. The borrowing is performed through issuing what is called 
debt securities (contractual obligations to repay corporate borrowing) and the dilution is 
performed through issuing equity securities (ordinary or common stock that represent non-
contractual claims to the residual cash flow of the company). The issued securities are then 
traded on financial markets. A financial market is the place where financial assets are issued and 
traded489. It is the forum for the exchange of financial products; this market might either have a 
physical location or an information system that can be accessed from distance that shares data 
and prices490. The financial market is the place where professionals and retailers take an active 
part in the different processes of the market.  
168 Functions of market.  The functions of the financial market are connected to the general 
economic definition of a market. From a pure economic perspective the market is that set of 
arrangements that enables its participants reach voluntary agreements491. The main elements 
constituting this definition point out three obvious functions of the market. These functions 
include promoting price discovery; provide a trading mechanism and enabling the execution of 
agreements492. The financial market fulfills these functions through disseminating information, 
putting in contact buyers and sellers and most importantly ensuring that the terms of the 
agreements are being honored and respected what is known as the settlement function. 
169 Role of market. The clearest and most important role financial markets has; is channeling 
savings to real investments. When performing this role financial markets contribute to the well-
being of individuals and the functioning of the economy. Financial markets offer payment 
mechanism, borrowing, lending, and pooling risk, further to, providing information493. The role 
and functions of financial markets are followed despite the form this market might take. What 
are these forms? What does the financial market consist of? What is the proper market for ICs? 
Questions that arise every time the term financial market is mentioned. It is important to 
                                                          
488D. Hillier n (215) Page 10 
489R. Brealey n (1) Page 359 
490 Lindsey Fell, An Introduction to Financial Products and Markets (1stedn, Continuum 2000) pages 18 and 93 
491 Claude-Danielle Echaudemaison, Di tio ai e d’E o o ie et de S ie es So iales (2nd edn, Nathan 2018) page 
309 
492R.E. Bailey n (480) Page 34 
493R. Brealey n ( 1) page 365 
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understand the composition and different categories of financial markets in order to define IC’s 
market (further addressed in the following paragraphs).  
§1: Composition of the Financial Market 
170 Types of financial markets. Financial markets are trading venues for financial assets of 
all their forms, they offer the place to the different counterparties of a transaction to meet or find 
each other494. Trading in financial markets is based on the general principles of supply and 
demand. The different forms of fungible and intangible assets that are traded on financial 
markets influence the composition of the market, therefore splitting it into various categories 
based on the type of instruments traded within (capital market, commodities market, derivative 
market and money market). The financial market can be further classified according to features 
of the services it offers (technical, advisory or administrative), trading procedure (electronic 
“forums”, virtual “exchange” or physical “over-the-counter”), market participants 
(professionals, retailers, officials or institutions) and the origin of the market (domestic, cross-
border or international)495. The financial markets when classified in accordance to the products 
or financial instruments they are trading and their maturity generally include capital market, 
money market, commodities market and derivatives market. What is the difference between 
these types? The difference lies in the characteristics of the traded assets and the targeted 
investor.  
171 Capital Market. The capital market, or as referred to in some occasions the cash market, 
is that sector of the financial market where long-term instruments are traded. Long-term 
instruments meaning those that have a maturity of over one year496. The capital market as other 
types of financial markets is a trading venue497; where demand and supply meet therefore 
                                                          
494 C. Echaudemaison n (491) page 312 
495 Beate Reszat, European Financial Systems in the Global Economy (John Wiley & Sons 2005) page 20 
496D. Hillier n (215) Page 10 
497 The Eu opea  la  defi es the t adi g e ue as the regulated market, MTF or systematic internaliser acting in 
its capacity as such, and where appropriate a system outside the community with similar functions to a regulated 
market or MTF”. (Article 2 Commission Regulation 1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 Implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council as regards record keeping obligation for investment firms, 
transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading and defined terms for 
the purposes of that Directive [2006] OJ L241/1)  
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allowing its participants to borrow, raise and publicly trade in capital498. The borrowing of the 
capital is generally performed by issuing bonds and shares perform the raise (what is known as 
equity). From both an economic and legal perspectives, the capital market consists of primary 
and secondary markets, in some cases it may be divided into sub-groups bond and stock markets 
(equity and debt). The distinction between the markets, the primary and secondary, puts the 
capital market in the context of having two subsidiary component markets providing two main 
case scenarios for the negotiations of financial instruments. The first is having an investor 
purchasing a financial instrument directly from the issuer or its underwriter, the second is 
having an investor purchasing from another investor who may or may not have purchased the 
financial instruments directly from the issuer499. Therefore; the first scenario is fulfilled in the 
primary market; meaning it is the place where issuers directly offer their financial instruments 
for the first time or offer new issues, and the second scenario is witnessed in the secondary 
market; where existing instruments are resold500.  
172 Primary capital market. There are two types of sales, in which issuers are engaged 
within the primary capital market: public offering and private placements. Within this market, 
there is also two sub-groups of markets equity and debt. To access these markets issuers using 
public offerings register with the local regulatory authorities501. The issuers within the primary 
market may issue debt-based financial instruments502 or equity-based ones503 that are 
underwritten directly through the issuer or a syndicate of investment banking firms in return the 
issuer raises cash.  
173 Secondary capital market. The secondary type of capital market, which is also known as 
the aftermarket, provides the means to transfer the ownership; it involves an owner or a creditor 
selling to another. There are two forms of secondary markets dealer and auction markets. The 
                                                          
498 R. Veil n (478) Page 73 
499 A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 47 
500 I. Chiu n (27) page 13 
501 Later emphasized in Title 2 of this Part; previously mentioned and further explained in sub-section 2 that the 
investment services provider is required to become a member of the market in which it intends to list its securities. 
Further to the registration with securities market authority and the disclosure obligation resulting out of this 
registration 
502 Bonds, like those issued by sovereign entities such as governments. They are essentially loans that have their 
terms of interest and repayment  
503 Common Stock, grants the purchaser an ownership right. The perfect example are shares issued by corporations  
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dealer market or what is known as the OTC (over-the-counter market) is the place where non-
listed financial instruments (usually those that do not meet the exchange requirement) are being 
traded directly between dealers either by phone or electronically504. The auction market or 
exchange market is the place where the majority of the exchange occurs (it is what generally 
investors refer to as the stock exchange). Investors at auction markets purchase at a price 
established by a previous sell order of another investor and sell at the bid price established by a 
previous buy order of another investor505. Therefore, investors in this form of market enter into 
series of competitive bids and orders.  
174 Money Market. Money market is a short-term marketplace known as a wholesale market 
in which financial instruments have a maturity or redemption date that is equal to or less than 
one year at the date of issuance506. This market facilitates the transfer of short-term funds from 
those who have excess of it to those who lack it for short-term needs, therefore allowing 
financial institutions to execute different functions. Including fund raising, cash and risk 
management and providing access to price related information507. This form of financial 
markets constitutes of several segments that are defined in terms of the participants (interbank 
markets the market through which banks lend each other). Further to the products traded within. 
Therefore exists primary money market that absorbs the issues and enables the raising of new 
funds. Secondary money market redistributes the ownership of short-term securities. In 
addition, derivatives money market deals with financial contracts whose value derive from 
underlying money market instrument.  
                                                          
504 EU Commission Memo 12/232 on Regulation on Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Market infrastructures of 29 
March 2012 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-232_en.htm> Accessed 1 November 2016 
505 ‘oge  D. Hua g a d Ha s ‘. “tall, Deale  Ve sus Au tio  Ma kets: A Pai ed Co pa iso  of E e utio  Costs o  
NA“DAQ a d the NY“E  [ ] 41 Journal of financial Economics 
<https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~keechung/MGF743/Readings/F1.pdf> Accessed 2 November 2016 
506 A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 48; C. Echaudemaison n (491) page 312 ; Marcia Stigum and Anthony Crescenzi, 
Stigu ’s Mo ey Ma ket (4th ed , M G a  Hill  page ; Je s Fo ss ae k a d La s O elhei , The I te pla  
between Money Market Development and Changes in Monetary Policy Operations in small European Countries 
1980-  i  Da id Ma es a d Ja  Topo o ski eds , Open Market Operations and Financial Markets (Routledge 
2007) page 126 
507 Valdo ė Da šku ie ė, Fi a ial Ma kets   Leo a do da Vi i p og a e p oje t o  the De elop e t 
and Approbation of Applied Courses Based on the Transfer of Teaching Innovations in Finance and Management 
for Further Education of Entrepreneurs and Specialists in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria 
<http://www.bcci.bg/projects/latvia/pdf/7_Financial_markets.pdf> Accessed 1 November 2016 
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175 Commodities Market. Commodities market is a public market where commodities are 
being traded. They are purchased or sold at a price agreed on between the counterparties for the 
delivery on a designated date (future commodities) or in direct physical trading508. What 
constitutes a commodity? The commodity is the marketplace item produced to satisfy the needs. 
Meaning it is a raw material or a primary agricultural product that is tradable509. The perfect 
example of these commodities include crude oil, rubber and coal510. This market may take 
several forms for both direct physical and derivative trading. These forms include the spot price 
(the prices and the exchange of the product occur in the present), futures (trading in future 
obligations taking delivery instead of the actual commodity)511, forwards512 and options513.  
176 Derivative Market. Derivative market is the place where different investors; trade using 
standardized or tailor-made contracts in derivatives514. The term derivative means that the 
product traded in this market is not the original asset but the product derived or obtained from it, 
therefore the value of this derivative depends on the value of the underlying asset515. Derivatives 
are financial instruments that consist of a contract entered into between a buyer and a seller to 
execute a transaction at a future point of time, where the value of this derivative fluctuates 
during the life of this contract516. Trading in derivatives market includes two segments: off-
exchange (what is known as OTC) and the on-exchange (the standardized contracts). Financial 
                                                          
508Commodities Market: an overview <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/37257/3/chapter2.pdf> 
Accessed 6 November 2016 
509 An Approach on how to trade in commodities market
 <http://www.karvycommodities.com/Documents/AnApproachToHowToTradeInCommoditiesMarket1305
2013.pdf> Accessed 6 November 2016 
510 For further explanation on the different commodities and their global indexes throughout the years; see World 
Ba k G oup epo t Co odities Ma ket Outlook  dated O to e   
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/143081476804664222/CMO-October-2016-Full-Report.pdf> 
511Carley Garner, A T ade ’s Fi st Book o  Co odities: A  I t odu tio  to the Wo ld’s Fastest G o i g Ma ket  
(2ndedn, Pearson 2013) 
512 Forward contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at a designated time in the future and for a certain 
price 
513 Options give holders rights to exercise an action without imposing an obligation. There are two forms of options 
the call option (right to buy at a certain date and for a certain price) and the put option (right to sell at a specific 
date and for a designated price)  
514 John C. Hull, Options Futures and other Derivatives (8thedn, Prentice Hall 2012) 
515Mi hael Chui, De i ati es Ma ket, P odu ts a d Pa ti ipa ts: A  O e ie   IF“ Bulleti  
<http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb35a.pdf> Accessed 6 November 2016 
516Deutche Borse Group, The Global Derivatives Market: An Introduction (2008 
<https://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/global_derivatives_market.pdf> Accessed 6 November 2016) 
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institutions usually use the derivatives as an insurance mechanism against the unwanted 
movements of prices, in addition to being used as an alternative investment method.  
177 Other categorization of markets. Financial markets are generally in one way or another 
regulated. The main purpose of financial markets regulation is the protection of investors from 
improper and unfair practices. The level of supervision and control exercised and the 
conditional permissions granted by national securities authorities differs creating two forms of 
markets regulated and non-regulated ones. 
178 Regulated market. Regulated market is a market for the financial instruments that 
functions regularly, and where its operation, the conditions for the access and those for listing, 
in addition to the conditions that should be met by the financial instruments traded within; is 
defined by regulations issued and approved by competent authorities517. This form of market 
further complies with the transparency and reporting requirements. The regulated market is seen 
as a: multilateral system that is operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings 
together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests 
in financial instruments in a way that results in a contract, in respect of the financial 
instruments admitted to trading under its rules and/or system518. 
179 Transition. After identifying the different forms and categories of financial markets, 
various questions arise in this regard including: which of the mentioned categories of markets 
fits best the needs of IC? Is it a sole market or does ICs have a choice? These questions and 
others addressed in the following paragraph.  
§2: Defining Investment Company’s Market 
180 Structural organization. Nationally every country follows its preferred organization to 
the different categories of financial markets. The economic level, the available commodities and 
resources, in addition to any existing regional structures, may influence this organization. When 
referring to the main legal frameworks addressed in this paper: French and Jordanian ones, we 
                                                          
517 Article 1(13) Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field OJ L 
141/27; This definition was further referred to in Article 2 (1)(J) Prospectus Dir. 
518 Article 4 (1)(21) MiFID II, this definition was referred to in Article 9(1) UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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note that the structures were close, nonetheless the EU structural proposal influenced the 
organization of French financial markets.  
181 French structure. On a French level, the fifth book of the AMF general regulation 
defined the constitution of the financial market. This book states that the market consists of five 
main forms that include regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTF), systematic 
internaliser, clearing houses519 and the central depository520. The existing EU directives that 
address the components and operation of these different infrastructures influence the entirety of 
this structure. The former paragraph introduced generally the different forms of financial 
markets from a mere theoretical point of view. The legal organization of these forms does not 
differ much from the financial theory. Legislation merely codifies every form and provides the 
most appropriate rules and procedures that aim at protecting investors and safeguard the 
integrity of the market.  
182 Regulated French markets. The regulated markets, one of the essential forms referred to 
throughout this paper, are those regulated by law and both their exercises and members fall 
under the supervision of the relevant securities authorities. Both the AMF general regulation and 
the Code Monétaire et Financier address markets' organizational rules and their code of 
conduct521. These markets defined as the markets for financial instruments that consist of a 
multilateral system that insures or facilitates the meeting of different interested buyers and 
sellers of financial instruments, within its scope and following its set rules, a meeting that 
results into entering into a contract involving financial instruments negotiated on this market522. 
This form of markets managed by a market operator incorporated as a commercial company523. 
                                                          
519 Also known as central counterparty (CCP) defined in Article 2(1) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories OJ L 
201/1; C. mon. fin., art. L. 440-1; AMF, régl. gén., art. 541-1 and following 
520Defined as a legal person that operates a securities settlement system providing services that include mainly 
settlement services in addition to notary and central maintenance services : Article 2(1)(1) Regulation (EU) 
No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in 
the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012OJ L 257/1; C. mon. fin., art. L. 441-1 
521 C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-4 
522 C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-1; A similar definition is stated in Article 4 (1)(21) of MiFID II 
523 C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-2 
 
104 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
They are subject to the supervisory power of the AMF524. The perfect example of regulated 
markets in France is the Paris Stock Exchange525. It is operated by the NYSE Euronext Paris SA 
(the one principle market in France). This market includes the Euronext Paris Market526 
(contains the main board and the professional compartment527) in addition to the Alternext528.  
183 Other market infrastructures. Regulated market differs from the MTF, as the latter is a 
non-exchange financial trading venue, considered as an alternative to traditional stock 
exchanges where the market is made up of securities typically using electronic systems529. The 
regulated market is different from the systematic internaliser, as it consists of an investment 
firm which on an organized, frequent and systematic basis deals on own account by executing 
clients’ orders outside the regulated market or the MTF530.  
184 Jordanian Structure. The JSL defines the financial market as any securities market 
licensed and registered with the JSC531. The securities market532 and the Amman Stock-
Exchange are regulated markets that fall under the supervisory power of the JSC. The ASE is a 
secondary capital market that consists of different specialized market segments including: 
first533, second534 and third markets535, bond market, fund market, subscription right market and 
                                                          
524 C. mon. Fin., art. L. 421-3,4; AMF, régl. gén., art. 511-5; regulated markets are subject to the supervision of the 
authority of prudential control (ACPR) (C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-4). The ACPR ensures the stability of the financial 
system and protects the beneficiaries and clients of the persons falling under its control. Its missions and scope of 
competence is defined in the financial and monetary code (C. mon. fin., art. L. 612-1) 
525 Jean-Luc Soulier and Sandra Vreedenburgh, Securities Law in France in Marcus Best and Jean-Luc Soulier (eds) , 
International Securities Law Handbook (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) page 203 
526 The main Paris stock exchange. It is a regulated market where companies list their stock, once the company is 
admitted to the market it complies with its admission rules along with those provided in the governing rules  
527 The professional compartment is a platform for listing of shares as well as specialist securities such as debt 
securities, convertible or exchangeable securities of any denomination 
528 A trading venue designed for small and recently incorporated companies. It provides less strict regulatory 
environment 
529C. mon. fin., art. L. 424-4; Article 4 (1)(22) MiFID II Directive 
530 C. mon. fin., art. L. 425-1; Article 4 (1) (20) MiFID II Directive 
531 Article 2 JSL of 2017  
532 Article 64 JSL of 2017 
533 Defi ed as that pa t of the se o da  a ket that p o ides a t adi g e ue fo  o pa ies  listed sto k i  
accordance with its special rules and conditions provided by law 
534 Defined as that part of the secondary market that provides a trading venue for compa ies  listed sto k i  
accordance with its special rules and conditions provided by law 
535 Defi ed as that pa t of the se o da  a ket he e o pa ies  sto k ot eeti g listi g e ui e e ts of 
neither the first nor the second market are traded  
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OTC536. Jordanian rules address a Securities Depositary Center (SDC) as part of the listing and 
issuing procedure of securities, this center is responsible for the registration and listing of the 
securities in addition to settlement and clearing services537. 
185 IC market membership. After going through the legal elements of the available national 
market structures, and considering the form of securities or financial instruments the IC trades 
in; we note that the IC fits perfectly within a capital market in both its categories primary and 
secondary. A question may be introduced in this regard: whether or not national legal rules 
explicitly state the form of financial markets within which ICs trade their financial instruments. 
Under the Jordanian rules, being a Plc. the IC is obliged to list its shares on regulated capital 
markets538. Therefore, IC becomes a member within the intended market and follows the 
internal regulatory rules. French rules provide a similar statement, nonetheless they only address 
the listing of the IC company shares on regulated markets539, therefore when considering the 
form of financial instruments this company issues and lists; we deduce that SICAV trades its 
shares on regulated equity markets.  
186 Industrial organization. The structural organization of financial markets differs 
nationally depending on the adopted regulatory regime in each country further it is influenced 
by the economic level of each country. Nonetheless, different regimes adopt successful 
structures from each other and transpose them nationally. The financial market regulation that 
covers financial transactions can be traced back in history to the most ancient civilizations, yet, 
the notion that applies the economic principles to the design and implementation of regulatory 
structures of financial market is a relatively modern one540. Financial markets do not at all times 
operate within formally constituted exchanges. When referring to those markets that do so, two 
main categories are noted: the mutually owned cooperatives and the shareholder-owned 
companies541.  A formal organization such as the exchange; facilitates and coordinates the 
                                                          
536Article 2 Regulation for Listing Securities on the ASE for the year 2016 
537 Articles 74 & 75 JSL of 2017  
538 Article 69.b JSL of 2017  
539C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7; C. mon. fin., art. D. 214-22-1; UCITS Directive refers to regulated market as that 
mentioned under the MiFID II (Article 9(1)) 
540 Andrew w. Lo (ed), Introduction to The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities Industry 
(University of Chicago Press 1996) page 2 
541 R. Bailey n (480) Page 41 
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cooperation between suppliers of financial transaction services; therefore, exchanges may be 
considered as institutions devised to reduce transaction costs542. The notion of the industrial 
organization of the securities industry is mainly connected to the level of cooperation and 
coordination present among different markets, while at the same time applying the most 
efficient rules to guarantee market integrity, achieve freer access and most importantly reduce 
costs. All of which leads to the connection between finance and competition rules. The different 
financial markets compete with each other, investors in some markets are considered as better 
informed than others, and the membership of these organizations may be faced with entry 
barriers, therefore orienting the discourse back to the role of the regulation while considering 
functions and goals of financial markets; most importantly those relating to investor protection. 
Considering the IC as a participant in the securities industry, specifically in the capital market 
means that this Company should acquire the necessary authorizations and seek the needed 
memberships in order to be an active participant and an operational element. After defining the 
proper local financial market of the IC, the following sub-section illustrates the membership 
requirement within this financial market. An essential process in order to perform the activities 
of an issuer and later a dealer within the intended financial market.  
Sub-section 2: Registration and Membership Procedures 
187 Concept of Membership. To be able to access the market and freely trade in financial 
instruments, ICs along with other Plc. are required to become members of their intended 
market543. The membership capacities and what can be exercised within the market are 
determined by the scope of the authorization or the license the competent securities authority 
grants to the member544. Considering this statement leads to having a membership procedures 
executed post financial licensing or authorization and not parallel545. 
188 Requirement. National securities rules state the membership requirement and links the 
membership to the exercise of investment services. The admission conditions and regulatory 
                                                          
542 C aig Pi o g, A Theo  of Fi a ial E ha ge O ga izatio  [ ]  J.L & E o . 
<http://heinonline.org.ezp.slu.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jlecono43&div=23&start_page=437&collectio
n=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults> accessed 26 November 2016 
543 Article 7 Internal Bylaw of the Amman  Stock Exchange of the year 2004 
544 Rule 2102/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
545 AMF, régl. gén., art. 513-2; Article 8.a.1 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
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framework on the other hand, is left to the discretion of every financial market. This discretion 
is subject to the elements of transparency and non-discrimination based on objective criterion546.  
189 Membership vs registration. The main aim of the membership is to have access to the 
financial market and be able to list and trade financial instruments within the intended one. This 
stage is distinct from the registration547 of financial instruments at the securities depositary 
center therefore the latter comes consequently to the membership, in other words the 
membership is a prerequisite to the registration. This distinction is further explained in this sub-
section alongside the membership process. 
§1: Timeline of the Procedural Process 
190 Membership application. IC and other Plc. file a membership application in accordance 
with both; general regulatory framework set by law and internal detailed governing rules 
imposed by the intended financial market548. The intended financial market for IC is the capital 
market; therefore, the rules and regulations of this market state membership conditions and the 
process of application for all financial institutions, including the IC, on which they look into 
listing their financial instruments549. The IC that is incorporated in Jordan or France finds its 
applicable membership related rules in the regulatory framework provided by the national stock 
exchanges; the ASE550 and the Paris Stock Exchange (PSE) respectively551.  
191 Application content. The admission to membership of the securities market require the 
IC, despite its country of incorporation, to file a written membership application with its 
intended market552, in accordance with the standard form the market provides553. The applicant 
company’s signatories sign the form, further, they attach the entirety of documents and 
                                                          
546 C. mon. Fin., art. L. 421-17; Articles 64 & 69 JSL of 2017 
547 The relevant securities commission determines the securities that are subject to the registration requirement, 
this registration is primarily addressing corporate debt and equity securities; A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 141 
548 Article 68 JSL of 2017; Article 7 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2004: this Article addresses financial 
i te edia ies a d states that A“E s e e ship i ludes a  othe  fi a ial i stitutio  that the “e u ities 
Commission Council requests its admission to membership; C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-17; C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-18 
549 Rule 2101/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
550 For ICs incorporated under the Jordanian Law 
551 For SICAV incorporated in France or those incorporated in other European MS 
552 Rule 2301/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
553 Rule 2302/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Article 9.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2014 
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information the market requires554. The IC when submitting the membership application fulfils 
the membership eligibility conditions555. The minimum information and details that should be 
stated in the application include among other things the name and the address of the Company, 
the registration certificate (with the company controller). Further to, the written permission to 
commence the activities, the AOA and MOA, the financial licensing or authorization, and 
management details. In addition to the list of shareholders holding more than five percent of the 
capital. 
192 Membership criteria. To be an eligible candidate for the securities market membership 
the IC, despite the country of its incorporation, should hold at the time of application a financial 
license or authorization issued from the competent securities authority, and enjoys the business 
standing suitable for such an admission556. Further, the staff and management hold the necessary 
qualifications, experience and expertise to perform its business activities on the market, has 
sufficient resources, fulfils the language requirement (required by the Euronext considering that 
it is a pan-European financial market), and enjoys technical requirements requested by the 
market557. The IC is further required to appoint at least two responsible persons (registered 
staff)558, the Euronext rules further request authorized representatives that do not exceed five 
persons and are distinct from the responsible persons559. These conditions are continuous and 
not instant560. The IC should hold these conditions valid as long as it is considered a member in 
the market.   
193 Decisions relating to application. Once the membership application is submitted the 
market reviews the application and verifies if it is complete and includes the entirety of the list 
of documentation and whether or not the eligibility criteria is fulfilled. Following this stage, the 
market reaches a decision based on the application (the market has the sole discretion to issue 
                                                          
554 Rule 2302/2 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Article 9.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
555 The eligibility conditions mentioned in Article 8 of the Internal Bylaw of the ASE address explicitly the 
intermediaries, and are implicitly applicable over the remaining members of the ASE 
556 Required by the Euronext for non-MiFID undertakings such as UCITS 
557 Article 8.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; Rule 2201/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
558Article 8.aInternal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; Article 4 Euronext Notice 2-01 dated 4 August 2014 on the 
Registration of Authorized Representatives and Responsible Persons 
559 Articles 9 and 11 Euronext Notice 2-01 of the year 2014 
560 Article 8.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; Rule 2101/4 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
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this form of decisions)561; the market either approves562 or rejects563 the membership of the 
IC564. Any decision that contains a rejection or refusal to admission should be reasoned565. 
194 Open or limited membership. The admission to membership on regulated markets is not 
open to everyone, alongside the criteria and eligibility conditions that the applicants go through; 
the financial market has the full discretion to limit the number of admitted members (this 
decision is taken by the market operator)566.  
195 IC admission to market. Once the approval decision is issued by the market and the IC is 
officially considered as an active member of the capital market, the legal consequences are due 
and the Company is expected to adhere to post-membership obligations that include among 
other things abiding to the rules of the market in addition to issuing shares. The aftermath of the 
admission to membership and the legal consequences resulting out of a positive decision by the 
market are further illustrated in the following paragraph 2. 
§2: Admission to Membership Aftermath 
196 Legal consequences. Once the securities market approves the membership application of 
the IC, it becomes an official active member of this market567. Within this market, it can 
exercise its authorized business activities. As a natural legal consequence to the membership, 
the IC should maintain the membership conditions valid as long as it remains a member568. 
                                                          
561 Under the Jordanian rules the period during which this decision is issued should not exceed thirty days following 
the date the complete application is submitted (Article 10.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014) 
562 Under the Euronext rules the membership may be restricted or conditional, it is left to the discretion of the 
market to evaluate the appropriateness of the scope of membership of the undertaking in question  
563 Where can the ASE decisions be contested? Administrative or regular courts? Is the ASE considered a public 
entity or not? The explanatory decision number 1 of the year 2012 states that the ASE is considered as a non-
official public entity for the matters that relate to the supervision of the ombudsman over its actions.  The newly 
implemented JSL of 2017 states explicitly that the decisions of the ASE are contestable before the JSC, strictly the 
decisions relating to securities. The decision of the JSC can later be contested before administrative courts (article 
73 JSL of 2017) 
564 Article 10.aInternal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; Rule 2303/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
565 Rule 2303/1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Article 10.c Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
566 C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-19 
567 Article 10.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; the member should commence exercising its activities six 
months follwoing the date of admission to the market, failing the exercise within the set period may result in the 
termination of its membership (Article 12.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014) 
568 Article 8.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; Rule 2101/4 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
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Further, abiding to market’s internal rules and regulations569. The most important legal 
consequence to the admission to membership, considered the main reason behind it, is the 
ability to list and trade financial instruments on the intended market570.  
197 Members’ obligations. Members of the capital market share similar continuous 
obligations towards the market and implicitly towards each other and the investors. The 
obligations imposed by the market are similar to those stated under the financial authorities’ 
rules. Therefore, the member of the market, including the IC, adheres to multiple similar 
internal regulations that has the safeguarding of investors’ interests and the integrity of the 
market as their guiding principle. What form of obligations does the market impose on the IC 
particularly and the remaining members generally? The obligations may be classified in 
different categories; financial obligations, transparency obligations and obedience obligations.   
198 Financial obligations. Include payment of membership fees and those charges relating to 
the exercise of business activities571. The importance of financial obligations is connected to the 
ability to become an active member in the market’s GA. As those members who do not pay 
their annual membership fees and their enrollment fees cannot participate in the market’s GA, 
hence they lose their right to vote in the GAM572. 
199 Transparency obligations. The IC complies, as a member of the capital market, with 
disclosure conditions and requirements provided in the internal rules of the market573. The 
disclosure addressed in these rules exists along with that imposed by national securities’ 
authorities and does not in, any way replace it574. The IC informs the market with any material 
change in the information provided in the membership application575, give prior notice of any 
                                                          
569 Rule 2401 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Articles 9.a (12) & 30.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 
; The IC sig s a itte  fo  ith the A“E that states the a solute o it e t of the Co pa  ith a ket s 
internal rules and regulations (Article 30.c Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014) 
570 Article 12 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
571 Rule 2401 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Article 30.a (2) Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
572 Article 13 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
573 Article 32 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
574 The reasoning for the existence of both forms of disclosures is reasoned by the fact that regulated markets are 
supervised by the national securities authority same as they supervise their members 
575 Article 33.c Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
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circumstances that may affect its legal form, organization or financial standing576, submit annual 
and regular financial reports577, in addition to informing the market of any ongoing legal 
actions578.  
200 Obedience obligations. IC abides to the internal rules and regulations of the intended 
market. To fully adhere to these rules the IC complies -at all times- with membership conditions 
including those connected to technical requirements and most importantly the Company fulfils 
the obligations mentioned in the admission agreement579. The obedience and subordination of 
the IC results in the creation of a sort of supervisory power of the market over the actions and 
activities of this Company and all its members in general580. This supervision takes several 
forms including disciplinary and investigatory. Disciplinary actions the market resorts to 
include sanctioning its members for their misconducts and violations of market’s internal 
rules581, in addition to terminating or annulling the membership and the suspension of the trade 
for those same reasons or when it deems necessary582. As for the investigatory actions, they 
include on-the-spot inspections583, and investigations584, that the representatives of the market 
perform when there is a suspected misconduct or violation585.  
201 Overview of financial requirements. The legal personality of the IC is created the minute 
it is fully registered in the companies’ registry in its state of incorporation. This personality 
bestows on the IC the moral person characteristic. The IC then generally commences the 
exercise of its business activities. Nonetheless, this exercise is restricted to obtaining prior 
authorization and fulfilling financial administrative prerequisites. They include obtaining a 
                                                          
576Article 33.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
577 Article 33.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
578 Rule 2401 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
579 Under French securities rules membership in regulated markets creates a contractual relation between market 
operator and the member (C. mon. fin., art. L. 421-18), it results out of an agreement entered into between them 
(AMF, régl. gén., art. 513-5). The disputes arising between these two parties may be resolved through arbitration 
(AMF, régl. gén., art. 516-16) 
580 Rule 2302/3 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Article 5 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
581 Article 36 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
582 Article 11 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014; AMF, règl. gén., art. 514-3 
583 Article 34 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
584 Article 35 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2014 
585 Members should authorize the market to perform regularly or when it deems necessary; the inspections over 
their financial records and registries (Rule 2401 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016); Article 65 JSL of 2017 
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financial license or authorization from the competent securities authority of the Company’s state 
of incorporation, which permits the IC to exercise its business activities. The licensing is 
followed by a membership obligation in the relevant capital market in order to facilitate the 
trading in financial instruments. Trading on financial markets requires the registration of the 
said financial instrument at the competent securities depositary center. The question that we can 
ask in this regard is the following: Can the IC switch between the different markets once it is a 
member with one of them? Generally, under ASE rules, Plc. may move between the available 
sub-markets of the capital market as long as their financial instruments meet trading and listing 
conditions provided by every segment586. The following title addresses the issuing and listing of 
financial instruments on regulated markets (chapter 1) in addition to the conduct of the IC 
within the financial market (chapter 2).  
 
  
                                                          
586 Article 5 & 7 Listing Regulation on the ASE of 2016 
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Title Two: Post-Establishment Requirements: The Birth of a Financial Legal 
Person 
202 Juridical person. Not the standard natural person subject to the majority of legal rules. 
Law grants the legal personality to ICs consequently to fulfilling the incorporation and licensing 
prerequisites. This personality opens the door to the possibility to treat the company as an asset 
alongside its legal personality. To some extent, the company is an asset. This statement is true 
regarding the view shareholders may have of the company “something they own”.  The 
company is an asset in the sense of being a subject of law with a patrimonial value (the moral 
person itself) further to, a collective entity endowed with a legal capacity587.  
203 Reasoning for market access. The IC is a moral person with financial activity. It 
accesses financial markets as its core activity. IC provides investments while taking into 
consideration their different characteristics; risk, return, safety, liquidity and marketability588. 
Therefore, having tradable investment instruments. The access is not random. It is based on 
several expectations, goals and targets differing from one market participant to the other. The 
different financing and investment resources available at financial markets unite market 
participants. Financial undertakings choice of access differs depending on the character of the 
researched investment resource. The notion of financial markets is dispersed; it does not 
respond to one unique definition. The definition of the financial market in question depends on 
the object of the undertakings’ question. Is it money, financial instruments or goods? The choice 
of the financial market is a multi-dimensional one. Both the undertaking and the individual 
investor have various options to choose from when investing or looking for an investment. In 
the sphere of ICs, the proper choice is regulated capital market.  
204 Methods of market access. ICs access their intended capital market in the aim of trading 
their products and the available ones on this market. The product is a financial one. It consists of 
financial instruments IC issues, lists and trades in. ICs available methods for market access 
include offering financial instruments for public sale (through PO for sale) or trading in 
financial instruments (acquisition). PO is one of the most well-known investment resources. It 
                                                          
587 Pierre Mousseron et Lise Chatain-Autajon, Droit des Sociétés (2nd ed, Joly 2014) page 36 
588 V.A Avadhani, Securities Analysis and portfolio Management (12th edn, Himalaya 2016) pages 6 & 7 
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plays a crucial role in providing an investment opportunity for different investors in addition to 
determining investor protection related rules. The rules translate mainly into a disclosure and 
communication obligation. PO is a method through which financial instruments are offered to 
the public589. The access therefore is the means through which ICs exercise their financial 
activities on their intended market.  
205 Exercise and corporate governance. Generally, ICs exercise their financial activities 
through a management body that holds powers to execute decision-making process as 
efficiently as the interest of shareholders require. Corporate governance rules rise as means to 
structuring the decision-making powers to avert from having a management that allocates 
personal revenues on the expense of company’s shareholders. On a broader term, corporate 
governance when implemented refers to different financial theories in connection with its main 
structure and object. These theories include market in equilibrium that structures the company 
as a black box, which holds no distinction between the interests of its different elements590. The 
agency theory591 considered as the intellectual foundation of corporate governance. In addition 
to the entrenchment theory (managerial entrenchment), broadly states that, mechanisms are not 
always sufficient to the management to run the company in the interests of its shareholders as 
managers may aim at making their replacement very costly therefore increasing their powers 
and discretionary powers592.  IC follows market and securities rules in the process of providing 
their financial services. The law provides two options for the exercise direct or indirect. This 
title addresses the market rules the IC follows to have their shares listed on the intended capital 
market (chapter 1). Further to the internal control mechanisms followed in the course of 
exercising their financial activities through auto management or outsourcing (chapter 2).  
                                                          
589 C. Echaudemaison n (491) page 356 
590 Willia  “ha pe, Capital asset P i es: A Theo  of Ma ket E uili iu  u de  Co ditio s of ‘isk     
Journal of Finance 425; Gregory Chow, Dynamic Economics: Optimization by the Lagrange Method (OUP 1997) 
page 54 
591 An agency relationship defined as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform services on its behalf. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, the 
agent does not always act in the best interest of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest 
by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent (Michael C. Jensen & Willia  H. Me kli g, Theo  of the Fi : Ma age ial 
Beha io , Age  Costs a d O e ship “t u tu e    Jou al of Fi a ial E o o i s  
592 A d ei “hleife  & ‘o e t W. Vish , Ma age e t E t e h e t: The Case of Ma age -“pe ifi  I est e ts  
(1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 123 
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Chapter 1: Market Related Conditions: Exercising Financial Services Activities 
206 Preview. The exercise of financial services as part of the activities of Plc. in general and 
IC in particular, puts securities and financial instruments as core object of these services.  
Securities or financial instruments generally defined as financial goods traded on their relevant 
financial market. Established as a Plc.593 the IC follows the same requirements and fulfills the 
same conditions as other Plc. to the extent the particularity of this Company allows. IC as other 
Plc. trades its goods and provides its services to concerned investors within financial markets. 
Generally, every Plc. has a capital that consists of shares traded on regulated markets594. To be 
eligible for this trading Plc. is granted a financial license to exercise financial activities 
including that of an issuer595. Consequently, the IC is similarly licensed. The question rising in 
this regard that feeds the following debate is whether the IC is considered an issuer as other Plc. 
or does the particularity of the open-end form of this company require otherwise.  
207 Issuer. The issuer as a character and an activity was defined by different domestic and 
regional legislations as the undertaking that issues securities or financial instruments or 
expresses its will to issue them596, those undertakings whose securities are the subject of an 
application for admission to official listing on a stock exchange597.  
208 Investment Company as issuer. If the IC is, a Plc. then as an automatic consequence it 
issues shares and trades them on regulated markets. This auto classification restrained in the 
case of the IC. Previously addressed, IC is exempted from minimum capital requirement rule 
applied globally to all Plc.598. Furthermore, the IC has a main object and provides as its main 
activity; collective investment services. IC does not as a general term trade its own shares on 
regulated market this Company has as its main purpose the collective investment in transferable 
                                                          
593 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7; Article 209.a JCC 
594 C. com., art. L. 225-1; Article 90.a JCC 
595 Article 4 Licensing  Regulation of 2005 
596 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
597 Article 1.a Codified Listing Directive (Council Directive 2001/34/EC of 28 May 2001 on the admission of 
securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities [2001] OJ L 
184/0001) 
598 Article 209.b.2 JCC 
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securities or any other liquid financial assets599. These particular conditions feed the debate 
concerning the issuer character of the IC. 
209 Exemption minimum capital requirement. OEIC is exempted from maintaining the 
minimum capital that is legally required for Plc. that share the same category of activities. This 
exemption applies in later stages of the life of the Company. It is directly linked to the 
variability of this company’s capital600. Having a fluctuating capital601 requires a derogation 
from the rules that strict capital movements602. Therefore, IC in the stage of incorporation is 
obliged as other Plc. to fulfil initial capital requirement provided by law. For purposes of most 
efficient performance of activities, in addition to accomplish the flexibility in redeeming and 
repurchasing shares at any moment the IC is exempted from holding the capital required by law. 
This exemption is restricted; IC assures a minimum liquidity or asset at hand603. The restriction 
is connected to shareholders’ right to request the redemption of their shares at any moment604. 
The fear of emptying the liquidity of the Company requires ceasing the redemption if the assets 
at hand do not mount to the threshold provided by law605.  
210 Character of issuer. The IC is an issuer and it is licensed to exercise the activities of an 
issuer mainly for purposes of the incorporation stage. The IC is not obliged to reissue new 
securities during its existence. In some cases, the IC is exempted by legislation from the 
application of general issuing and later listing conditions that apply globally to issuers of 
financial instruments606. The IC may in later stages request to suspend its issuer activities such 
                                                          
599Article 209.a JCC ; Article 1.2.a UCITS Dir. 2009/65 ; C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
600 C. com., art. L. 231-5 
601 C. com., art. L. 231-1 (A capital that varies increasingly and decreasingly without specific restriction)  
602C. com., art. L. 231-3 
603 C. com., art. L. 231-5; Article 47 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
604 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
605 Article 23.b Collective Investment Regulation of 1999; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-21  
606 The Codified Listing Dir. addresses in several places the possibility of exempting the undertaking of collective 
investment (other than the closed-end one) from the application of different conditions commonly applicable to 
the issuer within the internal scope of the MS 
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as those relating to the admission to list and to trade607of securities on regulated markets, in 
addition to the continuous restriction of its object to the collective investment of securities. 
211 Opening. How does the IC issue financial instruments? What are financial instruments? 
What are the different categories of financial instruments? Is there a difference between a 
financial instrument, a security and a transferable security? What form of financial activities 
does the IC exercise consequently to issuing financial instruments? How are financial 
instruments traded? What is the role of the Company and the market in the financial 
transactions? All of these questions and more addressed thoroughly in the following chapter. 
Financial activities exercised by IC divided in the following chapter into two stages: preliminary 
stage; preparation of the offering prospectus and the actual issuing of securities (section A). 
Secondary stage addressing post-issuing and listing procedures (section B). 
Section A: Issuing and Listing Securities: Different Classes of Shares 
Investment Companies Issue 
212 Preview. The IC is a Plc. that exercises financial activities including but are not limited to 
issuing securities and trading them on regulated markets. In order to enable future investors to 
make well informed judgments and investment decisions; IC follows a set of administrative 
phases provided by securities legislation in order to fulfill its incorporation conditions and 
eventually trade its securities on regulated markets. Where is the starting point for IC to effect 
the issuing of securities? How and where the issuing is performed? What form of requirements 
does the IC comply with before finally trading its securities? What are the prior-trading stages 
that the IC goes through? Generally, IC commences with the registration of the intended issued 
securities with the competent authority, following the approval of the registration the company 
proceeds with the issuing of these securities. Consequently, to the issuing or in some cases 
parallel to the latter the IC deposits the securities at competent securities depositary center 
within the state of incorporation. The IC then admits the registered and deposited securities for 
listing to trade them finally on the regulated market of its choice.  
                                                          
607 Every public issuer under the Jordanian law is obliged to submit a listing application before proceeding with 
trading its securities on regulated market (Article 3.a Listing Regulation of 2016) 
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213 Registration of Securities. Prior to proceeding with issuing securities, every issuer files a 
securities registration statement, for those securities it intends to issue, with the securities 
commission of its state of incorporation608. The commission then enjoys the full discretion in 
accepting or refusing the registration. Particularly the refusal is in case where the commission 
finds that the registration might result in harming holders of issuer’s securities (if it is a new 
issue) or generally harm investors (initial issue)609. The registration statement differs from the 
prospectus that is prepared and published as the main procedure in the issuing and offering 
securities.  
214 Issuing of securities. It is the process entailing offering for sale, of newly issued financial 
instruments. The offer might be “initial” such as the case of recently incorporated companies 
therefore addressing securities issued for the first time. “Posterior” such as the case of securities 
issued in later stages of company’s life. When considering the number of the targeted investors 
in the offer the offer may be public or private610. In order to understand the issuing process the 
question of the form and content of the offer emerges (later explained in sub-section 1).  
215 Depositing. It is the documentation of the securities ownership and that of the 
information relating to the owners, further it includes the registration of any existing royalties or 
restrains over the securities in question at the competent depositary center611. The IC registers 
and deposits its securities at the competent depositary center612, in addition, it designates a 
                                                          
608 Article 5 JSL of 2017; Article 3.a Issuing Regulation of 2005 
609 Article 3.b Issuing Regulation of 2005 
610 Article 4 Issuing Regulation of 2005 
611 Article 2 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 
612 Article 8 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 & Article 79.a JSL of 2017; Who is the depositary center? 
The depositary center is the entity responsible, among other things, for the registration of issued securities, 
depositing the securities, transferring their ownership in addition to effecting settlements and clearing services 
(Article 3 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 & Article 75 JSL of 2017). Under French rules, the 
depositary is an investment firm authorized by the competent authority to exercise the activities and functions of a 
depositary (all that relates to the authorization of the depositary is illustrated in the AMF Instr. DOC-2016-01 of 6 
April 2016). The depositary center provides investors with securities related services, including but not limited to: 
issuing ownership statements, issuing securities account records and freezing the securities (Article 4 Registering 
and Depositing Regulation of 2004, AMF, régl. gén., art. 323-1; C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-10-5 and Article 22.3 as 
amended by Article 1.4 of Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 
amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, 
remuneration policies and sanctions [2014] OJ L 257/186; The Depositary center is supervised by the Securities 
Commission (Article 81 JSL of 2017) 
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depositary613 from the list of undertakings authorized to exercise this activity in the state of 
issuing614.  The IC as other Plc. should file a registration statement -different and later to that 
filed with the Securities Commission- with the depositary center once it receives the 
authorization to commence its activities, as a result the IC becomes a member of this center as 
other financial services undertakings615. This statement includes the number of securities, their 
nominal value, their related prospectus (this requirement emerges the debate of whether the 
deposit of securities proceeds or precedes the issuing of securities), the registration approval 
issued by the commission and the securities ownership record616. The securities are considered 
as documented and deposited once the issuer communicates the information required by the 
center including owners and securities details617. Following this registration the issuer submits 
the securities ownership record to the center; where at this date or any later date communicated 
to the issuer the securities are officially deposited618. The issuer is not obliged to deposit all the 
securities it issues at the center619, yet it holds a record of non-deposited securities where every 
transaction, detail and transfer involving these securities is documented620. As depositing, is a 
pre-requirement to admission to trade of securities.  
                                                          
613 IC appoints a sole depositary through a written contract (Article 22.1.1, 2 as amended by Article 1.4 of Dir. 
2014/91 and AMF, régl. gén., art. 323-11), the depositary is distinct from the MC whereas the exercise of both 
activities cannot be combined within the same undertaking (shall be further illustrated in the following Chapter) 
Article 25.1 as amended by Article 1.8 of Dir. 2014/91  
614 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-10; Article 23 as amendment by Article 1.6 of Dir. 2014/91 
615 Mandatory membership: Article 80.a JSL of 2017; the depositary center enjoys investigatory powers (Article 
80.b JSL of 2017). The depositary is liable and responsible towards the company and its shareholders. It is liable for 
the loss affecting the deposited financial instruments. This liability may be invoked directly or indirectly by the 
shareholders of the IC (Article 24 as amended by Article 1.7 of Dir. 2014/91), further it should safe keep the 
records of the financial instruments in respect of the governing rules and regulations (AMF, régl. gén., art. 323- 2 & 
3). The depositary further holds a record of the charges relating to the exercise of its activities (AMF, régl. gén., art. 
323-6) in addition to acquiring the requested material, personal means and the internal control and organization 
that allows the proper performance of its activities (AMF, régl. gén., art. 323-7) 
616 Article 8 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004; The same operation is repeated for every newly issued 
security at later stages (Article 9.a Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004) 
617 Article 13 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 
618 Article 14.a Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 
619 Securities that do not meet the depositing requirements cannot be deposited, further they should be 
mentioned in the non-deposited section of the securities ownership record (article 12.b Registering and Depositing 
Regulation of 2004) ; The securities that are not deposited cannot be traded on the market (Article 19.b 
Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004) 
620 Article 15 Registering and Depositing Regulation of 2004 
 
120 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
216 Listing. It is the registration of securities on capital market’s records, therefore admitting 
the securities to trade upon the request of the issuer621. The registration or admission to trade of 
the security is preceded by a listing application submitted by the issuer622with the relevant 
market and for all its underwritten623 or subscribed624 securities. While at the same time the 
issuer (applicant) complies with the conditions laid down in the governing rules625, including 
providing all the information deemed necessary and appropriate to protect investors and ensure 
smooth operation of the market626. Further to the application, the competent authority may 
request a listing particular to be prepared and submitted by the issuer that includes necessary 
details relating to securities in question627. Consequently, to the admission to listing the 
securities become freely transferable and negotiable on regulated markets628, therefore creating 
the close link between the admission to listing and the admission to trade629. The two phases are 
mixed630 due to the overlapping occurring in most cases nonetheless; both terms coexist and are 
distinct from one another. 
217 Opening. The distinction between the different administrative stages that lead to the 
admission to trading on regulated markets is critical in some legislation. The closeness and the 
similarity of the requirements of every financial step, in addition to the overlap of certain steps 
feeds the difficulty of distinction and complexity of drawing a final time frame with definitive 
location for each step. To develop a global overview of the method through which securities 
end-up being traded on financial markets we chose to discuss two main steps within the 
following sub-sections: issuing (discussing the structure and preparation of the prospectus ‘sub-
section 1’) and admission to listing of securities (discussing post-prospectus stages ‘sub-section 
2’). The remaining stages further explained in the following chapters. 
                                                          
621Article 2 Listing Regulation of 2016; Rule 6102 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
622 Article 3.a Listing Regulation of 2016; Rule 6201 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
623 Article 3.b Listing Regulation of 2016; Article 49 Codified Listing Dir. 
624 Rule 6607 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
625Article 5 Listing Regulation of 2016 
626Article e 4.a Listing Regulation of 2016; Article 16 Codified Listing Dir. 
627Article 21 Codified Listing Dir.; To be further explained in sub-section 2 of this chapter 
628Rule 6605 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
629The allocation of Securities for the trade on regulated markets  
630Rule 6102 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
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Sub-section 1: Structuring the Offering Prospectus 
218 Financial Instrument. The coordination of the conditions for the admission of securities 
to official listing on stock exchanges provides equivalent protection for actual and potential 
investors; therefore ensuring that sufficient information is provided. Previously mentioned the 
trading of securities on regulated markets is preceded with an issuing and listing process for 
securities in question. IC throughout this process offers its financial product known as 
“Security” or a “financial instrument”. The question rising in this regard is the following: can 
both terms be used as synonyms or are they distinct from one another? Financial instrument is 
an asset or evidence of ownership of an asset or a contractual agreement between two parties to 
receive or deliver another financial instrument631. It can be further defined as a contract that 
gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability (or equity instrument) of 
another entity, hence representing a store of value without possessing an intrinsic value of their 
own632. 
219 Component of financial instrument. Financial instrument is classified based on its initial 
recognition as a financial asset633, financial liability634 or an equity instrument635. This 
classification is made in accordance with the substance of the contractual agreement. Under 
French law, financial instruments include financial titles636 and financial contracts637. As for the 
                                                          
631 C. mon. fin., art. L. 211-1; Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the 
document Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council with regard to definitions, transparency, portfolio compression and supervisory 
measures on product intervention and positions {C(2016) 2860 final} {SWD(2016) 156 final}, 18.5.2016, SWD(2016) 
157 final, p. 61 
632 Definition based on two international standards : the IAS 32 (paragraph 11) and the ESA 95; European Central 
Ba k, “tatisti al Classifi atio  of Fi a ial Ma kets I st u e ts  Jul   
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/statisticalclassificationfmi200507en.pdf?05d940969ab122b2d9aa7b
512e2d29fa> Accessed 30 March 2017 
633 According to IAS 32, financial asset means any asset that is cash, an equity instrument of another entity, a 
contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity or to exchange financial assets of 
financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially favorable to the entity   
634 Defined in Paragraph 11 of the IAS 32 as a contractual obligation that entails the reception or exchange of cash 
or other financial assets with another entity  
635 Equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducing all 
of its liabilities; IF‘“ Fou datio  “taff, IA“  Fi a ial I st u e ts : P ese tatio   IF‘“ Te h i al “u a  
<http://www.ifrs.org/Documents/IAS32.pdf> Accessed 30 March 2017 
636 They include equity titles, debt titles and units of CIUs; they become material once they are subscribed to and 
hold their proper owner (C. mon. fin., art. R. 211-1) 
637 Financial contracts also known as financial instruments with a term, they include option contracts, future 
contracts, exchange and others (C. mon. fin., art. D. 211-1 A); C. mon. fin., art. L. 211-1 al. III 
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EU law, they include among other things: transferable securities638, money-market instruments, 
units in CIUs, options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative 
contract639. 
220 Security. Under financial section of the business dictionary, the security is defined as a 
financing or investment instrument issued by a company or the government that denotes an 
ownership interest and provides evidence of a debt, a right to share in the earning of the issuer 
or a right in the distribution of a property. Within the scope of the Euronext rules, the security is 
defined as any transferable security that falls within one of the following categories: equity 
securities, certificates, depositary receipts, bonds or other debt securities, warrants, units in 
CIUs and any other security considered as such by the relevant national rules640. Both 
definitions lead to the same conclusion; considering the security as a form and part of the 
financial instruments and not an equivalent term641. The security or the transferable security 
classified into two main categories: debt securities and equity securities.  
221 Equity security vs. debt security. The distinction between the debt and equity based 
securities generally lies in investor’s intention642. The denomination given by the issuer may not 
be enough to determining if the security is one or the other. The US courts for example use an 
objective economic reality test to distinguish between equity and debt based securities, the test 
entails reasoning behind the fund paid by shareholders whether it is a contribution to the capital 
(equity) or a loan (debt)643. The distinction between equity and debt-based securities can be 
                                                          
638 Article 2.1.n UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
639 Section C of Annex I of MiFID II 
640 Article 1.1 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
641 Both Jordanian (Article 3.a JSL of 2017) and US (Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933) rules used the term 
security when addressing financial market instruments 
642C. mon. fin., art. L. 211-1 
643 3rdcircuit, Fin Hay Realty v. United States (1968) 
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designated by the following three different approaches644: basic ownership approach645, 
ownership-settlement approach646 and reassessed expected outcome approach647.  
222 Investment Company issues. IC issues and has as its main object the collective 
investment in a form of financial instruments that is securities or transferable securities. IC 
issues equity securities in the form of shares or stock648.  The shares are issued through public 
offering. The following paragraphs present a definition for shares and their public offering 
process (paragraph 1), in addition to discussing the preparation of the public offering (paragraph 
2). 
§1: Investment Company as a Plc that Issues Securities 
223 Shares or stock. Plc. – including IC - hold a capital that is divided into shares or stock 
generally granting equal rights to their holders649. The company in the process of raising this 
capital in the initial incorporation stage or later when deciding to increase the publicly declared 
capital; issues stocks that entitles owners to a partial ownership of the company. This stock is 
transferable and is traded on regulated markets (mainly the stock exchange) consequently to 
incorporating the company at the competent company controller650. Therefore, the investor 
becomes a shareholder, granting him a portion of ownership interest in the company represented 
by a stock certificate stating the number of shares of an issue of the corporation’s stock651. The 
share or stock entitles its holder to an equal claim on the company’s profits, an equal obligation 
for the company’s debts or losses in addition to conferring a voting right652. Therefore, the 
                                                          
644Identified according to the FASB project updates, can be accessed on the FASB website 
<http://fasb.org/fi_with_characteristics_of_equity.shtml> 
645 The basic ownership instrument is the one that is the most subordinate interest in an undertaking and it entitles 
the holde  to a sha e of u de taki g s et assets afte  satisf i g all highe  p io it  lai s 
646 This approach classifies financial instrument according to return and settlement requirements. Equity security is 
the basic ownership instrument, other perpetual instruments such as preferred shares and indirect ownership 
instruments. All other instruments are classified as assets or liabilities  
647 This approach classifies instruments depending on the direction of movement of fair value of the basic 
ownership instrument; A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Pages 53 - 55 
648 Article 3.b JSL of 2017; Jo. Cass. Civ., 22 March 2004, n° 140/2003; Jo. Cass. Civ., 11 Sept. 2005, n° 1228/2005; 
Article 2.1.n UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
649 Article 90.a JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-1 
650C. com., art. L. 228-10 
651Stephen Michael Sheppard, The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary (compact edn, 2011) page 1023 
652C. mon. fin., art. L. 212-1 A ; C. Echaudemaison n (491) page 10 
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holder is entitled to the earning and is responsible for the risk for the portion of the company 
that each share or stock represents.  
224 Classes of shares. Issued shares may take several forms. Most common categories of 
shares include ordinary shares (common stock or equity) and preference shares. Common stock 
or ordinary shares are those shares that their holders’ exercise all the rights linked to the share 
ownership without any restriction such as voting on major decisions undertaken in GAMs (ex. 
Merger and distribution of dividends)653. As for preference shares, they are those shares whose 
holders do not enjoy all the rights connected to the share ownership, meaning having a 
restriction on the exercise of shareholder activities or conferring a special right whether 
permanent or temporary654. The perfect example is embodied in holding a share with no voting 
right, receiving a minimum dividend or having the priority655 in dividend distribution656.  
225 National laws addressing preference shares. The origin of the preference shares in 
French company rules is traced back to the initiative to modernize company law following the 
footsteps of Anglo-Saxon countries. This form of shares was introduced in 2004657 in the aim of 
conferring particular rights on shareholders (having privileged shares)658. The particular right 
does not confer at all times an advantage on the shareholder’s part. The particular right may 
impose obligations or restrictions such as depriving shareholder from his voting right. The 
Jordanian law introduced the concept of preferred shares in 2002659 in the process of attracting 
foreign investments, where a new form of company660was introduced. This form of shares was 
limited to this company661 and was not extended to include the Plc. The preference shares are 
convertible into ordinary shares or to preferred shares from another category662. The particular 
rights conferred by this form of shares may invoke a general standing legal concept of equality 
                                                          
653C. mon. fin., art. L. 212-1; C. com., art. L. 228-7; Article 97 JCC 
654C. mon. fin., art. L. 212-6-1; C. com., art. L. 228-11  
655C. mon. fin., art. L. 212-6; C. com., art. L. 228-29-8 à 10 
656 C. mon. fin., art. L. 212-5; C. com., art. L. 228-11 
657Ordonnance n° 2004-604 of 24 June 2004 completed by Décret n° 2005-112 of 10 February 2005 
658 Philippe Bissa a, P se tatio  “o ai e de la ‘ fo e du ‘ gi e des Valeu s Mo ili es ises pa  les 
“o i t s Co e iales  AN“A, ‘epo t ° -058 [2004]) 
659 Amending law n° 4 of the year 2002 
660 Private Shareholding Company the equivalent of Société par Actions Simplifiée (SAS) in France  
661 Article 68- Repeated JCC; Confirmed by the explanatory decision, 28 Aug. 2013, n° 4/2013 
662 C. com., art. L. 228-14 
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of participation between shareholders, therefore violating the prohibition addressed in the civil 
law and known as the Lion Clause.  
226 Lion clause and shareholding. The lion clause is invoked in case of having a preferred 
share in a French IC that holds merely a voting right and totally deprives the shareholder from 
the connected financial rights663. As for the case of the Jordanian company, the rule is invoked 
even if the preferred share is granted a fixed amount of the dividends despite the achieved 
profit664. The existence of preference shares further requires the distinction between two 
concepts that relate to share ownership; the “shareholder character” and the “exercise of 
activity”. This distinction is specifically required in the case of no-vote shares. The restriction 
does not affect the character of shareholder even though it affects the exercise of activities the 
voting right grants. Particularly when the company in question looks into making a decision that 
legally requires the consent of the totality of the shareholders without connecting the decision to 
the voting right of the share (a very rare case). In this case, shareholder of a preferred share with 
no voting right has the right to participate in the decision-making process in his character as a 
shareholder as long as the decision is not limited to a majority represented in the general 
assembly meeting665.  
227 Features of share. Generally, concerning shares offered by a Plc, no share should be 
indivisible, nonetheless a single share can be owned by multiple individuals when the 
ownership results out of succession666. Common features of a stock deduced from the previous 
presentation include the right to receive dividends upon an apportionment of profits, 
negotiability, the ability to be pledged, conferring a voting right in proportion to the stock 
owned and the capacity for value appreciation667. 
                                                          
663 C. civ., art. 1844-1; See ANSA report on the calculation of percentage of participation in the case of having 
p efe ed sha es AN“A, Action de préférence sans droit de vote– obtention du droit de vote à terme : 
comptabilisation ou non de ces droits de vote pour le calcul du seuil de l OPA o ligatoi e  (Comité Juridique, 12-026 
[2012])) 
664 Articles 588 and 590 Jo. Civil Code 
665 A sa, D oit Fo a t ‘o pus: E e i e des D oits de ote  (Comité Juridique, 12-014 [2012]) 
666 Article 96 JCC 
667 These features were confirmed by the US jurisdiction in the process of determining the stock as a financial 
instrument due to the existence of common characteristics and a common name (Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 
471 US. 681 n.2 (1985)); A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 248 
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228 Share classes of Investment Company. The Jordanian law limited the incorporation form 
of the IC to the Plc668, unlike French law that provided two different forms of companies from 
which the IC chooses669. This restriction limits the shares the IC issues to the ordinary one 
within the Jordanian scope and provides the French incorporated IC with the possibility to issue 
both ordinary and preferred shares670, in addition to the possibility to attribute particular 
advantage to the benefit of a special group of shareholders671.   
229 Means of issuing shares. Being a Plc. the IC is legally required to have a fully 
subscribed to672 or an underwritten673 nominal capital (the authorized or registered capital at the 
moment of incorporation). The governing legal rules designate the applicable restriction on the 
timeframe permitted to fulfill the obligation in addition to the supplementary requirements and 
conditions met alongside this timeframe674. The puzzling question in this equation is the 
following: what is the link between this requirement, the IPO and the prospectus? To answer 
this question, a definition to each of these terms is introduced.  
230 Underwriting. The process whereby financial institutions (such as banks) commit to 
purchase the offered securities at a designated date (usually after the closing date) in case the 
minimum subscription amount is not met675. The underwriter commits to cover the unsubscribed 
securities, avoiding the risk arising from certain unforeseen contingencies, which may endanger 
the issue resulting from the shortfall in public response to purchase the offered securities.  
231 Public offering. An issue of securities offered for sale to the public after meeting all the 
requirements of securities authorities676. The IPO is the introduction on the stock market the 
capital raised at the time of introduction therefore offering new issue securities. Under EU law 
                                                          
668 Article 209.a JCC 
669 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
670 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-23 
671 C. com., art. L. 225-8 
672 C. com., art. L. 225-3; It is the process through which investors sign-up and commit to invest in a financial 
instrument before the actual closing of the purchase 
673 Article 99 JCC 
674 C. com., art. L. 225-4; C. com., art. R. 225-5 
675 R.S.N Pillai and others, Legal Aspects of Business (Mercantile laws including industrial and company laws, S. 
Chand 2011) page 884 
676West's Encyclopedia n (341); Thierry Bonneau & France Drummond, Droit des Marchés Financiers (3rd ed, 
Economica 2010) page 795  
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and followed by the French legal system PO is considered a communication677 in any form or 
medium presenting sufficient information relating to the offer and the securities in question that 
puts the investor in a state of a well-informed judgement once making his investment decision 
to purchase or subscribe to the shares678. As for the Jordanian law, it defined the PO as the offer 
for the sale of securities targeting more than thirty individuals679. 
232 Prospectus. Is the disclosure document that describes a financial security for the potential 
buyer. It commonly provides investors with material information about the offered stocks and 
the offeree. This includes a description of company's business, financial statements, biographies 
of officers and directors, detailed information about their compensation, any litigation that is 
taking place, a list of material properties and any other material information. In the context of an 
IPO, underwriters or brokerages distribute a prospectus to potential investors680. 
233 Link. The IC when incorporated raises capital through the sale of its issued securities681. 
These securities are issued and offered to the public through IPO682 (for the first introduction). 
Investors purchase the offered securities by way of subscription or underwriting (through 
intermediaries)683 or as a result of listing the securities in question for negotiation on regulated 
markets684. In order to make the investment decision and to subscribe to the offered securities 
based on a well-informed judgement, the IC produces and provides the investor with a 
                                                          
677 The notion of communication under French rules (C. mon. fin., art. L. 411-1) is addressed thoroughly in cases 
involving the distinction between a marketing communication (as referred to in Recital 58 and Article 77 of UCITS 
Dir. 2009/65) and a PO. French jurisprudence confirmed this rule by the following statement: in order to consider 
the communication as a PO it should include indications or information relating to the financial instrument; C. 
com., art. R. 225-1; CA Paris, 15 Fèvr. 1995, n° 29/ 22470 
678 Article 2.1.d Prospectus Dir. 
679 Article 5.a.1 Issuing Regulation of 2005 
680E“MA, The Co siste t I ple e tatio  of Co issio  ‘egulatio  EC  No /  I ple e ti g the 
P ospe tus Di e ti e  E“MA update of CE“‘ e o e datio s  E“MA/ /  of  Ma h 011; Article 35 JSL of 
2017; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-7 
681 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
682 C. com., art. L. 225-2 
683 C. mon. fin., art. L. 411-1 
684 Article 5 Issuing Regulation of 2005; French rules consider the admission to negotiation on regulated markets 
and the subscription for publically offered securities as two different procedures despite the similarity unlike the 
Jordanian law that considered the underwriting and the listing as two different forms to the public offering (the 
Jordanian rules address the concept of public listing that is the offering for sale of securities that result from cases 
other than the public issuing of securities such as the conversion of the form of the company or shares of 
p i atized pu li  e tities A ti le  Issui g ‘egulatio  of  
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document stating a full description of the offeree and the offered financial instrument; known as 
the prospectus.  
234 Mandatory or optional prospectus. Generally, the undertaking that looks into realizing a 
PO or an admission to trade on regulated markets for the issued securities puts in place a 
prospectus and submits it with the competent securities authority685. Nonetheless, it is possible 
to derogate from this obligation upon a decision made by securities authority for reasons 
involving a value threshold of the offered securities, the number of targeted investors686 or when 
considering that the prospectus is replaceable by sufficient disclosure made by the company687.  
The necessity and the role of the prospectus requires a through explanation of its format and 
content.  
§2: Preparation of Initial Public Offering 
235 Importance. Those who issue a prospectus hold out to the public great advantages which 
will accrue to the persons who will take shares in the proposed undertakings. The public is 
invited to take shares on the faith of the representations contained in the prospectus and it is at 
the mercy of company promoters. Therefore, everything must be stated as a fact with strict and 
scrupulous accuracy. Nothing should be omitted, the existence of which, might in any degree, 
affect the nature or quality of the privileges and advantages which the prospectus holds out as 
inducement to take share.688 
236 Format. The prospectus may constitute of a single or multiple documents689. When 
constituted of multiple documents the prospectus includes a reference document690, a base 
                                                          
685AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-1; Article 34.a JSL of 2017; Article 5.b Issuing Regulation of 2005 
686Cass. Com., 1 Févr. 2004 : Banque et Droit 2004, n° 95 
687AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-4 ; C. mon. fin., art. L. 412-1 ; Article 36 JSL of 2017 
688 Vice chancellor Kidnersely in New Brunswick & Canada Railway Company vs. Muggeridge (1960) 
689 When having multiple documents the prospectus is prepared based on a referencing procedure to the attached 
documents (AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-11) 
690AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-13; The reference letter according to the AMF, constitutes a communication tool that 
provides financial analysists, institutional investors or individual shareholders with all the necessary information to 
make a well-informed judgement in relation to the activities of the issuer, its financial situation the outcomes and 
the perspectives of the issuer. It includes the exhaustive sum of legal, economic, financial and accounting 
information. This document may take the form of an annual report destined to shareholders or as a specific 
document (AMF, Instr. 2016-04 art. 10). This document is submitted with the AMF and it is provided free of charge 
 
129 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
document for the first introduction to regulated markets691, a notice of securities and a 
résumé692. The prospectus may be submitted electronically693 or on a paper form694, signed by 
the management of the issuer and the majority of founding shareholders in case of IPO695, in 
addition to being signed by the person responsible for its preparation696. The main format of the 
prospectus and upon the request of securities authority attaches supplementary documents. The 
documents include among other things AOA of the issuer, legal opinion justifying the legality 
of the issuing697, agreement entered into with the issuing manager and the contracts containing 
essential information including the designation of omitted information698. Furthermore, the 
issuer attaches a statement within which he declares the responsible individuals or moral 
persons for the prospectus and its content in addition to attesting the accuracy, confirming the 
reality and facts of the content and the non-existence of any alteration or omission, all of which 
to the best knowledge of the mentioned persons in the statement699.  
237 Content700. Prospectus should include information that permits the investor to make a 
well-informed judgement, therefore including all the related investment project information, in 
addition to those details relating to issuer’s objectives701. The mentioned information includes 
those addressing the nature of the issuer, capital level and other details that allow the investor to 
evaluate the financial standing of the issuer702, in addition to predicting the prospective financial 
outcomes and verifying the rights and guaranties related to offered securities (a resumé of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the public the day following the submission whether electronically or on a paper form. It may be updated at any 
moment following the same rules of modification of the prospectus 
691AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-23 
692AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-6; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-9l; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/301 of 30 
November 2015 supplementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to regulatory technical standards for approval and publication of the prospectus and dissemination of 
advertisements and amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 [2016] OJ L 58/13 
693 AMF limited in its Instr. 2016-04 the format of the prospectus to the electronic form whether submitted 
electronically or directly deposited with the authority (Article 1) 
694 Article 37.a JSL of 2017 
695 Article 37 JSL of 2017 
696AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-14 
697AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-14 
698 Article 71.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; Article 35 JSL of 2017; AMF, Instr. 2016-04, art. 2 
699AMF, régl. gén., art. 212- ; AN“A, ‘espo sa ilit  des Ad i ist ateu s “ig atai es d u  P ospe tus  Co it  
Juridique, n° 06-036 [2006]) 
700 SICAV prospectus includes all the information mentioned in Schedule A of Annex 1 of the UCITS Dir. 2009/65; 
AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-113; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-114 
701 Article 69 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-113; AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-71 
702AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-7 ; C. mon. fin., art. 412-1 
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securities)703 and most importantly the investment related charges704. Unless the prospectus is 
submitted with a copy of the AOA, the prospectus should provide all the details usually 
mentioned within which705. The investor may request that the prospectus provides specific 
information or details especially those relating to risk evaluation706. The content of the 
prospectus is adaptable to the type of offered securities707, therefore any essential information 
that require to be omitted or considered as confidential should be removed708. Further, the 
prospectus explicitly indicates the asset category IC is authorized to invest in709. The content of 
the prospectus should be provided in a clear and non-ambiguous language710, published in the 
language of the country of issuing or that usually used in the financial field particularly for 
public offering targeting multinational investors accompanied with a resume in the national 
language of its home country711.  
238 KIID712. Issuers are further required to draw-up a short document containing key 
information of the offered investment known as Key Investor Information Document713. The 
information included are essential and structured in an appropriate manner that permits 
investors to comprehend the nature, characteristic and risks of both the issuer and the offered 
securities, further to allowing them to reach a decision without having to exhaustively go-
                                                          
703AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-8 
704AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-72; Article 14 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
705AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-11; Article 69.2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
706AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-77; Article 70.4 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
707AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-17; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-119 
708AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-18 
709AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-116; AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-74 ; Article 70 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
710AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-7 
711AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-12; Under the Jordanian rules no such requirement or option is addressed. The 
language issue presents a debatable issue on whether or not the possibility to draft a prospectus in a habitual 
language in the financial field violates the national laws protecting the languages such the loi Toubon in France and 
the law on the protection of the Arabic language in Jordan. The CE in France addressed the violation of loi Toubon 
if the prospectus contained a mere resume in French and it was entirely prepared in another language (CE, 20 dec. 
2000, n° 21-3415); Arnaud Raynouard, La gues F a çaises, Ma hes Fi a ie s et “ou es du D oit , CE, ° -
3425, Dalloz Recueil, 2001 (21), p. 1713 
712 The reasoning behind the introduction of the KIID: The Simplified Prospectus (SP) has failed as a consumer 
communication because the rules have led to long documents. In addition, many have been written in technical or 
legalistic language and poorly structured and designed, resulting in unattractive documents, which are unlikely to 
be read. The KIID is a radical attempt to address these shortcomings by giving management companies more scope 
to produce a document that is readily understandable by average retail investors (CESR, Guide to Clear Language 
and Layout for the Key Investor Information Document [CESR/10-1320] of 20 December 2010 ) 
713 Article 78 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-8-1 ; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-106 
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through the prospectus714. The KIID states different forms of elements that should be mentioned 
in the order provided by the governing regulation715. These elements include; a short description 
of the investment’s objectives and policy716, risk and reward profile of the investment717, the 
charges718, performance history and activities of the issuer719 and practical information relating 
to the general conditions of the offer, reasons of the offer and admission models720.  
239 Format of KIID. This document is parallel to the prospectus and does not replace it. It 
indicates where and how to obtain any additional information relating to the proposed 
investment. It should be prepared in a language that investors understand, should be clear, 
coherent, correct, not misleading and most importantly the used language should not be 
technical, it should facilitate the comprehension of the retail investor to the content by simple 
reading and to distinguish this document from the prospectus and any other attached 
documents721. KIID should not be too long; it should not exceed two pages of the size A4722. 
The content of KIID should be reviewed regularly at least every twelve months723, and the 
revised version should be published724. 
240 Communication of KIID. KIID is communicated to investors by the issuer725 in a durable 
medium726, on a paper form or by any other mean of communication such as websites; while 
meeting at the same time the conditions set by Article 38 of the KIID implementation regulation 
                                                          
714 Recital 61 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
715 Article 4 Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards key investor information and conditions to be met when 
providing key investor information or the prospectus in a durable medium other than paper or by means of a 
website OJ L 176/1 
716 Article 7 Reg. 2010/583 
717 Article 8 Reg. 2010/583 
718 Articles 10-14 Reg. 2010/583 
719 Articles 15-19 Reg. 2010/583 
720 Article 20 Reg. 2010/583 ; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-107; AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-68 
721 Article 3.3 Reg. 2010/583; Article 5 Reg. 2010/583 
722 Article 6 Reg. 2010/583 
723 Article 22 Reg. 2010/583 
724 Article 23 Reg. 2010/583 
725 A disclaimer addressing the liability of the issuer for the prepared KIID is addressed under the AMF rules in 
articles: 411-108 and 422-69 
726 Article 81 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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2010/583. Provided free of charge and at a useful time for the investor727. Once communicated 
the KIID is bestowed with a legal value where it is considered as a pre-contractual agreement728.  
241 KIID in Jordan. No such document was addressed under the Jordanian securities rules. 
This document provides a higher level of protection for retail investors in prior investment 
stages. The existence of such document within the same strict rules as those provided by the EU 
rules introduces a new form of investor protection seen as pro-shareholder orientation as long as 
such introduction does not impose further costs on companies in terms of its preparation and 
publication. The closest concept to the KIID under the Jordanian securities rules is the written 
content attached to or preceding a valid prospectus that was addressed in the former JSL of 
2002729. As for the JSL currently in force, it addresses an announcement or advertisement 
containing a summary of the prospectus730. Once the company is done with preparing the 
prospectus, it proceeds to disseminating it to the public in order to fulfill its purpose. The 
following sub-section addresses post preparation stages.  
 
Sub-section 2: Reporting and Publishing when Prospectus is Prepared 
242 Importance of IPO. IPO is not an end in itself or a culmination. It offers companies the 
opportunity to regularly carry out secondary fundraising operations allowing them to continue 
to finance their development and growth through the market.731 According to the Euronext, IPO 
permits undertakings to increase its equity by raising capital, diversify its sources of financing at 
the IPO and throughout its stock market life through capital increases and bond issues. Further, 
increasing the visibility at a national and international level, develop liquidity through offering 
shareholders’ a liquidity tool allowing them to buy or sell company's security at any moment on 
the markets. In addition, IPO helps strengthening the structuring level, retain teams and make 
employees recruiting easier when offering attractive share incentive plans to increase employee 
motivation and involve them more in the development of the company, further through IPO 
                                                          
727AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-128 
728AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-68; Article 79 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
729 Article 34.a (3) JSL of 2002 
730 Article 34.b(2) JSL of 2017 
731 Marc Lefèvre, Director of Issuer Relations and Commercial Development for Europe at Euronext 
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companies promote their external growth, increase their credibility, and enhance their 
company's value over time732. 
243 Prospectus related Disclosure. IPO requires the preparation of a prospectus. Seen as a 
form of disclosure; yet there is a difference between prospectus related disclosure and periodic 
disclosure (that relating to annual and half-annual reports) required by the governing rules. In 
PO process, issuers (including the IC) disclose details linked to offered securities including 
those details stating the number of subscribed or underwritten securities and their classes. This 
disclosure is made to both the public and the securities authority733. They further disclose 
management decisions that are connected to the offering including those decisions undertook in 
GAMs734. This form of disclosure is treated under the different governing rules consequently to 
preparing and submitting an approved prospectus with the securities authority, it is known as the 
publication process of the prospectus project735.  The publication addressed in this sub-section is 
a form of communication to the public and a means of publicity to the conducted PO by the 
company in question (further addressed in paragraph 1)736. The publication is followed with an 
enforceability and updating mechanisms of the prospectus’ content (further explained in 
paragraph 2). 
§1: Data Accessibility 
244 Submission of Prospectus. The prospectus generally, is not a confidential or a private 
document where neither the issuer holds secretly in its private possession nor does the securities 
authority consider as classified. The prospectus is the means of communication used by issuers 
to announce to potential investors the offered investment plan. It is prepared to fulfil an 
essential aim that is to allow investors to reach a well-informed judgement in connection with 
offered securities. Therefore, the prospectus in a PO is public and accessible by potential 
                                                          
732 Euronext website https://www.enternext.biz/en/enternext/non-listed-company/the-means-of-financing/ipo-
initial-public-offering accessed 5 April 2017 
733 Article 10 Issuing Regulation of 2005 
734 Article 19 Issuing Regulation of 2005 
735 Article 68.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-26 
736Connection between corporate reporting and integration of sustainability (ESG) in order to restore the 
confidence of investors; Jea  ‘oge s a d ‘o e t He tz Corporate Disclosure of Material Information: The 
E olutio  a d the Need to E ol e Agai     Applied Co po ate Fi a e  
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investors in most cases free of charge. Once the prospectus project is prepared meeting all the 
required conditions, containing all the essential information and attaching all the supplementary 
documents it is submitted with the securities authority737. This reporting or submission 
addressed by various legal systems. Nonetheless, some explicitly states the requirement (such as 
French and EU rules) and others referred to it implicitly (such as Jordanian rules). The different 
Jordanian securities rules and specifically those governing PO address the submission of the 
prospectus as a natural outcome to the preparation without providing an explicit obligation. The 
Jordanian law considered PO that does not meet the exemptions from the prospectus, yet is 
opened with no prospectus as a violation of securities rules738. The securities rules further 
address the role of the submission in the validity of the prospectus739 as for the public nature of 
the prospectus it is consequent to the approval of the JSC740.  
245 Role of securities authority. The legal rules state the role of the securities authority in 
accepting, rejecting, suspending or commenting on the performed prospectus submission. 
Securities authority as a form of external supervision; reviews and examines the submitted 
prospectus project and verifies its complete content741. The prospectus obtains a form of visa 
from the securities authority. The authority decides whether to approve and deposit the 
prospectus or reject it based on a reasoned decision742. Within the Jordanian scope, the JSC has 
the power to suspend the prospectus for the same reasons it may reject it743. 
246 Publication and accessibility. The prospectus once submitted and granted the visa of the 
securities authority becomes public no longer a private document744 with the exception of 
specific cases involving particular sensitive information745. The issuer is further required to 
publish the prospectus and communicate it to investors free of charge whether or not they 
                                                          
737AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-6; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-120; AMF, Instr. 2016-04 art. 1; Article 74 UCITS Dir. 
2009/65 
738 Article 34.a JSL of 2017 
739 Article 39 JSL of 2017; Article 12.a Issuing Regulation of 2005 
740 Article 38.a JSL of 2017  
741AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-21; AMF, Instr. 2016-04, art. 1; Article 41.a JSL of 2017  
742AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-20; AMF, Instr. 2016-04, art. 11; Article 5.a Issuing Regulation of 2005; Article 15 Issuing 
Regulation of 2005 
743 Article 15 Issuing Regulation of 2005; Article 41.b JSL of 2017 
744 Article 38 JSL of 2017  
745 Article 38.c JSL of 2017; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-4; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-30 (direct communication to 
professional investors or private offering) 
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request it746. The prospectus is published in newspapers, provided on a printed copy at the 
headquarters of the issuer, posted online on the issuer’s website that of the intermediary or the 
securities authority747. Therefore it is provided to potential investors in a durable medium748. 
Meaning using an instrument which enables an investor to store information addressed 
personally to that investor in a way that is accessible for future reference for a period of time 
adequate for the purposes of the information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of 
the information stored749. 
247 Lack of publication obligation. No publication obligation is addressed under the 
Jordanian rules, similar to that stated by the French and EU rules. The sole reference that the 
law made to the publication of the prospectus was implicitly when stating the necessity of the 
publication of the supplementary note to the prospectus. This statement states the necessity to 
follow those rules and medium of publication provided for the prospectus750. The publication is 
made and the issuer does communicate the prospectus to the public as a natural exercise with no 
legal obligation. On the other hand, the securities law imposed a publication and accessibility 
obligation on the part of the JSC. This obligation entails allowing the public to access the 
prospectus and its attached documents751. Seen as a form of visa granted to the prospectus by 
the securities commission. Even though the submitted and approved prospectus is considered as 
final, its content may be subject to modification, alteration or change. The prospectus once 
approved obtains a legal value and becomes enforceable to be further illustrated hereinafter.  
§2: Following a Published Prospectus 
248 An up to date prospectus. Generally, prospectus when submitted with the securities 
authority is final, nonetheless the content of the prospectus may witness certain modifications, 
changes or alterations. The change affects the prospectus either after the submission and before 
the visa or after the visa and publication. Being essential or not the change is reported to the 
                                                          
746 Article 68.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; Article 75 UCITSS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-27 
747AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-27 
748 Article 78.2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
749 Article 2.1.m UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
750 Article 17.b Issuing Regulation of 2005 
751 Article 38.b JSL of 2017 
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securities authority752, the non-disclosure, the inaccuracy or omission in the contained 
information is considered a violation of the law753. Therefore, the essential elements of the 
prospectus should be maintained up to date754. If any essential or important change affects the 
prospectus or a new event arises during the PO and before the opening date of the period of 
subscription or the sale then the issuer prepares and submits a complementary note to the 
prospectus while following the same procedure of publication used for the base prospectus755. 
The mentioned essential change or modification means that having a possible significant 
influence over securities’ evaluation. The other case of change is that affecting the content of 
the prospectus during the period of subscription, then the issuer suspends the subscription 
meanwhile it prepares the complementary note and meets the prerequisites set by the Jordanian 
law756. As for the French law no such suspension was addressed the solution was found in 
granting the subscribed investor the right to withdraw from its subscription or purchase as long 
as it is proven that the change affects the closing of the PO and the delivery of the securities757.  
249 Enforceability of the prospectus. The prospectus once published and the PO period is 
opened; does not remain valid and have an inevitable legal value. A Jordanian prospectus 
becomes valid and applicable thirty days following the submission date to the JSC758, it remains 
as such for the entire period of the PO (within which is included the period of underwriting or 
sale). PO is open for a period not inferior to ten days and has a closing date not exceeding 
ninety days759. The opening date for the sale or subscription to Jordanian issued securities 
begins the least ten days after the opening date of the public offering760. As a general principle 
                                                          
752 Article 40 JSL of 2017; Article 16.a Issuing Regulation of 2005; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-120 
753 Article 42 JSL of 2002 and 2017; in the new JSL of 2017 the content of Article 42.d is modified as it no longer 
consider the PO with no valid prospectus as a violation it introduced a new violation for the securities rules; the 
offer for sale of non-registered securities. This modification is positive in terms of investment protection 
o etheless the deletio  of the fo e  iolatio  puts pote tial i esto s  p ote tio  at isk of falli g fo  a o -valid 
prospectus. This risk may be partially averted from by implementing Article 34.c JSL of 2017; the article states that 
the enforceability of the sale of securities is possible if preceded by the communication of a copy of the valid 
prospectus. There is no guarantee of the validity of the prospectus other than reviewing the prospectuses 
published on the JSC website 
754AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-10; Article 72 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
755AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-25; Article 17 Issuing Regulation of 2005 
756 Article 17.c Issuing Regulation of 2005 
757AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-25 al. II 
758 Article 39 JSL of 2017; Article 12.a Issuing Regulation of 2005 
759 Article 14.b Issuing Regulation of 2005 
760 Article 14.b Issuing Regulation of 2005 
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and by summing up the mentioned timeframes a public offering within the Jordanian securities 
market remains for a period not less than two months starting from the submission of the 
prospectus and ending with the closing date of the public offering. The validity and 
enforceability of the Jordanian prospectus is a mandatory requirement as any issuer having a 
PO. On the other hand, the French approved prospectus remains valid for the period of twelve 
months as of the date of the visa granted by the AMF761. The valid prospectus is the core 
component of the enforceability of the sale of securities over the subscribed investors, whereas 
the validity and legal value of the sale result out of receiving a valid prospectus by the 
investor762.  
250 Aftermath of prospectus. As a core outcome for publishing an approved prospectus is the 
opening of the PO where the interested investors subscribe to or purchase the offered securities. 
At the closing date of the PO the issuing process is finalized the subscribed and bought 
securities are communicated to the securities authority and the securities (shares in our case) 
may then be listed on regulated markets763. The listing procedure is defined by the relevant 
financial market, it is mandatory to all Plc764.  
251 Admission for listing. The IC following the issuing of its shares seeks its concerned 
regulated market to admit these shares for listing following the procedure designated by the 
market. The admission procedure commences with an application submitted with the securities 
market containing all the details relating to the background of the Company, its financial 
situation, financial statements, those details of the issued shares765 and most importantly the 
prospectus766. The market enjoys a full discretion to approve or reject (reasoned decision767) the 
admission to listing of applicant’s securities768. The rejection is contestable by the applicant769. 
                                                          
761AMF, régl. gén., art. 212-24 
762 Article 34.c JSL of 2017 
763 Rule 6304 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
764 Article 98.c JCC; Article 3.a Listing Regulation of 2016; Article 69.b JSL of 2017 
765 Rule 6702 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
766 Article 4 Listing Regulation of 2016; Rule 6201 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Rule 6501 Euronext 
Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; Language requirement under the Euronext rules (Rule 6503 Euronext Harmonized 
Rule Book of 2016) 
767 Grounds for refusal (Rule 6401 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016) 
768Article 3.d Listing Regulation of 2016; Article 11 Codified Listing Dir.; Rule 6301 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book 
of 2016 
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The securities are admitted once the market expresses and communicates its approval to the 
applicant770 while at the same time meeting market requirements771. The admission to listing on 
the ASE is performed primarily on the second securities sub-market772. Shares of the IC may 
change their listing market therefore upgrading to the primary sub-market if they meet the 
required conditions set by the ASE773. 
252 Supervisory power of the market. Other than rejecting the admission to listing securities, 
the market imposes reporting obligations on the companies in question particularly of their 
financial statements774. The market imposes further listing requirements775, undertakes 
sanctioning and investigatory measures through applying sanctions on the companies in 
question including delisting the company776 or returning the securities to the second securities 
sub-market after being listed on the primary777. Consequently, to the successful admission to 
listing of securities on the market the securities can then be admitted to trading on the regulated 
market. The trading and listing of securities are distinct from one another. Nonetheless, they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
769 Article 3.d Listing Regulation of 2016; Article 19 Codified Listing Dir.; Rule 6403 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book 
of 2016 
770 Article 4 Listing Regulation of 2016; The Euronext undertaking issues its decision within a period not exceeding 
thirty days after the date of submission of the complete application by the company (Rule 6301 Euronext 
Harmonized Rule Book of 2016). The decision remains valid for a limited period of time that is not superior to 
ninety days extendable upon the request of the applicant for ninety further days (Rule 6302). The Euronext 
undertaking further issues a notice that designates the effective date of the listing (Rule 6303). No such periods 
where addressed in the Jordanian rules. The law does not state the period during which the decision of the ASE 
should be issued and the procedures in case such decision is not rendered. Further, the rules do not state a limited 
validity for the approval to admission to listing on the ASE. This leads back to the debate of the characterization of 
the ASE as an administrative or private entity, therefore designating the competent legal rules as the 
administrative ones if the ASE is considered as a public entity. As for the case, the ASE issues a decision then it is 
contestable before the JSC within fifteen days of its communication. The council of the JSC issues a decision in the 
matter within fifteen days from the submission date of the appeal. The decision rendered by the council is also 
contestable before administrative courts within thirty days of its communication (Article 73 JSL of 2017) 
771 Article 5 Listing Regulation of 2016; conditions include: prior registration of securities with the securities 
commission, deposit of securities, having clear and non-restricted securities, signing listing agreement with the 
stock exchange, providing financial statement for at least one preceding year and other conditions related to the 
subscription thresholds 
772 Article 4 Listing Regulation of 2016 
773 Articles 7 and 10 Listing Regulation of 2016 
774 Article 8 Listing Regulation of 2016 
775 Rule 6206 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016 
776 Article 15 Listing Regulation of 2016; Rule 6901/2 Euronext Harmonized Rule Book of 2016; The risk of delisting 
is used by the market as a disciplinary measure as a result of the violation of responsibilities and obligations stated 
by law or as a complementary measu e fo  the ha ge i  o pa s legal status a d ha a te  
777 Article 9 Listing Regulation of 2016 
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similar. The governing rules and conditions differ therefore the distinction between the two 
steps is required. 
253 Distinction listing and trading. The two terms (admission to list and admission to trade) 
coexist778 yet they overlap in some respects. They differ in their objectives. The rational for the 
admission to trading is to facilitate the fact that a particular financial instrument is appropriate 
for trading purposes. For example in terms of liquidity and other circumstances which would 
support orderly trading and market integrity. As for the intent behind official listing is to add 
quality not only to the financial instrument but also to the issuer. The financial instrument may 
be listed without being subject to official trading on a regulated market or even being subject to 
continuous trading on other trading venues. Admission to listing is a quality label, which adds 
value to the markets and their participants, including investors, and thus that it may enhance 
the competitiveness of the financial markets779. The meaning of this argument is that a regime 
for official listing creates a perception of higher quality, rather than adding higher quality in 
substance. However, if admission to listing on a stock exchange and admission to trading on a 
regulated market were to be totally separated. In the sense that the admission to listing were to 
be decided upon by an independent listing authority (not being a regulated market), then the 
decision on admission to listing could be seen as a “rating” adding value from a credibility point 
of view. In such a model, the issuer could first seek admission to listing from a designated 
listing authority, and then decide the trading venue where it wants its securities to be admitted to 
trading. It would then be possible to admit such securities to trading also on other regulated 
markets even without the consent of the issuer. 
254 Suspending Issuer Activities. Having a variable capital provides the OEIC with an 
exemption from the general applicable formalities of the immediate disclosure and submission 
                                                          
778Within the EU scope, the MiFID does not recognize the notion of admission to listing other than by reference in 
one of the recitals (Recital 57 in addition to the wise men report). This might mean that many of investor 
protection rules set out in MiFID are not applicable to all the instruments that are admitted to listing without 
simultaneously being admitted to trading on a regulated market. This observation is also valid for other directives 
such as the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive, the Transparency Directive, and the UCITS Directive 
which effectively have resulted in that requirements that previously applied in respect of officially listed 
instruments have been abolished for such instruments (unless they are admitted to trading on a regulated market) 
779 ESME report on MiFID and admission of securities to official stock exchange listing 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/05122007_mifid_report_en.pdf> 5 Dec 2007 
accessed 09 march 2017 
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of the change in share ownership whether executed by way of repurchase or redemption780 and 
within the scope of the variability, therefore excluding the cases of takeover and mergers. This 
variability and fluctuation of capital imposes constrains on the possible continuous trading of 
this company’s financial instruments on regulated markets. The main constrain is envisaged in 
the legislative requirement suspending the trade on the market every time the company performs 
a share transfer781. French rules provided an explicit restriction to the negotiation method of the 
securities of companies with variable capital it allowed the negotiation solely through the 
transfer of ownership on company’s registry782, nonetheless the Financial and Monetary code 
states the possibility of trading the securities of OEIC on regulated markets within the 
conditions fixed by law783. The Jordanian law provides among a list of cases of suspension of 
the trade of financial instruments784, the company with the full discretion to request the 
suspension of admission to trade solely upon a decision made by its board and for the period, 
they deem necessary785. Previously mentioned that the IC follows the issuing and listing 
procedures as other Plc. solely for the incorporation purposes, therefore such a suspension is 
necessary to continue its efficient activity performance in pooling assets and selecting its 
portfolio. Further to their role in preserving market integrity. The question rising in this regard 
is the following: what happens once the shares are admitted to trading on the market? To answer 
this question, the following section B addresses continuous conduct qualities required by the 
market and securities rules. 
Section B: Pre and Post Trade Transparency 
255 Preview. Securities market participants, including the IC are required to establish certain 
means of control and should contribute to market integrity. Market integrity is a prerequisite to 
efficient and transparent financial market. The full and proper transparency is guaranteed 
through preventing unlawful behaviors that encompass financial market abuse. Market abuse 
                                                          
780 C. com., art. L. 231-3 
781 Article 13.b.1 Listing Regulation of 2016 
782 C. com., art. L. 231-4 
783 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7 
784 The list includes among other things the cases of: merger, the day of the GA meeting until the decisions taken 
therein are communicated to the market and upon the decision of the market (Article 13 Listing Regulation of 
2016) 
785 Article 13.b.4 Listing Regulation of 2016; The board decides to issue (Article 95.o JCC) and they make the 
decision to suspend the issuer activities 
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behaviors include as a general concept those behaviors involving insider dealing, unlawful 
disclosure of inside information and market manipulation786.  As a result the regulatory regime 
of market abuse is necessary to fulfil the mentioned aims including preserving market integrity, 
avoid potential regulatory arbitrage, ensure accountability in the event of attempted 
manipulation and provide more certainty, investor protection and confidence in the market787.  
256 Connectivity to investor protection and reliability. In addition to the aim of achieving 
market transparency company legislation and that of financial markets aim to provide a high 
level of investor protection, particularly through regulatory regimes that deal with control of the 
prospectus, financial reporting and with different aspects of the functioning of securities 
markets. Reasonable investor when seeking the financial market reaches its investment decision 
based on an ex ante available information. Therefore, an evaluation of the available information 
is required. The evaluation consists of determining whether the decision reached by the investor, 
based on the available information, was impacted by sensitive and essential information that 
granted him an unfair advantage in comparison with other investors of the same category and 
class. The concept of fair treatment and preventive measures of conflicts of interest arises. 
Conflicts of interest linked and to some extent based on the disclosure of managerial 
transactions that may influence the overall investment conduct (further illustrated in sub-section 
1). 
257 Connection to admission to trading and listing. The main outcome of issuing shares and 
listing them is conducting financial transactions; meaning trading on regulated markets. Market 
integrity is a prerequisite to financial transactions therefore; they should be clean and non-
fraudulent. There has to be transparency to hinder the abusive behaviors and the misconceptions 
of market elements788. The protection of the underlying investor requires laying down a 
regulatory framework that provides legal certainty and less complexity to market participants in 
order to prevent and in some cases eliminate market abuse behaviors (to be further illustrated in 
sub-section 2). 
                                                          
786Provided for in the MAR 
787 This necessity is addressed in the MAR (Recital 4) 
788 Introducing preventive measures such as grey lists, window trading, implementing codes of conduct and 
establishing Chinese walls 
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Sub-section 1: Hindering Conflicts of Shareholders’ Interest 
258 Definition. Conflicts of interest789 is a term used to describe the situation in which a 
public official or fiduciary who, contrary to the obligation and absolute duty to act for the 
benefit of the public or a designated individual, exploits the relationship for personal benefits 
typically pecuniary benefits790. Different transactions may cause two different interests to clash 
into each other. The clash falls under rules of conflicts of interest and the law intervenes in 
cases that involve one party owing to the other a duty of loyalty (exceeds the ordinary duty to 
act in good faith), therefore the first is expected to protect and promote the interests of the other. 
Both civil and common law address this issue, the outcomes are similar yet the approach and the 
legal reasoning differ. In common-law jurisdictions the duty emerged out of the fiduciary duty 
that originate from the law of trusts, the duty of loyalty is a legal consequence of entrusting the 
trustee with the interests of the beneficiary791. On the other hand, in civil-law jurisdiction the 
duty of loyalty is connected to the obligations under a mandate contract or agency contract; 
where the agent undertakes to perform a service for or manage the interests of the principal792. It 
is a mandate of representation, which empowers the agent to act on behalf of the principal, 
therefore its execution is at the core of the contract and not its results, and this assumes the duty 
of care and diligence at a core position. The main valid outcome out of these definitions is that 
directors and officers everywhere and despite the governing jurisdiction and legal approach owe 
a duty of loyalty to their companies and shareholders. 
259 Scope of conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest is not limited to individual 
relationships, the widespread of this issue has an adverse effect on the entire market in question. 
The impact includes principally avoiding financial markets and lack of confidence that results 
out of believing that agency costs are too high therefore limiting the access to capital to certain 
wealthy or professional investors. Further, investors may seek an auto-investment decision-
making rather than acquiring professional and expert opinions and consultations.  The scope of 
                                                          
789 This plural form of conflict of interest is the most commonly used from in legal doctrine and internationally 
prepared reports 
790William Burton, Bu to ’s Legal Thesau us (4th edn, McGraw Hill 2006) 
791 Ta a  F a kel, U ited “tates Mutual Fu d I esto s, thei  Ma age s a d Dist i uto s  i  Lu  The e oz a d 
Rachid Bahar (eds), Conflicts of Interest Corporate Governance and financial Markets (Kluwer Law International 
2007) 
792 Julien Valie gue, Les Co flits d I t ts e  D oit P i  : Co t i utio  à la Th o ie Ju idi ue du Pou oi  DPhil 
thesis, Université de Bordeaux 2016) 
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conflicts of interest then is defined and addressed by the financial market regulatory framework 
rather than merely leaving it to company law. Where in this case financial markets take the issue 
at hand using the instruments of administrative law to resolve it or the least avoid it. This 
approach can be clearly noted within the EU financial markets regulations, including the UCITS 
regulatory framework793. 
260 Regulatory role of financial market. Laws generally impose a duty to act in the best 
interest and an implied conflicts of interest rule. With the emergence of corporate governance 
codes and their integration in the admission to listing and trading of securities, they play a major 
role in presenting the connection between and bring together financial markets regulations and 
that of company law. For example, company laws were not strongly concerned with issues that 
relate to executive compensation. Particularly in terms of the impact the flexibility provided 
within company rules may have on the securities market integrity and the protection of 
shareholders, the securities rules had an essential role in providing regulatory obligations and 
preventive measures that are crucial in governing board practices and their compensation 
packages794.   
261 Conflicts of interest legal context. The term “Conflicts of Interest” has a very specific 
meaning in the legal sense. It refers to the case where an individual in a certain situation holds a 
duty to decide how to act based on the interests of the other person. While having repercussions 
on his own interest by the choice made (having a conflict of duty and interest) or on the interests 
of others meaning third party he is bound to protect (a mere conflict of duties)795. The concept 
stating the existence of a personal interest in the choice the acting person is legally bound to 
make, is enough to arise conflicts of interest, is insufficient in the legal sense creating conflicts 
of interest. As a general rule in representation duties, they all intend to orient the actions of one 
                                                          
793 Recital 13 and Article 12.1.b  UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
794 The implementing directive (2014/91) of UCITS addresses the necessity to introduce a restricted and clear 
remuneration policies by national competent authorities in MS 
795 A conflict of duties does not differ much from the conflict of duty and interest. The conflict of duty and interest 
is a problem because there is a risk and fear that the person will not fulfill its duties as it contradicts or conflicts 
with its personal interest. As for the conflict of duties is problematic because abiding to one duty may imply the 
breach of another, therefore imposing sanctions that e e tuall  affe ts the a ti g pe so s i te est  
 
144 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
person to protect the interest of that represented796. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: what characterizes the situation of conflicts of interest in the legal context? 
262 Characteristics of duty of loyalty. Conflicts of interest in the legal sense falls within the 
content of the legal duty of the acting person. This duty is commonly referred to as the duty of 
loyalty. This duty has two main characteristics797. The first characteristic is that the legally 
required action is not specifically identified: the law does not provide the acting person with a 
specific rule on how to act and what to do, nonetheless this acting person under this duty enjoys 
a discretionary margin within which he can estimate the appropriate action798. This duty is 
distinct from the duty of care. The second characteristic is considered a consequence to the first 
one. It is based on the subjective standard in the judgement of the situation. Therefore 
addressing the ex-ante motive and purpose of the action and not the ex post effects of this 
action799. In order to relate the characteristics of the duty of loyalty and the concept of conflicts 
of interest with the context of market integrity and investor protection within the scope of the IC 
the following paragraphs address this scope (paragraph 1) and the preventive regulatory 
measures that where put in place (paragraph 2).  
§1: Applicability of Conflicts of Interest in Portfolio Investments 
263 Reason to worry. IC as other financial institutions essentially offers its shareholders the 
knowledge and skill in making and executing investment decisions. The decisions are supposed 
to be inspired by the investment interest of the shareholder. This loyalty that is promised, 
bargained for and legitimately expected arises potential conflicts of interest. Theoretically, the 
conflict may be eliminated by changing the substance of the rendered services; promising the 
                                                          
796 No etheless the legal a tio  a  e stee ed to p ote t o e s o  i te est, i  those ases he e the a ti g 
person is entrusted to reliably protect his interests voluntarily such as the cases of minors  
797 Ma  K uithof, Co fli ts of I te est i  I stitutio al Asset Ma age e t: is the EU ‘egulato  App oa h 
Ade uate  i  Lu  The e oz a d ‘a hid Baha  eds , Conflicts of Interest Corporate Governance and financial 
Markets (Kluwer Law International 2007) 
798 The typical element of this character is the combined presence of personal interests that are affected by the 
choice made, and having a legal duty that excludes this personal interest from the decision making process. 
Therefore the requirement connected to this character is the need for the acting person to be independent, 
i pa tial, u iased o  the like As i t odu ed : Mi hael Da is, I t odu tio  i  Mi hael Da is a d A d e  “ta k 
(eds), Conflicts of Interest in the Professions (OUP 2001)) 
799 This character presents the difficulty in some cases to deduce the intentions as the effects are objectively 
deduced. The effects of actions are not at all times determined by the actions alone they are influenced with 
external factors (what is known in economic literatu e as high-noise, low-sig al e i o e t  
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delivery of a particular outcome rather than full loyalty and best efforts or through restricting 
the discretionary margin of Company’s decision-making the question rising in this regard is: 
why worry about conflicts of interest in portfolio investments? Investor protection and 
confidence in the market.  
264 Investor protection. Financial services directives address the matter of conflicts of 
interest in dispersed provisions some explicitly and other implicitly. The beginning of the 
investor protection in regulatory parameters of financial services is found with stating 
reinforced pre-contractual duties that oblige issuers to disclose all relevant material information 
and prohibit them from conducting any fraudulent behavior800. This mere obligation was 
reinforced with new rules that address the conduct of market participants and the steps that 
should be taken to prevent conflicts of interest801.  
265 Interest in Investment Company. The company when incorporated has as a main object 
making profit and sharing it802. Sharing is envisaged in the distribution of dividends. Generally, 
the object of the company should be legitimate and the incorporation should be conducted in the 
common interest of shareholders803. What is the interest of shareholder? Generally, it is 
maximizing their wealth, minimizing their risk and profiting from their shareholding character, 
especially for long-term shareholders. Wealth is maximized only if the company is efficiently 
functioning and is producing such a profit, therefore exercising its activities and offering its 
services. The single interest of every shareholder forms an integral part of common 
shareholders’ interest created with the incorporation of the company. Common interest is 
favored over the individual one and should be protected. The concept and aspects of 
shareholders’ protection create obligations on the acting person within the scope of the company 
to act in such a manner that achieves the best interest and guarantees a treatment on an equal 
footing (fairness and equality of treatment of shareholders)804. Common interest under French 
law is superior; the violation or absence of which may result in the invalidity of the company 
                                                          
800 The perfect example is the Rule 10b-5 in USA 
801‘a hid Baha  a d Lu  The e oz, Co fli ts of i te est: Dis losu e, I e ti es a d the Ma ket  i  Lu  The e oz 
and Rachid Bahar (eds), Conflicts of Interest Corporate Governance and financial Markets (Kluwer Law 
International 2007) 
802 C. civ., art. 1832 
803 C. civ., art. 1833 
804 Cass. com. 3 June 1986, n° 85-12.118 
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what is called “la nullité” 805. This invalidity is linked to the concept of proportionality. In the 
sense that makes it limited to particular violations that mount to invalidity, meaning to a 
proportion of infringements. Common interest is the substance of the company whereas it is 
applicable equally to all shareholders806. It asks multiple related questions in terms of the 
participants’ in shareholders’ safeguarding process. There are two main questions. They are 
related to whether legal rules should assign to the company the research of the exclusive interest 
of its shareholders by subjecting its management, decision-making and investments towards a 
single criterion that is shareholders’ interest or assign to the company the research of company’s 
prosperity meaning subjecting its activities and decision-making to company’s interest criterion. 
All of which while considering the incentive of shareholders is it long-term or short-term 
investment. 
266 Company vs shareholders’ interest. Managing the company in shareholders’ interest is 
one thing and managing the capital for the company’s interest is another. Despite their 
difference they are connected and are considered as complementary to one another. The 
proceeding issues arising out of the existence of two interests relate generally to powers and 
discretion of the management in deciding to go for one of the interests rather than the other. 
Corporate governance rules generally orient the management towards the protection of 
Company’s common interest in addition to fair and equal treatment of shareholders807. 
Management may favor company’s interest as it benefits its management character therefore 
considering a non-shareholder management, or prefer shareholders’ interest as it benefits their 
shareholder character. This situation of pick-and-choose results into creating cases entailing 
conflicts of interests. The management may hold a personal interest in the undertaken decision 
beside that of the company or its shareholders808. This private or other interest may be favored 
over the common one creating what is called “Conflicts of interest”.  
267 Legal obligation. The basic rule for conflicts of interest in Collective Investment spins 
around the decisions made by the management on behalf of the investor. EU rules address the 
                                                          
805 C. Civ., art. 1844-10 
806 Cass. com. 10 October 2000, n° 98-10.236 
807 Article 5 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
808 Dominique Schmidt, Les Co flits D’i t ts Da s La So i t  A o y e (Joly 2004) page 33 
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necessity to prevent conflicts of interest whereas UCITS Directive urges competent 
authorities809 and the IC to lay down specific rules that prevent conflicts of interest810. The 
prevention that was addressed in the recitals of the Directive was transformed into a less 
restrictive obligation in the form of laying down rules that minimize conflicts of interest811. This 
approach by the EU may be understood as the impossibility to fully avoid and hinder conflicts 
of interest. Conflicts occur therefore the minimum requirement approach leads to reducing the 
impact of such conflicts over investors’ interests812. The approach guarantees fair treatment in 
cases where the conflict cannot be avoided813. The minimum requirement approach was 
supported with the separation of the management and depository functions this split introduced 
a supervisory mechanism over company’s activities814. French legislature followed the EU 
approach with a similar minimum requirement. AMF general regulation states that investment 
services providers should take all reasonable measures to detect conflicts of interest that may 
arise in relation to undertaking, concerned persons or any person that has a direct or an indirect 
connection to the provided services or those connected to clients815. The AMF in its approach of 
hindering conflicts of interest imposed another obligation on investment services providers to 
establish and maintain at all times an operational and efficient conflicts of interest managing 
policy while taking into consideration the size, the organization, the nature, the importance and 
the complexity of the provided activities816. AMF provides non-exhaustive case examples of 
conflicts of interest situations817. They include suspicion of making a financial profit or 
avoiding a loss on the expense of others, holding an interest for a third party in the performed 
transaction that is distinct from that of the investor. Further to, privileging or favoring the 
interest of a group of investors over that of the main investor, the acting person exercises a 
similar professional activity to that of the investor or the case of receiving or a future incentive 
                                                          
809Recital 85 
810Recital 13 
811 Article 12.1.b UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
812 Edd  W ee s h, Co fli ts of I te est, Espe iall  i  Asset Ma age e t  i  Lu  The e oz a d ‘a hid Baha  
(eds), Conflicts of Interest Corporate Governance and financial Markets (Kluwer Law International 2007) 
813 Article 14.d UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
814 Article 13.e UCITS Dir. 2009/65; conflicts of interest should be hindered by the depositary when performing its 
functions. It should ensure fairness, honesty and professionalism and it should act in the interest of the company 
and that of investors. Further, it hinders from carrying out activities that may arise a situation of conflicts of 
interest (Article 25.2 of the UCITS Dir. 2009/65 as amended by Article 1.8 of Dir. 2014/91) 
815AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-18 
816AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-20 
817AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-19 
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of receiving an advantage from a third party in a form other than that of the commission or the 
fees commonly billed for the provided service.  
268 Jordanian approach to conflicts of interest. Jordanian legislature took a different 
approach to that of EU and French ones. It addresses disclosure of existing interests and not the 
matter of conflicts of interests. The Jordanian rules address the necessity to separate the 
functions of the custodianship and that of the investment management818, further the rules 
specifically state the prohibition of having a custodian with a shareholder character or being a 
part in the transactions conducted on behalf of the IC819.  The approach prohibits having any 
direct or indirect interest by the investment manager in the performed transactions820. The rules 
address the consequences of the control of conflicts of interest situations including; 
independence (of members of management those owning shares in addition to non-executive 
and independent members that have no connection to the company other than their shareholding 
character)821, fair treatment and equality in different places without imposing an actual explicit 
legal obligation on the IC to lay down a conflicts of interest policy as such provided for under 
the AMF rules. The sole article relating implicitly to conflicts of interest is stated in JSL. It 
states that every licensee should comply with the applicable code of ethics. In addition to acting 
in an honest and diligent manner that maximizes investors’ interest and achieves investment 
goals, with diligence, impartiality and fair treatment and without incurring investors further or 
excessive rates, fees and commission, avoiding empty or unrealistic profits and promises and 
hindering from any misleading or fraudulent behaviors822. This legal obligation despite the 
approach used requires preemptive measures that manage the occurring conflicts, hinder their 
occurrence, disclose potential or existing conflicts and ensure fair treatment of investors (further 
explained in paragraph 2). 
                                                          
818 Article 51 JSL of 2017; Article 31 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
819 Article 29 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
820 Article 30 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
821 Article 4 Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
822 Article 57 JSL of 2017 
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§2: Preemptive Measures for Conflicts of Interest 
269 National approach. Conflicts of interest occur, they cannot be fully prevented yet they 
can be avoided or in some cases disclosed in order to avert from negatively affecting the 
investment decision or influencing market transparency and integrity. This approach requires 
the Investment Companies to define the steps they might reasonably be expected to take to 
identify, prevent, manage or disclose conflicts of interest as well as to establish appropriate 
criteria to determine the types of conflicts of interest whose existence may damage the interests 
of the Company823. In the process of managing conflicts of interest, regulatory approach is 
considered the most common one. Whereas through this approach structural measures are taken 
by national competent authorities that entail as core principles; disclosure, safeguarding the 
independence and ensuring market integrity. The most common structural measure is requiring 
undertakings to establish and maintain an internal supervisory method that prevents, exposes 
and identifies situations entailing conflicts of interest, this method may take the form of a 
conflicts of interest policy824.  
270 Conflicts of interest policy. The policy that the IC is expected to put in place should 
identify among other things investment services and other activities that arise or potentially 
arise a situation of conflicts of interest. In addition defining the procedures and measures to be 
followed in order to manage these conflicts and insure that acting persons exercise their 
activities with an appropriate level of independence in terms of the size and activities of the 
company825.  
271 Appropriate independence. IC is expected to safeguard appropriate independence826 of 
its acting persons by following a set of procedures and laying down measures whether those 
imposed by the legislature or any supplementary ones it deems necessary. The measures include 
                                                          
823 Article 14.c UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
824 Like the case of the French legislature (AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-20) 
825AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-21 
826 Jordanian corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 provides (Article 2) a definition for the independent 
member of management. It defines him/her as a board member that does not hold any financial interest or is 
connected with the company, the auditor, the administrative staff or a competing company other than the interest 
or the connection linked to its shareholding in the company. This independence concerns the interest or 
connection that may bring out a suspected financial or non-financial benefit influencing its decisions or entailing a 
misuse of its powers and position 
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but are not limited laying down efficient procedures that prohibits the exchange of information 
between the acting persons that their activities arise or potentially arise situations of conflicts of 
interest. Deleting the direct link between the acting person’s remuneration of one activity and 
the revenue of a concerned person when suspecting a situation of conflicts of interest. Further to 
laying down measures that prohibit or limit the inappropriate influence third parties may 
exercise over the acting person in addition to limiting and controlling the number of 
participations acting persons hold in other competing undertakings that may result into  conflicts 
of interest or affect the adequate management of such conflict827. The independence of members 
of management was previously addressed in this work, and relates to shares ownership and 
board membership in companies that exercise similar activities to the IC in question.  
272 Independence and disclosure. The independence of members of management may be 
guaranteed through disclosure measures. Measures that aim to control the situations entailing 
conflicts of interest; as the full prevention is difficult and impossible in certain cases. How is the 
disclosure dealt with? What disclosure do conflicts of interest require? The disclosure is that 
regulated in national governing rules and is based on the mere statements of acting persons’ 
participations and interests outside the scope of the undertaking in question. Therefore it 
constitutes a preventive measure to the activation of the fiduciary duty and the agency theory. 
The disclosure as a measure averting and controlling the rise of conflicts of interest differs from 
the periodic disclosure of financial statements that is further required in securities rules. The 
disclosure of the interest empowers investors with the ability to assess conflicts of interest and 
its impact on the overall decision-making process. Conflicts of interest generally results out of 
the multi-managerial involvement in competing companies or in their transactions arising or 
entailing conflicts of interest. 
273 Performing disclosure. Disclosure is conducted through submitting a written statement 
to the company specifying the names of the companies in which the member owns competing 
participations or holds a management position828. Disclosure obligation extends to include close 
family members of members of management; including the spouse and minor children. 
                                                          
827AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-21 II 
828Articles 12, 2 & 23 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; C. com., art. L. 225-109; Article 138.a JCC; Articles 133, 146.b, 
147 JCC 
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Members of management of the IC are prohibited from having any direct or indirect interest in 
the transactions they perform on behalf of the company829. They are required to disclose any 
existing interest.  
274 Conflicts of interest and clean transactions. The connection between conflicts and 
interest and clean transactions lies in the disclosure as it empowers the investor to fully assess 
the prospective investment decisions therefore making a well-informed decision. The disclosure 
further hinders the possibility of abuse of inside information as members of the management are 
prohibited from having any direct or indirect interest in the transactions they perform on behalf 
of shareholders except for the case of having shareholder directors, and then the fair treatment 
rule is activated830. Therefore, the main aim for hindering conflicts of interest is having a 
prudent and efficient management. Hindering situations entailing conflicts of interest and 
disclosure of interests result in presenting the market with integrity, confidence and 
transparency. These characteristics should be guaranteed. The following sub-section addresses 
the measures that should be taken to safeguard the confidence, integrity and transparency of the 
financial market.   
Sub-section 2: Maintaining a Clean Market 
275 Preview. Providing financial services requires continuous diligence and care prior and 
post-the performance of the activity. The necessity of this diligence is requested by both the 
investor and the market. Therefore, the two main concepts that the diligence ensures are 
safeguarding shareholders interest and market integrity. They are interconnected shareholders 
interest is protected through performing clean and non-fraudulent transactions on the market, in 
other words ensuring market integrity that creates a level playing field for all market 
participants and increases investors’ confidence in the market they are seeking. Reaching the 
required level of market integrity entails the introduction of different regulatory frameworks of 
financial markets that address abusive market behaviors such as market manipulation, through 
establishing a strong commitment to transparency and equal treatment of market participants. 
                                                          
829 Article 148.c JCC; Article 30 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
830 As a perfect example the EU approach. Its approach clearly provides for the difficulty to avoid conflicts of 
interest in certain circumstances therefore requires fair treatment of investors 
 
152 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
276 Background of AMP and MAP. In financial markets, participants exercise two forms of 
financial practices: Accepted Market Practices (AMP831) and Market Abuse Practices (MAP). 
The distinction between the two categories of practices is explicit under the governing legal 
rules. EU rules provide a harmonized framework for the prohibition of market manipulation. It 
encompasses the prohibition of entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or engaging 
in a behavior, which gives or potentially gives a false or misleading signal as to the supply of, 
demand for or price of financial instruments within the sphere of the financial instruments 
defined by MiFID. Not all practices even though they seem, as manipulative fall under the 
concept of MAP, there are exceptions from this categorization. The exception applies if it is 
established by the concerned person that the transaction in question is conducted for a legitimate 
reason and in accordance with a preexisting national market practice, therefore holding what is 
referred to as an AMP832. AMP is viewed as a safe harbor that exempts the acting person or 
undertaking from the abusive characterization and the sanctioning imposed by competent 
authorities. To qualify as an AMP the practice in question should meet a set of criteria stated 
within the EU scope under the MAR. The criteria include having a practice that provides a 
substantial level of transparency to the market, ensures a high degree of safeguards to the 
operation of market forces, positively impacts the liquidity and efficiency and does not create 
integrity related risks whether directly or indirectly833.  What behaviors fall under the abusive 
category and considered as endangering the integrity of the financial market? What is the scope 
of these behaviors within the sphere of the IC? The answer for these two questions is in the 
following paragraphs. 
§1: Behaviors Endangering Market Integrity 
277 Market abuse. An efficient and transparent financial market requires market integrity. 
Smooth functioning of securities market and public confidence in the market are prerequisites 
for economic growth and wealth maximization. Market abuse harms the integrity and negatively 
affects investors’ confidence in securities834. This concept entails the unlawful behavior in 
                                                          
831 MAR addresses this form of practices 
832 E“MA, Poi ts fo  Co e ge e i  ‘elatio  to MA‘ A epted Ma ket P a ti es o  Li uidit  Co t a ts  Opi io  
ESMA70-145-76 of 25 April 2017 
833 Article 13 MAR 
834 Recital 2 MAR  
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financial markets that prevents full and proper market transparency. On a general scale this 
concept consists of insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market 
manipulation. 
278 Base obligation. The main requirement imposed on financial market participants is that 
entailing the notification submitted with competent authorities of newly or any admitted 
securities to trading on regulated markets835. This notification consists of, among other things, 
the identification of trading venue, financial instruments in question, further to the notification 
of the ceasing of trade. 
279 Inside information. The exercise of financial activities including; trading securities on 
regulated markets, entails providing the investor with an overview of investment transactions 
and decisions while ensuring at the same time equal or the least fair treatment of all targeted 
investors. Members of the investment services provider hold wider and more detailed 
knowledge, background and experience relating to the investment in question, than that of the 
investor (particularly retail investors). This knowledge may be referred to as “Inside 
Information”836. The inside information is an information with a precise nature837 which was not 
publically disclosed and relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers or financial 
instruments, where if it is made public there is a likelihood838 that it will have a significant 
effect on the price of the financial instrument839. The market abuse practice relating to this form 
of information is the unlawful disclosure of the information. 
                                                          
835 Article 4 MAR 
836 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-1; Cass. crim., 26 June 1995, n° 93-81.646 
837 The p e ise atu e is that i di ati g a set of i u sta es hi h e ists o  hi h a  easo a l  e e pe ted 
to come into existence, or an event which has occurred or which may reasonably be expected to occur, where it is 
specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or event 
o  the p i es of fi a ial i st u e ts  A ti le .  MA‘ . The Eu opea  Cou t of Justi e i  a p eli inary ruling 
defined that the notion of the precise nature refers to future circumstances or events from which it appears, on 
the basis of an overall assessment of the factors existing at the relevant time, that there is a realistic prospect that 
they will come into existence or occur (Case C-19/11 Markus Geltl v Daimler AG [2012] ECR I); French jurisprudence 
mentioned precise nature and not necessarily certain (Cass. com., 5 Oct. 1999, n° 97-17.090). The information 
needs to be sufficiently precise to be immediately exploited on the market (Cass. crim., 26 Oct. 1995, n ° 94-
83.780). As a perfect example of a precise information the preparation of an IPO 
838 Means information a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his or her investment 
decisions (Article 7.4 MAR) 
839 Article 7.1 MAR  
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280 Unlawful disclosure of inside information840. This case arises if a person possessing 
inside information discloses that information to any other person, except where the disclosure is 
made in the normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties841. To avoid unlawful 
disclosure the issuer is obliged to conduct a prior transaction disclosure of inside information in 
order to permit investors to make a well-informed assessment of the information and its impact 
on the investment in question842. 
281 Insider dealing. This practice is considered as market abuse behavior prohibited by the 
governing legal rules843. This situation arises as a result of holding inside information and using 
them by way of acquiring or disposing, to the person’s own account or that of a third party, 
directly or indirectly in relation to an information relating to financial instrument in question844.  
Who is the insider? The insider is the person possessing the information as a result of: being a 
member of issuer’s management, supervisory body or administration845, having a holding in 
issuer’s capital, having access to the information through the exercise of an employment, 
profession or duties846, being involved in a criminal activity847 or a third party insider848.  
282 Safe harbor. Not all behaviors including inside information are considered as abusive. 
The law specifies legitimate behaviors the exercise of which does not entail a violation of 
market integrity. This exercise should meet the criteria set by law that allows the proof of good 
faith or that justifies the nature of the activity exercised by the acting person849. 
                                                          
840 Article 14.c MAR; French jurisprudence addresses non-disclosure of inside information as another form of 
violation next to the disclosure of false and misleading information (Cass. crim., 16 Nov. 2005, 04-85.815) where, 
the AMF have the discretion to sanction both under its administrative umbrella 
841 Article 10 MAR 
842 Article 17 MAR 
843 Article 14 MAR 
844 Article 8 MAR; C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3 
845 Primary insider C. com., art. L. 225-108; Simple presumption of knowledge is required by jurisprudence (Cass. 
crim., 15 Mars 1993, n° 92-884) 
846 Secondary Insider: Cass. crim., 18 Fèvr. 1991, n ° 90-82.288 
847 Article 8.4 MAR 
848 Cass. crim., 26 Oct. 1995, n° 94-83.780 
849 Article 9 MAR provides a list of legitimate behaviors 
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283 Market manipulation. This form of abusive behaviors850 encompasses the case of 
entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behavior that gives rise, 
introduces or is likely to give rise to misleading or false signals, secures or is likely to secure a 
price at an abnormal or artificial level or the behavior that affects or is likely to affect the price 
of a financial instrument851. Market manipulation includes further behaviors that involve 
disseminating, providing or transmitting of false or misleading signals or information852. Market 
manipulation may be conducted through securing a dominant position, conducting a buying or 
selling that misleads investors, disrupting or delaying functions of the trading system and 
voicing opinions on financial instruments by taking advantage of regular access to the media853. 
The question rising in this regard is the following: what is the scope of this abusive behavior 
and other abusive practices in the sphere of ICs?  
§2: Scope of Market Abuse Behaviors for Investment Companies 
284 Scope. IC when exercising its portfolio investment activities should act within a sphere of 
market transparency, in a manner protecting market integrity and most importantly preventing 
market abuse practices. The scope of application of the MAP covers all the persons 
professionally arranging or executing transactions. Who is this person? Does the IC fall under 
the scope of the person? The person is that professionally engaged in the reception and 
transmission of orders for, or in the execution of transactions in financial instruments854. In the 
EU approach, this definition is activity based, does not cross-refer to and is not subject to one 
investment related regulation. This leads to a non-limitation and non-exclusion in the 
applicability of this definition to a particular category of persons nor does the scope limit the 
application to investment services provided through non- portfolio investment undertakings855. 
In a broader sense, MAR provides a scope of application that extends to cover a broad range of 
financial instruments on a scale that clearly addresses the IC856.  
                                                          
850 Article 15 MAR 
851 Article 12.1 (a) (b) MAR 
852 Article 12.1 (c) (d) MAR 
853 Article 12.2 MAR 
854 Article 3.1 (28) MAR 
855 E“MA, Questio s a d A s e s o  the Ma ket  A use ‘egulatio  E“MA/ /  of  De e e   
856 Article 2 MAR: Applies to financial instruments that are traded on regulated markets 
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285 Jordanian approach to MAPs. The Jordanian approach is closely linked to the powers 
and supervisory role of JSC. The Commission has as its main goal and objective the regulation 
and development of the financial market in a manner safeguarding and achieving the intended 
equality, efficiency and transparency, in addition to protecting the market from any potential 
risks and providing investors’ protection857. In the process of fulfilling these goals, the 
Commission exercises a supervisory power over the market and its transactions858.  
286 MAPs in Jordan. Securities rules in Jordan provide two forms of prohibited practices 
that are categorized based on the character of the acting person. The first category is market 
manipulation limited to licensees and their authorized members859. The second category is that 
relating to the misuse of inside information and is globally applicable to every violating person 
or undertaking860. Market manipulation consists of the practices negatively or attempts at 
negatively influencing the financial market whether performed individually or as part of an 
organization861. Furthermore, practices that negatively affects the competitiveness within the 
market862, conducting fraudulent, misleading or prohibited transactions and the misuse of 
investors’ assets863. As for the second category of abusive practices, their applicability is broad 
and is positively interpreted as providing a large scale for investors’ protection and a solid 
ground for market integrity and transparency. The infringements that may be committed as part 
of the inside information related practices include insider dealings (trading of securities based 
on inside information864), unlawful disclosure of inside information and the misuse of these 
information to fulfil unlawful financial or non-financial profits and gains865. Further to the 
practices affecting or manipulating the prices of securities866.  
287 Positivity of insider dealing. Insider dealing is considered globally as a MAP, 
nonetheless the economists note a potential beneficial effect for this form of practice. This view 
                                                          
857 Article 8.a JSL of 2017 
858 Article 8.b JSL of 2017 
859 Article 56 JSL of 2017 
860 Article 105 JSL of 2017; Article 106 JSL of 2017 
861 Article 56.d JSL of 2017 
862 Article 56.c JSL of 2017 
863 Article 56.a JSL of 2017 
864 Concerning an informed individual defined in Article 2 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
865 Article 105 JSL of 2017 
866 Article 106 JSL of 2017 
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was advocated through analyzing this dealing as a victimless crime that potentially increases 
market efficiency867. Theoretically speaking insider dealing leads to a faster reflection of the 
information on the market price than in cases where the trade is restricted to the reflection the 
globally available information has868.  
288 Preventive measures. The contribution to market integrity and investor protection 
requires all market participants to become integral parts of the control process of financial 
services. The control process addresses preventive measures participants should employ to deter 
from abusive practices influencing the market or investors’ interest in addition to regulating 
prohibited and violating practices of acting persons within the market. In the process of 
promoting transparent and efficient markets, corporate governance emerges as a framework that 
contributes to this promotion and provides a system that is consistent with the rule of law and 
clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory and enforcement 
authorities869. The measures covered by the notion of corporate governance include the control 
of the self-executed practices through laying down a code of conduct or merely outsourcing the 
activities to a more professional MC (further illustrated in chapter 2).  
  
                                                          
867 Geneviève Giudicelli-Delage, Les dispositifs sp ialis s de lutte contre la criminalité économique et financière – 
D. i te e/ D. o pa  “ th se i  L'o ga isatio  des dispositifs sp ialis s de lutte o t e la i i alit  
o o i ue et fi a i e e  Eu ope  LGDJ  
868 M. Andenas n (71) Page 518 
869 D. Hillier n (215) page 43 
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Chapter 2: Internal Conduct Conditions: Auto-Management or Outsourcing 
289 Preview. Corporate governance is defined broadly as the organization of the control over 
and management of a company870. Its structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in business transactions871. Including members of 
management, shareholders and other stakeholders. The question rising in this regard: what does 
corporate governance cover? It covers the definition of company’s legal framework (its 
organization, functioning, rights and responsibilities of shareholders meetings and corporate 
bodies responsible for oversight), rules for appointing management, rules of conflicts of interest, 
organization of control over management (regulatory controls and audits) and the disclosure of 
financial information872.  
290 Good governance. Good govenance is a means to support economic efficiency, 
sustainable growth and financial stability873. It facilitates long-term access of companies to the 
capital market; in addition, it ensures protection and fair treatment of company’s participants 
including shareholders and other stakeholders. According to the OECD, corporate governance 
provides a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board and shareholders, 
therefore providing the structure through which company’s objectives are set.  
291 Purpose of corporate governance. The main purpose is to help build an environment of 
trust, transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investments, financial 
stability and business integrity thereby, supporting stronger growth and societies that are more 
inclusive874. A credible corporate governance framework supported by effective supervision and 
enforcement mechanisms help improve and in some cases restore the confidence of investors in 
                                                          
870 C. Echaudemaison n (491) page 244; the origin of this concept dates back to Berle and Means when referring to 
the o ept of sepa atio  of o e ship a d o t ol. I  toda s o eptio  it add esses also the pe fo a e of the 
company therefore, modern theories address different mechanism of internal and external governance and 
control 
871 ECB, A ual ‘epo t  [ ] page  < https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2004en.pdf > 
Accessed 8 February 2018; the same definition was referred to by the OECD in its Glossary of statistical terms 
872 Pierre Vernimmen and others, Coporate Finance : Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Wiley 2011) page 810  
873 Wo ld Ba k, Go e a e a d De elop e t   Washi gto  DC < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604951468739447676/Governance-and-development > Accessed 16 
April 2018 page 1 
874 Angel Curria: OECD Secretary General 
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the market, further reduces the cost of capital, underpin good functioning of financial markets 
and ultimately induces more stable financing sources875.  
292 Scope of corporate governance. Corporate governance consists of various global key 
guiding principles that provide companies with a model performance. These principles are 
usually regulated nationally in a way that provides a benchmark for sound financial systems that 
functions with sufficient flexibility and stability. Further, the principles address efficient 
assessment and enforcement measures. One of the main principles of corporate governance is 
promoting transparent and fair financial markets. This principle entails providing sound and 
reliable legal framework that permits different market participants to resort to it once their 
private contractual relations are established876. The implementation of this principle requires 
monitoring and supervising market related performances. Whereas corporate governance 
contributes to market integrity that eventually requires laying down means of control and 
preventive measures including the application of internal codes of conduct, application of 
window trading mechanisms, and establishing Chinese walls877. In addition to the possibility of 
outsourcing the activities to professional management companies (further illustrated in section 
B).  
293 Internal conduct control and market performance. The objective behind the preventive 
measures required by financial rules is to provide shareholders, management, financial 
intermediaries and financial services providers with the right incentives to perform their 
activities within a framework of checks and balances. According to the OECD approach, 
corporate governance entails four main areas that relate to the internal performance of 
company’s activities: shareholders’ rights (particularly ex-ante rights and their reinforcement 
such as voting), transparency of information (periodic disclosure and disclosure of material 
information), organs of management and control and the alignment of compensation.  
                                                          
875 OECD (2015), G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en > page10 
876Ibid page 13 
877 M. Andenas n (71) page 530, MAD Recitals 
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294 Adoption of corporate governance codes. National codes setting corporate governance 
principles are generally not obligatory878. They have an explanatory nature and provide a model 
law that may be adopted by different companies in accordance with companies’ legal rules879. 
This adoption differs depending on the form of exercise the company seeks. Self-exercise or 
externalization as two options provided for IC. The following section A addresses extensively 
these options.  
Section A: Self-Executed Activities 
295 Preview. Investment services providers, including the IC, in the process of performing 
their activities are obliged to comply with their professional obligations including enacting 
sound administrative procedures, internal conduct mechanisms, efficient risk evaluation 
techniques in addition to respecting and following the applicable governance norms that 
guarantee the liquidity and stability of financial structures880. The main objective of the rules of 
internal conduct should be investors’ protection and the integrity of the operations. The value of 
shareholders’ investments is added whenever financial managers succeed in making the 
company earn a higher return than that earned by shareholders’ themselves. Generally, 
shareholders’ opportunities outside the company set the standards to those investments inside 
the company. In the process of increasing the value, the company should combine governance 
rules and procedures with appropriate incentives to make sure that all the participants in the 
investment decision are in hand to reach the targeted increase. The necessity to separate 
ownership and control, the attempts of the management to secure their jobs rather than 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth and restrained and shy decisions management may reach 
create conflicts between them and shareholders.  
                                                          
878 V o i ue Mag ie  et Ya  Pa lot, Le Gou e e e t d e t ep ise e  F a e, Vi gt a s ap s  i  Jea -Jacques 
A sault, Louis d A out et Ni olas Bi ctin (eds), M la ges e  l’ho eu  du P ofesseu  Mi hel Ge ai  (LGDJ 2015) 
page 496  
879 C. Com., art. L. 225-37; C. Com., art. L. 225-68; Jean-Ma  Mouli , La Fo e No ati e du Code AFEP-MEDEF  i  
Jean-Ja ues A sault, Louis d A out et Ni olas Bi ti  eds), M la ges e  l’ho eu  du P ofesseu  Mi hel Ge ai  
(LGDJ 2015) page 597 
880 Article 151 JCC (Article 11 of the amending bill of this law for the year 2017 introduces and for the first time the 
te  o po ate go e a e i to the Co pa s la , A ti le .a Li e si g ‘egulatio  of , C. o . fi ., a t. L. 
533-2; no such requirements are addressed in the newly implemented Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
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296 Agency problems. Agency theory is the main intellectual foundation of corporate 
governance. It is due to the significant effect corporate governance has on company’s 
performance, in terms of inducing management to act in the interest of share value 
optimization881. Particularly, when considering this theory as the rule governing the relation 
between management and shareholders. Corporate governance is the means through which 
shareholders control management.  The conflict of shareholders and management’s objectives 
arises agency problems, whereas they avail when agents (managers) work for principals 
(shareholders). As a perfect example to these problems is higher agency costs incurred by 
shareholders due to the lack of the attempts to maximize company’s value and the costs of 
monitoring and constraining the actions of management882.  
297 Solution for agency problems. Profit is the incentive of every business. Profit is achieved 
through acquiring an efficient, effective and non-costly management body, in addition to a solid 
decision-making framework. The incentives intended from the business activity are endangered 
by the misconduct of management and the lack of control measures. The question rising in this 
regard is the following: what form of management may IC have? Previously noted that there are 
two forms of portfolio management active and passive.   
298 Active management. Active investing is an attempt to add value. It is the outperformance 
of a given equity market often represented by an index or achieve a specific investment 
objective, it is achieved through the use of financial analysis skills and a process of stock 
picking883, this form of management has both benefits and risks884.  
                                                          
881 Li ia Bo azzi a d “a da  Isla , Age  Theo  a d Co po ate Go e a e: A stud  of the Effe ti e ess of Boa d 
i  thei  Mo ito i g of the CEO     Jou al of Modelli g i  Ma agement 7 < 
https://doi.org/10.1108/17465660710733022 > accessed 16 April 2018 
882 R.A. Brealey n (1) page ; see: Pat i k M Colga , Age  Theo  a d Co po ate Go e a e: A ‘e ie of 
Literature from a UK Pe spe ti e   < 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/79c5/2954af851c95a27cb1fb702c23feaae86ca1.pdf > Accessed 16 April 2018 
883 Stock picking is the buying of shares that are undervalued and have future potential increase in price or in paid 
dividends 
884  Va gua d, A ti e a d Passi e I esti g   < 
https://www.vanguard.co.uk/documents/portal/literature/active-passive-investing-guide.pdf > accessed 31 May 
2017 
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299 Passive management885. Stemmed out from the belief that it is difficult to outthink the 
market therefore matching it. It is a form of managing investments while focusing on costs. 
How is the market matched? The approach is following or tracking an investment index886, the 
advantage is spreading the risk widely within the market887, this form of management is 
approached through replication (straightforward matching888) or sampling (optimizing889)890. 
300 Form guaranteeing efficient portfolio management. Both forms of management have 
their related benefits and risks; they are practically the contrary of each other. The active 
management benefits in the opportunity of outperformance, the research insights in addition to 
the application of defensive measures minimizing potential losses. These benefits form the risks 
of the passive management as it leads to total market risk, lack of flexibility due to non-
application of defensive measures and provides a performance constraint. As for the risks active 
management incurs they include expenses. Market research is costly and the management 
henceforth charges higher fees, the provided style issues limits the performance in addition to 
holding no guarantees on picking successful shares at all times. Contrary to active management, 
passive holds the risks of the active as its benefits, whereas it achieves diversification, low costs 
and simplicity. Which of the two forms provide a more efficient portfolio management for the 
IC is difficult to tell, as both can be useful. We previously preferred active management for IC 
rather than passive management; nonetheless, mixing both approaches into an asset allocation 
model may be more realistic. This blend known as core or satellite approach, includes 
submitting a portion of the portfolio to active management therefore avoiding costly operations, 
it is a practice of both tactical891 and strategic892 asset allocation893. The following sub-sections 
                                                          
885 SICAV passively managed C. mon. fin., art. R. 214-28 
886 History of indexing (Gokhan Kula & others, Beyond Smart Beta: Index Investment Strategies for Active Portfolio 
Management (Wiley 2017)) 
887 The risk is spread and not avoided, this approach cannot protect from broad market declines and it follows it 
888 Closely tracking the performance of the target index, preferred for equities. 
889 Using a representative sample of the securities included in the target index, it requires extensive portfolio 
modeling and monitoring combined with very disciplined and cost-conscious trading capabilities. 
890 Lionel Martellini and others, Fixed-Income Securities: Valuation, Risk Management and Portfolio Strategies 
(Wiley 2003) page 213 
891 It is opportunistic, takes advantage of the shifting market conditions to increase the level of investments in 
shares that are expected to outperform in a short-term. 
892 A long term approach that takes into consideration financial goals and risk tolerance to determine portfolio 
path.  
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address the performance of the management in terms of achieving efficient portfolio 
management and the decision-making process.  
Sub-section 1: Efficient Portfolio Management 
301 Portfolio management. The right governance model is contextual as it depends on; what 
the concerned company does and the conditions of the market. Governance model should be 
dynamic therefore, accommodating the changes in the market if it cannot then it is considered as 
too simple to accommodate the complexity of the business environment in which companies 
function894. Portfolio management is a process consisting of an integrated set of steps undertook 
in a consistent manner creating and maintaining an appropriate portfolio, while meeting at the 
same time investors’ goals895. This process has as its main component investment policy, which 
identifies the financial objectives and risk tolerance. The process has a preset path that is 
considerably stable despite the inconveniences along the way. It commences with the planning, 
moves to the execution and returns to feedback. 
302 Focus. This sub-section focuses on the execution level with slight reference to feedback 
stage. Execution requires establishing well-documented organizational structure for the IC, 
clearly allocating responsibilities, implementing supervisory functions and appropriate internal 
conduct mechanisms, in addition to laying down effective decision-making procedures that 
secure compliance on all levels896. Eventually these implementations should be combined with 
effective communication and recording mechanisms in order to achieve the main objective of 
efficient portfolio management. 
303 Purpose of efficient portfolio management. The purpose of efficient portfolio 
management is reached through employing and using techniques and instruments that relate to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
893 Active vs. passive Portfolio Management (Broadridge Investor Communication solutions) 2013 < 
https://www.vanguard.co.uk/documents/portal/literature/active-passive-investing-guide.pdf > Accessed 31 May 
2017 
894 ‘o ald J. Gilso , F o  Co po ate La  to Co po ate Go e a e  [ ] ECGI Wo ki g Pape  “e ies i  La  
324/2016 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819128 > accessed 1 June 2017 
895 John L. Maginn & others, Managing Investment Portfolios: A Dynamic Process (3rd edn, Wiley 2007) 
896 Article 4 of Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organizational requirements, conflicts of interest, conduct of 
business, risk management and content of the agreement between a depositary and a management company  
[2010] OJ L 176/42 
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the traded securities and follow strict investor-oriented criteria897. The criteria include cost-
effective and economically appropriate instruments that fulfil ultimate aims of cost and risk 
reduction, in addition to generating additional income and capital with a proper level of risk 
falling within the risk tolerance of the undertaking and respecting diversification rules898. To 
have a better understanding of efficient portfolio management the following paragraphs address 
the agency control related mechanisms (paragraph 1) and the risk management function 
(paragraph 2) as part of the execution stage. 
§1: Agency Control Mechanisms 
304 Locating agency problems. According to Jensen & Meckling model, agency problems 
exist where there is a possibility and incentive to management to pursue their interests at the 
expense of shareholders. Efficient portfolio management requires effective control of 
management performance in a manner alleviating the agency problems and their associated 
costs. The performance of management refers to their activity. Meaning their decisions and 
behaviors throughout their term. This term differs from performance management used in 
human resources writings. The latter refers to an appraisal system that promotes and improves 
employees’ effectiveness through continuous review, control and cooperation between them and 
the management. Therefore, it refers to a process and not the actual activity899. Agency control 
mechanisms assist the company in achieving its strategic goals. It is integrated into the 
company’s organization. The doctrine introduces various mechanisms as part of an agency 
control system exercised directly by the company. These mechanisms fall under two main 
categories: one aligns the incentives of managers and shareholders and the other limits the 
discretion of managers. The aim from both categories is to reduce agency costs.  
305 Doctrinal examples. One proposition entailing equity based managerial compensation 
that links management remuneration to the performance of share price900. Further, market for 
                                                          
897 Article 51.2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
898 Article 11 of Commission Directive 2007/16/EC of 19 March 2007 implementing Council Directive 85/611/EEC 
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards the clarification of certain definitions [2007] OJ L 79/11 
899 Margret Sinclair Hunt, Performance Management (Updated by Helen Simms, Cambridge) page 18 
900 ‘o e t A. Hauge  & Le a W. “e et, ‘esol i g Age  P o le s of E te al Capital Th ough Optio s   
36 (3) Journal of Finance 629 
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corporate control901, as stock price signals managerial ability and efficiency902. Low stock 
shows poor management and creates an incentive for takeovers by more efficient owners. In 
addition to the role of managerial labor market (incentive to guard the reputation)903. These 
examples lead to seven main issues addressed by both the agency relation and corporate 
governance rules. They include management remuneration, independence, conflicts of interest, 
risk management, compliance, efficient decision-making process and the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights. This paragraph addresses solely the first two, as for the remaining ones 
they are further illustrated in the upcoming chapters. 
306 Remuneration. Agency theory suggests that managers be rewarded based on their 
performance. Therefore avoiding agency conflicts. The compensation is used as an incentive to 
motivate and induce managers to think more like shareholders. It develops a shareholder’s 
mind-set that stimulates the effective and profitable decision-making904. Doctrine suggests that 
outside managerial labor market exerts direct pressure on companies to sort and compensate 
managers according to their performance. The pressure availed in the form of having the 
company as always in the market for new managers. Managers in the managerial labor market 
are always concerned with the remuneration mechanisms and responsiveness of this mechanism 
to their performance. It was suggested that in a competing managerial labor market if 
company’s reward system is not responsive to performance, company loses managers (the best 
manager leaves first)905. This opinion opens the door for questioning the link between 
compensation entailing share ownership and that granting a percentage of the net profit and 
creating the incentive for managers to better control the decision-making process.  
307 Compensation systems. The notion of the separation of ownership and control aims to 
avoid conflicts of interest and agency problems. Laying down a compensation scheme based on 
                                                          
901 He  G. Ma e, Me ge s a d the Ma ket fo  Co po ate Co t ol     Jou al of politi al E o o   
902 Tuo as Laiho, Age  Theo  a d O e ship “t u tu e: Esti ati g the Effe t of O e ship “t u tu e o  Fi  
Pe fo a e  Maste  Thesis, Aalto University 2011) 
903 Euge e F. Fa a Age  P o le s a d the Theo  of the Fi    Jou al of Politi al E o o   
904 Cha les M Elso , Directors Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The History of a Symptom and 
a Cure   (1996) 50 (1) SMU Law Review 
<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/smulr50&div=16&id=&page=> accessed 13 
December 2015 
905 E. Fama n (903) page 292 
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allocating shares to managers creates a financial incentive and induces managers’ performance 
to be shareholder-oriented. On the other hand, being a shareholder may lead to unfair and bias 
treatment. Managers are capable of influencing the decision-making process and orient it to 
serve their personal interests on the expense of others. The other form of compensation is the 
one connecting the remuneration with performance. This form seems pro-agency solution. 
Managers are more likely to become accountable once the pay is linked to performance. This 
notion induces to act rationally in order to maximize performance906. Nonetheless, this system 
arises excessive remuneration problems. In this particular place, the role of corporate 
governance and internal conduct rules is found. Both insist on the necessity to implement a 
detailed remuneration policy, whether through having a cap on the allocated amounts907, 
establishing a ‘say-on-pay’ system entailing ex-ante or ex-post binding vote, or the preparation 
of an extensive remuneration report controlled by shareholders908.  
308 Excessive remuneration. Problems of excessive remuneration exist in all forms of 
compensation systems. To avoid these problems and hinder their occurrence, a regulatory 
approach should be put in place. Legal rules should stipulate clearly the direct role of 
shareholders in monitoring and controlling the allocated amounts. Most regulatory approaches 
provide the board with the discretion to designate the remuneration strategy and allocate to itself 
the amount it deems appropriate with no system of checks and balances909. The allocated 
amount includes mobility, exceptional remuneration or missions, activities and privileges. 
Jordanian rules as a perfect example for this lack of legal involvement did not grant 
shareholders a vote on remuneration; they provided them with a mere reviewing role910. The 
                                                          
906 Hasna Ha o , Dete i a ts of Di e to s  ‘e u e atio  i  Mala sia  Pu li  Li ited Co pa ies     
Indian  Journal  of  Corporate  Governance 
<http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ezp.slu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1734462b-33c4-4fa4-a9ea-
63c224ec88ca@sessionmgr4005&vid=2&hid=4105 > Accessed 20 December 2015 
907 Jordanian law approach limited the allocated remuneration to managers to a percentage of the net profit ten 
percent. Therefore, allocating an amount that does not exceed five thousand JOD per year (Article 162.a JCC); 
approximately five thousand seven hundred Euros (exchange rate of February 2018) 
908 Article 143 JCC (no actual binding vote on the report overviewing right unlike France a binding vote); C. com., 
art. L. 225-115 
909 Article 162 JCC 
910 Article 143 JCC 
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discretion is further extended to no-binding vote over the allocation of remuneration amount for 
general manager911.  
309 Dealing with excessive remuneration in France. French rules on the contrary, provide 
shareholders with a binding vote on pay. The question rising in this regard is whether this vote 
is ex-ante or ex-post. In the process of avoiding excessive remuneration code de commerce 
introduces a general prohibition of fixed or permanent allocations to members of management 
other than those stated by law912. The remuneration is connected to members’ attendance of 
their meetings and calculated based on a fixed annual amount determined by the GA913. 
Nonetheless, not all forms of remuneration allocations are determined by the GA. Exceptional 
remuneration for missions and mandates confined to members of management, is determined by 
the management with the assembly’s binding vote on the set amounts914. The vote on 
management remuneration in France has two forms. Ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante over the 
principles and criteria of allocations. This vote includes the chairman, general manager, and 
assistant director (directeur général délègué)915. In addition to the members of two tier 
management916. Further to, an ex-post vote on the allocated and attributed amounts that are 
limited to variable and exceptional elements of the remuneration917. They cover chairman, 
president of the supervisory board, president, directeur général délègué and members of 
executive committee. The remuneration of members’ of executive committee is designated in 
the appointing deed while being subject to the binding vote of GA918. Chairman may decide to 
allocate himself his proper remuneration yet it is subject to the binding vote of the assembly919. 
Board determines general manager’s remuneration while subjecting this allocation to the 
binding assembly vote on pay920. Whereas the French jurisprudence considered the general 
                                                          
911 Article 153.a JCC 
912 C. com., art. L. 225-44 
913 Board: C. com., art. L. 225-45; Supervisory body: C. com., art. L. 225-83 
914 Board: C. com., art. L. 225-46; Supervisory body: C. com., art. L. 225- ; B di te F a çois, Bila   du “a -
on-pa    ‘e ue des “o i t s  
915 C. com., art. L. 225-37-2 
916 C. com., art. L. 225-82-2 
917 C. com., art. L. 225-100 
918 C. Com., art. L. 225-63 
919 C. Com., art. L. 225-47 
920 C. com., art. L. 225-53 
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manager’s attributed remuneration without being foreseen in the statute nor was it approved by 
the board as an abuse of company’s assets921.  
310 Binding vote on remuneration. The binding vote on pay represent a method to avoid 
excessiveness in management remuneration. French recent approach introducing the system of 
say-on-pay in 2016 provides a balanced and protective measures to shareholders interest. 
Further, it hinders management excessiveness and limits managerial and operational costs. The 
EU when amending the UCITS directive addressed the necessity to establish and maintain 
remuneration policies that are consistent with, and promote sound and effective risk 
management while at the same time not impairing management from acting in the best 
interest922. Further to the say-on-pay system provided by shareholders directive on an EU level. 
The say-on-pay came as part of the measures introduced on an EU level to provide shareholders 
with a form of control on management’s performance and a verification tool that management 
preserves the viability of the company through having transparent remuneration, say-on-pay, 
creation of remuneration committee and subordinating the variable remuneration to the 
performance923.   
311 Independence. Previously addressed in this part, the notion of management independence 
in terms of the possibility to have multiple memberships in different boards. The flexibility is 
linked to the general prevailing concept of ‘no need to have a fully available manager’, 
managers should be available enough to run the company in an efficient and effective manner 
that hinders conflicts of interest and be oriented in the best interest of its shareholders. The 
value of the independence is viewed by corporate governance rules as a solution to many 
problems. The notion of independence is having a director that has no link of any nature 
whatsoever with the company, the group or management, which could compromise him in the 
exercise of his free will924. Board independence is related to better company performance.  
                                                          
921 Cass. crim., 22 mars 2017, n° 15-84.229 ; Be a d Boulo , ‘ u atio  o  auto is e d u  Di igea t , Cass. 
Crim., n° 15-84.229, Revue des Sociétés, 2017, n° 10, p. 591 
922 UCITS. Dir. 2014/91 amending UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
923 Be oit Le ou t, Les ‘ u atio s des Di igea ts des “o i t s Cot es  i  Dossie  : Réflexions Collective sur la 
Nouvelle Directive Droits des Actionnai es    ‘e ue des “o i t s  
924 Article 2 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
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312 Achieving independence. The key concept of the notion of independence lays in having a 
director or general manager that is not a senior member of management (neither a board 
member nor the chairman). Therefore, having what is known as an outsider general manager. 
The role and positive value of this concept depend on the role given to general manager. Is he a 
mere implementer of the rules or an actual decision-maker? An outsider general manager is a 
monitoring process to related-party transactions those that invoke conflicts of interest, it is 
further seen as a protective shield to minority shareholders verses the majority925. This is 
conditioned to having effective monitoring and assigning general manager with actual functions 
and discretion. A perfect example of national implementation of the concept of outsider director 
is found in both Jordanian and French company rules that provide for such possibility (an option 
and not a strict binding rule)926. This option limits the freedom of general manager as he/she 
should exercise the activities assigned to him/her by the board and he/she is subject to board’s 
supervision. This limitation minimizes the value of the independent director as his discretion is 
restricted therefore, opening the door to dominant board especially if the general manager is 
appointed by the board.  
313 Connection to risk management. According to OECD corporate governance reports, the 
governance of remuneration incentive systems often fail because the decisions and negotiations 
are not carried out at arm’s length. Managers have far too much influence over the level and 
condition of the performance-based remuneration while having an incapable board of exercising 
objective independent judgement927.  Management remuneration and independence closely 
relate to risk management. When they are both controlled and strictly regulated, they offer a 
solution to elevated agency costs therefore influencing one of the forms of risks incurred by IC 
(operational risk). The regulation of both notions avert from having a dominant board that 
implements excessive remuneration policies and alleviated charges. The following paragraph 
addresses different elements of the risk management function.   
                                                          
925 Do ald C. Cla ke, Th ee o epts of the I depe de t Di e to    Dela a e Jou al of Co po ate La   
926 C. com., art. L. 225-51-1; Article 153.a JCC 
927 OECD (2011), Board Practices: Incentives and Governing Risks, Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing. < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264113534-en > 
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§2: Risk Management 
314 Risk and business. Risk taking is a fundamental driving force in business. Effective 
management does not entail risk elimination it involves an effective management of risk taking. 
Companies face both financial and non-financial risks. When considering financial institutions 
(including IC) the focus naturally tends to be financial such as market risks in addition to 
operational risks.  
315 Financial risks. A risk involving a financial aspect such as market risk. It is the 
fluctuations in the market value of securities held by the undertaking in question, which may 
vary over time reflecting different market conditions. Financial risks include other influential 
factors that impair trading conditions of certain securities. They include among other things 
credit, counterparty and liquidity risk (ability of the company to meet at a responsible cost its 
obligations as they become due). Other risk drivers may emerge such as concentration risk928. 
316 Operational risks. It is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or external events (including legal risks)929. These risks increase 
the chances of loss due to human or technical errors, they are attached to different features and 
quality of trading operated by the company930. On a general term, it is a form of risk placed over 
the company and its management.  
317 Risk management practices. They include identifying company’s risk appetite and the 
level of tolerance, appointing a chief risk officer, qualification requirements for staff and 
management and establishing board committees that supervise company’s internal control 
mechanism in the form of an audit committee states in its duty chart the function of risk 
management 931. Key practices932 include identifying risk hence; there is a need to perform a 
                                                          
928 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-61 
929 Basel II Co ittee o  Ba ki g “upe isio , P i iples fo  the “ou d Ma age e t of Ope atio al ‘isk  Ba k of 
International Settlements, June 2011) 
930 CE“‘, ‘isk Ma age e t P i iples fo  UCIT“  -178, 2009) 
931 OECD (2014), Risk Management and Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing. < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264208636-en >; F“B, The ati  ‘e ie  o  ‘isk Go e a e: Pee  ‘e ie  
(February 2013) < http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130212.pdf >  
932 According to AMF (AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 21 October 2011, n° SAN-2011-18) 
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periodic independent assessment of company’s overall risk governance framework933. In 
addition to evaluating company’s level of tolerance. The practices relate to the obligation of due 
diligence, the company should provide financial analysis based on information obtained from an 
objective and guaranteed source, any contradictory action is considered as lack of due diligence 
and an action not oriented towards the exclusive interests of shareholders934.  
318 Risk management process. IC should employ a risk management process that enables it 
to monitor and evaluate the risk at any time and its contributions to the overall risk level935. This 
process includes the equation through which risk is calculated meaning the calculation of global 
exposure936. Global exposure is the total exposures or leverage that the investment undertaking 
managed or a general term through financial contracts, which do not exceed the net assets, in 
addition to the portfolio market risk that captures the exposure of standard movements. IC 
should be vigilant in maintaining its global risk related to its financial contracts and 
instruments937 within a limit not exceeding the net value of its portfolio938. 
319 Calculation of global risk. The calculation of global risk should be frequent, not less than 
once a day939. The calculation should take into consideration the limits of exposure the national 
law specifies, as they should be permanently respected. The law further introduces two methods 
of calculation; a standard commitment approach940 and a value-at-risk approach941. The chosen 
approach takes into account risk profile of the company that relates to investment policy, the 
complexity of traded securities and considering the part of portfolio consisting of financial 
contracts942. The approaches have their own criteria that company fulfils when choosing one or 
the other. 
                                                          
933 FSB 2013 n (931) page 33 
934 AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 20 December 2012, n° SAN-2012-21 
935 Article 51.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
936 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-51 
937 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-50 
938 C. mon. fin., art. R. 214-30 ; Article 51.3 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
939 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-51 
940 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-52 
941 Measures maximum potential loss while considering a specific level of confidence and during a set period of 
time (AMF, régl. gén., art.422-56) 
942 AMF, régl. gén., art.422-52 II 
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320 Value-at-risk. The choice of this approach requires an IC that employs a complex 
investment strategy covering a notable portion of its assets, in addition to being exposed to non-
standardized943 financial contracts944. An IC of this category surely faces inadequacy in the 
application of standard commitment approach when calculating its market risk. This approach is 
completed with a resistance test that assimilates the company in crisis945.  
321 Standard commitment946. It is the general approach of global risk calculation. The 
approach requires the conversion947 of the position of every financial contract into the 
equivalent market value of the underlying asset948. When using this approach of global risk 
calculation the techniques and instruments of efficient portfolio management are taken into 
account949.  
322 National law and risk management. Jordanian securities and company rules do not 
address in any form the notion of risk management. Nonetheless, corporate governance 
regulation of 2017 states the necessity to create a risk management committee within the scope 
of listed companies950. It is a permanent supporting committee of the board. It lays down risk 
management policy and ensures the calculation and continuous review of risk exposures. The 
proposed amending bill of company law suggests an amendment of the law and introduces the 
obligatory application of corporate governance principles including laying down a risk 
management policy951. This newly implemented regulatory reference boosts investors’ 
protection, yet ultimately no obligation is imposed to calculate global risk under securities rules. 
as an obligation of this kind has infringement consequences that guarantees its application. 
Shareholders of IC with the new rule can make better informed judgements. Nonetheless this 
                                                          
943 AMF introduces a list of standard and non-standard contracts (AMF, Instr. 2011-15 Modalités de calcul du risque 
global des OPCVM et des FIA agréés)  
944 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-  III; Tho as Li s eie  a d Neil Pea so , Value at ‘isk     Fi a ial 
Analysts Journal 47 
945 AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-58 
946 Applicability criteria is defined by the ESMA guidelines ESMA/2011/112 
947 AMF states in its instruction 2011-15 the conversion equation (Article 7) 
948 AMF, Instr. 2011-15, art. 6 
949 AMF, Instr. 2011-15, art. 9 
950 Article 10 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
951 Article 11 
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rule remains limited in terms of the explanation of methods of risk calculation and the role of 
shareholders’ protection and market transparency in its applicability.   
323 Transition. Efficient portfolio management entails a properly organized decision-making 
process, where responsibilities and duties are clearly allocated. The following sub-section 
addresses this process in terms of both the board and the GA.  
Sub-section 2: Meetings and Decision-Making 
324 Preview. Members of management are expected to make decisions based on well-
informed and ethical grounds while taking into account company and shareholders’ objectives. 
As it was previously illustrated, management of IC should act in the best interest of all 
shareholders, in addition it ensures equal and fair treatment between them. They are required to 
approach the management of the company in an objective and independent fashion that hinders 
conflicts of interest and manages potential problematic situations952.   
325 Strategies. According to corporate governance rules, board employs and puts in place a 
strategy for decision-making process, where they examine and decide on the different 
transactions therefore performing their responsibility of monitoring the managerial 
performance953. The effective functioning of the strategy depends on the disclosure obligation; 
that made to the market, shareholders and the public. Generally, management should publish a 
communication of the strategy relating to financial, non-financial and material disclosure. The 
strategy permits stakeholders and in some cases, the public to access the data and information. 
The communicated information should be compatible with business development model and 
perspectives of the company, further, they should be within the sphere of a well-established 
communication strategy954. In other words, the laid down strategy is the method through which 
the board orients the corporate performance while taking into consideration managerial 
requirements. Therefore, clearly defining the structure and responsibilities of the board.  
                                                          
952 D. Hillier n (215) page 47 
953 Code AFEP/MEDEF of November 2016 
954 OECD 2015 n (875) pages 21 and 50 
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326 Shareholders vs. board. Shareholders are the founding pillar of IC.  This characterization 
is due to the participations shareholders contribute with when creating the company and later 
when increasing its capital or investing in its shares. The contribution grants shareholder in 
return individual rights that cannot be taken away against its will. IC under classical legal 
doctrine is established on a contractual basis. The distinction of this company is linked to its 
form. Shareholders own tradable securities in the form of shares, which brings about the 
original role of financial markets. This notion presents financial markets as the venue where 
contesting and control over the performance (trading) is exercised955. Where does this put 
shareholders’ rights? Shareholders participate in company’s social life through their character as 
members of the GA.  
327 Reaching a decision. The management runs daily activities of the company. They are 
mandated by the GA to do so. Therefore, their exercise is controlled, monitored and 
complemented with decisions and resolutions rendered by the GA. The GA and the 
management (including board members and the general manager) are the two key components 
of the company; they function together and they complete each other to achieve eventually 
company’s objectives. The following paragraphs illustrate the role of the board (paragraph 1) 
and that of the GA (paragraph 2) in the decision-making process.   
§1: Elements of Board 
328 Preview. Board structures and procedures vary both within and among countries; this 
structure determines main elements for the allocation of decision-making powers and 
consequently the responsibility for the decisions within the company. Some countries have two-
tier boards that separate the supervisory function and the management function into different 
bodies. In such systems, they typically have a “supervisory board” composed of non-executive 
board members and a “management board” composed entirely of executives, the perfect 
example is the French model956. Other countries have unitary boards, which bring together 
executive and non-executive board members such as the other form of management structure 
                                                          
955 See: Michel Germain and Veronique Magnier, Traité de Droit des Affaires (Tome 2 : Les Sociétés Commerciales, 
21st edn, LGDJ 2014) 
956 C. com., art. L. 225-57, 58,59 
 
175 Part I: Structuring a Pro-shareholder Investment Company 
provided by French rules957, further to the Jordanian one958. In some countries, there is also an 
additional statutory body for audit purposes. In theory, the board in which two different people 
exercise the control and management roles, should be more effective in controlling management 
on behalf of shareholders, yet in practice it is not the case, it depends on the quality and probity 
of the involved individuals959.  
329 Functions and responsibilities. The board is principally responsible for monitoring 
managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders, while preventing 
conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation960. In some countries, 
companies find it useful and effective to articulate explicitly the responsibilities that the board 
assumes961 and those for which management is accountable within its AOA962. In order to fulfil 
their responsibilities effectively, boards must be able to exercise objective and independent 
judgement.  
330 Business judgement rule963. Business judgement rule is a legal presumption that 
directors when making the business decision acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
honest belief that the decision made was for the best interest of the company964. Therefore, 
providing directors with a corporation immune from the liability of the loss incurred by the 
company due to transactions and decisions that fall within their powers and activities. This rule 
is closely connected to fulfilling the duty of care by the board965. Communication and access of 
information by the board has a notable role in the legality of board’s deliberations. The absence 
                                                          
957 C. com., art. L. 225-17 
958 Article 132 JCC 
959 P. Vernimmen n (872) page 814 
960 OECD 2015 n (875) page 45  
961 C. com., art. L. 225-37-1; C. com., art. L. 225-51 ; Article 156 JCC 
962 C. com., art. L. 225-56, C. com., art. L. 225-64, C. com., art. L. 225-68 
963 This rule is extensively addressed under US jurisdiction within the scope of duty of care of directors and is linked 
to the fiduciary duties of directors see Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E. 2d. 587 (Ind. App. 1992); Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 
,  Del. ; L a  Joh so , The Modest Busi ess Judge e t ‘ule    Bus. La   fo  fu the  
discussion 
964 A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page364; C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-11 ; Article 65.c JSL 
965 Carsten Gerner-Beue le & othe s, “tud  o  Di e to s Duties a d Lia ilit  P epa ed fo  the Eu opea  
Commission DG Market , 2013)  
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of the information may lead to the annulment of deliberations and the decisions made within 
which966.  
331 Board meetings. How does the board perform the decision-making powers? The basic 
answer is; in the decisions reached by the board through their meetings in addition to the 
decision, general manager or senior management makes on a regular basis when running daily 
activities of the company. Generally, the AOA determines the procedures for deliberations and 
number of board meetings967; nonetheless, it is possible that company rules provide either a 
minimum requirement968 or the actual procedural process969. 
332 Session procedures970. Key procedure in board deliberations is identifying the individual 
or body responsible for calling to convene this meeting. Generally, company rules state that the 
AOA defines the rules of convocation and the process of deliberation for the board971. The rules 
providing the minimum requirement grant explicitly board members the right to request a board 
meeting. The validity of this request requires meeting few conditions: board was not convened 
for more than two months972; the request made by third (France) or quarter (Jordan) the 
members, the request is submitted to the chairman while designating a specific date for the 
meeting973, in addition to a justification of the request974.  General manager holds the same right 
as the members, through a request submitted directly with the chairman designating the exact 
date of the proposed meeting975. The call for board meetings should further designate the 
location976. Once the board is called the session requires a specific quorum to be convened half 
of the members for France977 and the majority for Jordan978. The mandates and proxies in board 
                                                          
966 Cass. Com., 13 Dec. 2005, n° 04-12.135 
967 C. com., art. L. 225-36-1 
968 C. com., art. L. 225-37 
969 Article 155 JCC 
970 This paragraph addresses unitary board structure and not two tier-structure (C. com., art. L. 225-64, 81) 
971 Article 92.b (9) JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-36-1 
972 Under the Jordanian rules there is a possibility to convene the board directly by its members if the calling is not 
made by neither the chairman nor vice chairman within seven days of the receipt of their request, further the rules 
designate a minimum number of board meetings during the financial year (six) 
973 C. com., art. L. 225-36-1 
974 Article 155.a JCC 
975 C. com., art. L. 225-36-1 
976 Generally, board meetings are convened at the headquarters of the company unless the call states otherwise  
977 C. com., art. L. 225-37 
978 Article 155.b JCC 
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meetings are treated differently under the two laws. The Jordanian rules consider that the voting 
on decisions of the board deliberations is personal and cannot be mandated or delegated from 
one member to the other979. This point of view is understandable as it avoids the dangerousness 
of having a non-active board member that does not participate in the actual deliberations of the 
meeting. The presence in board meetings differs than that of the GA; every vote in the board 
matters and crucially influences the policies and strategies of the company980. As for the GA, 
owning a small non-influential percentage of shares in addition to having a bigger number of 
involved members minimizes the importance of the presence of every shareholder in the GAMs. 
Nonetheless, the counter argument to this approach addresses the freedom and choice board 
members should hold981; therefore, French rules permits the representation in board meeting yet 
limited it to a single mandate per member982. Decisions made in board meeting are taken by the 
approval of the majority of present members983, in case of tying the chairman’s casting vote is 
taken into consideration984. Board meetings have their own registry that contains minutes of 
meeting for every session numbered chronologically, authenticated985 and signed by chairman 
and board members986.  
333 Investment Company requirements. In Plc. including IC, the chairman is responsible for 
the preparation of a report (distinct from yet attached to the annual report) that stipulate clearly 
among other things; the composition of the board, the application of the gender equality 
representation within the board. Further, the conditions of the working method of the board, the 
rules of internal conduct and risk management, the procedures dealing with financial and 
accounting information, identifying the role of the company in fulfilling its social responsibility 
                                                          
979 Article 155.c JCC 
980 No facilitation of presence by video conference or telecommunication are mentioned under the Jordanian rules, 
the rules explicitly stipulate that the vote cannot be done in any indirect method. As for French rules, they state 
the possibility of having a participation in board meetings through video conference (C. com., art. R. 225-21) 
981 M. Germain n (955) page 480 
982 C. com., art. R. 225-19 
983 This opens the debate on the dominance of the board, whereas the decisions relating to the performance of the 
company can be taken with only quarter of the board 
984 Article 155.b JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-37 
985 The authentication of the municipality or the judge of competent court within its jurisdiction the headquarter 
falls: a request stated in code de commerce as fo  Jo da ia  la , it add esses the e ui e e t of o pa s seal 
986 C. com., art. R. 225-22, 23,24 ; Article 154 JCC 
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and pro-environmental measures, and providing a reasoning for the selected and adopted rules 
of corporate governance987.  
334 Special committees. The board does not function solely it is accompanied with various 
sub-committees that play advisory and supervisory roles. French code de commerce in addition 
to the different national corporate governance codes and guiding principles insist on the 
necessity to create special committees instructed by the board to draw up reports and provide 
opinions for board questions. Corporate governance code addresses four principle forms of 
special committees including audit committee988, remuneration committee, selections or 
appointments committee989 and strategic or financial committee990. The code de commerce 
addresses merely the audit committee991 and studies committee992. The Jordanian company rules 
did not refer to any special sub-committee to be created by the board; nonetheless, the rules 
address in one occasion the sub-committees in the discussion of the calculation of board 
remuneration for companies in difficulty993. As for the securities related rules they require the 
creation of two forms of special committees: audit committee and a committee combining the 
remuneration and election responsibilities994. Board performs the responsibilities that the GA 
cannot exercise on a daily and regular basis. In the following paragraph, we shall illustrate the 
complementary and initial role of the GA within ICs.  
 
§2: Role of General Assembly 
335 Shareholders’ influence. Shareholders should be allowed to fully exercise their powers. 
Anything that stands in the way of this exercise is considered an obstacle to good corporate 
governance. Its main framework protects and facilitates the exercise of shareholders’ rights and 
ensures the equitable treatment of all shareholders. The basic rights of shareholders include the 
                                                          
987 C. com., art. L. 225-37 
988 Inspects accounts, monitors internal conduct and selects external auditors 
989 Paves the way for the succession of managing directors and CEO, puts forward proposals for new directors 
990 P. Vernimmen n (872) page 813  
991 C. com., art. L. 823-19 
992 A committee created by the board in charge of examining the question referred by the board or the chairman 
(C. com., art. R. 225-29) 
993 Article 162.c JCC 
994 Article 46 JSL of 2017 
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ability to register ownership of their shares, sell their shares, and have access to important and 
material information, most importantly to share in company’s profits, being able to participate 
in GAM, and to elect and remove the management995. Shareholders hold a crucially influential 
role during the life of the company. Throughout GAM and the exercise of their voting and 
participation rights; they get a say on major changes and amendments in company’s structure 
and organic documents, composition of the board, approval of extraordinary transactions, and 
other basic issues as specified in company law and internal company statutes. GA then is 
considered the place where decisions are made, the perfect location for the communication of 
information usually addressed to shareholders and the sole form of consultation in Plc. GA 
globally unites shareholders, for meeting purposes it is represented by attending shareholders, 
and discusses questions with common interest that impact the entirety of shareholders attending 
or not. Nonetheless, legal rules present a form of special assembly that consists of a specific 
category of shareholders especially those holding preference or other special category of shares, 
it discusses questions that relate to the particular interest of its shareholders996.   
336 General assembly. All Plc. including the IC have a GA, as for the special assembly it is 
not globally applicable. It is limited to companies that offer shares with different classes997. The 
GA meets in two forms ordinary and extraordinary one. The periodic convening of each form of 
GA provides for further sub-categories such as having an annual ordinary general assembly998. 
Ordinary General Assembly stems its activities from its name as it discusses questions relating 
to regular and ordinary performance of the company999. As for Extraordinary General 
Assembly, it is exclusively responsible for discussing the modifications of the AOA1000.  
337 General assembly meetings. Both forms of GA cannot be convened spontaneously. They 
follow a legally pre-set ritual. Company calls shareholders to meet in a set place and date, 
                                                          
995 D. Hillier n (215) page 44 
996 This form of assembly is introduced by code de commerce (C. Com., art. L. 225-99), the assembly seen as a legal 
protection to either minority shareholders or shareholders with preference shares. In addition this assembly may 
be influential as its decisions generally modify the rights connected to the category of shares concerned in this 
group where shareholders represented within which, might own an influential percentage in the company as a 
whole  
997 See : Paul et Philippe Didier, Droit Commercial (Tome 2 : Les Sociétés Commerciales, Economica 2011) 
998 C. com., art. L. 225-100; Article 169 JCC 
999 C. com., art. L. 225-98; Article 171 JCC 
1000 C. com., art. L. 225-96; Article 175 JCC 
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further it defines the agenda and number of resolutions that needs to be adopted. Most 
importantly, the call includes communication of material information that permits shareholders 
to analyze management resolutions and inform them of company’s financial situation. 
Generally, the AOA stipulates the process and power to convene GAMs, nonetheless in case 
AOA contains no such precision company rules grants this power to the management1001.  The 
GAM may be further convened upon the request of shareholders1002, by auditors and majority 
shareholders1003. The call includes1004; all shareholders registered in company’s registry three 
days before the designated meeting date1005, company controller, securities commission, board 
members and auditors1006. Convening a legitimate GAM requires fulfilling a quorum by 
attending shareholders. The quorum differs depending on the form of convened meeting. In 
OGAM the required quorum of present and represented shares or shares with voting right in a 
first call for the meeting, is the majority of underwritten shares for the Jordanian law1007 and 
fifth shares with voting right for the French one1008. In case of a second call, the meeting can be 
convened with any quorum for both laws. EGAMs are convened on a first call with the majority 
of underwritten shares for Jordan1009, or quarter of shares with voting rights for France1010. On 
                                                          
1001 For OGAM: Article 169 JCC, C. com., art. L. 225-103; for EoGAM: Article 172 JCC, C. com., art. L. 225-103 
1002 There are two forms of request: one by any shareholder filed with the competent court (Tribunal de 
Commerce) to request the management to convene the annual OGAM if it was not convened within the time limit 
set by law (C. com., art. L. 225-100). The second form is the request filed with the competent court by a group of 
shareholders holding not less than five percent of the share capital or the association of shareholders within 
publically traded companies (C. com., art. L. 225-120). The Jordanian rules provides similar forms for the meeting 
request; yet, by applying different shareholding percentages. The rules mention a request directly filed with the 
oa d f o  sha eholde s holdi g ot less tha  ua te  of o pa s u de itte  apital. A othe  fo  of e uest 
filed with o pa s o t olle  to e uest the eeti g o  thei  ehalf  sha eholde s holdi g ot less tha  fiftee  
pe e t of the u de itte  sha es i  Co pa s La  a e di g ill A ti le  p oposes de easi g the e ui ed 
percentage to ten percent) 
1003 Majority shareholders directly convene the meeting whether they hold majority share capital or majority votes 
after a public offering; no such right is provided within the Jordanian scope of OGAM; C. com., art. L. 225-103; this 
exception of the general rule for convening GAMs by company controller or auditors applies solely over EoGAM 
under Jordanian Law (Article 172 JCC) 
1004 As part of the protection envisaged for employees of the company, the possible attendance of members of the 
o it  d’e t ep ise in GAMs (C. trav., art. L. 2323-67 no longer applicable after the recent reform of the code); 
their attendance was seen as important in board deliberations (Cass. com., 17 Fevr. 1975, n° 73-13242) 
1005 Article 178 JCC (Article 17 of Company Law amending bill of 2017 proposes the change of number of registered 
days at the registry to one day instead of three); the principle of participating shareholders in France includes 
every shareholder registered in the registry two working days before the meeting may participate (C. com., art. R. 
225-85)  
1006 Article 182 JCC 
1007 Article 170 JCC 
1008 C. com., art. L. 225-98 (the decisions are made with the approval of majority of present and represented votes) 
1009 Article 173 JCC (decisions are made with the approval of seventy five percent of present shares) 
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the second call, the meeting is convened if forty percent of underwritten shares are present in 
Jordan or fifth shares with voting right in France. 
338 Obligation of meeting. The general principle stated by law is convening the least one 
annual OGAM1011. The IC is exempted from the application of this obligation. Whereas the 
board of the IC is not obliged to call the GA for a meeting unless a new board needs to be 
elected1012. This exemption is linked to the character and activities of this Company. OEIC is 
particular. It is called open-end due to holding a variable and fluctuating capital that changes 
continuously increasingly and decreasingly without the need to follow the rigid procedures set 
by law. Therefore, the GA does not necessarily need to be convened every time a share is 
redeemed or issued. On the other hand, this exemption complicates the supervisory and 
monitoring role of the assembly over the performance of the management. Nonetheless, the 
assembly can still be convened at any time upon direct request of shareholders or indirect 
requests made with auditors or company controller.  
339 Meeting agenda. The call for GAM includes meeting’s agenda and explanatory 
documents. The items on the agenda differ from one form of meeting to the other. Previously in 
this part we mentioned that the EGAM discusses the questions relating to the modification of 
the AOA1013. This competence is extended under Jordanian rules to include questions relating to 
dismissing the board, merger and acquisitions, taking over other companies, increasing or 
decreasing the capital, allocating shares for employees, buy-backs1014, in addition to any 
question that falls under the competence of the ordinary meeting1015. The OGAM is competent 
in matters relating to board reports, financial reports, annual budget, appointing the board and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1010 C. com., art. L. 225-96 (decisions are made with the approval of two third of present shares) 
1011 Article 169 JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-100 
1012 Article 209.b (5) 
1013 EoGAM i  F a e dis usses also the uestio  of o pa s atio alit  a d t a sfe  of seat C. o ., a t. L. -
97) 
1014 Article 175.a JCC (the items that can be discussed in the Jordanian extraordinary meeting are normally 
discussed in ordinary meetings under French rules) 
1015 Article 176 JCC 
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auditors, prepositions of mortgage and loans any other topic proposed by the board or attending 
shareholders1016 and does not fall under the special competence of extraordinary meetings1017.  
340 Obstacles to good corporate governance. The most important right that shareholders 
exercise is the right to vote. The control GA exercises over the management is represented in 
the decisions they take in GAMs involving; appointing or dismissing the board, having a say on 
pay and monitoring the financial situation of the company. As was previously mentioned, 
according to corporate governance principles, shareholders should not be restricted from 
exercising their rights. The restriction or obstacle comes in different forms. The most obvious 
obstacle is the existence of shares with multiple voting rights that may enable minority 
shareholders with small stake in the capital to impose their views by wielding their extra 
votes1018. Further to, the existence of preference shares with no voting rights attached1019. The 
restriction of voting rights in meetings by introducing a cap on the number of votes cast during 
general meetings and administrative or material restrictions on exercising voting rights by way 
of proxy1020 or postal vote1021.  
341 Transition. IC personally exercises its activities through its members of management 
complemented with the role of the GA. The IC may choose to delegate its functions to more 
experienced and expert third party known as the MC. The following section B addresses the 
delegation process and scope of application.  
                                                          
1016 Shareholders holding not less than ten percent of shares present in the meeting may request to add an item on 
eeti g s age da A ti le  of the a e di g ill of  p oposes a de ease i  the pe e tage to fi e percent); 
similarly French rules provides such an option but with a smaller percentage of present shares five percent 
(C.com., art. L. 225-105) 
1017 Article 171 JCC 
1018 Jordanian rules solved the issue by limiting IC to Plc. form therefore; shares of IC are of the same class and 
enjoy a voting right. As for French rules, the possibility of granting a double vote share exists; it is conditional to 
having a nominal share that the same shareholder is in hold of it for at least two consecutive years (C. com., art. L. 
225-123) 
1019 No such shares can be issued by Jordanian IC as it is limited to the form of Plc. under French law preference 
shares with no voting right may be issued and therefore providing an exception from the general rule of having all 
shares connected to a voting right (C. com., art. L. 225-125) this restriction on the exercise of the voting right finds 
its solution under the French rules in special assemblies   
1020 This restriction does not exist under either laws as both the Jordanian and French rules permit shareholder to 
mandate another to represent him in GAMs (Article 179 JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-106) 
1021 P. Vernimmen n (872) page 813; the restriction exists under Jordanian law as no voting can be done in GAMs 
by correspondences or telecommunication therefore complicating and constraining good corporate governance 
(postal vote C. com., art. L. 225-107; Telecommunication C. com., art. R. 225-61) 
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Section B: Delegation of Functions  
342 Preview. MC is an undertaking that exercises an investment activity1022. It is retained by 
investors to manage mutual funds and ICs in return for a management fee. It is comprised of 
experienced and professional managers with an established record of accomplishment in their 
field1023. The IC as a form of delegation of functions assigns a MC. MC performs similar 
activities to financial intermediaries; nonetheless, this company strictly manages CIUs in all its 
forms. Under the French securities rules and on an EU level two types of MCs are 
distinguished1024. The first type is the MC created following the UCITS directive therefore it is 
limited in its activities to managing CIUs and cannot provide investment services of reception 
and transmission of order on behalf of third party. The second type is the MC that exists 
following the MiFID directive. This form of MC provides portfolio management services to non 
UCITS CIUs in addition to other investment services that includes the transmission and 
reception of orders. The two types differ in their scope of activity yet their governing rules are 
almost identical. For purposes of this work, the first type of MC is taken into consideration. 
343 Mandatory Management Company. Within the scope of EU rules those addressing CIU, 
UCITS are required to appoint a MC (except for self-managed undertakings after meeting the 
conditions set by the directive)1025. MC is distinct from the investment manager earlier 
mentioned in this part. It does not replace the investment manager, they exist side-by-side to 
strengthen the operating model of CIU. The manager chooses to exercise the activities on its 
own or delegate them to the MC. Under Jordanian rules, the investment management activity is 
                                                          
1022 C. mon. fin., art. L. 321-1 al. I (4); Article 26 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 10 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1023 Business Dictionary, accessed 05 June 2017 <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/management-
company.html>; Article 2.1 (b) UCITS Dir. 2009/65; CA Orléans, ch. com., éco. et fin., 12 mai 2011, n° 10-02.984; C. 
mon. fin., art. L. 532-9 
1024 Jea  Guillau e de To ue ille et “t pha e Puel et Esthe  Bouja d, OPCVM  i  Répertoire de Droit des Sociétés 
(Dalloz 2013) paragraphe 142 
1025 Article 5.2 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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regulated1026 and MC exists as a notion without having a mandatory rule to assign such a 
company by the IC1027.   
344 Reason for delegation. The approach of EU rules requiring carrying out activities of IC 
through a separate entity segregated from the investment manager and depositary; form an 
organizational measure used to avoid and hinder conflicts of interest1028. The segregation as a 
form of independence is far from being complete, as MCs tend to be part of universal banks or 
financial groups where their directors are not fully independent1029. The outsourcing of activities 
rather than self-management is the solution when IC cannot be established as self-managed. It is 
the case when its directors or the individual investment committee members do not hold the 
necessary expertise and experience in this form of portfolio investments1030. Further to the case 
where IC does not meet minimum capital requirement and the conditions of self-management 
stated in UCITS Directive. No similar conditions or reasoning is given under Jordanian rules. 
The option is available for IC to outsource its management to specialized third party entities at 
any time without the need to meet any capital or expertise requirements. To which extent-
leaving outsourcing of activities as an option is positive? In terms of the investment fund the 
reasoning is clear. Having no legal personality the fund requires the MC to manage it and 
represent it. As for the IC, the debate is different whereas it holds a legal personality further to 
meeting a level of professionalism and expertise. There are no data showing which of the two 
forms of functioning self or outsourced holds more benefit for shareholders of IC.  
345 Level of delegation. The traditional model of outsourcing functions of the UCITS by 
assigning a MC focuses particularly on monitoring the delegated functions and ensures the 
compliance rather than exercising the daily activities of UCITS1031. The delegation is of 
                                                          
1026 Article 47 JSL of 2017 
1027 Article 6 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
1028 L. Thevenoz n (801) Page 17 
1029 Co issio , A e  to the G ee  Pape  o  the E ha e e t of the EU F a e o k Fo  I est e t Fu ds  
(Staff Working Paper) COM (2005) 314 final 
1030 F a k Chet uti Di e h a d F a k Ca ua a, Collective Investment Schemes     IFL‘ < 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intfinr28&div=133&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&
men_tab=srchresults > accessed 17 September 2015 Page 69 
1031 Willia  Jo es, Thi d Pa t  Ma age e t Co pa ies: A Ne  Go e a e Model  Deloitte,  < 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-
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functional responsibilities such as those relating to risk management and depositary. ICs cannot 
ultimately delegate their legal liability1032. The IC can choose to delegate the entirety of its 
management to the MC or partially particular functions to more experienced and independent 
entities1033. Outsourcing of activities arises the question of cost, as management fees risk being 
doubled. The scenario this section is addressing is the case of outsourcing of activities. The 
scenario lays down two main questions: what is the role of the assigned MC? Where do the 
legal and managerial liabilities lay? The following sub-sections answer these questions 
respectively.  
Sub-section 1: Role of Management Company 
346 Pros vs. cons. Generally, portfolio management function may be outsourced to a third 
party asset manager. This can be done through the distribution of third party funds1034 or by the 
use of multi-management1035. By spreading assets among multiple managers, investors can 
benefit from a diversification of management styles (and therefore of risks). Multi-management 
includes funds of funds (mainly for retail investors) and manager of managers (offered to 
institutional investors). Nevertheless, the double layer of fees may partly counter-weight the 
positive effects of diversification. 
347 Main role. MC provides investment services as defined by law. They have as their main 
role management of CIUs1036. MC as other forms of companies is subject to rules of 
incorporation in addition to an authorization requirement. MC when is delegated the functions 
of CIUs, does not as a general rule, limit its performance to one undertaking it might choose to 
act on behalf of several undertakings at the same time as long as fair and responsible treatment 
is guaranteed. The concept of outsourcing activities and functions of ICs arises the importance 
of understanding the creation of MC, its obligations and its characterization under existing legal 
theories. What form of company does MC have? What are the conditions and requirements that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
services/performancemagazine/articles/lu-third-party-management-companies-092014.pdf > Accessed 12 June 
2017 
1032 A. Rechtschaffen n (305) Page 363 
1033 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-1 
1034 Third-party Distributor: Company that sells the units of CIS on behalf of IC in return for a portion of the fees 
that IC charges its investors. It is beneficial in the case of having an IC lacking knowledge and resources 
1035 Commission 2005 n (1029) Page 13 
1036 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-9 
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it should meet? Is there a place for the application of the agency theory or fiduciary duties? All 
of which answered in this subsection and the following one. Therefore, localizing shareholders’ 
interest if such delegation is performed.  
§1: Creating a Management Company 
348 Organization procedure. MC may undertake any form or structure of company provided 
by national laws1037. This rule is conditional to having a statute compatible with applicable rules 
over the type of activities it intends to exercise, further to subjecting its accounts to legal 
control1038. MC before commencing the exercise of its activities should obtain an authorization 
or license1039 from the competent authority of the country where the activity is exercised1040, in 
order to asses its eligibility to exercise its intended portfolio management activities. Submitting 
the authorization application does not have as a pre-requirement the complete incorporation 
under company law rules. It is possible to file the application in the period of incorporation1041. 
Under French rules for instance the MC adopts the structure of Société de Gestion de 
Portefeuille (SGP), further it is authorized by the AMF in order to be able to exercise its 
portfolio investment management. The authorization is limited to fulfilling specific conditions 
directly linked to the performance of its activities. MC should have two persons responsible for 
its management, have its headquarters in France1042, hold sufficient capital and adequate 
financial means, and provide complete details of its shareholders and management component, 
in addition to preparing a program of activity1043. Under Jordanian rules, MC is licensed in a 
similar manner to that of IC. Further, it follows those procedures and incorporation process 
applicable to the form of company it chooses to undertake.  
                                                          
1037 Article 4 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 4 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1038 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-2 
1039 Article 47 JSL of 2017 
1040 Under French rules MC obtains the authorization from the AMF as for other investment services providers such 
as credit institutions and banks; they obtain their authorization from the Authority of Prudential Control and 
Resolution (ACPR) 
1041 AMF, recomm. DOC-2012- , Guide d la o atio  du p og a e d a ti it  des sociétés de gestion de 
portefeuille et des placements collectifs autogérés  
1042 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-1 
1043 C. mon. fin., art. L.  532-9 
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349 Dossier d’agrément. The applicant company submits the authorization application with 
the AMF. The AMF reaches its decision within a maximum period of three months following 
the submission of a complete application. The refusal of the AMF to grant the MC the 
authorization does not form a sanctioning measure1044. The application is divided into six 
different parts that address on a general term the following information: presentation of the 
request, nature of the company, its activities and organization, marketing means of financial 
instruments, and financial elements of the company in addition to the request to freedom of 
establishment1045. The applicant company should define the nature of the manager; is it internal 
(self-managed company) or external (MC). It further identifies the scope of managed activities 
and functions, in addition to connected services it intends to exercise alongside management, 
particularly those activities that require a prior authorization. The applicant company should 
designate what it manages, meaning it manages a CIU, an Alternative Investment Fund 
(AIF)1046, or a third-party portfolio investment1047. The applicant provides a detailed list of the 
nature of authorized financial instruments within the scope of its program of activities1048. The 
applicant fills out any eventual restriction connected to targeted investors or provided financial 
instruments.  
350 Program of activity.  This program provides and consists of a synthetic vision of the 
intended activities of MC. This vision does not replace the detailed description of the provided 
investment services and activities, the used instruments and the eventual restrictions that also 
form part of the main body of the program1049. The program presents a document containing 
two main parts: basic program of activity (states general organization of MC) and 
complementary documents (contains eight complementary documents relating to financial 
instruments subject of its activities). The program of activity allows the identification of the 
                                                          
1044 CE, 6e et 1er ch. réunies, 13 juill. 2011, n°s 33-7552 34-5402 
1045 Anne-Dominique Merville, Droit Financier (2nd edn, Gualino 2015) page 157 
1046 Regulated in directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) 
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 OJ L 174/1  
1047 MiFID Directive 
1048 Financial instruments admitted for trading on regulated or non- egulated fi a ial a kets C. o . fi ., a t. L. 
421-1; C. mon. fin., art. L. 422- , ultilate al s ste s C. o . fi ., a t. L. -  o  fo eig  a kets C. o . fi ., 
art. L. 423- , u its of CIUs p o ided fo  etail i esto s, AIFs desti ed to i stitutio al i esto s a d othe s 
(intermediaries C. mon. fin., art. D. 321-1) 
1049 AMF, Recomm. Doc-2012-19 n (1041) page 4 
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responsible members for company’s principal activities including the number of members and 
collaborators attributed to different functions (financial, commercial and support departments).  
351 Incorporation rules. MC can undertake any form of company provided under the 
governing company rules1050. It should hold a minimum initial capital of one hundred and 
twenty five thousand Euros1051. It should clearly state in its AOA the principle of independence 
of its management conditions. MC guarantees sound and prudent management1052, further; it 
provides proper surveillance or oversight system. The AMF particularly endorses the role of GA 
in fulfilling this oversight mission1053. The role and importance find their perfect example in the 
case of acquisition. There are criteria for acquiring shareholders. It includes the reputation of the 
candidate, experience and reputation of the management, integrity of the operations and the 
capacity of the company to satisfy its prudential obligations1054.  
352 Management. Minimum two persons effectively direct the MC1055. The persons directing 
the MC should be individuals and not entities. They are attributed operational and effective 
functions. Their detailed background and identity are mentioned in the program of activity and 
their curriculum vitae attached therein. Their role is important in the performance of MC’s 
activities and MC meeting its liabilities and responsibilities towards managed IC and its 
shareholders. These individuals should hold necessary knowledge and experience that is 
compatible with their attributed functions1056. These directors undergo a knowledge exam 
prepared by the AMF that examines their financial analytical skills and competences1057. The 
AMF has the full discretion to authorize or not the applicant director. The refusal to authorize 
may be for reasons relating to the involvement of the applicant in a sanctioning process with the 
AMF Sanctioning Commission. Alternatively, for reasons relating to being previously laid off 
                                                          
1050 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-2 ; limited under the Jordanian rules to Plc., private limited company and limited 
liability company 
1051 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-3; one million JOD (Article 4 Licensing Regulation of 2005, article 4.d Licensing Bylaw 
of 2018) 
1052 Article 27 Licensing Regulation of 2005 (standard of care); no such standard is mentioned in the newly 
implemented licensing bylaw of 2018  
1053 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-5 
1054 C. mon. fin., art. D. 532-15-1 
1055 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-6; C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-9 
1056 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-6 
1057 AMF, instr. Doc-2008-03 defines the process of examination. It is similar to that members of management of IC 
undergo; AMF, régl. gén., art. 318-7 
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for serious misconduct or misconduct for not communicating the required information to the 
AMF. The binary management of MC may be derogated from if the conditions stated in 
governing legal rules are met1058. These conditions include: the case of having a MC that does 
not manage any CIU, further to the case the value of the managed portfolio does not mount to 
twenty million euros or it is superior to this amount, yet the functions are limited to managing 
professional funds of capital investment. In addition to the case of having a director, that holds 
the necessary knowledge and experience to exercise effectively, the allocated functions in a 
manner guaranteeing sound and prudent management. A question arises in this regard; to which 
extent should directors of MC be fully available to run the company? The AMF states in its 
recommendation on the incorporation of MC that at least one of the two directors should be 
fully available to manage the company1059. It further states that in some cases both directors are 
effectively running the company. The Jordanian MC’s management structure and component 
depend on the form of company the MC choses to undertake1060. No conditional structure is 
imposed by the JSC.  
353 Association. All investment services providers should adhere to an association that 
collectively represents and defends the interests and rights of companies with similar 
activities1061. MC as a form of investment services providers should be a member of the 
Association Française des Etablissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d’ Investissement 
(AFECEI). The importance of the organization of the MC avails in the affect the expertise of 
this company has on shareholders’ interest, especially when the IC decides to delegate entirely 
its portfolio management activities. The following paragraph addresses the obligations of the 
MC that influences the performance of the IC and eventually pours in the interest of 
shareholders.  
                                                          
1058 AMF, régl. gén., art. 312-7 
1059 AMF, recomm. Doc-2012-19 n (1041) page 13 
1060 Article 132 JCC for Plc., article 72-bis JCC for private limited company, article 60 JCC for limited liability 
company  
1061 C. mon. fin., art. L. 531-8 
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§2: Obligations of Management Company 
354 Exercise of activities. Once authorized by the AMF, the MC commences the exercise of 
its activities within a period not exceeding twelve months following the date of authorization. 
The AMF has the full discretion to withdraw the authorization if the MC does not at least 
manage one CIU within the first twelve months following its authorization1062.  The exercise of 
the activities should be continuous without any unexplained or unauthorized interruptions that 
exceed six consecutive months1063.  
355 Notion of obligation. The activity of portfolio management as part of investment services 
is a protected activity. The protection avails through different monopolies; one formal relating 
to the designation of the company as a Management Company (SGP), another is connected to 
the services (the investment services as defined by the different legal rules) and a third relating 
to the intermediation in financial instruments1064. The combination of these notions arises the 
different categories of obligations imposed on MC as an investment services provider.  
356 Extended obligations. The obligations that relate to the label of investment services 
provider guaranteeing the stability of financial market extend to cover MC. These obligations 
include prudential and accounting obligation, compliance function, adhering to securities’ 
safeguarding mechanisms, risk management, in addition to fight against money laundry and 
financing terrorism.  
357 Particular obligations. There are particular obligations connected to client-MC relation. 
They include reporting and disclosure, maintaining the authorization conditions valid, holding 
technical, financial and professional requirements and means. These obligations form what is 
known as operational and organizational obligations.  
358 Operational and organizational obligation. MC is requested to maintain on a regular and 
permanent basis adequate and sufficient material, financial and personnel means1065.  The 
                                                          
1062 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-10 
1063 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-10 (I) 
1064 A.D. Merville n (1045) page 159 
1065 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-54 
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operational obligation extends to include laying down decision-making procedures in addition 
to having an organizational structure under a clear form that details hierarchal constitution and 
functional and responsible divisions. Maintaining a valid authorization requires holding at all 
times valid the conditions of the authorization1066 within which included the operational 
obligation of technical and professional means that is subject to the organizational requirements 
stated in the program of activity1067. Guaranteeing a well-established company and a 
safeguarding structure require both the MC and its personnel to hold necessary background and 
experience to manage portfolios and risks1068. Other forms of this operational obligation include 
having a practical operational experience, an engagement and communication policy with 
investment managers and a problem-solving mindset that orients different components of the 
company towards achieving reduced failure odds and minimize the negative impact. The AMF 
ensures the existence of professional and technical means through its supervisory power. In 
deciding whether or not MC lacks these means it examines on a case by case the potential fault 
and characterizes it as core or not depending on two criterion. Dysfunction the company in its 
investments and the influence over the exclusive interests of investors1069. The MC further lays 
down rules on internal control and conduct1070, whether these rules form part of the compliance 
function and internal control1071 or a distinct periodic control system1072. It is further required to 
establish and maintain conflicts of interest policy1073. Throughout its operation and performance 
the MC, undertakes all reasonable means to obtain the best results out of its performance. 
Therefore, it puts in place a best execution policy1074 that states the selection criteria of 
                                                          
1066 Similar condition under the Jordanian rules concerning the license (Article 6 Licensing Regulation of 2005;  
article 8 Licensing Bylaw of 2018) 
1067 AMF,  Sanct. Comm. 17 March 2015, n° SAN-2015-06 
1068 Article 4.d Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 4.h Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1069 AMF, sanct. comm., 20 March 2013, n° SAN-2013-08 
1070 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-63, 64; Article 66 Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1071 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-63 
1072 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-62 
1073 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-20; AMF, sanct. Comm., 17 October 2014, n° SAN-2014-19; under Jordanian rules MC 
is obliged to declare its direct or indirect interest in the transactions it performs on behalf of the managed IC, this 
is a form of controlling conflicts of interest yet the rules do not address explicitly conflicts of interest policy (Article 
63 Licensing Regulation of 2005), no such obligation is addressed in the newly implemented Licensing Bylaw of 
2018 
1074 C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-18 
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executors within the company1075.  Jordanian rules do not address the best execution they 
require sound and prudent performance.  
359 Risk management. Management companies are required to establish and maintain 
adequate and documented risk management policy, which identifies risks; ICs they manage are 
or might be exposed to1076. The risk management policy comprises the necessary procedures 
that enable the MC to evaluate and calculate the global risk exposure of the IC, including 
market, liquidity and counterparty risks1077. Most importantly, the MC should include in its risk 
management policy the procedures that detect and evaluate operational risks and calculation of 
operational costs particularly in cases when it chooses to delegate the management of the IC to a 
selected third party. The Jordanian rules do not mention the notion of risk management. The 
securities rules and licensing regulations do not address the notion; this major gap threatens the 
sound protection of shareholders of the IC. If the MC takes the form of a listed company, it 
creates a risk management committee according to corporate governance regulation. Yet this 
committee manages risks faced by MC and not that of the managed IC.  Unless the IC is 
considered as part of its activities.  
360 Compliance obligation. The compliance function has a notable status in the financial 
sphere. It is a function closely related to the operational control that imposes and generally 
englobes different professions. Compliance has various norms, rules and procedures that are 
exercised as a form of internal control. MC is obliged to establish and maintain adequate 
measures, procedures and policy that detect the risk of non-compliance with professional 
obligations1078. The AMF sanctioning commission may issues a sanctioning decision based on 
the breach of professional obligations even for those obligations that did not state in its GR. The 
key concept is having a clear legal text that can be sufficiently extended in scope and content to 
contain this justification1079. The mission and tasks of the compliance function and officer are 
                                                          
1075 This obligation is particular to the case of delegation or externalization to third party executors by the MC, 
especially when the MC executes orders through other entities (AMF, régl. gén., art. 314-75). To be further 
illustrated in sub-section 2 
1076 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-53-4; Article 38 Dir. 2010/43 
1077 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-53-5 
1078 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-1; Article 7 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1079 CE, 6e et 1er sousec. réunies, 18 fevr. 2011, n° 32-2786 
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further addressed in the following sub-section 2, further to, the impact of the delegation on IC’s 
accountability.  
Sub-section 2: Effect of Delegation on Liability of Main Management 
361 Preview. Managing CIU by an MC arises different questions in terms of the allocation of 
responsibilities and liabilities among the different participants. If the IC choses to out-source its 
functions of portfolio investment, risk management or compliance, the core question rising in 
this regard is the following: what impact does this delegation have on the powers, 
responsibilities and liabilities of the IC and its management? 
362 Collective portfolio management. The core activity of the CIU management is portfolio 
management meaning the financial management of the UCITS, taking investment and 
disinvestment decisions1080. Other activities include administration; meaning legal and 
accounting tasks, inquiry requested by investors, evaluation of portfolio and asset value 
determination1081, in addition to the commercialization of portfolio or units of the CIU1082. The 
following paragraphs address the consequences of outsourcing functions of IC to MCs. 
Therefore, they address the outsourcing in terms of characterization of MC’s functions; is it a 
transfer of responsibilities, liabilities or powers (paragraph 1). Further to the role of the 
competent authorities in controlling the performance of MC (paragraph 2). 
§1: Transfer of Functions vs. Liabilities 
363 Role. Outsourcing or delegation IC seeks is a delegation of functions. It can be global in 
terms of portfolio management and all that it entails or partial of particular functions1083. The IC 
does not delegate its liabilities neither its main responsibilities towards its shareholders. The 
question rising in this regard concerns the nature, the character or the role of the MC. Is the MC 
a representative of the CIU it manages? In particular circumstances the MC is considered as 
                                                          
1080 Article 26 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 10 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
 1081 The activities mentioned in Annex II of the UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1082 Under EU scope; UCITS may obtain a European passport and may be marketed in other MS 
1083 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7-1 
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such1084. MC’s role revolves around the exercise of a representative power over the rights 
connected to financial instruments constituting the managed portfolio1085. This responsibility is 
conferred to the MC, not shareholders or depositary1086. Therefore, MC participates in GAMs, 
exercises voting rights, participates in associations of shareholders in addition to ester in courts. 
The externalization of the functions and their exercise does not confer the status of a 
shareholder over the MC in relation to the financial instruments in which IC invests1087. MC 
may also be delegated risk management function either as part of the internal control 
mechanism of a MC or a partial delegation of functions1088.  MC performs its delegated 
functions through an implicit mandate for the account of the IC. The question rising in this 
regard: what effect does this characterization have on the allocation of liabilities and 
responsibilities?  
364 Responsibilities vs liabilities. MC has specific responsibilities towards the IC it manages. 
The responsibilities or what is referred to as duties relate to the functions and obligations 
imposed on MC in governing legal rules. The investment manager remains responsible under 
the Jordanian securities rules for fault and negligence in the performance of its activities, in 
addition to being liable for the damages that its actions incurred unit holders1089. These 
responsibilities do not discharge the IC from its liabilities and responsibilities towards its 
shareholders. Particularly the case of the delegation of the calculation of global risk exposure 
the European Securities Commission confirmed the statement that the outsourcing of risk 
management activities does not exempt companies from retaining full responsibility for the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of risk management process1090. Both the IC and the MC 
should fulfill their incorporation and ongoing conditions. The MC does not hold a direct liability 
towards IC’s shareholders, whereas the liability of the moral person does not transfer. The 
                                                          
1084 For example in collective investment funds, as the  ha e o legal pe so alit  MC s ole e e ges as the 
representative of this co-propriety (C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-8-8) 
1085 C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-22 
1086 This statement endorses the separation of MCs and depositaries activities earlier addressed in this part 
1087 See: Isabelle Riassetto and Michel Storck, Les Organismes de Placement Collectif (Tome 1 : OPVCM, 2nd edn, 
Joly 2016) 
1088 Permanent risk management function Article 12 Dir. 2010/43 
1089 Article 104 JSL of 2017 
1090 CESR guidelines 09-178 n (930) page 14 
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liability it owes is towards the IC and the IC remains liable before its shareholders for the 
misconducts and violations of the MC. 
365 Externalization vs delegation. MC may choose to transfer partially its functions to a third 
party for their execution1091. The percentage of delegated functions should not exceed the limit 
that presents MC as a “mail-box” company; meaning no global delegation is accepted. 
Externalizing or delegating the functions to third party is further conditioned in terms of the 
performance of the delegate. MC either; externalizes its operational functions or services for a 
selected third party (services provider) to carry them out1092, or delegates the functions relating 
to the management of the IC to a third party delegate1093.  The Jordanian rules are silent in terms 
of this form of outsourcing. The silence can be positively interpreted. It is possible to outsource 
functions of MC in a sub-contracting framework. Nonetheless, the possibility of delegating the 
management of IC is questionable. Jordanian ICs that do not hold the required experience and 
resources to perform their activities on their own and not as an automatic obligation refer to 
MC1094. It is an option; therefore, the choice of the IC will fall upon an experienced investment 
manager and not one that will outsource the activities. If the form of sub-contracting is used to 
outsource the activities then effectively the responsibilities and the liabilities of the parties to 
this contract are not affected. Neither party is discharged from its initial obligations 
consequently to entering into this agreement.  
366 Conditions. MC should inform the AMF as soon as possible of the delegation. It should 
ensure that the delegation does not, in any way, hinder the exercise of the AMF of its 
supervisory power over the MC nor should it prevent a better management of the portfolio by 
the MC, therefore, negatively influencing shareholders’ interest. No delegation of financial 
management is allowed unless the concerned third party is an entity authorized to manage 
collective investments similar to those mentioned in the delegation. The delegation should not 
endanger the best execution of MC’s activities, therefore it should not arise cases of conflicts of 
interest. The delegation is not absolute, the directors of MC should be at all times able to give 
                                                          
1091 Article 32 Dir. 2010/43; AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-77; AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-72 
1092 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-72 
1093 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-77 
1094 Even this statement is debatable; the IC is required as part of its licensing process, to provide the JSC with the 
proof that it holds necessary technical and professional experience and resources  
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supplementary instructions to the delegate; whereas MC lays down permanent measures that 
guarantee its effective control over the performance of its assignees1095. Third party delegates 
should be qualified to exercise the delegated functions. Most importantly, and as a form of 
investor protection; once the delegation is effected and is permitted by the AMF; the prospectus 
and all the documents destined to provide information to concerned investors should detail these 
delegated functions. As for the externalization, it is limited to essential and important 
operational functions for the exercise of MC’s activities or providing a service1096. Essential and 
important operation function is considered as such if an anomaly or a failure is expected to 
occur and harm the capacity of the MC in conforming to permanent conditions of its 
authorization or its professional obligation, further to that harm affecting its financial 
performance or the continuity of its activities1097. The externalization should not constrain the 
functions of directors of MC, should not modify the relation of the company with its clients nor 
its obligations towards them, in addition to not having an externalization that alters the 
conditions or commitments connected to the authorization1098.  
367 Legal effect. The fact that MC delegates or externalizes its functions to a third party does 
not discharge nor affect the liability of this company1099. This rule finds its grounds in the 
restriction of full delegation of MC’s functions, in addition to considering the transfer of 
liability of moral persons as not possible due to the fact that the delegated person performs its 
delegated functions on behalf of the company and never in person. MC should maintain at all 
times its professional obligations valid. It should hold the necessary expertise and resources to 
control effectively the delegated and externalized activities. Particularly those activities relating 
to risk connected to the agreement entered into between delegates and MC. MC further 
guarantees that the selected third party performs efficiently its activities and has the capacity, 
knowledge and qualities that permits him to exercise such activities. MC complies with 
conditions of its outsourcing and that of its authorization within the scope of AMF’s powers. 
The following paragraph explains the scope of oversight and control over MC’s activities and 
functions.  
                                                          
1095 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-77 (6 and 7) 
1096 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-72 
1097 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-74 
1098 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-75 (I) 
1099 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-77; AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-75 (I) 
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§2: Supervision of Management Company 
368 Impact of supervision. The regulatory and administrative supervision and control over 
management companies has as a main goal; the promotion of MCs with more substance and 
solid operational base. Therefore, providing a higher level of investor protection, whereas they 
have no direct connection with MC’s appointing nor do they have a direct contact with it. The 
importance of this supervision avails in hindering conflicts of interest and guaranteeing 
transparency of MC’s activities. The supervision comes in different forms; external represented 
in the supervisory power of competent securities authority or internal represented in an auto-
control mechanism such as compliance function.  
369 Supervisory power. Competent securities authority exercises an active monitory role 
throughout the life of MC. This role is similar to that exercised over IC1100. The AMF sets out 
conduct of business rules and professional obligations for MCs to comply with. It performs on-
site inspections to ensure that MC is acting within the sphere of its program of activity1101. It 
also ensures the compliance with organizational requirements and internal control provisions. 
The AMF may further invoke financial sanctions upon MCs particularly in cases involving 
default in maintaining authorization conditions permanently valid1102. The AMF has full 
discretion to approve or refuse the authorization of MC; it can also withdraw the authorization 
or delist the company from the registry of MCs as forms of administrative sanctions. The JSC 
performs a similar power over MC1103.  
370 Disciplinary power. MC when failing to meet its obligations or failing to maintain the 
prerequisites valid; is questioned before the securities commission. The commission then 
performs its investigation and as a result, it reaches a decision considering the company as in 
breach or not1104. Consequently, the commission imposes financial or non-financial sanctions on 
the infringing company. The non-financial sanctions include withdrawal of authorization. The 
AMF also executes the withdrawal of the authorization in particular cases. Where the 
                                                          
1100 The aspects of this role shall be further illustrated in Part II 
1101 Stephane Puel and Arnaud Pince (France) in Chris Carroll and Samuel Kay (eds), Investment Funds: Jurisdictional 
comparison (1st edn, Thomson Reuters 2012) page 133 
1102 AMF, sanct. Comm., 7 November 2012, n° SAN-2012-18 
1103 The powers of the JSC overrules those of company controller (Article 111 JSL of 2017) 
1104 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-15 ; Article 21 JSL of 2017 
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withdrawal is considered as an ex officio consequence due to reasons including: the MC no 
longer meeting its professional obligations required under the authorization. When the MC does 
not make use of the authorization during the first twelve months or suspends its activities for 
more than six consecutive months, in addition, if it has been proven that the company obtained 
the authorization through false declarations or misleading means 1105.  The withdrawal as a 
disciplinary measure includes all other cases not specifically covered by the de facto 
consequence. In the absence of sound and prudent management1106, in cases that does not 
involve the company committing a fault; such as the case of non-respecting the substantial 
content of its program of activity1107. The withdrawal as a sanction does not exist under the 
Jordanian securities rules. Alternatively, the JSC suspends or annuls the license as a disciplinary 
measure1108. The other form of non-financial sanctions that securities commission may seek is 
delisting MC from the registry of MCs1109. Delisting consists of the decision to liquidate the 
MC. The AMF should not decide to withdraw the authorization as disciplinary measure while 
reasoning its defense on the core content of the ex officio cases1110.  
371 Internal supervision. MC itself over its own proper actions exercises internal 
supervision. This supervision takes several forms including compliance function, controlling 
conflicts of interest and disclosure.  
372 Compliance function. MC as other investment services providers lays down and 
maintains operational an efficient compliance function that is exercised in an independent 
manner1111. The compliance function should consist of specific missions. Such as control on a 
regular basis and evaluate the efficiency and adequacy of laid down policies and procedures in 
order to ensure effective measure of risk detection for non-compliance with professional 
obligations. Further to, advice and assist concerned persons1112 in charge of the investment 
                                                          
1105 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-10 
1106 CE, 25 Juin 2012, n° 35-0712 
1107 CE, 17 Nov. 2004, n° 25-7402  
1108 Article 21.d JSL of 2017 
1109 C. mon. fin., art. L. 532-12 
1110 CE, 20 Dec. 2000, n° 22-1215 
1111 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-2 ; Article 7 Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1112 The concerned person includes members of management of the MC, members of management of the agents 
of the MC, employees of the MC or its agents, the individual put in place under the supervision of the MC or its 
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services in complying with their professional obligations1113. The appropriate and independent 
exercise of compliance function imposes different conditions on the part of the MC. These 
conditions include; the function consists of necessary expertise, resources and authority, in 
addition to the access to all the pertaining information1114. Designating a compliance officer, 
titled and attributed a professional card to act as the responsible for the compliance and internal 
control1115.  The persons involved in compliance function should not be involved in the 
activities they control. The determination of the remuneration of the members of the compliance 
team should not compromise or be a suspect of compromising their objectivity. The MC 
establishes and maintains operational a periodic control function it is distinct from the 
compliance function and from internal control mechanisms. This function envisages laying 
down a program to evaluate and examine the adequacy and efficiency of systems and internal 
control mechanisms of MC1116.  
373 Conflicts of interest. MC as other investment services providers undertakes all 
reasonable measures to detect situations involving conflicts of interest with their provided 
services. Whether the situation arises within the company, its concerned persons or any person 
directly or indirectly linked to the company by a relation of control of one side and the clients of 
the company on the other hand; or it arises between two clients1117.  MC is not obliged to 
eliminate situations involving conflicts of interest. It is required to establish and maintain 
operational an efficient policy to manage conflicts of interest. This policy takes into 
consideration the size, the organization, the nature, the importance and the complexity of 
company’s activity1118. The Jordanian MC does not as a general rule lay down a conflicts of 
interest policy. Nonetheless, if it chooses so, it is allowed to voluntary establish such a policy. 
The company is merely obliged to declare and communicate the existing direct and indirect 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
agents that participate in providing investment services and the externalized individual that provides investment 
services 
1113 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-2 (I) 
1114 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-3 
1115 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-4; Article 68 Licensing Regulation of 2005; the newly implemented licensing bylaw of 
2018 does not address the duties and requirements of the compliance officer 
1116 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-62 
1117 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-18 
1118 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-20 
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interests it might have with the transactions its performing or the financial instruments with 
which it is trading.  
374 Disclosure. Disclosure is a form of internal control that entails the communication of 
financial statements and information to both clients and competent securities commission1119. In 
addition to, keeping record of all the transactions, they performed for their own account and that 
of their managed portfolio1120. In order to be able to perform this communication the MC should 
put in place and maintain operational accounting policies and procedures1121. These policies 
allow the company to communicate in a timely fashion financial information that offers 
confident and sincere image of company’s financial standing. Further, these policies and 
procedures should be laid down in a manner insuring the protection of IC’s shareholders1122.  
MC communicates its annual financial reports to the securities commission1123. The auditors of 
the company should certify the communication beforehand.  
375 Better internal control. It was mentioned earlier that the effective management of the 
MC is oriented in the path of having minimum two directors. This condition is the application of 
the rule of “quatre - yeux”1124. This rule constitutes that not both directors of the MC should be 
of senior management. One of the directors should be mandated to represent the company with 
third party and the other can be the chairman, or an individual specifically mandated the 
management or determining the orientation of the company1125.  
376 Role of IC. The governing legal rules do not address the role of the IC in the supervision 
of the performance of the MC. No explicit statement of the control the IC may exercise over the 
MC. This silence is debatable in terms of its interpretation. Why should the IC have control over 
the MC? Why should not it? The MC remains liable for its misconducts and negligence in 
performing its management activities. The liability stands once a violation of the mandate 
                                                          
1119 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-61; Article 80 Licensing Regulation of 2005; no such form of disclosure is addressed in 
the newly implemented licensing bylaw of 2018 
1120 C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-8; AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-48; Articles 30 & 56 Licensing Regulation of 2005; no such 
obligation is addressed under the newly implemented licensing bylaw of 2018 
1121 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-57 
1122 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-59-1 
1123 AMF, régl. gén., art. 313-59 
1124 AMF, dec., n° 2004-5, Application de la Règle des « quatre yeux » dans les Sociétés de Gestion de Portefeuille 
1125 I. Riassetto n (1087) Page 103 
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occurs. The liability replaces to some extent the need to provide explicit supervisory role and 
power for the IC. Nonetheless, the need for this role is not limited to the case of default. The 
supervisory role is ongoing and can be exercised at all times such as that attributed to the AMF. 
The supervisory role provides shareholders with a higher level of protection in terms of, the 
influence MC’s activities have on their interest and the value of the IC. Nonetheless, the liability 
of IC remains in place before its shareholders for the behaviors of MC, as no transfer in this 
case is possible. 
377 Part I Conclusion. The creation of the legal personality of IC takes place once the initial 
registration is over and the securities commission grants the prior registration approval. The IC 
chooses its management organization and structure and ahead of commencing the exercise of its 
activities, it takes on the second phase in the registration process. This phase relates to financial 
services it provides. IC is obliged to fulfill a list of financial requirements securities rules 
impose in this regard. The requirements include among other things being subject to the 
supervision of the competent securities authorities. IC follows a financial registration procedure 
embodied in a financial license or authorization issued by a domestic securities authority. The 
procedure is administrative therefore, it consists of several phases including filing an application 
and issuing an administrative decision. This prior approval of licensing permits the applicant 
company to exercise its business activities freely. To guarantee the coordination and to 
safeguard the later arising rights and interests, the competent authority, as an output to assessing 
the licensing or authorization application, chooses whether to approve or refuse to grant the 
authorization or license. The legal consequence of the decision the authority reaches differs in 
these cases. The protective measures require the existence of recourse to the negative decisions, 
mainly to hinder bureaucracy and prejudices.  
378 The access to financial markets by ICs is mainly performed through issuing or listing of 
financial instruments or securities, Companies are required to register at markets in which,  they 
intend to issue their securities or financial instruments. The IC enjoys the character of an issuer 
merely in incorporation stages, in order to raise capital. In later stages, it does not follow the set 
procedures for capital increase or decrease, due to its variable capital. The issuer character is 
suspended upon the request of the IC. Further, the trade in its own securities may be suspended 
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upon its request. Its main objective and principle activity is portfolio selection, meaning, 
pooling assets and collective investment in securities. Therefore, the IC provides financial 
services. The exercise of these activities requires continuous diligence and care prior and post- 
performance. Both shareholders and the concerned market request the necessity of this diligence 
and transparency. Therefore, the two main goals that the diligence should ensure are 
safeguarding shareholders interest and market integrity. In achieving these goals, IC appoints 
professional management and counts upon them for the best performance in the interest of 
shareholders and in a manner guaranteeing market transparency and efficient operation.  
379 Overall performance of ICs is regulated and monitored. ICs are subject to continuous 
supervision throughout their exercise. This supervision begins with the incorporation and 
continues all along the life of the company. Supervision safeguards shareholders’ interests and 
provides the market with confidence grounds that incentivize investors to access it. Supervision 
has multiple participants, different stakeholders, the company and competent authorities play a 
role in the supervision. The following Part II addresses thoroughly the different forms of this 





Part II: Controlling the Performance of Investment Companies: 
Continuous or One Time Shareholder Protective Supervisory Obligation 
380 Company’s place of interest. The company, a moral person, is not isolated. As other 
elements of the social structure, it interacts with similar natural and moral persons. As 
participants in the national and global economy the importance, it represents for its partners and 
the state justifies the interest in its well-functioning. In theory, a well-functioning company 
results in fulfilling objectives, minimizing global risk exposure and achieving social interest. 
Therefore, having a satisfied shareholder. Well-functioning of the company requires different 
levels of performance oversight that of the company and its members of management. 
Alongside the company is the mass of stakeholders that benefit and are influenced directly or 
indirectly from the social interest of the company. To safeguard their proper interest a part of 
these stakeholders enjoys oversight power that they exercise throughout the life of the company 
including the decision-making process. An example of this sample is shareholders. Meaning, 
there is a social control exercised over the company. Based on the collective interest as its main 
reference and motivated by the individual interest of the concerned stakeholder. A new project 
of law aiming at modifying article 1833 of the French civil code is put in place. The aim of this 
project is to modify the long-standing concept of companies acting in the common interest of its 
shareholders to introduce explicitly part of third party stakeholders into the equation1126. Third 
party include those holding labor characters, collaborators, creditors, clients and others.  
381 Social interest. The social interest then consists of a collective interest rather than the 
individual interest of shareholders. This interest resides in the prosperity of the company. it 
answers questions relating to the collectivity despite the individual incentives of the 
participants, the prosperity in this sense is seem as a long-term investment incentive rather than 
a short-term one. The interest further englobes extra-statutory participants therefore relating the 
company to the concept of institution rather than having a mere contractual base. The social 
interest in this regard forms a crucial component of the performance of the company where it is 
achieved through adequate and efficient performance. Therefore, the interest is connected to the 
                                                          
1126 AN“A, Co t at de “o i t  et I t t “o ial : Pla  d A tio  pou  la C oissa e et la T a sfo atio  des 
E t ep ises P opositio s de loi E t ep ise ou elle et ou elle gou e a es  Note, ° -054 [2017]) 
 
204 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
notion of corporate governance. The company adopts internal policies and control measures that 
confirm with this interest and seeks its achievement, this policy includes laying down 
organizational and conduct norms that eventually enhance the governance of the company1127.  
382 Objective of supervision. The main objective of supervision is ensuring adequate 
implementation of the applicable rules to the financial sector. The impact of this objective is 
exemplified in preserving financial stability and thereby ensuring confidence in the financial 
system as a whole and sufficient protection for the recipients of financial services. This is 
justified in the crucial impact the legal environment in which a company does business have on 
its decisions and performance.  The impact entails the regulatory framework proposed 
nationally by every country addressing legal and illegal actions. Further to the adherence to 
applicable rules and the efficiency of law enforcement. Therefore, addressing company 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms whether public or private. The functions of 
supervisors entail detecting problems at early level and prevent crises from occurring. Failures 
occur from time to time. The response to a crisis that breaks is to have effective and efficient 
management that limits the damages to the least possible, a public enforcement mechanism that 
restores market integrity and clearly defined regulatory framework allocating liabilities and 
imposing obligations.  
383 Forms of supervision. CIU are expected to act in an honest, loyal and professional 
manner that serves the best interest of investors1128 while guaranteeing market integrity1129. 
Shareholders of IC and future investors in CIU look forward to accessing the financial market 
while holding a financial objective. The investment decision is subject to uncertainties. The 
choice of the IC and other forms of CIU is a method through which, the negative effect of these 
uncertainties may be minimized to the lowest possible and, it ensures the compatibility with 
shareholders’ original financial objective. Achieving the financial objective includes acting in 
the best interest of shareholders of IC. Therefore, it puts company’s performance in question 
and subjecting it to different forms of supervision. Due to the multiplicity of the participants in 
the investment decision, the supervision takes an external and internal form. The investment 
                                                          
1127 Didie  Po a hia et Didie  Ma ti , ‘ega d su  l I t t “o ial    ‘e ue des “o i t s  
1128 C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-11; Article 65.c Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1129 C. mon. fin., art. L. 533-1 
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decision involves the company, its shareholders, the decision-maker (members of management), 
the concerned financial market and the competent authority. Every one of them has a role in the 
oversight of company’s performance. An oversight that is continuous, adaptive and consistent 
with market requirements and investor protection plan.  
384 Plan. This part addresses the previously mentioned forms of supervision internal and 
external. The external supervision in the form of an outsider independent and authoritative 
supervisor that ensures the proper functioning of the market and its participants. This supervisor 
takes the form of a competent authority responsible for public enforcement of securities rules 
and safeguards investors’ protection (title 1). An internal supervision exercised at company 
level, whether directly by the company and its shareholders or indirectly through adhering with 
the applicable rules (title 2). 
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Title One: External Administrative Supervision 
385 State power. The IC once it obtains its authorization or license and commences the 
exercise of its portfolio investment activities is not free of the external governmental control. 
The control remains in place throughout its life. The control and supervision addressed in the 
securities regulation require the existence of an authority that assures the compliance with the 
rules and carries out the duties and enforcement provided in them. This authority should be 
empowered to undertake preventive measures and adopt penalties regarding its subject 
undertakings in order to guarantee a well-functioning securities market and safeguard investors’ 
interests1130. These measures and penalties should not prejudice the regulatory and discretionary 
powers accorded in the incorporation stage of the IC. The measures, penalties and decisions 
undertook and adopted by the authority form the key component of the powers and authoritative 
nature the authority in question enjoys in IC’s sphere. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: who is the responsible authority for the control and supervision? This authority is a 
public body assigned or created within the IC’s country of incorporation or its host country to 
operate a stable and protective securities market. Therefore, this authority means the existence 
of a strong governmental oversight.  
386 Oversight framework. The governmental securities market oversight as other 
components of the national administrative body has a set framework differing from one country 
to the other depending on the size of market and the level of participation. This title provides a 
concrete understanding to the authority responsible for the control and supervision. It sheds the 
light on the identification of this authority. Is it a direct individual or cooperative performance 
or a delegated one? Chapter 1 provides an identification to the institutional governance, in terms 
of the national organization and the designated authority. As for chapter 2, it provides a concrete 
analysis to the performance and operation mechanism of the governmental oversight, in the 
sense that safeguards shareholders’ interests and guarantees financial stability.  
  
                                                          
1130 Recital 23 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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Chapter 1: Identifying Institutional Framework of the Authority 
387 Structure of financial supervision. How the institutions for financial services 
supervision are set up and structured is important, because this can crucially affect the quality of 
financial services supervision, financial stability and financial development. The question rising 
in this regard is the following: Do similar countries choose similar supervisory structures for 
financial services? Studying in depth the institutional organization of the external administrative 
supervision opens the door for a profound understanding of the most efficient form of authority 
the IC requires and should have. Therefore addressing the most successful framework of a 
governmental institution. In modern economy a set of doctrinal frameworks are available for 
countries to choose from when seeking a regulatory reform or a better market stability and 
investor protection especially in the periods following financial crisis and in an attempt to 
contain the negative outcomes it generates.  The framework includes different approaches 
employed globally to enhance the supervisory structure. These approaches consist of an 
institutional, functional, twin peaks and integrated ones (further discussed in section b). The 
supervisory structure differs in its composition and role on international, regional and national 
levels.  
388 Importance of oversight. Financial markets and undertakings evolve so do the regulatory 
systems that oversee them. Generally, regulatory structures and architecture of national 
supervision arise proceeding national debates, events and economic crises1131. This chapter 
questions whether the existing financial supervisory model is compatible with the IC and 
securities market needs or there is a need to perform changes and adopt newer and more 
adequate approaches that achieve financial stability and investor protection. The chapter 
introduces and analyzes the globally available supervisory structure, further provides an 
assessment to the applicability of the classical and modern organization theories (used generally 
in management organization of commercial groups) over the institutional architecture of the 
external financial supervision (section A). The chapter further illustrates oversight bodies. 
                                                          
1131 G oup Thi t , The “t u tu e of Fi a ial “upe isio : App oa hes a d Challe ges i  a Glo al Ma ketpla e  
(2008) < http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_StructureFinancialSupervision2008.pdf > Accessed 
9 October 2017 
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Those that enjoy regulatory (impose rules) and supervisory (oversight of undertaking through 
the application of rules) authorities and powers.  
Section A: Concepts of Institutional Organization 
389 Organization theory. Most of what is available on the organization theory has its origins 
in ancient and medieval times. Aristotle is the first to write on the importance of culture for 
management systems, Ibn Taymiyyah used scientific methods to outline the principles of 
administration within the sphere of Islam and Machiavelli gave the world the definitive analysis 
of the use of power1132.  Organization viewed as a vehicle through which objectives and goals 
are accomplished. This traditional approach tends to obscure the internal purposes of 
organization itself; therefore, a different view of the organization introduced it as that 
mechanism having ultimate purpose of offsetting the forces that undermine human 
collaboration1133. In this view, organization minimizes conflicts. Organization seen as a 
universal phenomenon of systems of coordinated actions among individuals who differ in their 
knowledge, preference and interest1134. The emphasis in the definition of organization differs 
depending on the used perspective. From a rational perspective organization is a tool designed 
to meet pre-defined goals, the natural perspective sees it as a group, as for the open perspective 
it concentrates on the organization as a self-regulation system that is open to exchanges with its 
external environment1135.  
390 Organization and financial markets supervision. Organization exists when people 
interact to implement essentials and reach a certain goal. A financial market that is smoothly 
functioning requires a system of relationships among functions achieving stability, continuity 
and predictability in its internal activities and external contacts. The market needs harmonious 
relationships between the different participants and processes creating it. Meaning an 
organization of the external oversight that is free from destructive tendencies caused by 
                                                          
1132 Jay M. Shafritz and others, Classics of Organization Theory (8th edn, Cengage Learning 2015) page 32 
1133 Willia  G. “ ott, O ga izatio  Theo : A  o e ie  a d a  App aisal     Jou al of the Academy of 
Management 7 < www.jstor.org/stable/254584 > accessed 02 September 2017 
1134 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Prentice Hall 1979) page 18 
1135 Ozgu  O da , Classi al to Mode  O ga izatio  Theo     I te atio al Jou al of Busi ess a d 
Management Review 15 < http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Classical-to-Modern-Organization-
Theory1.pdf> Accessed 21 September 2017 
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divergent interests. The organization of the supervisory authorities requires an overlook on the 
existing theories and their application in practice. Theories come from practice to serve practice. 
The following sub-sections illustrate the existing organization concepts classical (sub-section 1) 
and contemporary ones (sub-section 2) with an overview of their applicability over the IC and 
securities market.  
Sub-section 1: Classical Concept 
391 Classical theory. The classical doctrine deals with the anatomy of formal organization. In 
a socio-economic sphere, the classical theory is built on four key pillars1136. They include as a 
cornerstone factor the division of labor known as the departmentalization. Further the scalar and 
functional processes1137, the structure1138 and the span of control (scope of power). In another 
view of the classical theory of organization introduced by Max Weber, power is principally 
exemplified within organizations by the process of control. The notion of the organization 
attains through administrative bureaucracy as its most efficient form. Meaning the exercise of 
control based on knowledge. The classical theory as introduced by the doctrine was criticized 
and the scholars introduced a neo-classical theory to put an end to the critics of the former 
theory.  
392 Neo-classical theory. The neo-classical theory maintained the four main pillars of the 
organization theory yet it introduced into the equation the behavioral science1139. This theory 
states that the pillars are subject to modifications by people acting independently or as part of an 
informal organization1140. The informal organization is seen as a natural grouping of people in a 
given situation. This grouping is influenced by different factors including location, occupation, 
interests and special issues.  
                                                          
1136 Edward Franz Leopold Brech, Organization: The Framework of Management (Longman 1957) page 11 
1137 Deals with vertical and horizontal growth of the organization respectively. From a pure classical management 
doctrine, this pillar addresses top management and hierarchy. The scalar is the vertical growth meaning the 
delegation of authority and responsibilities in addition to the obligation to report. As for the functional it deals 
with horizontal evolution meaning the division of the organization into specialized parts 
1138 The logical relationships of the different functions and their role in achieving the goals of the organization 
efficiently. It implies system and pattern 
1139 “ee: ‘o e t V. P esthus, To a ds a Theo  of O ga izatio al Beha io     Ad i ist ati e “ ie e 
Quarterly 48 
1140 W.G. Scott n (1133) page 10 
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393 Classification of organization. Organization generally consists of a structure with 
specific classification that differs depending on the used criterion. When referring to the 
criterion used by Weber that is the nature of the legitimacy the organization is then classified 
into three different forms of authorities. Charismatic, traditional and rational legal authority1141. 
The following paragraphs address the different axes of this classification (paragraph 1) in 
addition to the applicability within the scope of the IC and financial market (paragraph 2).  
§1: Axes of Classical Classification 
394 Rational legal authority. Rational legal authority consists of a structure with generalized 
rules. Logically consistent and claims to cover all possible cases of conduct falling within its 
jurisdiction1142. The constituting rules are universalistic and impartial. Therefore, they apply to 
any person meeting the logically formulated criteria. They are impersonal; in the sense that the 
statuses and qualities of the persons falling under its jurisdiction treated as a function of the 
application of the general rules. As for those not falling within the scope, considered as 
irrelevant. The fundamental source of control in this type is the impersonal order itself. The 
scope of this control extends to persons who occupy a specially legitimized status under the 
rules. Outside this sphere treated as private persons with no more authority than anybody else. 
According to Weber’s theory the list of criteria constituting this form of authority include 
having a code claiming obedience from the members of the organization. Law in this form of 
authority is a system of abstract rules applied to particular cases where the administration looks 
after its interest within the limits of the law. The person exercising the authority obeys the 
impersonal order. The person should be a member in order to obey the law. Obedience is due to 
the impersonal order or granting the person the authoritative position and not to the person 
holding the position or the authority. This authority attained through its most efficient form of 
organization that is “bureaucracy”.  
                                                          
1141 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Translated by A.M Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons, Free Press 1947) 
1142 Ibid page 68 
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395 Characteristics of bureaucracy. Within the scope of the legitimacy of power, Max 
Weber provides a list of characteristics for the bureaucracy1143. They include a continuous 
organization of official functions bound by rules. The rules are stable and comprehensive. 
Further to, specialization; each office has a defined scope of competence where the tasks are 
divided between the offices in a form of distinct separate functions. A clearly defined hierarchy 
of offices. In addition to impersonality in the sense of being able to attend the duties in a fair 
and objective manner, officials appointed on a professional qualification basis, separation of 
private and public affairs that eventually avoids conflicts of interest and strict and systematic 
discipline and control of the officials.  
396 Traditional authority. The system of order constituting this authority is based on a 
complex criteria that treats this authority as having always existed and been binding1144. 
Therefore, in this type of authority there is no place for new legislation. It is essentially a respect 
of custom. For example, innovation is justified under this criterion by the fiction of once 
existing and in force but fell to disuse and now; it is brought back to its rightful position. The 
traditional authority involves different statuses of persons who exercise the authority1145. The 
status constituting the authority is defined through three things. Firstly, having concrete 
traditional prescription of the traditional binding order. Secondly, the authority of other persons 
over the status in a hierarchal sphere. Thirdly, a sphere of arbitrary free grace open to 
incumbent, free to make decisions based on considerations of utility of substantive ethical 
justice. Therefore, the persons exercising the authority are not restricted to specific powers. 
They are in position to claim the performance of unspecified obligations and services as their 
legitimate right. In this form of authority, there is no separation of private affairs and scope of 
the authority.  
397 Charismatic authority. It is an authority based on the outstanding characteristic of the 
individual. It differs than the other two forms of authority in terms of being considered as a 
revolution. The authority is claimed in conflict with the basis of legitimacy of an established 
                                                          
1143 Classical Organization Theory < http://www.hrmguide.co.uk/history/classical_organization_theory.htm > 
Accessed 10 September 2017 
1144 M. Weber n (1141) page 59 
1145 Da a Willia s, Ma  We e : T aditio al, Legal-‘atio al a d Cha is ati  Autho it  < 
http://danawilliams2.tripod.com/authority.html > Accessed 06 November 2017 
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fully institutionalized order1146. This authority is distinguished through the introduction of a 
pattern of conduct treated as a definite duty once confirming with it. The authoritative person 
claims moral authority and legitimacy to give orders to whoever falls within the scope of the 
pattern1147. This authority requires an individual leader that has a charismatic quality proven and 
recognized as genuine by the followers. The authority is represented by the duty or obligation of 
the followers rather than their will.  
398 Connection to classical and neoclassical theories. The three forms of authorities 
introduced by Weber despite their preceding existence to the neoclassical theory may fall within 
its main elements. The rational legal authority and the traditional authority consist of the four 
main pillars of organization proposed by the classical theory. The departmentalization exists 
under the rational legal authority within its universalistic rules that prescribe the different 
specializations as for the traditional authority the division is considered as preexisting and 
binding. The vertical and horizontal growth of the organization alongside the structure exist 
under both authorities within the scope of the codes stating the hierarchal structure of the 
organization whether explicitly or implicitly. In addition to the span of control as the rational 
legal authority has a restricted scope of power over the subjects meeting its set criteria. The 
traditional authority has an open grace form of scope that claims the performance of specified 
and unspecified obligations and services. The charismatic authority addresses the behavioral 
science and the possible modifications to the main pillars through the charismatic movements 
introducing new patterns of conduct and depending on a charismatic leader (the person acting 
independently under the neoclassical theory). The following paragraph 2 addresses the 
applicability of these theories and the proposed classification for the IC.  
§2: Application of Classical Theory in Financial Market Sphere 
399 Real scope. The classical theory of organization with its different proposed systems of 
orders is sociologically introduced generally applied in terms of economic organization of 
commercial groups. This theory is further connected to behavioral theories and management 
organization researches. In this paper, we aim to apply the organization theory within the notion 
                                                          
1146 M. Weber n (1141) page 75 
1147 Ma ti  E. “pe e , We e  o  Legiti ate No s a d Autho it     The B itish Jou al of “o iolog  
123 < www.jstor.org/stable/588403 > Accessed 06 November 2017 
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of the institutional structure of financial market activities’ authority. The application of the 
classical theory requires introducing the advantages and disadvantages of each system of order 
to be able to identify the most proper applicable system over financial market activities.  
400 Critical overview of authorities. To some extent, every institution has a level of 
instability and tends to transform from one form to another to match the changes it faces. On an 
at all comparable scale, the free market economy cannot function without the rational legal 
authority1148. It is the predominant form of authority. Nonetheless, the individual use of which is 
criticized and entails both positive and negative consequences similarly does the individual use 
of the other two types. The traditional authority on the other hand presented as more stable than 
the other form of the routine order (rational legal authority). The reasoning behind this 
consideration is found in the cases where the concurrent challenges transforms the rational legal 
authority into a traditional authority directly or indirectly through the influence of the 
charismatic movements. The rational legal authority generally functions through imposing and 
enforcing. Its structure is not exhaustive of the social structure. The individual application of 
this form of authority leaves a space for potential risks of not having an exhaustive scope of 
powers and authority. In terms of the financial market this risk translates into the possibility of 
having an authority that is not competent in all that concerns the market participants and market 
activities therefore leading to minimal investor protection framework. There are strains between 
the scope of this authority and the parts that are predominantly traditionalized. In the sense that 
the predominant authority entails two forms of orders the legislative one and that based on 
customs. The rational legal authority depends on the coexistence of the custom and charismatic 
movement as means to undermine the instability of the prevailing institutional system. The 
charismatic authority as a sole institutional system is unstable and temporary it is rather an 
intermediate with long-term effects depending on the choice of one of the other two types of 
authority. A charismatic leader holding special quality and capable to influence and inspire1149. 
The preferable and more stable system by the sociologists is the traditionalized one as the 
                                                          
1148 M. Weber n (1141) page 76 
1149 Jeffe  D. Houghto , Does Ma  We e s Notio  of Autho it  “till Hold i  the T e t  Fi st Ce tu ?    
(4) Journal of Management History 449 < https://doi.org/10.1108/17511341011073933> Accessed 06 
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strains of the rationalized one strengthens and enforce biased treatment of the parts covered 
within its scope.   
401 Authority of Investment Company. In terms of the IC, charismatic authority cannot 
individually be the prevailing system of order due to the continuous introduction of patterns of 
conduct without having a stable and consistent institutional structure. This form of authority is 
necessary for the IC, yet as a movement to induce innovation and legislative changes that the 
rational legal authority requires in most cases. The latter is very strict in its application. The 
rational legal authority has a relatively strict scope of application that weakens the control of 
financial markets in terms of the statuses that fall outside its scope. They fall outside the scope 
because they do not meet the criteria preset in its constituting rules. Nonetheless, the traditional 
authority cannot solely serve the prerequisites of the financial market and the form of activities 
exercised by the IC. The traditional authority does not hold minimum strictly specified powers. 
Positively interpreted in having an application depending on the assumption that it is competent 
and it is extended to cover all the possible statuses. Negatively in the sense that this loose 
structure means that, the IC does not have a concrete prescription of the competent authority, its 
powers and scope of jurisdiction leading to risks of cost and efficiency. Shareholders of the IC 
within the sphere of this authority do not witness legislative amendments that serve the market 
stability and enforce their protection due to the philosophy of preexistence of the rules and their 
binding character. The question rising in this regard is the following: what does the IC require in 
the supervisory structure? The preferable institutional structure of the supervision and external 
control is having a hybrid permanent structure consisting of the three axes of the organization 
theory. The basis of the structure is a rational legal authority that has universalistic and impartial 
rules specifying the scope of jurisdiction and application. Therefore, covering all the possible 
statuses and addressing the different market participants and levels of financial activities. Open 
to changes to cope with the demands of the stability of the financial market, the investor 
protection framework and reducing uncertainty, while maintaining the hybrid structure and 
without having to transform from one form to the other. The change performed through 
charismatic movements. It introduces new patterns of conduct that serve the subjects of the 
authority and open the door to effect amendments to the existing rules. The authority should 
also be able to claim the performance of unspecified powers within the limits of law in order to 
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avoid the rigidity of the classical administrative system, yet in a manner not presenting the 
institutional system as arbitrary or bias. Both classical and neoclassical theories seen as not 
asking the right question in terms of the organization. Therefore, a modern theory of 
organization introduced treating the organization as a system of different mutual dependent 
variables. This theory is accompanied with contemporary legal notions of organization that 
influence the choice of the proposed hybrid structure of the classical theory (further explained in 
the following sub-section 2).   
Sub-section 2: Modern and Contemporary Concepts 
402 Modern organization theory. The rise of this theory came to address the organization as 
a total system and to distance the analysis from the different pillars by asking a different angle 
of questions. This theory has a conceptual base of analysis. It treats organization as a system 
with different mutually dependent variables1150. This theory studies the relation of structure to 
behavior1151. The distinction of this theory found in the questions it lays down; not previously 
dealt with by classicalists and neoclassicists. The main questions asked within the analysis this 
theory performs include; what are the strategic parts of the system? What is the nature of their 
mutual dependency? What are the main processes in the system those that link the parts together 
and facilitate their adjustment to each other? What are the goals of the system? Consequently, to 
asking these questions the theory puts together the final ingredients of the system. The system 
within its scope consists of four main ingredients: parts, interactions, processes and goals, 
therefore looking at the system in its totality1152. The main parts constituting the system are 
individuals, formal arrangement of functions, informal organization, status and role patterns and 
physical setting. The parts are interdependent. They interact together through processes 
including communication, balance (having harmoniously structured relationships) and decision 
making to achieve the goals of the system. The goals include growth, stability and interaction. 
The closest theory introduced in this scope as being similar to the modern organization theory is 
the general system theory1153. This closeness and similarity is in terms of treating the 
                                                          
1150 Lawrence J. Henderson, Pa eto’s Ge e al So iology: A Physiologist’s I te p etatio  (HUP 1935) page 16 
1151 Mason Haire (ed), Modern Organization Theory (John Wiley and Sons 1959) page 76 
1152 James G. Mason and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (John Wiley and Sons 1958)  
1153 Interdisciplinary study of systems, involving broadly applicable concepts and principles, as opposed to concepts 
and principles applicable to one domain of knowledge 
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organization as an integrated whole1154. The main difference between these two theories is the 
level of system subject matter. The general system theory addresses every level of system. As 
for the modern theory, it focuses on the human organization.  
403 Application over Investment Company. Extending the scope of application of this 
modern management theory to cover the structure of the authority responsible for the external 
control over ICs requires justifying the degree of implementation of its different ingredients 
within the scope of organization of a public authority. The authority consists of different 
interdependent parts that may include the different competent authorities and informal industrial 
organizations that share a common physical setting. The parts interact with each other through 
harmonized set of rules and a level of communication that achieve the main goals of the 
authority. Guaranteeing the stability of the market and safeguarding investors’ interests.  
404 Legal concepts. A mere legal setting that seeks financial security proposes an authority 
established by law to earn its legitimate existence and has a set of rules that presents a 
framework of its span and scope of control. The contemporary legal concepts presents the 
authority outside the scope of the organization theory. The authority is considered regulatory in 
the sense of having specific powers and enforcing nature (further explained in paragraph 1) or 
merely prudential in terms of having a role that is close to the social responsibility (paragraph 
2).  The legal notions presented more like forms for the exercise of the main activity 
“supervision” rather than organization concepts.  
§1: Regulatory Authority 
405 Definition. The regulatory authority is an independent body or system that exercises an 
autonomous authority over an area of activities in a supervisory or regulatory capacity. This 
authority deals with regulatory law and rule making. In the sense that it codifies and enforces 
rules and regulations. Further, it imposes supervision and oversight for the benefit of the large 
public. Its independence stems out of the necessity for expertise in performing certain 
supervisory and regulatory tasks such as the case of the supervision and regulation of the 
financial market activities. Further the need to the rapid implementation of the rules and 
                                                          
1154 W. G. Scott n (1133) page 15 
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regulations. This form of authority enforces standards set usually by sectorial or prudential 
propositions. 
406 Functioning mechanism. It is an authority that exercises a regulatory role. This role 
consists of having powers, functions and missions prescribed by law. Having a strict procedural 
framework that set its decision-making process including being transparent in its 
communications and having reasoned, non-arbitrary and responsive decisions that are open to 
legal review. The regulatory role closely connected to the regulatory intervention and regulatory 
management system. They form part of its global role. The regulatory management system is 
the processes through which regulation develop, is enforced and adjudicated1155.  The system 
supports the objectives of the regulation or that of the reform in terms of economic 
performance, effectivity and efficiency. Further, enhance democratic values in the sense of 
having a participative and responsive government. The system consists of three basic mutually 
reinforcing components: high-level regulatory policy, measurable and explicit standards for 
regulatory qualities and regulatory management capacity1156.  
407 Financial regulatory authorities. Financial regulatory authorities exercise their activities 
of monitoring and regulating in two main financial fields banks and financial markets. Our main 
concern is financial markets (the trading venue for ICs). They are structured to insure the 
smooth functioning of the market, investigate, gather information and have a non-profit goal. A 
financial regulatory authority exists in every country. These authorities cooperate regionally and 
internationally. The cooperation on an international level is found in the representation of the 
different national market authorities in the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)1157. On a regional level, the European authorities such as the formerly 
existing authority of CESR1158 replaced by the ESMA since 2011. On a national level, the 
French financial regulatory authority is represented in the Banque de France and the AMF. As 
                                                          
1155 Pete  Ladegaa d, Good Go e a e a d ‘egulato  Ma age e t  ‘egulato  Ma age e t a d ‘efo  
Seminar, Moscow, Nov. 2001) < https://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/2724495.pdf > Accessed 27 
September 2017 
1156 According to the suggestions made by OECD member countries 
1157 Sets global standards for securities market regulations (See official website < http://www.iosco.org/ > for 
further information) 
1158 Representation of EU MS market authorities. Coordinates the communication between different local 
authorities and advices on regulatory framework on a European level 
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for the Jordanian financial regulatory authority, it consists of the Jordanian Central Bank, the 
Insurance Commission and the JSC.  
408 AMF. The AMF is an independent public entity1159. Created through the merger of the 
predecessor financial authorities the French stock market regulator (COB) and Financial 
Markets Council (CMF). COB and CMF represented respectively administrative and 
professional authorities. The control of the market during their coexistence created difficulties 
and challenges. Envisaged in the existence of multi applicable rules from different sources 
without respecting the hierarchy of norms1160. Therefore, the outputs were contradictory in 
terms of the same financial transaction. Investor protection was the engine that urged the 
continuous request of the financial reform in order to safeguard the invested savings, develop 
the investments and restore investors’ confidence in the financial market1161. The creation of the 
AMF was for the sake of streamlining. The AMF has as a main mission maintaining orderly 
financial markets. In the process of accomplishing its mission, the AMF approves the rules 
applicable to financial markets and market infrastructures1162. Supervises corporate finance of 
the listed companies and authorizes financial services1163. Ensures the regulatory compliance 
and disclosure of market participants1164. Undertakes disciplinary and sanctioning decisions1165. 
Investigates and inspects1166. It plays an essential part in the structure of financial regulators1167. 
All of which to fulfill its regulatory independent character. The AMF scope of supervision and 
control cover collective investment products including IC. The body that issues the 
authorization to the IC permitting it to exercise its portfolio investment activities.  
409 JSC. JSC was established in 1997 as a regulatory independent authority in the process of 
separating supervisory and executive roles within the scope of securities markets1168. Up to the 
                                                          
1159 Loi n° 2017-55 du 20 janvier 2017 conferred this character on the AMF 
1160 Jean-Paul Valette, Droit de la Régulation des Marchés Financiers (Gualino Editeur 2005) 
1161 Ibid page 81 
1162 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-1 
1163 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-8, C. mon. Fin., art. L. 621-8-1 
1164 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-9 
1165 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-12 
1166 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-11 
1167 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-6 
1168 Information available on JSC official website < 
http://jsc.gov.jo/Public/Arabic.aspx?site_id=2&Lang=1&Page_Id=2004&Menu_ID=14&Menu_ID2=12 > 
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latter date the Amman securities market faced several challenges in terms of supervision and 
control over the rise of the number of market participants. The implementation of the securities 
law in 1997 envisaged a new era of financial regulation. The main missions of the JSC are 
envisaged in the regulatory and supervisory roles it holds. The JSC ensures investors’ protection 
and development of the national securities market1169. The JSC enjoys disciplinary and 
sanctioning powers directly related to its supervisory role1170. It exercises the role of the 
financial regulator by laying down the different applicable rules to financial transactions1171. In 
the process of de-jurisdiction of financial related decisions on an administrative level the JSC 
presents a level of jurisdiction a priori to administrative courts1172. The JSC has a scope of 
jurisdiction that covers all Plc. Including IC. The following paragraph 2 addresses the other 
form of authorities introduced by legal doctrine. 
§2: Prudential Authority 
410 Rise of prudential supervision. In a financial market framework exists a financial 
regulatory policy and rules applicable to the different market participants. Following the 
financial crisis, a connection was made between this policy and the supervision. This connection 
resulted out of various studies, such as those conducted on an EU level to reach a resolution for 
the crisis and prevent from recurrent actions. One of the main reports that addressed this 
connection is the Larosière report addressing the financial market stability. It proposed this 
connection and considered policy and supervision as interdependent in the sense of having a 
competent and well-designed supervision influences the efficiency of the regulatory policies1173. 
The report addresses this supervision and specifically the prudential one. Supervision is the 
cornerstone activity of the authority. The authority in this concept exercises its main activity of 
supervision nevertheless this supervision may be complemented with a regulatory nature such 
as the authority mentioned in the former paragraph or it may hold a basic supervisory role 
without any disciplinary or sanctioning powers such as the case of prudential supervision. The 
                                                          
1169 Article 8 JSL of 2017 
1170 Article12 JSL of 2017 
1171 Article 12.s JSL of 2017 
1172 Article 12.f JSL of 2017 
1173 De La osi e G oup, The High-Le el G oup of Fi a ial “upe isio  i  the EU  Chai ed  Ja ues La osi e, 
Brussels 2009) < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf > Accessed 10 
September 2017 
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latter is a form of supervision that permits the authority to oversee the financial market and its 
participants without having a say on their behaviors.  
411 Forms of prudential supervision. Within this prudential authority exists two forms of 
prudential supervision1174. One, an authority exercising a micro-prudential supervision and the 
other macro-prudential supervision. These two forms of supervision exercised by different 
authorities that form what is known as a System of Financial Supervision (SFS) introduced 
exclusively on an EU level1175. This approach of the EU brings us closer to the modern 
organization theory. As the SFS is a multi-layered system of prudential authorities of both forms 
micro and macro1176, (meaning a system of mutual interdependent variables as the modern 
theory proposes). This European approach introduces a system on a European level that 
eventually affects and includes a national subordination and intervention1177.  
412 Micro-prudential authority. The main objective of micro prudential authority is to 
supervise and limit the distress of individual financial institutions (micro level). Therefore, 
providing a protection for the investors in these institutions. This authority views the financial 
system as exposed to common risks. It aims to mitigate and prevent the risk of contagion and 
subsequent negative externalities especially in terms of investors’ confidence in the system. On 
an EU level, multi layered authorities exercise the micro-prudential supervision. The various 
authorities can be separated depending on two criterion; sectoral area (banking, insurance and 
securities markets) or level of supervision and regulation (EU or national). The role of the 
national authority is particularly seen in this form of supervision rather than the macro one. The 
national authorities conduct the day-to-day supervision over the financial market and its 
different participants. The perfect example for an EU agency that exercises the supervision on a 
                                                          
1174 E. Wymeersch n (479) page 243 
1175 The ESFS is composed as follows: ESRB, ESMA, ESA (EBA and EIOPA), joint committee of ESA and competent or 
supervisory authority in the MS (Article 2 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L 
331/84) 
1176 Do is Kolassa, Eu opea  “ ste  of Fi a ial “upe isio  E“F“  Eu opea  Fa t sheet /  < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.2.5.html > Accessed 10 
September 2017 
1177 Co pete t atio al supe iso  autho ities fo  pa t of i o p ude tial supe isio  this i ludes F a e s 
competent authorities 
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micro level is the ESMA1178. An independent European authority enjoys a legal personality1179 
and acts in the interest of the Union as whole. The ESMA is a sectoral agency specialized in 
securities markets covering all market participants including UCITS1180. An example of a 
national authority that exercises the micro-prudential supervision is the ACPR1181.   
413 Macro-prudential authority. The main objective of macro prudential authority is limiting 
the distress of the entirety of the financial system. The aim is to ensure financial stability1182. It 
is concerned in protecting the overall economy from significant loses in real output. Financial 
stability is a real condition for the real economy to provide jobs, credits and growth. The 
authority pays attention to other forms of risks that affect the entire system. They are common 
and correlated shocks. In addition to the shocks, that affect parts of the financial system and 
triggers contagious knock-on or feedback effects. When this form of supervision was suggested, 
the aim was to ensure financial stability on a global European level. The main European body 
responsible for this form of supervision is the ESRB1183. On a national level, the perfect 
example is the role of the central banks in the national financial system oversight and the Higher 
Council of Financial Stability in France1184.  
414 Connection micro and macro. Both forms of prudential supervision play a major role in 
ensuring financial stability. They intertwine and to some extent complement each other. Having 
a meaningful macro-prudential supervision impacts the supervision on a micro level and vice 
versa micro supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately 
taking into account the developments on a macro-level. Having arrangements in place that 
properly acknowledge the interdependence of micro- and macro-prudential risks permits all 
                                                          
1178 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1179 Article 5 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1180 Article 1 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1181 C. mon. fin., art. L. 612-1; Loi n° 2017-55; not considered as a moral person (CE, 9 déc. 1999, n° 363834), 
established consequently to the merger of several authorities (ACAM, CEA, CB and CECEI). It is competent in the 
sectors of banking and insurance (C. mon. fin., art. L. 612-2). Its main mission is preserving the stability of the 
financial system (C. mon. fin., art. L. 612-1) 
1182 Recital 6 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk 
Board [2010] OJ L 331/1 
1183 Main objectives and missions include the contribution to prevention or mitigation of systematic risks that 
impact financial stability of the union (Article 3 Reg. 1092/2010) 
1184 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-2-1 
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stakeholders to have sufficient confidence to engage in financial activities1185. Tensions also rise 
between micro and macro-prudential supervisions. To exploit fully the complementarities 
between the domains of both policies, minimize frictions and ensure an efficient use of the 
different policy instruments; it is essential to have a constructive cooperation and adequate flow 
of information between both supervisions1186.  The basis for cooperation between the two 
supervisions served through having sound and shared diagnosis of the determining factors of the 
crisis. Further cooperation ensured through a mix composition of the authorities exercising each 
of the two forms of supervision. In the sense of having members representing one authority 
within the board of the other.  
415 Output of prudential supervision. The prudential supervision main tasks include issuing 
recommendations, warnings, guidelines, and monitoring their follow-up by market 
participants1187. On a micro level, the authorities conduct economic analysis, assure compliance 
with legal rules and foster investor protection1188, further to, implanting technical standards1189. 
416 Investment Company authority. From a Jordanian stand, the micro and macro-prudential 
supervision are envisaged in the same authority, as the cases financial authorities deal with are 
dominantly national. The prudential supervision is exercised by the JSC. The JSC is concerned 
with the development and the stability of the securities market in Jordan. It lays down standards 
and policies for its global functioning framework1190. Therefore, the regulatory authority in 
Jordan performs both forms of supervision. This dual role presents the authority as legally 
valuable and bestows over its suggestions and recommendations an implicit legal nature despite 
their prudential consistency. The institutional framework within the scope of the IC consists of a 
regulatory authority or authorities as suggested legally and confirming with the modern theory 
                                                          
1185 Recital 30 Reg. 2010/1092 
1186 F ed i  Boissa  a d Lo e zo Capiello, Mi o Ve sus Ma o- Prudential Supervision: Potential Differences, 
Te sio s a d Co ple e ta ities   ECB Fi a ial “ta ilit  ‘e ie   < 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/shared/pdf/sfcfinancialstabilityreview201405en.pdf??666514071375fbc9111
c22effdacff9f > Accessed 25 September 2017 
1187 Article 3 Reg. 2010/1092 
1188 Article 8 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1189 Article 8 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095; another example of implementing prudential standards are those introduced 
in the Dodd-Franck Act, extending the scope of protection to include the public by imposing disclosure obligation 
to mitigate risks. Therefore protecting potential, current and future investors 
1190 Article 12 JSL of 2017 
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of organization. This framework closely connected to the assigned powers and resources to the 
authorities. Its basis is the legitimacy and independence criterion (further illustrated in the 
following section b).  
Section B: Designating the Authority 
417 Definition of authority. The authority is the power to enforce law, command, determine, 
judge and exact obedience1191. The most obvious entities invested with this form of power 
include governmental bodies and agencies. Based on the former statement the authority may be 
defined as the public agency or corporation enjoying administrative powers in a specified field. 
The authority is then a right or permission coupled with the power to act or order others to act. 
418 Forms of authority. There are different forms for the authority categorized following the 
scope of power it enjoys1192. Apparent authority exemplified in the relationship between a 
principal and an agent in terms of giving actual signs of the authority1193. Express or limited 
authority it is the written set of instructions specifying the exact scope of the authority. Implied 
authority flows indirectly from the position held, further to the general authority the broadest 
form of authority has a global power to act1194.  
419 Authority vs. power. There is a difference between authority and power. Power is defined 
as the ability and capacity to perform an act and generate change in a said legal relationship1195. 
Max Weber introduced an obvious distinction between authority and power. He defines the 
power as the relationship within which one person could impose his will regardless of any 
resistance from the other. As for the authority, considers it as existing when there is a belief in 
the legitimacy of that power or imposed will. They interconnect, as power exists alongside the 
authority. The authority is more or less the setting and the power is the action. In this chapter 
and particularly in this section the talk surrounds an authority performing the external oversight 
over IC. The use of the term authority is accompanied with an adjective. The first sub-section 
                                                          
1191 American Heritage Dictionary, n ( 78) 
1192 Bu to s Di tio a , n (790) 
1193 William J. Stewart, Colli ’s Di tio a y of La  (Collins 2006) 
1194 S. Sheppard 2011, n (651) page 89 
1195 Bu to s Di tio a  n (790) 
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identifies this accompanying adjective and the second suggests a plural form for the term based 
on the existing supervisory framework.  
Sub-section 1: Assigning Proper Term for External Oversight 
420 Concerned authority. Throughout the thesis, the focus was oriented towards the financial 
market authority as the main concerned authority. We did not address the term competent 
authority nor did we discuss the possibility of having several responsible authorities alongside 
the financial market authority. The financial market authority has an essential and inseparable 
role in the life of the IC. Introduced as the main supervisory and regulatory authority in terms of 
the functions, control and measures it is empowered with. It is responsible for the external 
oversight of the IC and its related activities.  The role of the market authority extends to include 
shareholders of the IC in terms of their proper protection. The concerned authority may include 
multiple authorities or be limited to a sole authority. This sub-section aims to define the proper 
term when addressing the external state oversight and public enforcement over capital market 
participants including the IC (paragraph 1). Once the term is defined, the sub-section addresses 
the legitimacy interpreting the authoritative nature of the authority (paragraph 2). 
§1: Description of State Oversight 
421 Different terms. The authority responsible for the external oversight differs in its 
designation from one system to the other. The designation influences the scope of powers of the 
authority, the nature of decisions and the challenging of these decisions. The authority may be 
referred to as an administrative authority, supervisory or competent. The term that fits more IC 
is related to the role the authority exercises in the course of activity of the IC.  
422 Administrative authority. Administrative authority refers to public officials, bodies, 
commissions or institutions concerned with two main public issues even if they are granted both 
or only one of them. Implementation of government policies and enforcement of duly enacted 
laws1196. They are the creation of the administrator.  
                                                          
1196 West s E lopedia n (341)  
 
225 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
423 Supervisory authority. The supervisory authority is that responsible for monitoring the 
work of others, in a manner ensuring the achievement of targets1197. This authority consists of 
supervisors assigned a supervisory power. Assigning such a term to the authority exercising the 
external oversight over IC and securities market may seem uncertain in terms of the scope of 
power of this authority. The authority in this sense is more likely to be understood as having 
mere prudential power rather than actual control and enforcing power.  
424 Competent authority. Competent authority is a term used to address the national 
authority responsible for carrying out the duties mentioned in a specific legislation within the 
scope provided for in that same legislation. This term used in the UCITS Directive to address, 
the authorities designated by the MS to fulfil the duties of the competent authorities stated in the 
directive1198. The competent authorities are public authorities or bodies designated as competent 
in a specific duty through appointing1199. According to EU rules, the UCITS competent 
authority is the one responsible for supervising the UCITS and its compliance with the 
provisions falling inside and outside the scope of the directive1200. The authorities are given 
powers supervisory and investigatory deemed necessary to exercise their functions1201. The 
UCITS competent authority performs directly its powers in a collaborative manner with other 
authorities within the same MS or similar authorities in other MS. This performance is under the 
responsibility of the competent authority if the tasks are delegated to other entities or by 
application to the competent judicial authorities1202.  
425 IC authority. Choosing the term that fits best the IC requires the analysis of the impact of 
every term on the IC’s performance, the form of oversight, the consequences to the violation of 
rules and the response to arbitrary or unsatisfying decisions. The term competent authority is the 
most proper term used to designate the external oversight over IC. This term addresses a public 
body similar to that consisting the administrative and supervisory authorities. The term 
competent authority is more general when designating the authority responsible for the IC. Both 
                                                          
1197 Collins Dictionary of Business 2005, n (5) 
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terms administrative and supervisory may be included within the global term of competence. 
The administration and the supervision are closer to characters, forms of power and description 
rather than a designation of the authority. The sole use of either terms may draw a limitation on 
the scope of activity of the authority and its enforcing power. Being only supervisory may lead 
to considering the authority as prudential rather than regulatory. Being an administrative 
authority limits the possibility of delegation of tasks to third party entities. The competent 
authority is an administrative authority that is responsible for the implementation of public 
policies and enforce the enacted rules and legislation. As well, a supervisory authority exercises 
its supervisory power and role over the IC and other market participants. The decisions of the 
competent authority are contestable such as other administrative decisions (negative or positive) 
through challenging procedures provided by law by way of jurisdictionalization of the 
administration or de-jurisdictionalization. The use of a general term as the competent authority 
opens the door for having multiple competent authorities and not just one exclusive authority. 
The preferred term to designate the authority responsible for the external oversight on a 
continuous basis in terms of the IC is “competent authorities”. Where do these competent 
authorities find their legitimacy? A question addressed in the following paragraph 2. 
§2: Legitimacy of Authority 
426 Legitimate authority. Financial activities and services when performed are influenced by 
an array of legal domains such as company law, securities regulation, contract law, audit and 
accounting standards, labour law and tax law. These domains affect the choice of the competent 
authority. The choice bestows implicitly on the competent authority the legitimate nature and 
competence. Having the competence to exercise its functions and powers while respecting the 
rules of law. This legitimacy or having a legal value results out of the characters consisting the 
authority and the rules establishing such authority. The legal value of the authority is connected 
to the decisions the authority issues. The applicability of these decisions within its limits of 
jurisdiction and while following the set legal proceedings. The legitimacy of the authority 
remains debatable. Does the authority find its legal value in the mere reference to the law? 
Alternatively, in the functions and powers it exercises. The mere reference to the law may not 
be enough, as the competent authorities are not usually mentioned as is in the constitution. It is 
the legislator’s choice to insert them or not. The viewpoint of the functions and powers of the 
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authority suggests that the authority is necessary and indispensable for the state of law1203. The 
legitimacy of the authority is related to specific criteria the independence, the efficiency and the 
regularity.  
427 Independent authority. The doctrine introduced two criterion to identify an independent 
authority organic and material1204. Organic criterion consists of lack of individual legal 
personality, connection to the public treasury and reinforced statutory guarantees. Material 
criterion addresses the exercise of effective powers; regulatory and disciplinary. In the 
legislation rarely, we see a list identifying the existing independent authorities1205. The authority 
in its establishing rules is qualified as independent or not. The independent authority is defined 
as the administrative organism acting in the name of the state and holding a real power not 
subordinate to the authority of the government or that of the beneficiaries1206. The creation of an 
independent authority considered an important specificity and particularity facing the traditional 
organization principles1207. The CE attributed the quality of Independent Administrative 
Authority (IAA) over a number of authorities based on legislative and jurisprudential 
determinants or characteristics conforming with those laid down by the CE. The independent 
authority that exercises its competence within the framework of the market economic is 
attributed powers differing from other IAA. The IAA plays a vital role, an intermediary between 
administration and justice, it is subject to neither, yet it completes the economic framework1208.  
The powers attributed to the IAA include regulation, recommendation, proposition, supervision, 
control, investigation, authorization, arbitration and sanctioning1209. Not all IAA are attributed 
the entirety of these powers the number differs from one authority to the other. The financial 
market authority enjoys the same powers granted to IAA nonetheless it holds a moral 
                                                          
1203 J.P Valette n (1160) page 83 
1204 Ibid 
1205 The newly issued law of 2017 in France is dedicated to the character of independent authorities administrative 
and public ones (Loi n° 2017-55) 
1206 CE, Les Autorités Administratives Indépendantes (Réflexions sur les Autorités Administratives Indépendantes, 
rapport public 2001) 52 EDCE 253 <http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/content/download/368/1132/version/1/file/rapport-public2001.pdf > 
1207 Ibid page 284 
1208 Ja ues Che allie , Auto it s Ad i ist ati es I d pe da tes et la ‘ gulatio  des Ma h s    Justi e et 
Economie 81 
1209 CE Rapport Public 2001 n (1206) page 307 
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personality that other IAA do not have. This personality allows the qualification of the financial 
market authority as an independent public authority rather than mere administrative one.  
428 Importance of regulatory role. As part of the powers attributed to the IAA is the 
regulation. Therefore, this authority enjoys a regulatory role. This role permits the authority to 
complete the control exercised by the judicial authority1210. Judges may be limited in certain 
circumstances (especially in terms of expertise). The permanent and preventive character this 
authority enjoys explains the efficiency of its regulatory role. The efficiency is related to the 
margin of action the authority enjoys and performs especially in terms of repressive issues. In 
the economic sphere, including the financial markets, the repressive function is discussed as an 
indispensable instrument. This function is closely connected to the sanctioning power the 
authority enjoys in certain circumstances. The sanctioning power opens a debate on the level of 
impact the extension of the administrative sanctions has on the role of judges in exercising the 
litigation function. The decision of de-jurisdictionalization of certain conflicts from the control 
of the courts into the jurisdictional control of the administrative authority have practical 
advantages1211, they include rapidity, efficiency, simplicity and prevention. The administrative 
authority imposes a legal system of administrative sanctioning. This system drives the authority 
away from classical concept of administrative authorities and brings it closer to the character of 
judges while avoiding contradictory resolutions and overlapping. A disadvantage for the 
administrative repression is the uncertainties surrounding this form of repression as it does not 
present similar guarantees as typical criminal judges, what is known as justice hors du juge1212.  
429 Other criteria. The efficiency that grants the authority the legitimacy and legal value is 
connected to the incontestable competence and expertise of its members and collaborators. The 
competence introduces a rapid and effective authority in its resolutions and decisions. As for the 
regularity, it comes as a response to the uncertainties of the administrative repression. The 
regularity requests the authority to have minimum guarantees, being impartial, independent 
                                                          
1210 Paul Quili hi i, ‘ gule  est pas Juge , ‘ fle io s su  la Natu e du Pou oi  des “a tio  des Auto it s de 
‘ gulatio  E o o i ue    AJDA  
1211 Ibid 
1212 Pierre Delvolvé in Rapport sur la Colloque de Justice Hors du Juge (1984) 4 Cahier Droit Entreprise p. 18 
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respects the legislative framework and the procedures set within which1213.  As part of the 
regularity is the opportunity the authority has in terms of the consultations, guidelines, decisions 
and recommendation it may provide for professional and other market participants. The 
different criteria of the legitimacy noticeable in terms of the financial market authority. The 
question rising in this regard is the following: are there any other competent authorities within 
the scope of the IC? The following sub-section 2 answers this question.  
Sub-section 2: Multiplicity of Authorities 
430 Multiple or single. The main question this sub-section deals with is the preference in 
using the term competent authority in a singular or plural form. Singular meaning having a 
single competent authority responsible for everything that concerns financial market 
participants. Plural in the sense that the responsibilities connected to the financial market are 
shared between several competent authorities. The issue of singularity or multiplicity of the 
competent authority opens the debate on cost related issues, public oversight efficiency, 
overlapping and conflicts of jurisdiction. There are potential risks facing the plurality of 
competent authorities. The singularity means that the IC is subject to one single authority (an all 
in one), is the IC in practice subject to a single competent authority? Meaning can we consider 
the securities market authority as the sole competent authority that covers the IC? In practice 
and in the related rules various public institutional bodies other than the securities authority 
have certain jurisdiction over the IC such as the SDC and companies controller.  Singularity or 
plurality requires an understanding of the role and impact of every authority on the performance 
of the IC within the intended financial market, designating the competent authority in reviewing 
the violations of securities rules and shareholders rights, in addition to, explaining the possible 
hierarchy of authorities (paragraph 1). Corporate governance rules and requirements address 
public oversight such as other components of the financial activity. These requirements 
highlight the previously mentioned risks arising in a multi-layered supervisory system 
(paragraph 2).  
                                                          
1213 J.P Valette n (1160) 85 
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§1: Authority Established by Statute 
431 Supervisory model. On a macro level, the choice of a single competent authority is 
encouraged in modern economy. The singularity addresses the competent authority responsible 
for the prudential supervision and that of conduct of business (investor protection, market 
conduct and corporate governance) for the different sectors constituting the financial system 
(banking, insurance and securities market). Therefore, no reference to the singularity and 
plurality in terms of the securities market alone. On a micro sectorial level, international 
standards introduce the principle of allocation of responsibility among various authorities and 
organization. This means having multiple regulatory regimes while clearly identifying the 
allocated responsibilities. The clear identification ensures more efficient and broader coverage 
of all the aspects of the market and used as means to reduce the costs of duplication. The macro 
level presented different supervisory models for the national competent authority. The choice of 
the model sets the singularity or plurality. In the sense that considers the level and degree of 
integration, existing between the authorities and bodies allocated the public oversight despite its 
form. The available supervisory models are sectorial, integrated or hybrid1214. The models 
provided on the macro level may be extended to cover the micro sectoral level, meaning the 
securities market and other competent authorities.  
432 Sectorial model. The sectorial model proposes separate authorities or bodies that exercise 
the external oversight1215. Therefore, dividing the responsibilities between multiple authorities 
depending on the type of financial undertaking addressed. The authorities in this model have 
exclusive competences and limited scope of jurisdiction. A perfect example for this division is 
the JSC, Insurance commission and the Jordanian Central Bank. This model is qualified as non-
unified institutional supervision where different supervisors and rules exist for the different 
undertakings. Therefore, zero level of integration. 
433 Integrated model. The integrated model groups supervisory authorities of different 
sectors of the financial activities into one autonomous integrated authority. The proposed 
                                                          
1214 See: Charles Goodhart et al. and the Bank of England, Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now? 
(Routledge 1998)  
1215 “tephe  Lu pki , “upe isio  of Fi a ial “e i es i  OECD A ea  OECD,  < 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/insurance/2089622.pdf > Accessed 18 April 2018, pages 9 and 11 
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integration in this model can be either full or partial. This model is qualified as functional 
oriented in the sense of having common rules for similar financial activities regardless of the 
performer. Having different types of integrated supervision encourages the talk of a hybrid 
model that is neither fully sectorial nor fully integrated. This hybrid model introduces a full 
sectorial integration and a partial one.  
434 Full sectorial integration. Full sectorial integration means to cover the entirety of sectors 
constituting the financial systems (banking, insurance and securities market). The unification 
suggested in this form of integration covers the prudential supervision and not the regulatory 
one. Nonetheless, it is applicable over the regulatory supervision covering the control of the 
conduct of business. This complete sectorial integration includes three types. Full sectorial and 
functional integration, twin peaks and full sectoral and partial functional integration1216. The 
fully sectorial and functionally integrated authority is that responsible for all supervisory 
functions (both forms prudential and conduct of business). The twin peaks is a model consisting 
of two sectorial integrated bodies that cover some supervisory functions. As for the full sectorial 
and partial functional is the model that introduces the functions that are shared among different 
bodies. The common character between the different types of full sectorial integration is having 
one supervisory authority covering the three segments of the financial sector.  
435  Partial sectorial integration. From its title partial sectorial integration is seen as a model 
covering two third of the three segments of the financial sector, regardless of which two1217. 
This model has three different sub-models integrated supervision of banks and insurance 
companies, integrated supervision of banks and securities markets and an integrated supervision 
of insurance companies and securities markets. The perfect example for this form of partial 
integration is France. The French system put together banks and insurance companies under the 
ACPR and the Banque de France and granted the AMF the full supervision of securities 
markets.  
                                                          
1216 Ma ti  Cihak a d ‘i ha d Podpie a, I teg ated Fi a ial “upe isio : Whi h Model?    (2) North 
American Journal of Economic and Finance 135 
1217 Ibid page 137 
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436 Micro IC supervisory level. The securities market in most supervisory and regulatory 
approaches is connected to sectorial supervision. Shaped and cut to fit its needs and 
particularity. Within the scope of the IC, the securities market authority arises as the main 
competent authority responsible for the external oversight. Taking the form of a company 
obliges the CIS to undergo the common structural procedures of Plc. under the Jordanian rules. 
This obligation puts the company’s controller in a position of a competent authority especially 
in terms of the continuous supervision it exercises over the structure of the IC. The company 
controller is not a full independent public authority unlike the JSC. The IC deposits its issued 
securities with the SDC. The IC is a member in the SDC. The SDC exercises a degree of 
supervision and control over the IC1218. This leads to the concept of multiplicity of competent 
authorities. The new JSL of 2017 took a different approach oriented towards a more integrated 
competent authority. The JSL granted the JSC a higher position in the establishment and 
continuous structural supervision of the IC, over that enjoyed by the companies control 
department. The requirement of the prior approval of the JSC before the initial registration at 
the company’s registry1219, in addition to transferring the supervisory and organizational role 
normally exercised by the companies control department to JSC1220. The new approach of the 
Jordanian legislature did not repeal the existence of the company controller nonetheless; it aims 
to provide a more coordinated supervisory model. This coordination requires an understanding 
of the risks and efficiency related issues when choosing an integrated or sectorial supervision in 
addition to qualifying this approach as wise or not (further explained in the following paragraph 
2). 
§2: Coordinated Investment Company Supervisory Structure 
437 Impact of integration. The presence of more integrated financial authorities is associated 
with higher quality and consistency of supervision across the supervised undertakings1221. The 
structure of the regulation and supervision is an aspect affecting the efficiency and effectivity. 
Having an oversight divided in responsibilities among different authorities should be clearly 
                                                          
1218 Articles 80 & 83 JSL of 2017 
1219 Article 98 JSL of 2017 
1220 Article 111 JSL of 2017 
1221 Ma ti  Mele k  a d A a Ma ia Podpie a, I stitutio al “t u tu es of Fi a ial “e to  “upe isio  Their Drivers 
a d Histo i  Be h a ks    Jou al of Fi a ial “ta ilit   
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articulated and designed. This prerequisite finds its reasoning in the public interest. The public 
interest requests the elimination of duplicated support functions and an increase in the efficiency 
of the authorities. Further, it seeks the potential increase of synergies in the sense of having an 
easier transfer of expertise. The integration and coordination of the different elements of the 
supervisory structure is a method used in the process of limiting regulatory gaps, ensure 
competitive neutrality between different market participants, and provides investors with clean 
and solid external supervisory system that protects their interest alongside ensuring market 
integrity. The question rising in this regard is the following: how can we achieve the most 
efficient and effective coordination among IC’s competent authorities? The solution is in having 
a high level of communication and cooperation between the different authorities that form the 
system of interdependent authorities. The level of integration among the authorities affects four 
main areas of supervision. Regulatory governance1222, prudential framework, regulatory 
practices1223 and financial integrity.  
438 Counter arguments. The multiplicity and integration of the supervisory structure faces 
counter arguments. In terms of having less effective supervision in case of unclearly defined 
objectives, not easily achieved synergies in a scenario of minimally harmonized regulation in 
terms of the different competent sectors and possible extension of moral hazards problem across 
the financial sector. The non-coordination of the different elements of the supervisory structure 
increases costs related risks, inefficiency, conflicts and overlapping eventually affecting risks 
incurred by investors and their benefits. On the other hand complying with the international 
standards and adopting good corporate governance practices impact the quality of the 
supervision and increase the efficiency and effectivity of oversight within securities market.   
                                                          
1222 The interaction between the government and the public when shaping regulations that affect their business 
community. Measured through the accessibility of regulations, ability to challenge them, assessing their impact 
and the public engagement in their preparation. Addresses two main aspects transparency of rulemaking and 
a ou ta ilit . Glo al I di ato s G oup, Bette  ules of the Ga e: I t odu i g Ne  Glo al I di ato s o  
‘egulato  Go e a e  (World Bank 2016) < 
http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/~/media/WBG/CER/Documents/Presentation-Global-Indicators-of-Regulatory-
Governance.pdf > Accessed 11 October 2017) 
1223 Practices ensuring high quality of regulations, their efficiency and effectivity. Their main principles include 
predictability, accountability and transparency 
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439 Corporate governance requirements. Corporate governance practices inspired and 
influenced by a variety of legal influences that may cause unintentional conflicts, overlaps and 
risks. They frustrate the ability to pursue the objectives and goals behind the requirements. 
Limiting the level of frustration requires an oversight that is aware of the risks and conflicts and 
is actively limiting and eliminating them. According to corporate governance requirements, the 
effective supervisory structure requests a clear allocation of responsibilities of supervision, 
implementation and enforcement1224. Further, in terms of the potential conflicts of objectives 
they should be managed through clear governance provisions. Overlapping and contradictory 
support and resolutions coming from the different authorities should be monitored and 
controlled in a manner hindering the duplication of the decisions and applicable rules that 
increase the chances of compliance costs over market participants. Therefore, less return for 
shareholders due to the increase in operational costs.  
440 Investment Company structure. The particularity of the IC requires a supervisory 
structure that is effective and efficient. In the sense of having an oversight, that identifies 
appropriately the regulatory objectives (market integrity and transparency). An oversight 
establishing mechanisms that achieve and monitor the objectives through licensing and 
authorization, imposing reporting and disclosure obligations and controlling the exercise of 
financial activities. An oversight that lays down an enforcement framework and corrective 
action for the violations and the lack of compliance (inspection and sanctioning). Generally, no 
one model of supervision has proven unambiguously superior in achieving all the objectives of 
the securities regulations and the proper functioning of the IC. Within the Jordanian scope, the 
IC is subject to multi interdependent competent authorities that has the JSC as their superior and 
constant reference. The portfolio investments provided by the IC bestows the superiority onto 
the JSC over other authorities. This superiority impedes compliance costs IC may incur due to 
having a supervisory structure that is not fully coordinated neither integrated. Having an 
authority that has a global competence provides the shareholders of IC with a designated 
administrator holding the necessary expertise and qualifications. To ensure the efficient external 
oversight of IC the competent authority holds as a main element a supervisory mechanism 
                                                          
1224 OECD 2015 n (875) page 13 
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updated and modernized to accommodate financial evolution, market realities, and global 
integration (further illustrated in the following chapter 2). 
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Chapter 2: Supervisory Mechanism of Competent Authority 
441 Efficient mechanism. An effective supervisory structure requires a well-established 
oversight with clearly defined objectives. An oversight ensuring adequate implementation of the 
financial regulation that seeks financial stability and economic development through responsive 
actions and procedures. Most importantly an oversight that restores investors’ confidence in the 
financial system. To fulfil its objective the authority lays down an effective and efficient 
mechanism controlling the performance of the securities market. The question rising in this 
regard is the following: what is an efficient and effective supervisory mechanism? It is a 
mechanism consisting of different elements composing its general framework. Including, 
behaving in a manner that is not intrusive otherwise, the intrusiveness translates into costs on 
the financial sector. Further, guaranteeing an efficient supervision with lowest compliance costs 
possible. Achieving the efficiency and effectivity is closely connected to the available securities 
regulatory regime. The effective oversight rises from having well defined regulatory objectives.  
The role of the oversight represented in the control and monitoring of the achievement of these 
objectives. In fulfilling this role, the authority takes all the necessary enforcement and corrective 
actions to remedy the violations and ensure a non-costly compliance. The authority further 
ensures the existence of a minimum set of standards applicable to market participants. The 
following chapter addresses the supervisory mechanism laid down for securities market and IC. 
First, it introduces the elements constituting the system including the composition of the 
authority and its scope of jurisdiction (section A). Then it discusses the powers of the authority 
(section B) those exercised in the process of achieving the objectives of the regulation and that 
of the supervisory system.  
Section A: Elements Constituting Supervisory System 
442 Composition of system. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have 
the resources and potentials to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. Their 
rulings should be timely, transparent and fully explained. The Supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement responsibilities should be vested with bodies that are operationally independent 
and accountable in the exercise of their functions and powers, have adequate powers, proper 
resources, and the capacity to perform their functions and exercise their powers, with respect to 
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corporate governance1225.  Some countries choose to have politically independent securities 
supervisors. They achieve this independence through the creation of a formal governing body (a 
board, council, or commission) whose members are given fixed terms of appointment1226. These 
bodies should be able to pursue their functions without conflicts of interest and their decisions 
should be subject to judicial or administrative review1227. In order to follow developments, the 
authority will have a significant demand for fully qualified staff to provide effective oversight 
and investigative capacity, which will need to be appropriately funded. In the process of 
identifying the elements of the supervisory system the following sub-sections address the 
objectives of the authority in connection with the objectives of the securities regulation (sub-
section 1). In addition to addressing the scope of jurisdiction of the authority and its cycle of 
performance on national and international levels (sub-section 2).  
Sub-section 1: Objectives of Authority 
443 Main objective. The main objective of the authority is supervision of all its forms. The 
supervision is exercised through oversight of market activities and crisis management. To have 
a fully functioning supervisory system the authority may apply substantive control directly or by 
way of delegation to another competent body of its choice1228. Further by ensuring that all 
material information are properly disclosed. Alternatively, by adopting a combination of both 
approaches. The functioning, role and powers vested with the authority closely connected to the 
securities regulatory objectives. The authority is the main body responsible for the 
implementation and enforcing of the enacted securities rules. The implementation process 
requires an autonomous and independent authority (paragraph 1) that holds an effective role in 
the oversight and essential powers that allows it to achieve efficiently the objectives of the set 
regulations (paragraph 2).   
                                                          
1225 OECD 2015 n (875) page 15 
1226 The AMF has a board consisting principally of experts and professionals in the field (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-2) 
1227 Members of the board of AMF hinder from cases involving conflicts of interest (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-4); 
members of the council of the JSC disclose their interests and ownerships ahead of occupying their posts (Article 
11 JSL of 2017) 
1228 Co ittee I I est e t Co pa ies Fu ds a d T usts, Basi  P i iples of I esto  P ote tio  fo  Colle ti e 
Investment Undertaki gs     I te atio al Busi ess La e   < 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ibl8&div=114&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=8&men_
tab=srchresults > accessed 17 September 2015 
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§1: Autonomy: Financial and Functional 
444 Missions. What do investors want? Fair, honest and orderly markets. Market integrity is 
an important aspect of public interest. It is achieved through fair and efficient capital markets. 
The authority fulfils the demands of the investors when exercising properly its missions in 
achieving regulatory objectives1229. Having an orderly market meaning the existence of a 
continuous supervision over market activities. A form of supervision guaranteeing the integrity, 
fair and equitable treatment spreading the balance among market participants. The orderly 
market consists of general elements forming its general framework they include, clear trading 
rules and procedures, oversight over market participants, review of trading products, market 
accessibility and regulatory authorization. The authority further ensures transparency. A 
transparent market requires full material disclosure and data accessibility. The authority in this 
regards implements the disclosure obligation set by law and controls its content. The authority 
further prohibits unfair trading the prohibition is based on a regulation that detects and deters 
market manipulation and market abusive practices. The authority controls and monitors the 
activities on the market, ensures their fairness and that investor protection is safeguarded at all 
times. The authority further detects conflicts of interest and maintains standards and rules for 
market access criteria. The authority addresses risk management. It lays down the necessary 
standards that foster the confidence in the capital market and promotes financial stability1230 in 
addition to, introducing means of risk assessment and management and monitoring the 
competence of market participants. These regulatory objectives result into two main missions 
for the authority. Micro mission in terms of safeguarding investments, ensuring the receipt and 
disclosure of material information and maintaining an orderly financial market1231. Mission on a 
macro level to maintain financial stability of international and regional financial markets1232.  
445 Financial resources. Being an independent authority enjoying a moral personality and 
financial autonomy, the securities market authority has its proper financial resources and funds. 
The financial resources of the authority derives from what it owns and holds in its position, in 
                                                          
1229 Te h i al Co ittee of IO“CO, “upe iso  F a e o k fo  Ma kets  Ma   < 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD90.pdf > Accessed 11 October 2017 
1230 Perfect example is prudential power and supervision exercised by financial authorities 
1231 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-1 ; Article 8.a JSL of 2017 
1232 A duty imposed on the AMF to maintain financial stability on an EU level. Related to the cooperation and 
arrangement between national financial market authorities 
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addition to the contributions and fixed fees due by its subject undertakings1233. There are two 
forms of fees due to the authority. Fixed fees and contributions. Fixed fees paid for publications 
of declaration, examinations of PO, notification and authorization of commercialization of 
foreign CIS and the cases of document deposits and the control exercised over the deposit. 
Contributions due to the authority as a result of the control it exercises over subject 
undertakings including the IC. Cases of due contributions include the procedural stages of the 
IPO. The two categories of due amounts find their distinction under French rules and not the 
Jordanian ones. Within the sphere of the JSC, the due amounts are included in one category and 
considered as contributions paid upon request1234. The financial resources of the JSC consists of 
the contributions, imposed fines, grants and donations, the allocated allowance in the 
government’s budget in addition to any other resources approved as such by the cabinet1235. The 
budgetary means of the JSC are satisfyingly diversified. The JSC receives public financing that 
guarantees well-functioned authority. The diversification and the limitation of the public 
financing presents the authority as more independent and oriented to serve the interest of the 
public and the securities market. The most important part of the funding of securities authority 
is the contributions. They form an essential part of the role played by the industry and market 
participants in the efficiency and benefits of the supervisory system1236.  
446 Human resources. Monitoring the financial stability and guaranteeing investors’ 
protection requires an authority that consists of a college of experts competent in financial 
market activities. The professionalism and expertise is a prerequisite to all market participants, 
hence a natural consequence to be required in the authority that controls expert undertakings. 
The rules addressing the organization of the financial market authority requests professionalism, 
expertise and experience in both financial and legal matters, to be present in the members of 
board1237 or council1238 managing the authority.  
                                                          
1233 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-5-3 ; Article 27 JSL of 2017 
1234 Article 27 JSL of 2017 
1235 Article 28 JSL of 217 
1236 EU recently proposed the necessity to have market participants and the industry as key players in the financing 
of Eu opea  supe iso  s ste  Co issio , Co u i atio  o  ‘ei fo i g I teg ated “upe isio  to 
Strengthen Capital Markets Union and Financial Integration in a Changi g E i o e t  COM   fi al < 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/law/170920-communication-esas_en.pdf >); L. 2017-55, art. 18, 19 
1237 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-2 
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447 National authority governance. The AMF has a board that plays the role of its principle 
decision-making body. It is composed of sixteen members varying in their background; 
including government officials, professionals and experts in financial market activities 
(representing the majority of the board nine members) and a representative from the Banque de 
France (guaranteeing the coordination between the different segments of the financial 
system)1239. Another collegial body exists under the umbrella of the AMF, having full decision-
making autonomy in terms of sanctioning and enforcement ‘sanctioning committee’1240. 
Consists of twelve non-board members dominated by experts and professionals in financial 
activities. Five consultative committees comprising of twenty experts that advice the board on 
regulatory changes and policies that support the AMF. The JSC on the other hand has a council 
responsible for its daily functioning, sanctioning and decision-making process1241. The council 
of the JSC has the general power to run the authority without having another co-collegial body 
that shares the functions and powers1242. It consists of five non-government officials members. 
Private independent individuals holding the experience and expertise in financial and legal 
matters1243. The JSC is supported with multiple subordinate directorates responsible for the 
functioning of the supervisory framework of the authority. A small composition of the council 
of JSC in comparison with the French governance.  The quality is more important than the 
quantity nonetheless, the council’s composition is small, presented as insufficient and could 
open the door for ineffective and inefficient supervision. The French approach is more adequate 
and compatible with the needs of the securities market and ICs. The French approach is 
compatible with the size of the securities market existing in France and its connection to the EU 
level. The Jordanian securities market is rather limited in its exposure to systematic risks and 
conflicts this limit is connected to the size of the Jordanian market. The supervision takes into 
consideration the size of the market. Having one body responsible for the exercise of all the 
supervisory functions and holding the entire supervisory power seems from the exterior as more 
integrated yet when reviewed closely, it sounds arbitrary. Having an enforcement committee 
that is independent from the council provides a higher level of investor protection. Particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1238 Article 10.a JSL of 2017 
1239 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-2  
1240 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-1 IV 
1241 Article 10 JSL  of 2017 
1242 Article 12 JSL of 2017 
1243 Article 10 JSL of 2017 
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this division does not leave the decision to grant the authorization and withdraw it with the same 
body. Therefore, providing multiple appeal destinations the investors may seek for the different 
decisions before going through courts. If such dual collegial bodies exist in Jordan, they require 
clear and extensive allocation of responsibilities and the level of interdependence and 
integration between them. Further, a mandatory cooperation and exchange must exist between 
the two bodies while maintaining a degree of independence. All of which to have a regulatory 
and enforcement bodies promoting market integrity, safeguarding investors’ interests and 
guaranteeing their protection. The financial market authority in its establishing rules is 
attributed supervisory powers alongside other functions, consequently it may choose to maintain 
the performance of its main mission of oversight or delegate it to another body. The following 
paragraph 2 explains this option.  
§2: Delegation of Supervisory Powers 
448 Supervisory role and power. The securities market authority assumes a supervisory role. 
In the sense of a position assigned to and forming an essential part of the structure of the 
supervisory system.  This role played particularly by the authority based on specific attributions. 
The attributions presented in the form of supervisory and discretionary powers. They are 
attributed to permit the authority to perform the tasks and duties it is expected to complete 
according to its role. The securities market authority in exercising its supervisory function 
covers the entirety of CIU. The authority have the option to delegate partially its supervisory 
function among other ones to another body. The question rising in this regard is the following: 
who is this body? The term body used on a general scale meaning, any public or private body to 
which the authority chooses to attribute part of its functions on a temporarily or permanent base. 
449 Form of delegation. The delegation to another body may be of regulatory or executive 
powers. Further, it may be to a body holding administrative autonomy and independence. The 
delegation of the regulatory powers is criticized and argued against as ineffective and 
unnecessary. The counter arguments entail the doubt of realistic and effective possibility to 
ensure the accountability and the review, the independence runs counter to the principle of 
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accountability and review and possible result of legislative abdication1244. The main concern of 
counter argument of delegated regulatory authority are accountability and control. Substantive 
and procedural limits may be undertaken to ensure them. There are two main factors to 
determine these limits autonomy (limits on independence) and control (extent of the imposed 
supervision).  
450 Autonomy and control. To ensure the autonomy there must be a level of independence 
that the delegated body enjoys. Little independence undermines the advantages these bodies 
enjoy over the ordinary administration and absolute independence places this body beyond the 
reach of control. In this sense, the delegated body is not a department or a directorate existing 
within the sphere of the authority. This argument concerns an independent public body such as 
having an agency delegated the regulatory responsibility. The context of an agency autonomy is 
based on three elements the creating statute, the relationship with legislative and executive 
powers and appointment procedures for the members1245. The issue of the creating statute 
differs if the agency is established legislatively or executively. Meaning does it have an actual 
discretionary power defined clearly without depriving it from its role or reducing in any way 
this role to a mere executor. Further, this creation introduces the concept of judicial review of 
decisions. As for the relationship with other powers, it is addressed in the location of this body 
on the governance chart, is it in an equivalent horizontal framework or vertical in the sense of 
being subordinate and subject to continuous evaluation? The appointment of the members 
meaning does the body have a condensed form of governance that unit the extreme diversities 
and segmentation or it follows the general administrative appointment available nationally. 
Ensuring the control over the body is exercised through ensuring a balance with autonomy. 
Meaning, the body reports to an authority through clearly defined mechanisms of supervision. 
They include executive oversight, budgetary evaluation, procedural control, judicial review and 
network coordination1246.   
                                                          
1244 Xe opho  A. Yataga as, Delegatio  of ‘egulato  Autho it  i  the Eu opea  U io : The ‘ele a e of the 
A e i a  Model of I depe de t Age ies   Jea  Mo et Wo ki g Pape  /  < 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/010301.html > Accessed 16 October 2017 
1245 Ibid page 41 
1246 Ibid page 42 
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451 Delegation of executive power. Under the principle of separation of powers, the 
executive power is considered as an independent and distinct body granted certain functions 
differing and separate from those of the legislative and judicial powers. The executive power 
mentioned in this paragraph is not meant as one of the three main powers within the state rather 
it means the execution and enforcement of laws. Meaning the mere exercise of the executive 
functions. Within the framework of the securities market authority, it refers to the administrative 
functions and tasks performed on a daily basis. They include reviews, inquiries and 
investigations. The perfect example of the delegation of the executive power within the scope of 
the authority is that made to the supporting directorates. The executive power in this context 
does not entail decision-making and public enforcement rather covered under an executory and 
performance framework.  
452 Investment Company and delegation. Seeking delegation or self-execution is a matter of 
internal structure of the securities market authority. In order to have a smoothly operating 
securities market more measures should be adopted to ensure rapid and effective enforcement 
process. The question rising in this regard is the following: does the financial supervisory 
system in Jordan suffer from a crisis of governance? The term governance used in the sense 
denoting the importance of cooperation and positive interaction among different public 
authorities in different spheres of responsibilities and at different geographical levels. The 
institutional balance plays a major role in the regulatory process. The JSC does not perform any 
form of regulatory delegation. Nonetheless, it performs an executive one through its supporting 
directorates that allow efficient and effective functioning of the authority. The JSC delegates the 
investigatory function and permits the competent directorates within its structure to execute 
inspections 1247and detect the violation of securities regulation1248 on a continuous basis and 
long term. Nonetheless, the decisions issued following the investigations that hold a disciplinary 
character are issued directly by the council of the JSC1249. The concept of delegation of powers 
not as part of an internal structure but rather to an independent body such as an agency is not 
feasible for a market with the size of the Jordanian one. It results in operational costs, regulatory 
amendments and a level of coordination that the JSC is better off without it. The supervisory 
                                                          
1247 Article 17 JSL of 2017 
1248 Article 21.a,b JSL of 2017 
1249 Article 21.d JSL of 2017 
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system under the Jordanian law is not in a crisis, yet eventually requires a slight restructuring in 
terms of the governance of the JSC. Having an enforcement committee separate from the 
council is seen as positive and effective step on different aspects; investor protection and the 
stability of the market. Nonetheless while considering the size of the Jordanian securities market 
an increase in the number of the members of the council might be a better answer to the market 
and IC requirements. The stability of the market and investors protection is achieved on a macro 
level through having an authority that has well defined scope of jurisdiction in its different 
national, regional (cross-border) and international dimensions. The following sub-section 2 
addresses the cooperation and coordination that allow the competent authority to function 
effectively and efficiently within the financial system and ensues investors’ protection even 
beyond its geographical scope of jurisdiction.  
Sub-section 2: Scope of jurisdiction 
453 Definition. The scope of jurisdiction entails the scope of the authority’s rule making and 
enforcement power1250. The allocation of jurisdiction has vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
Horizontal in terms of the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction more or less on a national 
level within the context of the state’s territory it concerns particularly the designation of the 
undertakings subject of the control and supervision of the authority. Further the integration 
among the different authorities regulating the different segments of the financial system, cases 
of having a sectoral supervision. Vertical, in terms of the hierarchal relationships meaning, to 
whom the securities authority reports and is it subject to higher authority. Does it cooperate with 
other authorities on an international or regional level? The clear definition of the scope of 
jurisdiction of the securities market authority is necessary for financial institutions. They have a 
pre-set and clear overview to whom they belong and report. It is similarly important for 
investors as it provides them with an obvious appellate body with protective nature. On an extra 
territorial level, an evident scope of jurisdiction explains the possible geographical extension of 
the discretionary powers of the authority. An example for this extension is the principles of 
                                                          
1250 Collins English Dictionary (12th edn, 2014) 
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home country control1251 and mutual recognition1252 existing within the EU supervisory 
framework of financial markets1253.  
454 Strategy. The multi-lateral supervisory system should be supported by a strategy of 
consistency and coherence among its different components. The creation of coordinating bodies 
and instruments on national and international level is one option and direct exchange and 
arrangements between the different authorities is another. This sub-section deals with the 
territorial competence of the securities authority (paragraph 1) and the cooperation procedures it 
follows to achieve an effective supervisory system and a healthy and smoothly operating 
securities market for the IC (paragraph 2).   
§1: Territorial competence 
455 Conditional scope. The institutional provisions regulating the supervision of financial 
markets in a national territorial context differs from one country to the other depending on the 
level of integration among the financial segments. The scope of territorial jurisdiction under the 
Jordanian rules is fully sectoral. Every sector of the financial system in Jordan is competent 
within the sphere of the segment with no connection to the others. JSC’s scope of jurisdiction 
covers solely capital markets and does not in any way extend or interact with the remaining 
sectors (banking and insurance). The JSC has a limited list of subordinate undertakings. They 
include issuers, licensees, registered individuals, capital market, SDC, collective investment 
fund and the investment company1254. The oversight exercised by the JSC does not cover banks 
and insurance companies; leaving the Jordanian financial system sectoral to its furthest extent. 
The banking sector is controlled by the Jordanian central bank1255. Banks are established as 
                                                          
1251 Defi ed as att i uti g the p i a  task of supe isi g fi a ial i stitutio s to o pete t autho ities of 
member states of origin. The authorities of the member state, which is the destination of the service, whilst not 
deprived of all powers, would have a o ple e ta  ole  Co issio , White Pape  o  Co pleti g the I te al 
Ma ket  White Pape  COM   fi al ; E a Lo i ka, The Ho e Cou t  Co t ol P i iple i  the Fi a ial 
“e i es Di e ti es a d the Case La     Eu opea  Busi ess Law Review 324 
1252 A single authorization valid and recognized in the entirety of the European community 
1253 Ka el La oo, “upe isi g the Eu opea  Fi a ial “ ste   CEP“ Poli  B ief /  < 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1987/ > Accessed 17 October 2017 
1254 Article 15 JSL of 2017 
1255 Article 37 Banking Law no. 28 of the year 2000 
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Plc1256, further, they exercise financial activities licensed generally by the JSC alongside their 
banking activities. The fact that they exercise banking activities as a main object introduce these 
undertakings as subjects of the supervision and licensing of the central bank. Abiding to 
securities regulation is not required from banks; nonetheless, they abide to the rules stating the 
information constituting the annual reports due to the central bank1257. As for the insurance 
sector, regulated and supervised locally by the insurance commission1258. Insurance companies 
also incorporated as Plc1259, they are authorized and controlled by the insurance commission1260. 
The scope of jurisdiction of the JSC and the other authorities is limited to the territorial 
framework of Jordan, unlike the AMF. According to the principle of mutual recognition, the 
authorization issued by the AMF is valid and recognized by all MS, similarly the authorization 
issued by the competent authorities in the remaining MS is recognized as valid by the AMF.  
456 Pro-integration approach. The sectoral approach of the Jordanian supervisory 
framework has advantages. Sectoral supervision is a specialized form of supervision that is 
close to the business. A lower profile of supervisors allowing them to fully focus on the sector, 
clearly defined mandates that makes it easier to manage the overall performance of the 
competent authority, a strategy that is better adapted to the influences of risks and nature of the 
business exercised in the sector further to stimulating inter-agency competition1261. The pro 
integration see more advantages in an integrated financial system. They see the integration as a 
one-stop shop for authorizations, easily adaptive to the evolution in complex financial products, 
reduces regulatory arbitrage, delivers neutrality, lower supervisory fees, more transparent to 
consumers, and eases the cooperation between sectoral supervisors1262. Providing healthy and 
stable environment where securities market and the IC can develop and function efficiently 
imposes greater role and expectation on the part of the financial market authority. The authority 
enhances its role through upgrading the efficiency of financial undertakings operating in the 
market and improves their performance. Therefore, enabling the undertakings to provide better 
                                                          
1256 Article 93 JCC 
1257 Article 68 Banking Law 
1258 Established in 1999 as an administratively and financially independent organization; Article 5 Insurance 
Regulatory Law no. 33 of the year 1999 
1259 Article 93 JCC 
1260 Article 45 Insurance Regulatory Law 
1261 K. Lannoo n (1253) page 4 
1262 Ibid  
 
247 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
services in a healthy competitive environment positively reflected on investors, institutional 
requirements and the Jordanian market as a whole. One of the main elements of the regulatory 
strategy provided by financial market authorities to complete their supervisory framework is the 
coordination with modern international criteria and the cooperation and exchange on national 
and international levels (following paragraph 2 illustrates the cooperation arrangement 
procedures). 
§2: Cooperation and Arrangements 
457 Importance of communication. The crucial factor of an effective supervisory system is 
not the fact that functional supervisors are under a single roof rather it is in their 
communication. The integrated system may incur globally spreading risks over the entirety of 
the financial market. Therefore, undermining investor’s confidence in the financial market as a 
whole, in addition to, incurring investors’ financial risks that could have been avoided if a 
minimum communication was guaranteed. It is enough to have one failure on the part of an 
institution to witness a widespread effect in the combined regime. The effectiveness of the 
whole market is brought into question. The exchange of information and cooperation between 
financial market authorities has an increasing importance due to the internalization, 
harmonization and interdependence of financial services and markets.  
458 Form of cooperation. The cooperation and arrangements within the financial system are 
performed either internally between the different competent authorities of the financial sectors 
or externally through the exchange and communication with competent authorities of other 
countries or the authorities and agencies existing on a regional or international level. The 
clarification that should be made in this context is that the level of cooperation differs in its 
nature and scope. It can be a mere exchange, communication, arrangement or a simple inquiry. 
Despite the form of coordination the authority chooses to have with other authorities, the 
cooperation does not in any way prejudice the respective competences of these authorities. the 
communicated information enjoys a confidential character to guarantee clean competence under 
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the different market segments further they have limited scope of use and utility merely to help 
the authority in its operation1263.  
459 National level. The cooperation on a national level exists particularly in fully sectoral or 
quasi-integrated financial supervisory systems. Meaning, distinct authorities that supervise and 
control the three segments of the financial system. The financial sectors are interdependent. 
Financial products evolve and intertwine to create complex ones that cannot be solely regulated 
and supervised under one authority or the other. The necessity of a level of cooperation among 
different competent authorities of one country arises in order to foster market integrity and 
financial stability. Similar and related financial activities are exercised under the different 
sectors this requests an authority that is aware and up to date with the changes and innovations 
occurring in parallel markets even if the subject undertakings are not directly affected. The 
authority should be aware of newly innovative product that should be integrated or an 
unprecedented infringement or action that should be regulated. The operation of one financial 
sector influences the remaining ones. The degree of influence differs depending on the size of 
the market. The cooperation on a national level differs from one country to the other. Ranges 
from zero to full cooperation.  
460 Cooperation between Jordanian markets. There is zero supervisory cooperation among 
the financial sectors constituting Jordanian financial system. The sectors exercise their control 
and supervision separately with no reference or communication among them. This lack of 
cooperation is due to a regulatory silence. The law does not request from the JSC to establish 
any form of arrangements with the insurance commission or the central bank1264. An 
individualist system. Neither do the Jordanian rules impose a mandatory representation of the 
members of every authority within the board or even the meetings of the other. The silence is 
crucial. The fact that the financial system choose a sectoral approach is understandable due to 
its existing advantages of having a clearly focused and specialized supervision. Nonetheless, to 
secure the financial market a level of cooperation and coordination should exist. The financial 
sectors eventually exist under a single market roof and economy. Having no exchange of signals 
                                                          
1263 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-1 III 
1264 On the other hand a representative of the JSC attends GAM of the ASE (Article 14.h Internal Bylaw of ASE of 
the Year 2004) 
 
249 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
deprives the financial market from the advantages of having an inter-agency competition and 
affect the varied skills and specialization of supervisors on the monitoring of potential 
dangerous exposures that may end-up being contagious and harm investors’ interest.  
461 Cooperation between French markets. Reviewing the French approach to the 
cooperation provides further arguments supporting the necessity of the cooperation. The French 
rules address two forms of national cooperation among the competent authorities that proposes a 
cooperation on a micro level direct between the authorities and a macro prudential level that 
supervises the financial stability. The proposed cooperation combines the AMF, ACPR and 
Banque de France. The proposed cooperation is performed through the communication of 
useful information and reference to accomplish their respective missions1265. This cooperation 
includes non-financial market authorities such as the competition authority within the sphere of 
commercialization practices. The cooperation is implicit in the required representations of 
members of each sector within the board of the other1266. On a macro prudential level, French 
rules established a higher council for the financial stability. Includes as members the different 
actors of the financial sectors. The Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière composes of the 
president of the AMF, governor of the Banque de France, the president of the ACPR alongside 
other professionals in financial and economic fields1267. The council exercises a global 
supervision covering the entirety of the financial system in order to preserve financial stability 
and ensure the capacity of contribution to cross-border economy. The council lays down a 
macro-prudential policy and ensures clear missions that support the cooperation and exchange 
of information between financial undertakings, members and members with the council1268.  
462 External level. The competent authority may choose to cooperate on an extra territorial 
level with other competent authorities. In the sense of coordinating with similar competent 
authorities operating within a regional or international sphere. The most obvious example is the 
cooperation provided under EU rules between the different competent authorities within MS 
and that with ESMA. The EU legislation adapted to the shortcomings of the financial crisis in 
                                                          
1265 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-1 
1266 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-2 
1267 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-2 
1268 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-2-1 
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terms of including mandatory cooperation procedures. Further tasking the ESMA with an active 
role in building a common supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices applied 
consistently throughout the union1269. Consequently, MS entered into a Multilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) on the exchange of information and surveillance of 
securities activities1270. Following the financial crisis the ESMA Regulation tributes the former 
efforts and proposes entering into a new MMOU that is compatible with the new regulation1271. 
The new MMOU addresses the cooperation relating to securities and financial markets as an 
obligation in the union law and beyond it. Therefore, cooperation arrangements between 
competent authorities within every MS is performed on an individual level directly between the 
authorities1272 and multilaterally with the ESMA1273. This obligation is henceforth applicable to 
the AMF1274.  The JSC is expected, under securities rules, to establish a coordination with 
regional, international and foreign securities commissions1275. Further to exchange, the 
information with other securities commissions that information supporting the foreign 
commission in its investigation and relate to the licensees and their scope of activities1276. This 
exchange is conditioned to the request of the foreign commission and only in cases, involving a 
mutual treatment if the JSC makes such a request. An obligation that does not apply internally 
in terms of the cooperation with the authorities regulating the remaining financial sectors. An 
adoption of the cooperation arrangements between different market segments is crucial for the 
smooth and the well-functioning of the Jordanian financial system.  
463 Investment Company approach. Whatever the approach to financial supervision of a 
particular jurisdiction, any system must strive to have effective coordination among supervisory 
authorities, central banks, and finance ministries. Authorities should seek maintaining good 
contacts and interaction at operational and principal levels. Coordination and communication 
                                                          
1269 Article 29 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1270 E te ed i to u de  the CE“‘ CE“‘, Me o a du  of U de sta di g o  the E ha ge of I fo atio  a d 
“u eilla e of “e u ities A ti ities   -335 < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/fsa-mou-cesr-
securities.pdf >) 
1271 Article 16 ESMA Reg. 2010/1095 
1272 Article 101 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1273 E“MA, Guideli es o  Coope atio  A a ge e ts a d I fo atio  E ha ge: Bet ee  Co pete t Autho ities 
and Compete t Autho ities a d E“MA  E“MA/ /  of  Ma h  
1274 C. mon. fin., art. L. 631-1 
1275 Article 12 JSL of 2017 
1276 Article 23 JSL of 2017 
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can and do create challenges, even in jurisdictions that have an integrated regulator, the 
challenges are often greater when there are a larger number of regulatory authorities. The 
supervisory system of securities market and IC if not integrated is still interconnected to other 
financial sectors. Taking a fully sectoral supervision such as the Jordanian one, the coordination 
is required on an extra territorial level and not nationally. The different sectors of the financial 
system operate separately leaving the investor protection, their level of awareness and 
investment knowledge and the financial stability at stake of the side effects and contagious risks 
of market innovations. The cooperation is essential for the smooth operation of ICs other sectors 
and their participants influence them. The financial system exist as whole and not sector wise. 
The financial stability is guaranteed globally for the entirety of the financial system and not 
sector based. The operation of the competent authority of securities market is connected to 
specific powers enjoyed by the authority. The exercise of these powers is limited by the 
governing rules. Arbitrage and intrusive authority is hindered through challenging and redress 
mechanism imposed by the securities rules. The following section B illustrates these powers and 
their legal framework.  
Section B: Powers of Competent Authority 
464 Definitions and differences. Power, function and responsibility three terms involved in 
the discourse of the competent authority.  Being public and official authority directly bestows 
upon the authority a power. The governing legal rules nonetheless state a list of functions for the 
authority and an indirect responsibility of its actions. The responsibility is clear in the notion of 
contestable of decisions. The terms might be mixed and used as alternatives; they further differ 
in the nature and the capacity they bestow. Power is the ability or official capacity to exercise 
control, act or do something effectively1277. it is defined as the possession of control or 
command over others1278, a natural consequence to the authority the competent authority enjoys. 
The function is the action or purpose for which a person is suited or employed, meaning a 
person’s role or occupation. Defined as the actions and activities assigned to, required of or 
expected of a person1279. Therefore, it is a natural action or intended purpose of a person in a 
                                                          
1277 American Heritage Dictionary 2011 n (78) 
1278 Collins Dictionary 2014, n (1250) 
1279 American Heritage Dictionary 2011 n (78) 
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specific role1280. The functions of the authority are the duties exercised by the authority on a 
regular basis in the process of fulfilling its bestowed powers. As for responsibility, it is a form 
of answerability, being responsible for an action or taking responsibility for the consequences of 
actions1281. The responsibility for the actions includes those performed directly by the person or 
by those for whom he is responsible. In a different legal context responsibility defined as the 
ability or duty to decide or act upon one’s own or someone else’s decisions without 
supervision1282. It is then the scope or extent of one’s activities. All the terms are used in this 
section. This section addresses the powers of the authority directly exercised and those 
delegated to subordinate bodies (sub-section 1). When addressing these powers the related 
functions are explained. Further, this section addresses the answerability of the authority (sub-
section 2) whereas; the decisions issued by the competent authority are binding yet contestable. 
The process of their challenging is made before a body that the authority answers to.  
Sub-section 1: Designating Source of Power 
465 Discretionary vs disciplinary. The competent authority enjoys an authoritative nature 
represented in an organization of powers and functions it enjoys and exercises as part of the 
operation and supervision of the financial system. The powers identified as having two general 
characters discretionary or disciplinary. They interact despite their predominant characteristics. 
Having a discretionary power means an authority that is able to decide, control and regulate on 
its own discretion1283. The competent authority functions in light of the governing legal rules, 
yet in an operational framework that it personally sets. In exercising its discretion, the authority 
administers the capital market and controls subject undertakings including the IC. As for the 
disciplinary power, it entails a corrective and preventive form of authority. The disciplinary 
nature involves enforcement, constituting and using discipline1284. Discipline is performed 
through imposing punitive or retaliatory actions. The exercise of either one of the two powers 
does not necessarily require a prior existence of the other, as they exist separately. They are 
exercised individually depending on the circumstances in question. The question rising in this 
                                                          
1280 Collins Dictionary 2014 n (1250) 
1281 Collins Thesaurus of the English Language (3rd edn, 2008) 
1282 Collins Dictionary 2014 n (1250) 
1283 Ibid 
1284 American Heritage Dictionary 2011 n (78) 
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regard is the following: who exercises either of the two authorities? The competent authority 
have personalized powers and functions that it exercises directly and others delegated to its 
board and competent body constituting its internal governance1285. This sub-section addresses 
both forms of power in all their contexts those exercised by the authority (paragraph 1) or 
delegated (paragraph 2). 
§1: Competent Authorities’ Discretionary Power 
466 Location of power. Competent authorities enjoy powers and have functions that allow 
them to operate on a daily basis. In addition, it permits them to achieve their objectives in 
having a stable financial system where investors’ protection is guaranteed and maintained. The 
powers and their related functions are exercised as part of the authoritative nature of the 
authority. Their enjoyment is not exclusive to the financial market authority. In the context of 
securities market and the IC, JSC, capital market, company controller and SDC exercise control 
over the IC. The powers attributed to each competent authority are stated in their governing 
legal rules. They may be categorized depending on their nature into various categories including 
administrative, supervisory, organizational and regulatory powers.  
467 JSC. The JSC and in the process of achieving its objectives enjoys a group of powers and 
exercises functions directly; yet being a moral person these functions are exercised by its 
council as a representative. As part of the JSC’s administrative power is charging fees for the 
proceedings followed by the licensees and subject undertakings1286. The fees are charged for the 
registration of securities, submitting a prospectus, listing of securities, granting licenses and for 
the membership in the SDC. The fees form part of the financial resources of the authority1287. 
The JSC further exercises a supervisory power1288. It constitutes of the supervision of subject 
undertakings in terms of the control of the securities’ issuing process and issuers’ material 
disclosure1289 including the submitted annual reports1290. Further to the hierarchal supervision of 
                                                          
1285 Article 98.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1286 Article 27 JSL of 2017; the AMF requires its subject to pay fixed contributions as a result of its financial 
autonomy (C. mon. fin., art, L. 621-5-3,4) 
1287 Article 28 JSL of 2017 
1288 The AMF exercises a similar power of supervision and control over its subject undertakings (C. mon. fin., art. L. 
621-9) 
1289 Article 8.b JSL of 2017 
 
254 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
the capital market and the SDC1291. The JSC enjoys an organizational power exampled in the 
organization procedures it undertakes to regulate the issuing of securities, the disclosure, the 
licenses, the capital market, the SDC and the IC1292. As part of the organization and regulation 
of the issuing process, the JSC reviews the submitted prospectuses and their attached 
documents1293. Consequently to its different powers the JSC has functions including 
guaranteeing complete and accurate material disclosure of investor necessary information1294. 
The JSC has the discretion to request the performance of inspections and reviews to determine 
the potential or actual occurrence of a violation of securities rules1295. The JSC may further 
investigate the circumstances and requests information it deems necessary to implement 
properly the securities rules1296, through a competent body within its structure or by appointing 
experts and professionals to perform the investigation and the inspection1297. As for the 
regulatory power, the JSC adopts the necessary bylaws that state the financial solvency 
standards required by financial companies1298. 
468 Securities market (ASE). The securities market exercises its powers over its members 
and the issuers of securities admitted for listing on it. The main objective of the securities 
market is to operate and control the market on a regular basis1299. The market enjoys several 
powers including a supervisory power. This power entails the supervision and control of the 
trading on the venue1300 and the adoption of a code of conduct laying down the best practices 
required by members of the market1301. A typical administrative power consisting of the 
preparation of market activities reports in addition to publishing them1302. An organizational 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1290 Article 43.a JSL of 2017 
1291 Article 8.b JSL of 2017 
1292 Article 8.b JSL of 2017; as part of AMF general regulation are rules applicable to issuers and market 
infrastructures (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-7) 
1293 Article 41.a JSL of 2017 
1294 Article 8.b JSL of 2017; AMF communications and disclosure helps it in fulfilling its supervisory and control 
missions (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-8-4) 
1295 Article 17.a JSL of 2017 
1296 Article 17.b JSL of 2017 
1297 Article 17.d JSL of 2017; agents of the AMF perform investigations and inspections (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-9) 
1298 Article 8.b JSL of 2017; the AMF lays down a GR that provides the applicable rules throughout the exercise of 
its missions (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-6) 
1299 Article 4 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1300 Article 5.c Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1301 Article 5.h Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1302 Article 5.z Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
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power represented in the adoption of the necessary measures and procedures guaranteeing 
adequate and transparent trading1303. A power of intervention through performing inspections, 
reviews and investigations1304. The market has a discretionary power to inspect with or without 
a prior notice to the concerned member1305. Throughout the inspection, the market reviews the 
entirety of the records and documents of the member and has the right to request copies. Most 
importantly, the market has a disciplinary power. This power includes the ability to suspend the 
trading of securities and ceasing the activities of the member1306. Further to the ability to impose 
administrative sanctions over the members1307. The sanctions include a simple alert, a warning 
or notice and fining. The scope of powers of the market is limited if the actions or financial 
standing of one of its members threatens and influences negatively the global investors’ interest 
or the entirety of the market1308. In these circumstances, the power transfers to the JSC the role 
of the market stops at the mere reporting of the incident1309. 
469 SDC. The SDC is the sole entity in Jordan responsible for the registration and deposit of 
securities, transfer and safekeeping in addition to the clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions1310. Recognized as the sole numbering agency for the assignment of International 
Security Identification Numbers (ISIN). The SDC performs the aforementioned functions in 
addition to a series of powers including an administrative power represented in charging 
membership fees1311. A regulatory power entailing the adoption of internal regulation and 
bylaws necessary for its operation and binding to the members1312. Intervention power involving 
an inspection of the members with or without prior notice performed by the delegated staff in 
                                                          
1303 Article 5.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1304 Article 65.a JSL of 2017 
1305 Article 34 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1306 Article 65.c JSL of 2017 
1307 Article 36 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1308 Article 65.d  JSL of 2017 
1309 Article 39.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1310 Article 75 JSL of 2017 
1311 Article 82.a JSL of 2017; Article 8 SDC Membership Internal Bylaw of 2004; the default in payment of the fees 
results into a violation of securities rules (Article 80.d JSL of 2017)  
1312 Article 76 JSL of 2017 
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the SDC1313. Disciplinary power involves sanctioning actions such as fining the members1314. In 
addition to seizing the securities1315. 
470 Company control department. The company controller has the power to oversee and 
control the incorporation of all forms of companies that choose Jordan as their state of 
incorporation1316. The control covers the IC1317. The powers of the company controller extend to 
cover post-incorporation period and throughout the life of the company. Incorporated as Plc. the 
IC falls under the new implemented rule that transfers organizational and supervisory functions 
of the company control department to the JSC1318. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: what are the organizational and supervisory functions? Going through the rules 
governing Plc. under the JCC, we note that the company controller has several functions spread 
over the life of the company and the different procedures undertaken by Plc. The dilemma is 
categorizing these functions under either of the two categories of functions provided by the JSL. 
Considering the organizational function means transferring the functions relating to post-
incorporation of the Plc. and not the incorporation stage. The initial registration of the IC 
remains within the company control department following an approval by the JSC1319. 
Therefore, the approval of the registration1320 and the related submissions1321 and requirements 
are due to the company controller. The related incorporation procedures include the appointing 
of an expert to reevaluate the shares1322.  As for the submissions and reporting made to the 
company controller following the initial registration but during the underwriting, they may be 
considered as part of the organizational and supervisory functions of the company controller and 
can be transferred to the JSC. The reasoning for such consideration is the fact that the company 
is fully registered in the companies’ registry despite the fact that it has not yet commenced the 
performance of its activities. The problem this transfer introduces is the lack of a clear 
identification of the subject matter of the transferred functions which leaves the IC unaware of a 
                                                          
1313 Article 80.b JSL of 2017; Article 4.a SDC Membership Internal Bylaw of 2004 
1314 Article 82.b JSL of 2017 
1315 Article 83 JSL of 2017 
1316 Article 6 JCC 
1317 Article 7.h JCC; Article 209.a JCC 
1318 Article 111 JSL of 2017 
1319 Article 98.a JSL of 2017 
1320 Article 94.a JCC 
1321 Article 92.a JCC 
1322 Article 97 JCC 
 
257 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
reporting and disclosure obligation to the JSC and not the company controller. Further, it puts 
the shareholders of the IC in the dark while not knowing to whom they address the requests to 
convene a GAM. The need for a clear definition of the transferred functions hinders the rise of 
such problems and proves an adequate regulatory intervention. Furthermore, due to the recent 
application of the JSL no explanatory or jurisprudential interventions took place in this regard.  
471 Transition. The aforementioned powers despite their variance are exercised directly by 
the competent authorities in the process of achieving their objectives. The authorities delegate 
partially or totally their powers to be exercised by their supporting bodies including their 
boards, the presidents or the supporting staff and directorates.  The following paragraph 2 
explains in details this delegation. 
§2: Delegated Powers 
472 Definition. A delegated power is giving or committing duties and powers to be exercised 
by way of representation to another person rather than exercising them directly1323. The fact that 
the competent authority is not a natural person requires a representative that issues the decisions 
and undertakes procedures and actions on behalf of this moral person. For example, the 
president of the AMF is considered its representative before all jurisdictions1324. As previously 
mentioned the securities market authority is operated by its council and supported by its 
directorates and internal committees. This might avail that the authority does not in fact exercise 
the powers and performs the functions. The council performs them through what is called a 
delegated power. Such as the delegation of specific competence to be exercised individually by 
the president of the AMF without the need to have a collegial vote1325.  
473 Council of JSC. The powers and functions of the council of the JSC are undertaken to 
achieve the main objectives of the JSC in guaranteeing financial stability and investors’ 
protection. Therefore, its main function is drawing up the general operational policy of the 
JSC1326. The council has a discretionary power that allows it to issue approvals and decisions 
                                                          
1323 Collins Dictionary 2014 n (1250) 
1324 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-2 
1325 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-5 
1326 Article 12.a JSL of 2017 
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concerning the different requests and applications submitted by subordinate undertakings. They 
include the approval of trading and listing of securities outside the scope of the ASE1327. 
Approving the registration and incorporation of a collective investment fund1328. Approving the 
scale of fees charged by both the ASE and the SDC1329. The council issues decisions relating to 
the registration of securities1330 in addition to the licensing1331. The council exercises an 
administrative power in designating the fees charged by the JSC1332, further designating a scale 
for the fees and commissions charged by financial companies1333. The council performs a 
budgetary function as part of its administrative power represented in the preparation of the 
JSC’s annual budget1334. It is the main regulatory responsible within the JSC. Issues a code of 
conduct regulating the relationship between the commission’s staff and the investors1335, further 
to issuing all the necessary rules and regulations to operate the JSC1336 and guarantee an 
adequate implantation of the securities rules1337. The council lays down corporate governance 
rules1338 and adopts auditing principles and standards1339. Most importantly, the council is the 
main body responsible for the preparation of the proposals for securities rules amending 
bills1340. The council has an intervention power that allows it to undertake immediate corrective 
measures when the investors’ protection requires such actions1341. These measures may be a 
temporary remedy until the violation or the harmful act is controlled and ceased. Hence putting 
an end to the lack of compliance or irregularity1342. As part of the intervention and a form of 
                                                          
1327 Article 12.b, c JSL of 2017 
1328 Article 12.o JSL of 2017 
1329 Article 12.e JSL of 2017 
1330 Article 12.d JSL of 2017 
1331 Article 12.z JSL of 2017 
1332 Article 12.t JSL of 2017 
1333 Article 12.k JSL of 2017 
1334 Article 12.r JSL of 2017 
1335 Article 12.s JSL of 2017 
1336 Article 12.s-1 JSL of 2017 
1337 Article 34.a JSL of 2017; Article 53.a JSL of 2017 
1338 Article 12.n JSL of 2017 
1339 Article 12.l JSL of 2017 
1340 Article 12.k-1 JSL of 2017 
1341 Article 19.a JSL of 2017; under the scope of the AMF it consists of a measure requiring a prior request of the 
AMF s se eta  ge e al to the o pete t ou t C. o . fi ., a t. L. -13); a corrective measure may consist of 
assigning an administrator to the subject undertaking by the AMF (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-13-1) 
1342 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-14 
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preventive action, the council may choose to publish the violations1343. The council through a 
process of delegation of delegation1344 may convene a hearing requesting the deposition of the 
concerned licensee1345. As part of the control, the JSC exercises over its licensees the council is 
delegated a disciplinary power, granting it the ability to impose administrative sanctions such as 
fining the licensees1346. Alternatively, punitive such as the suspension of trade1347, ceasing the 
issue of securities1348, suspending the activities of the licensee1349. In addition to annulling, 
limiting and suspending the license it previously issued1350. The council is further considered as 
an appellate and review body. It reviews the decisions of the ASE and the SDC1351. The 
decisions of the ASE are contestable primary before the council ahead of seeking the 
administrative courts1352.  
474 Board of ASE. The main function and role of the board of ASE is to supervise the stock 
exchange and the performed transactions in order to guarantee fair and honest treatment and 
safeguard investors’ interests. In achieving this role, the board administers and operates the 
stock exchange1353, has a discretionary power to approve or refuse membership applications1354, 
in addition, the board exercises its regulatory power to issue and implement the necessary rules 
and regulation for adequate operation of the market and efficient supervision of market 
participants. The rules regulate listing and trading of securities, governs the internal governance 
of the market, disclosure of members and the charged fees and commissions1355. Before using 
its disciplinary power the board seeks corrective measures by the members such as requesting 
                                                          
1343 Article 20 JSL of 2017; this publication is limited under EU rules to cases that do not jeopardize financial 
market, be detrimental to the interests of investors or cause disproportionate damage to the involved 
undertakings (Article 99.3 UCITS Dir. 2009/65) 
1344 A competent body in the JSC moderates the hearings (Article 21.c JSL of 2017) 
1345 Article 21.a JSL of 2017 
1346 Articles 21.d and 22 JSL of 2017; composition administrative: an agreement between the AMF and the subject 
in violation to compensate the damage caused by the violation and misconduct as an alternative to disciplinary 
sanctions (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-14- ; A tho  A a da Vas uez, U e P e i e Appli atio  de la Co positio  
Administrative en Mati e d A us de a h  pa  l Auto it  des Ma h s Fi a ie s    Petites Affi hes  
1347 Article 12.h JSL of 2017 
1348 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-13-2 
1349 Article 21.d JSL of 2017 
1350 Articles 12.h-1, 60.a, 109 JSL of 2017 
1351 Article 81.c JSL of 2017 
1352 Article 73.a JSL of 2017 
1353 Article 24.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1354 Article 10 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1355 Article 24.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
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the removal of the harmful and violating act1356. If such removal is not enough or not possible 
the board may impose administrative sanctions including fining the members1357 or annulling 
their membership1358. To limit the challenging before courts the board provides alternative 
dispute resolution for the disputes arising between members or members and their clients1359.  
475 Investigatory power. The investigatory power is a power oriented to observe and inquire 
into in detail. A power designated to find information and ascertain facts. It is performed by a 
competent body within the JSC, conditionally delegated the power as it reports and answers to 
the board of the JSC1360. This body performs an official investigation based on speculations or 
request of the board. Similarly, in France, the agents of the AMF perform the investigation and 
does not necessarily involve an official summoning by the collegial body. Meaning the respect 
of the right to defense guaranteed constitutionally is not required in this stage of investigation. 
This statement was affirmed by French jurisprudence1361. The official investigation entails 
reviewing and examining the records of the licensee, inspection of the related documents and 
circumstances. The investigation leads to organizing deposition hearings, summoning 
witnesses1362 and assigning experts and professionals throughout the process of 
investigation1363. The investigation is prior stage to the sanctioning. The decision entailing the 
opening of an investigation does not have to be reasoned such as the sanctioning decision1364. 
The investigatory power delegated to the competent body does not entail sanctioning actions 
even if the outcome of the investigation came positive. The board of the AMF evaluates the 
result of the investigation and issues a decision thereof. The decision entails the opening of a 
sanctioning procedure that is performed before the sanctioning committee and not the board 
while granting the right to one board member to attend the sessions held before the sanctioning 
commission without having a deliberative vote1365. Another form of investigation is performed 
                                                          
1356 Article 38 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1357 Fining a member is principally a decision of the manager of the ASE, the board undertakes such decision if the 
amount of the fine exceeds the cap stated by law; Article 37.b Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1358 Article 11 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1359 Article 24 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1360 Article 15.b JSL of 2017; under the AMF it is delegated by the secretary general (C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-9-1) 
1361 CE, 2 juill. 2015, n° 36-6108; CE, 28 dec. 2009, n° 30-1654 
1362 Article 17.c JSL of 2017 
1363 Article 17.c JSL of 2017; C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-9-2 
1364 Affirmed by French jurisprudence: CA Paris, 1er ch. Sect. h, 24 oct 2008, n° 2008-02551 
1365 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-15 
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randomly yet regularly by the staff of the JSC, it consists of an inspection with or without prior 
notice to the licensees1366. Investigations are also performed by the ASE, through a delegated 
power to an investigation committee appointed by the manager of the ASE1367. It answers and 
reports the outcome of the investigations, negative or positive, to the manager. Random and 
regular visits performed by the agents of the AMF to the domicile of subject undertaking respect 
the procedures laid down by law. A prior warrant should be issued and the visit should confirm 
with the modality provided by law1368 especially in terms of the time of the visit.  
476 Transition. The powers accorded to the different competent authorities, form part of a 
main power guaranteeing the proper implantation and efficient performance of the securities 
regulations. A well performing securities regulation result in a stable financial system and 
guarantees investors’ protection. The powers and functions exercised by the competent 
authorities followed by decisions. These administrative decisions are binding to the subject 
undertakings yet they are not absolute. The following sub-section addresses the performance 
assessment of these authorities from a mere legal viewpoint.  
Sub-section 2: Regulatory Performance Assessment 
477 Scope of assessment. The regulatory performance assessment entails assessing the 
performance of the regulatory authorities through determining the impact of regulators’ acts. 
The assessment aims to examine the level of commitment to achieving the goals of the 
regulation. Therefore, there is a need to designate the responsibility for the regulatory 
management and regulatory performance on an administrative level. It is a complex and shared 
management cross-governmental. The system of assessment includes sector and portfolio 
specific arrangements. Such as carrying out a priori assessment in the sense of applying a 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA)1369 through, examining the expected social, economic and 
legal effects of a proposed regulatory reform, reviewing the capacity and quality of 
                                                          
1366 Article 53.b JSL of 2017; a simple inspection or a preliminary investigation performed regularly or randomly by 
the agents of the AMF does not require a prior notice. Nonetheless, the notice is required once the decision for the 
investigation that is followed by a sanctioning stage is required by the secretary general (CE, 5 mai 2013, n° 35-
6054) 
1367 Article 35 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1368 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-12 
1369 OECD (2008), Introductory Handbook for Undertaking Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), Version 1.0 OECD 
Publishing, Paris < https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/44789472.pdf >  
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regulation1370. Alternatively, the assessment is performed a posteriori. Having a regulation that 
is recently reformed or evaluating an existing regulation ahead of the reforming proposal. 
Therefore, it entails evaluating the regulators achievement of objectives through assessing the 
economic and social impact with regard to powers and resources assigned to them. This form of 
evaluation consists of various dimensions depending on the nature of the soak evaluation. If the 
evaluation involves the use of public fund then it falls under the umbrella of an audit. If the 
evaluation consists of an analysis of decision-making and institutional framework then it falls 
under a legal evaluation as done within this chapter and illustrates this sub-section. The 
evaluation may be economically oriented whether self-performed or outsourced generally in an 
academic framework or on an international level such as the reviews performed by the OECD.  
478 Regulatory goals. The goal of the regulation is to provide a treatment for a problem. 
Bodies implement regulations such as an oversight body. The oversight body is tasked with a 
variety of functions or tasks in order to promote high-quality evidence-based decision making. 
The decisions of the external oversight is the natural outcome of the powers accorded to them 
by statute. Securities regulations accorded the competent authorities powers under an 
administrative umbrella. They bestowed a mandatory characteristic over the decisions of these 
authorities. A quality regulation and an effective performance assures that practices of the 
authorities in terms of inspection, enforcement or mere administrative discretionary decisions 
respect the legitimate rights of those subject to the enforcement. Further, they should be 
designed to maximize the net public benefits through compliance and enforcement and avoid 
unnecessary burdens on those subjects1371. The following paragraphs designate the decisions 
that fall under the chapeau of legitimacy (paragraph 1) and are therefore subject to 
administrative and judicial reviews (paragraph 2). 
§1: Decisions Leading to Answerability 
479 Framework of decisions. Competent authorities in exercising their accorded powers 
issue decisions that are expected to be executed and complied with by their subject 
                                                          
1370 This thesis performs on a limited scale this form of examination in terms of the proposed regulatory reform to 
Jordanian securities regulation 
1371 OECD (2012), Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Regulatory Policy and Governance, OECD, Paris < 
https://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf > 
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undertakings. The question rising in this regard is the following: what are these decisions? 
Generally, the decisions are issued under the name of its relevant competent authority to 
regulate the actions of the subjects and control their interactions among them and with the 
securities market. Therefore, these decisions may be negative or positive. Negative in the sense 
of having a silent decision (no decision)1372, in the sense of a refusal or a disciplinary decision. 
Positive meaning a decision is issued by the authority despite its content further to the case of 
having a decision entailing an approval or a redress. The decisions of the competent authority 
have a legal value and they are binding to the concerned subjects1373. The legal value of the 
administrative decision is affirmed by administrative jurisprudence. The decision is considered 
as valid and legitimate as long as the contesting party does not prove otherwise1374. Such as 
other administrative decisions, the non-compliance with these decisions is considered a 
violation of law1375. The binding nature of the decision does not deter the contestability of the 
administrative decision. The issued decision by the competent authority should be reasoned1376. 
Decisions lacking reasoning are a place of contesting before administrative courts, as the 
reasoning is the explanation according the decision its legitimacy1377. The concerned subjects of 
the authorities’ decisions should be aware of the decision in order to comply with it. The 
authority in this sense chooses its method of notification through publication in the official 
gazette, publication electronically, personal notification to the subject of the decision or any 
other means of notification the authority may deem fit1378. The fact that the subject of the 
decision is informatively aware of the decision is another form of notification1379. The decisions 
of the AMF’s sanctioning committee should be issued within a reasonable timeframe. The 
                                                          
1372 Article 7.b Administrative Justice Code of 2014 
1373 This opens the discussion on the relationship between the public and the administration under administrative 
law; sanctioning decisions pronounced by the sanctioning committee of the AMF should confirm with the principle 
of legality. In the sense of having a sanction based on a violation of an obligation set in securities rules (CE, 9 Oct. 
1996, n° 17-0363) 
1374 Jo. co. admin., 24 Jan. 2017, n° 517/2016; Jo. Co. admin., 11 Jan. 2017, n° 391/2016; Jo.co. admin., 23 Jan. 
2017, n° 208/2016 
1375 Article 18 JSL of 2017 
1376 Article 21.h JSL of 2017; the decisions of the AMF and those of the sanctioning committee should also be 
reasoned nonetheless the decision entailing the opening of an official investigation is not included in this 
obligation (CE, 12 juin 2013, n° 1037) 
1377 Article 7.a (5) Administrative Justice Code of 2014; Jo. co. admin., 03 Jan. 2017, n° 229/2016 
1378 Article 8.a Administrative Justice Code of 2014; the sanctioning decisions are made public (C. mon. fin., art. L. 
621-15 al. V) 
1379 Article 8.b Administrative Justice Code of 2014; affirmed by the administrative jurisprudence Jo. co. admin., 11 
Oct. 2015, n° 154/2015; Jo. co. admin., 7 feb. 2016, n° 443/2015 
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length of the proceeding do not result in the annulment of the administrative decision1380 unless 
the lengthy proceedings prevent the exercise of the right to defense1381.  
480 Examples of decisions. The decisions issued by competent authorities influence the 
position of investors and shareholders. positive decisions approving licensing, authorization, 
registration, membership or redress provide investors with a form of seal and prior assessment 
of company’s financial standing that they may not be able to conduct due to the limitation of 
their investment knowledge and experience. As for negative decisions such as pecuniary 
sanctioning or suspending the activities of the company, they affect the value of company’s 
shares and its liquidity consequently influencing shareholders. An example for a positive 
decision of the council of the JSC is approving the license application1382. A negative decision is 
that entailing a refusal to license, annulling a previously attributed license1383 or refusing to 
register securities1384. The ASE’s board issues positive decisions in terms of approving the 
membership1385, permitting the listing or trading of securities on the market1386. Negative 
decisions such as refusing the membership application or withdrawing the membership1387. The 
SDC issues decisions that relate to the deposited securities. The SDC may decide to seize the 
securities of any of its members1388. As for the company controller, while taking into 
consideration the newly implemented rule transferring the duties from the company controller to 
the JSC1389, the decisions issued by the controller that may fall under the notion of answerability 
is that approving the incorporation of the company. The company controller does not issue this 
decision directly it reports its decision to the minister of industry and trade and the latter is the 
one that issues the final decision1390.  
                                                          
1380 AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 7 Juin 2007, n° SAN-2007-19 
1381 CA Paris, 1re ch., sect. H, 26 nov. 2008, n° 51/14613 
1382 Article 58 JSL of 2017; AMF authorization and visa 
1383 Article 60 JSL of 2017; AMF withdrawing the authorization 
1384 Article 3.b Issuing Regulation of 2005; a sanctioning decision pronounced by the sanctioning commission; the 
punishable person is the moral person and the natural person subject to the control of the authority  
1385 Article 10.a Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1386 Article 3 Listing Regulation of 2016 
1387 Article 11 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1388 Article 83 JSL of 2017 
1389 Article 111 JSL of 2017 
1390 Article 94 JCC 
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481 Execution and aftermath. Who executes the decisions of competent authorities? The 
president of the JSC is considered its representative, signatory and has as his main role the 
execution of council’s decisions1391. The ASE also has an executive manager appointed by its 
board post the approval of its GA. This manager manages the ASE on a daily basis and is 
considered as its representative (similar to the general manager of other Plc.)1392. The SDC also 
has a board and an executive manager that operate the center and execute the decisions issued 
therein1393. Once the decision is published and the concerned subject became informed of it, the 
decision enjoys the characteristics of the administrative decision; legitimate, binding and should 
be complied with by the concerned subject. Nonetheless, the decision is not absolute it is 
contestable and subject to annulment, further explained in paragraph 2. 
§2: Challenging and Redress 
482 Expected authority exercise. Regulatory authorities must exercise their authority only 
within the scope permitted by their legal powers. In the sense of having no abuse of power and 
treating alike cases in a similar manner. They sanction and control subject undertakings to its 
rules and not those undertaking covered by other competent authorities1394.  Therefore, 
justifiable reasons for their decisions, and for any departure from regular practice. Guaranteeing 
this adequate and fair exercise requires embedding explicitly these principles in the governing 
legal rules. As a form of protection for the subject of the authorities from arbitral actions and 
abuse of discretionary authority, the law provides for appeals processes in the form of 
administrative and judicial reviews. Therefore putting the subjects on semi equal footing with 
the authority and preserves the integrity of the regulatory system1395.  
483 Contestability. The legal nature of administrative decisions present them as non-absolute, 
meaning they are contestable and challenged judicially1396. This contestability is performed on 
two different degrees administrative and judicial reviews. The administrative review is 
                                                          
1391 Article 13.a JSL of 2017; similarly the president of the AMF  
1392 Article 25 Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1393 Article 76 JSL of 2017 
1394 The AMF follows in its decisions the concept of administrative specialty, therefore it sanctions its subject 
undertakings and cannot extend its power to banks or insurance companies (AMF Sanctioning Commission 
decision of 13 march 2013, n° SAN-2013-07) 
1395 OECD 2012 n (1371) page 15 
1396 Article 8 Administrative Justice Code of 2014; C. mon. fin., art. R. 621-44 
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performed within the scope of the competent authority without any judicial intervention (first 
level challenge). It may be automatic, performed by one authority over the other without the 
need to having a subject contesting the decision. Such as the review the JSC performs over the 
decisions of the SDC, it examines the compatibility and compliance with securities rules1397. 
Further, it can be upon contestation made by one of the concerned subjects (the prevailing form 
of review). The contestability is not the only form of challenge the concerned subjects seek. 
They may request the removal, limitation or suspension of a corrective measure undertook by 
the authority. The JSC is empowered with the ability to impose a disciplinary measure such as 
suspending the activities of the licensee or the trading of a security as an immediate measure to 
contain or minimize the harm of investors’ interests1398. Such a measure is taken without 
respecting the right to defense. The challenge of the subject for such a measure is through a 
request to convene a deposition hearing and the permission to submit counter proof and 
evidence for the suspected action1399. This is a challenge prior to issuing a final disciplinary 
decision by the authority. 
484 Place to contest. The entirety of the decisions of the competent authorities are subject to 
contestation and challenge. The question rising in this regard is the following: where does the 
subjects contest the decisions? On a preliminary stage, the subjects contest the decisions 
administratively at the competent authority. The decisions of the JSC’s council are objected 
directly before the council within a period of fourteen days following the informed notification 
of the decision1400. The council has the right to accept entirely or partially the objection as well 
as the possibility to refuse it. The council issues a decision concerning the objection within a 
period of fourteen days following its registration at the JSC. This final administrative decision 
must be reasoned and particularly if negative is contestable before administrative courts as a 
posterior stage of challenge1401. Within the French context the challenging “recours” is divided 
between two courts. Challenging before the CE of the decisions of authorization and 
sanctioning that has as their subject matter one of the persons or undertakings covered by the 
                                                          
1397 Article 81.c JSL of 2017 
1398 Article 19.a JSL of 2017 
1399 Article 19.d JSL of 2017 
1400 Article 21.h (1) JSL of 2017 
1401 Article 21.h (2) JSL of 2017 
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control of the AMF1402. As for other forms of decisions not related to the former ones they are 
contestable before the court of appeal “Cour d’Appel de Paris”1403. The decisions issued by the 
board or executive manager of the ASE are objected first before the board of the ASE if they 
entail a disciplinary sanction such as fining1404. The entirety of the decisions of the ASE that 
relate to securities are objected beforehand before the council of the JSC within fifteen days 
following the notification of the decisions to the concerned member1405. The council issues a 
decision concerning the objection within fifteen days following its submission. The decision of 
the council is contestable before administrative courts within thirty days following the informed 
notification1406. As for the decisions that do not relate to the securities such as the refusal or 
suspension of membership in the market the law does not directly state their contestability. 
Therefore, the general rule of administrative law is applied they are contestable before 
administrative courts if the ASE is considered as a public entity1407. Stating the contestability of 
the remaining forms of decisions ASE’s board issues; averts from the debate concerning the 
competent court and the character of the decisions issued by the ASE. 
485 Regulatory silence. The decisions of the SDC are not objected first before the council of 
the JSC. Despite their content, they are considered as administrative decisions issued by a 
public entity1408 contestable directly before administrative courts. The decisions are merely 
reviewed by the JSC without any possible objection before the SDC or the council. This 
regulatory silence grants the SDC a larger slice of independence than the ASE, which is 
understandable due to the major role SDC, performs in securities’ depositing process. 
                                                          
1402 C. mon. fin., R. 621-45; an example of the competence of the CE is the case of urgent suspension of the 
execution of the decision. The emergency is justified through having an administrative decision prejudicing in a 
sufficient severe and immediate manner the public interest or the situation or the interest of the petitioner (CE, 11 
fevr. 2003, n° 27-6376). A perfect example for this prejudice is the influence on the reputation (CE, 6 Juin 2008, n° 
31-6001) 
1403 C. mon. fin., R. 621-45 al. II ; the request to stay the execution of the sanctioning decision is made before the 
CA. The plaintiff should prove that excessive consequences result from the execution of the said decision (CA Paris, 
28  janv. 2010, n° 09/24356) 
1404 Article 37.c Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1405 Article 73.a JSL of 2017 
1406 Article 73.b JSL of 2017 
1407 Possible under Article 3 of Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004 
1408 Article 3 SDC Internal Bylaw of 2004 
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486 Company control department. The decision concerning the incorporation of the IC and 
its registration in the company registry is undertook by the minister of industry and trade1409. 
The minister’s decision is considered an administrative decision contestable directly before 
administrative courts1410. As for the decisions of the company controller, they do not fall within 
the context of administrative decisions explained in this chapter. The decision of the company 
controller are not final they require a ministerial approval due to the organization of this 
department. It is a subordinate and supporting directorate. Neither an IAA nor an IPA. It forms 
an essential part of the internal governance of the ministry of industry and trade. 
487 Who contests. The fact that the decisions of the competent authority are contestable is not 
innovation in itself. It is a natural consequence to their administrative character. The debatable 
issue concerns who can contest these decisions? In addition, how contesting can be considered 
as legal proof for the protection of investors and shareholders in IC? Every person (natural or 
moral) having a personal interest in the contested decision may contest before the competent 
court1411. Does the shareholder in the IC has such an interest in the decisions issued by 
competent authorities? The personal interest exists, what affects the company consequently 
influences its shareholders. From a theoretical legal viewpoint, the interest of shareholders may 
be proved for purposes of the challenge even though shareholders were not directly mentioned 
in the contested decision. On the other hand, the decisions of the competent authorities are 
issued in the name of the company and on an administrative level, the company is responsible 
before the authority and it is the one subject of the violations and sanctions. A natural 
consequence is having the IC contesting the decisions on behalf of its components. The first 
objection before the authority is explicitly limited to subject undertakings and not open for 
shareholders. The law addresses members, registered individuals and licensees. In the French 
sphere, the persons or undertakings sanctioned in the decision of the sanctioning commission 
are solely permitted to contest the decisions before the CE. The principle of interest for 
challenges before administrative judges does not apply for challenges made by third party for 
AMF’s sanctioning decisions1412. Even the manager of the sanctioned undertaking cannot 
                                                          
1409 Article 94.a JCC 
1410 Article 94.b JCC 
1411 Article 5.h Administrative Justice Code of 2014 
1412 CE, 30 oct. 2007, n° 30-1380 
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contest the sanctioning decision taken against the company he manages if he was not personally 
sanctioned within which1413. The jurisdiction of the administrative judge in France is limited to 
cases and subjects stated in the securities rules. 
488 Protective obligations. The governing securities rules impose obligations on the part of 
the competent authorities and their staff that provide a higher level of protection for investors. 
Such obligation includes the confidentiality of the information reviewed and examined through 
inspections and investigations1414. It is a means to contain conflicts of interests resulting from 
the abuse of the information throughout the market therefore threatening market integrity. 
Further, the newly implemented JSL obliges the JSC to publish regulatory reform proposals for 
the public to review them and provide their notes, comments, suggestions and opinion1415. The 
obligation extends to considering the proposed notes and comments in the regulatory reform1416. 
A further obligation is the obligation imposed on the AMF to respect the fundamental 
constitutional rights and liberties in the sanctioning process1417. 
489 IC shareholders’ interest. Identifying the competent authority responsible for the 
external governmental oversight is of great importance to the IC and its shareholders. How can 
this importance be qualified? Shareholders’ interest require the existence of efficient and 
effective external oversight. The connection is found in the supervision and control the 
competent authority exercises over the IC and other market participants. The form of exercised 
supervision sectoral or integrated influences the level of protection provided within the 
securities market. Further, the impact the form has on financial stability and market evolutions. 
The external oversight exercised by the competent authority if efficient results in achieving the 
objective of the securities regulation. Therefore, restoring the confidence in the market and 
providing cost friendly investment environment. The supervision and control if effective results 
in having a higher level of compliance with securities regulation in addition to providing a 
protective legal environment open to full material disclosure, redress and challenging. The 
                                                          
1413 CE, 28 nov. 2014, n° 36-2868 
1414 Applicable to the entirety of competent authorities; Article 34.h Internal Bylaw of ASE of the Year 2004; Article 
65.b JSL of 2017; Articles 20 & 25 SDC Internal Bylaw of ASE of the year 2004; Article 24 JSL of 2017; professional 
secrecy of the participants in the performance and operation of AMF s issio s C. o . fi ., L. -4)  
1415 Article 16.a JSL of 2017 
1416 Article 16.b JSL of 2017 
1417 CE, 12 juin 2013, n° 35-9245 
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continuity of the governmental supervision and control is a dependent performance. The 
operation of competent authorities is connected and limited to their subject undertakings. The 
supervision and control is exercised over the members and subjects of competent authorities. 
Such exercise cannot exist and guarantee an orderly market if the IC and other market 
participants do not function within the intended securities market. The administrative control 
coexists alongside other forms of control. The exercise of these forms of control belong to the 
IC and its shareholders. Therefore forming what is known as an internal control (further 
illustrated in the following title two).   
 
271 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
Title Two: Internal Control: Self vs. Sub-Supervision 
490 Notion of control. The control, in company law, is a notion relates principally to the 
power the parent company has over its affiliates or to address the general missions of auditors. 
Further, it traditionally relates to the function of ownership of voting power in both its forms 
absolute (being a majority shareholder) or working control (capacity to mobilize votes despite 
minority ownership)1418. Nonetheless, this notion is richer in its consistency than it appears. 
Linguistically, it is the power to direct or master something or someone. Further the power to 
supervise the conduct and performance of this thing or person. Therefore, control is exercised 
through managing and supervision. In the sphere of the IC, the question that arises is who 
exercises this managing and supervision. This exercise relates to a long-standing statement of 
considering sustainable business and solid shareholder protection as prerequisites to the 
efficiency of business activities. To ensure this level of efficiency, and at the same time 
safeguard shareholders’ interest, different legislations introduce the concept of shareholders’ 
control and supervision over management, along with the introduction of the CIS as the most 
proper framework to solve problems of professional decision-making that previously concerned 
individuals when deciding to invest in financial markets1419.  
491 Since most shareholders do not get involved in the day-to-day work of the company they 
own shares in, their interest remains at stake. They are concerned in the maintenance and 
expansion of their returns. Therefore, every company strives to fulfill the needs of its 
shareholders and safeguard their interest. Safeguarding through enhancing business 
performance through clear allocation of responsibilities. Further clearly stating shareholders 
rights and company duties in addition to disclosing financial standing and publishing financial 
structure. 
492 Plan. The control this title addresses is that exercised internally within the company. 
Internal control is a form of continuous supervision guaranteed in the governing legal rules for 
the benefit of the participants in the investment process. It can be direct such as the control 
                                                          
1418 Adolf Be le, Co t ol i  Co pa  La     Colu ia La  ‘e ie   
1419 Gio gio Co sigli, Asset-Liability Management for Individual Investors  i  “ta a os )e ios & Willia  )ie a 
(eds), Handbook of asset and liability management (Vol II: Applications and case studies, Elsevier 2007)  page 754 
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shareholders exercise over management performance (chapter 2) or indirect through allocating 
responsibilities and obligations that should be adhered to by the company and its members of 
management (chapter 1). 
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Chapter 1: Indirect Control 
493 Focus of control. Who has a real right of control? Who has a mere right of information? 
The dichotomy of the notion of control within the sphere of company rules is found in the study 
of the social organs of the company1420. Certain organs of the company have the power to 
decide its functioning they manage, administer and operate the company; therefore, they master 
the moral person. Particularly they include members of management (board and general 
manager). The remaining organs of the company hold a supervisory role such as GA and 
auditors. Is shareholders’ control direct or indirect? On an internal level of the company, the 
control of shareholders’ may take either forms. The focus of this chapter is the indirect control. 
The question rising in this regard is the following: what is an indirect control? An indirect 
control is that derivatively granted. In the sphere of IC, indirect control performed through 
attributions and allocation of obligations and responsibilities on members of management. The 
execution of these obligations in a timely fashion while fulfilling company’s main objectives 
and in the interest of both the company and its shareholders is a key point in maintaining a 
sustainable course of work and providing solid protection of shareholders’ rights and interests. 
At the heart of this form of control, shareholders’ do not exercise a real control. The law 
imposes obligations on members of management they should comply with and fulfill. The 
control and role of shareholders’ come at a later stage, envisaged in a private enforcement 
measure or a mere supervisory role during GAMs.  
494 Exercise of indirect control.  Governance of companies should promote respect for the 
rule of law, board accountability and equitable treatment of shareholders and appropriate 
cooperation with stakeholders1421. Effective financial regulation is essential to support a stable 
and well-functioning financial system. Therefore, indirect control requires a level of financial 
education and consumer and investors’ protection to exist. Considered as an important element 
of its framework. Indirect control leading to safeguarding shareholders and investors’ interest is 
                                                          
1420 Etie e G os ois, ‘espo sa ilit  Ci ile et Co t ôle de la “o i t  DPhil thesis, U i e sit  de Cae   page 
25 
1421 Declaration on Propriety, Integrity and Transparency in the Conduct of International Business and Finance 
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achieved in a transparent market where the accountability and responsibility is encouraged by 
providing fair and transparent information and advice and promoting financial awareness. The 
following sections address the transparency of the IC market (section A) in addition to the 
accountability related to IC and its organs (section B).  
Section A: Financial Protection in the Sphere of Market Integrity 
495 Scope of protection. Financial protection is a main contributor in financial stability1422. 
Responsible behavior by financial services providers contributes to economic empowerment in 
the sense creating a protective investment environment for the interests of investors and users of 
financial markets. Financial protection requires the existence of a significant level of oversight. 
The supervisory framework ensures the adoption, respect and compliance with three main 
pillars of the financial protection regime. The main pillars constitute of fair treatment, 
transparency and accountability. Financial protection regime addresses retail investors as 
consumers of financial products and services. The regime is divided into two main stages. 
Prudential supervision performed by competent authorities in the market safeguarding the 
global concept of market integrity in addition to, an enforcement active plan guaranteeing 
financial literacy and awareness in addition to dispute resolution and recourse actions.  
496 Consumer vs. shareholder. The consideration of retail investors as consumers emerges 
an important consequent question. Are shareholders included in this categorization? Can they 
benefit from the protection regime applied nationally within securities market? Providing an 
answer to these questions requires defining who the consumer is. The consumer is defined 
legally as natural persons acting outside their trade, business, profession or craft1423. This 
definition is provided generally for consumers who seek products or services including yet not 
limited to financial services consumers1424. Departing from this definition the financial 
consumer is that acting outside its profession, trade or craft within a financial venue that 
                                                          
1422 Natali a M le ko, Oversight frameworks and practices in 114 economies - full report’, Washington, DC, World 
Bank Group (2013)  < http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/775401468171251449/Oversight-frameworks-
and-practices-in-114-economies-full-report > page 1 
1423 Article 2.1 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council [2011] OJ L 304/64; C. consom., art. liminaire 
1424 The financial consumer was excluded from the scope of application of the Dir. 2011/83 (Article 3.3; Recital 32) 
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provides financial products or services. Therefore purchasing products or receiving a service. 
The definition in this regard applies to retail investors and not professional ones. The distinction 
between the two forms of investors under this definition is clear. The financial regulation 
provides a similar distinction in terms of the governing legal rules. The regulation provides a 
higher level of requirements and prerequisites in financial products and services targeting retail 
investors. These rules take into consideration the level of experience, knowledge and financial 
literacy of the investor. An obvious example of financial consumers is those seeking loans and 
credits in the banking sector.  
497 Vulnerability. In qualifying shareholders, as consumers or not we shall provide a 
thorough analysis to the applicability of the elements consisting the character of a consumer 
over the shareholder. Two main elements bestow the character of the consumer. Vulnerability 
and the lack of knowledge. Consumers are vulnerable. The vulnerability is relative. Consumers 
when facing market players are vulnerable. Even amongst them, the level of vulnerability 
differs depending on their educational and cultural level. Doctrine provides different definitions 
to vulnerable consumer depending on the focus factor. For example vulnerable consumers seen 
as those who have diminished capacity to understand the role of advertising, product effects or 
both1425. They are similarly seen as those who are more susceptible to economic, physical, or 
psychological harm in, or as a result of economic transactions because of characteristics that 
limit their ability to maximize their utility and well-being1426. These definitions focus on the 
difficulty that consumers have in playing the role traditionally expected of consumers by 
classical economics “rational maximizers of their own utility”1427. Shareholders are not 
vulnerable in the sense provided here for consumers. Shareholders have a role in the financial 
market differing from that of the conventional consumer. Shareholders contribute to companies 
                                                          
1425 De a J. ‘i gold, “o ial C iti is s of Ta get Ma keti g: P o ess o  P odu t     A e i a  Beha io al 
Scientist 578 
1426 Craig Smith and Elizabeth Cooper-Ma ti , Ethi s a d Ta get Ma keti g: the ‘ole of P odu t Ha  a d 
Consumer Vulnerabilit     Jou al of Ma keti g  < www.jstor.org/stable/1251786 > Accessed 10 
November 2017 
1427 Pete  Ca t ight, The Vul e a le Co su e  of Fi a ial “e i es: La , Poli  a d ‘egulatio   Fi a ial 
Services Research Forum < 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/businesscentres/crbfs/documents/researchreports/paper78.pdf > 
Accessed 09 November 2017 
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they form part of by way of providing funds, information and discipline1428. Whether considered 
as owners of the company or owners in the limit of their participation or share ownership. They 
have a claim on earnings that consumers, of the final product or services of the company, do not 
enjoy. Both shareholders and consumers considered stakeholders of the company. The 
difference lies in the control, redress and recourse actions that consumers do not have in a 
conventional situation (concept of shareholders primacy norm they stand over and above other 
stakeholders1429), despite not having the final say in the majority of the decisions and actions 
undertook by the company.  
498 Knowledge. In terms of knowledge, shareholders and consumers may be on equal 
footing. Shareholders of IC do not necessarily hold a higher level of financial literacy or 
awareness. Here arises the role of the disclosure obligation in providing consumers of financial 
services and shareholders of the service providers with the necessary information to make their 
investment decision. Shareholders and consumers are not alternative terms. Nonetheless, the 
case of having a shareholder consumer is possible1430. What is good for shareholders is not 
necessarily good for consumers and vice versa. The maximization of wealth and value differs if 
the aim of the company is to maximize that of its shareholders or of its consumers. Consumers 
and shareholders are not located at the same side of the financial services line. The concept of 
share ownership puts shareholders outside the scope of a financial consumer. Yet they are 
considered as investors and they benefit from the regulatory protective measures imposed in a 
given financial market.  
499 Market protective measures. Consumer protection in securities sector is critical to the 
development of the integrity of securities markets. The relationship between an undertaking 
providing investment services and products to customers, such as an intermediary, investment 
adviser or CIU and its customers is the basis for fair, sound and efficient functioning of 
                                                          
1428 Justi  Fo  & Ja  W. La s h, What Good a e “ha eholde s?   Ha a d Busi ess ‘e ie  < 
https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders > Accessed 09 November 2017 
1429 Da id G. Yosifo , The Co su e  I te est i  Co po ate La    U i e sit  of Califo ia Da is La  ‘e ie  
243 < https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/43/1/articles/43-1_Yosifon.pdf > Accessed 09 November 2017 
1430 ‘o e t G. Ha se  & Joh  ‘. Lott, E te alities a d Co po ate O je ti es i  a Wo ld ith Di e sified 
“ha eholde /Co su e s     Jou al of Fi a ial a d Qua titati e A al sis  < 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2331386.pdf > 
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securities markets1431. The financial protection regime includes key principles that secure a high 
level of investor protection within the different sectors of the financial system. Two main 
principles that guarantee market integrity are transparency and disclosure in addition to the 
control of market conduct. The following sub-sections provide a thorough explanation to these 
principles and their role in safeguarding the interest of IC’s shareholders.  
Sub-section 1: Transparency in Operation and Performance 
500 Transparency definition. Transparency is the antidote of an ailing market. It refers to an 
environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, 
policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and financial 
policies, and the terms of accountability, are provided to the public in a comprehensible, 
accessible, and timely manner1432. Transparency is not defined in legal texts. The sole definition 
that can be found in this regard is doctrinal.  
501 Importance of transparency. Transparency is a key factor contributing to market 
efficiency and effectivity. Transparency permits effective market discipline that in its turn is a 
central provision for good corporate governance that guarantees market stability and restores 
investor confidence in the market1433. The connection between good governance and 
transparency is deep. Transparency is a major aspect of good governance it is the means through 
which investors can assess the value of the company and risks of its operations. Transparency is 
achieved through disclosure. Every undertaking functioning within a financial market has a 
disclosure obligation. The IC has a similar obligation. On an international level, the promotion 
of transparency took a major part in international declarations. The need for a corporate 
disclosure policy was addressed in the PIT declaration. It means having a policy tailored to the 
                                                          
1431 Wo ld Ba k G oup, Good P a ti es fo  Fi a ial Co su e  P ote tio   < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Good_Practices_for_Financial_CP.pdf > 
Accessed 09 November 2017 page 33 
1432 IMF Mo eta  a d E ha ge Affai s Depa t e t, “uppo t Do u e t fo  the Code of Good P a ti es o  
T a spa e  i  Mo eta  a d Fi a ial Poli ies  Pa t I I t odu tio ,  < 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/sup/part1.htm#appendix_III > 
1433 Bill Withe ell, The ‘ole of Ma ket Dis ipli e a d T a spa e  i  Co po ate Go e a e Poli  Ba ue de 
France International Monetary Seminar, Paris, May 2003) < 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/2717763.pdf > page 1 
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size, nature and activity of the company. Further ensures accurate and timely disclosure of 
material information including potential operational risks.  
502 Subject of Disclosure. The disclosure obligation consists of the dissemination of 
information deemed as material for securities market, investors and the public. The obligation 
requires full, accurate and effective dissemination. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: what information fulfil the disclosure obligation? Disclosure is performed in several 
stages throughout the life of the company. The issuer and the natural persons operating the 
company or holding major shareholding in other undertakings are subject of this obligation. 
French rules address the disclosure and communication of regulated information. Paragraph 1, 
provides a thorough explanation to the levels of disclosure of the regulated information. As for 
paragraph 2, it introduces the format and requirements connected to the disclosed information.   
§1: Continuous Disclosure 
503 Stages of disclosure. In the process of accomplishing market transparency undertakings 
including the IC, performing within the securities market have an obligation to meet the set 
disclosure requirements. The aim of these requirements is to help investor reach a well-
informed investment decision, in addition to permitting them to understand the actual financial 
situation and overall performance. Disclosure has several stages depending on the period of 
company’s life we are addressing. The first stage of disclosure is that made pre-sale. Meaning 
the disclosure of the information necessary to make a well-informed investment decision. In this 
stage, principally the issuer prepares and publishes prospectuses and KIID in European MS. 
Pre-sale disclosure is mandatory unlike marketing communication and advertisements made by 
market participants. Another stage of disclosure is that made in the point of sale. Such 
disclosure is of information that has immediate impact on the investment decision. The 
information disclosed in this stage are material and may be a turning point in the investment 
process. A perfect example of this information is that of percentage of share ownership and 
memberships of boards in similar companies. Generally, the impact of this form of information 
is a means to hinder conflicts of interests or serious share price change. Another example of this 
stage of disclosure is the analytical and evaluative services providing information on the market 
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for investors1434. The final stage of disclosure is that made regulatory and continuously post-
sale. Disclosure of timely and accurate information regarding company’s activities, financial 
situation, non-financial performance, adherence to responsible investment principles, and 
foreseeable risks1435. Disclosure is made to the public (reaching the widest possible audience) 
parallel to competent authority. The first two stages of disclosure formerly addressed in part I. 
this paragraph focuses on periodic and ongoing disclosure.  
504 Periodic disclosure. Periodic disclosure is a regular disclosure made with the competent 
authority and disseminated with the public. Listed companies should hold the market regularly 
informed of their situation and their perspectives through publications and communication. 
Periodic disclosure is an obligation legally imposed on issuers1436. They make this disclosure on 
an annual, half-yearly and quarterly basis of their financial and accounting information.  
505 Annual report. Disclosing annually in the form of an annual report prepared at the level 
of the company1437. Consists of company’s annual accounts, consolidated accounts for group of 
companies, management report1438, auditing report1439 in addition to a declaration of the 
responsible persons for the content of the annual report1440. Specifically for IC the AMF 
provides a minimum content requirement for annual reports that include alongside the 
previously mentioned information a description of the remuneration policy paid by the company 
to its personnel in addition to the method of their calculation1441. Further, IC includes in its 
                                                          
1434 Principle 23 IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation  
1435 Principle 13 IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
1436 For the purposes of this obligation, French rules introduce a definition for the issuer. Defined as any person or 
an entity that trade their securities on regulated markets 
1437 C. mon. fin., art. L. 451-1-2 ; Article 43.a (1) JSL of 2017  
1438 Prepared by the board (C. com., art. L. 225- . Co sists of a detailed des iptio  of o pa s a ti ities a d 
financial performance, the results of its achievements, description of principle and potential risks the company is 
facing, characteristics of the principle internal control and risk management procedures in addition to the 
description of its profits and losses and the measures taken to maintain the losses (C. com., art. L.225-100-1; 
Article 4.b Disclosure Regulation of 2004) 
1439 Article 73 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1440 AMF, régl. gén., art. 222-3 
1441 AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 33; Article 68.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
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periodic reports a statement of its assets and liabilities in addition to the composition of its 
portfolio1442.  
506 Half-yearly report. Issuers prepare half-yearly reports1443. This report provides a 
description to the complete accounts of the preceding semester, in addition to biannual activity 
report that indicates the important events occurring during the first semester in addition to the 
referral to principle transactions1444. The activity’s report also mentions company’s assets and 
liabilities, its portfolio composition, indications of distributed dividends and a recap of the 
redemption cap for the passing semester1445. The half-yearly report includes a declaration from 
the persons responsible for its content in addition to attaching auditors report1446. Under the 
Jordanian securities rules the half-yearly report is not included in the obligatory periodic 
disclosure in the JSL yet it is mentioned in the Disclosure Regulation.  
507 Quarterly report. The issuer produces a third type of periodic reporting, a quarterly 
report1447. The AMF general regulation do not mention this form of report yet it referred to it in 
its instruction DOC-2011-19 when addressing procedures and requirement of UCITS’ periodic 
disclosure1448. Under the Jordanian securities rules the issuer is obliged to publish the results of 
its initial activities. These results state net assets and liabilities of the company, minority rights, 
net distributed dividends, a resumé of company’s activities in addition to a comparative analysis 
to the numbers of the current year with preceding ones1449. This publication is similar in its 
content to the biannual activity report requested under French rules. Nonetheless, the Jordanian 
obligation requests this disclosure annually and separate from the annual report. The 
qualification of whether shareholders are better off with a biannual activities report or an annual 
one is necessary. This report shares similar content with half-annual and annual reports. 
Requesting this report annually undermines the importance of the annual report and provides 
this report with more importance. Shareholders and potential investors are more intrigued in 
                                                          
1442 Schedule B – Annex I UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1443 Article 68.1 (c) UCITS Dir. 2009/65; Article 6 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1444 AMF, régl. gén., art. 222-6 
1445 AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 32 
1446 AMF, régl. gén., art. 222-4 
1447 C. mon. fin., art. L. 451-1-2 IV ; Article 43.a (2) JSL of 2017 
1448 AMF, instr. 2011-19, art. 32 
1449 Article 3 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
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being informed of the activities and the outcomes of the performance of the company, through a 
summarized content rather than having to go through the annual report whose content may be 
beyond their knowledge or basic comprehension. Shareholders and potential investors are better 
off if this report became part of half-yearly report. Half-yearly report in Jordan includes similar 
information to that mentioned in the activity report. It is more convenient to shareholders and 
investors to have such an analysis at an early stage in the financial year ahead of reviewing the 
complete analysis.  
508 Ongoing disclosure. Ongoing disclosure is the disclosure of material information deemed 
vital to ensure an informed market and investor. This information influences the value of the 
company within the market and potential risks of operation. The obligation imposed on issuers 
to make public material information that they know of1450. This includes the information that 
comes to the knowledge of the company post the communication of its periodic reports and hold 
a change for previously published information1451. Meaning the information that may influence 
investment or disinvestment decisions. This form of disclosure requires issuers to be in 
coherence with their financial information. This ongoing disclosure consists of a special 
disclosure. The specialty is related to particular forms of disclosure relating to share ownership 
and rights related to shares1452, shareholders agreement1453, statements of intent1454, trading of 
senior managers in company’s shares1455, board decisions that influence the value of securities 
on the market1456, changes in AOA1457, and material changes in the assets and liabilities of the 
company1458. Further to the information relating to disputes and lawsuits that the company 
forms part thereof1459. 
509 Importance of Special disclosure. The entirety of the special disclosure relates to a piece 
of information having crucial influence on the overall financial situation of the company. 
                                                          
1450 Article 43.d JSL of 2017; Article 8 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1451 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-5 
1452 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-21; Article 8.a (3,6) Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1453 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-18 
1454 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-7 
1455 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-6 
1456 Article 8.o Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1457 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-19 
1458 Article 8.a (1) Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1459 Article 8.k Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
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Disclosure of the changes in share ownership and the rights related to shares is connected to the 
cases of having major holdings due to a purchase, issuing of new securities or changes in 
ownership due to dilutions, takeovers and mergers. These changes influence the price and value 
of shares on the market. The disclosure of the changes in the statements of intent is of 
importance to shareholders and potential investors in determining and evaluating cases of 
conflicts of interest. Reporting of trading by senior manager in company shares is important in 
cases of having an operation subject to suspicion of significant impact over the securities and 
the rights of their holders. The disclosure of current disputes and lawsuits is necessary to define 
the impact of such legal proceedings over the profitability and financial standing of the 
company. Both ongoing and periodic disclosure have a common aim that is to provide 
shareholders, potential investors and the market with an overview of company’s financial 
situation and the procedures of risk management. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: How are the disclosed information disseminated? The following paragraph 2 
provides an exhaustive answer to this question. 
§2: Accuracy and Timing of Disclosure 
510 Effective dissemination. Appropriate transparency is ensured through a regular flow of 
information. The information include what is called under French rules “regulated information”. 
Regulated information is a term used to designate documents and information provided by listed 
companies to the public and communicated to competent authorities. They include annual 
report, half-yearly report, management report, corporate governance report1460, reports 
indicating governmental payments, the communication of audit fees, information related to the 
total number of voting rights and shares constituting the capital, models of buybacks, material 
information, shares related information and the disclosure made with the competent 
authority1461. The disclosure obligation is imposed on issuers1462. They are required to make full 
and effective dissemination of information to the public and the competent authority. The 
effectivity and complete dissemination is achieved through accurate, clear, integral and timely 
                                                          
1460 C. com., art. L. 225-37 
1461 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-1 
1462 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-18 
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publication of the information1463. Meaning a publication that reaches the largest public possible 
within a short period of time using procedures that ensure the integrity of information1464.  
Under French rules, issuers’ diffusion obligation covers the entirety of regulated information 
except for the information that relate to crossing the share participation threshold. The 
disseminating of this category of information is made directly by the AMF1465.  
511 Preparation. Financial reports and statements disseminated by issuers consist of 
technical explanations and details, they provide snapshot of the risk exposure and the decisions 
undertook by the management. Their readability and consistency is a place of importance for 
shareholders and potential investors. Governing legal rules address the necessity to prepare 
these documents in an accurate, precise and clear manner1466. To achieve such requirements the 
competent authority control the content and the presentation of the information. The 
competence is further endorsed in the governing legal rules. Under French rules the regulated 
information are prepared in French language or any other commonly used language in the 
financial field1467. The terminology of the information should take into consideration the level 
of financial literacy of the public. The financial protection regime introduces the principle of 
“know-your-customer” to address the necessary protection for investors lacking financial 
literacy and awareness. The French Cour de Cassation affirmed this concept in considering the 
profession of an investor or having a management shareholder as enough evidence for the 
existence of a level of financial knowledge and competence1468. The accuracy imposes the 
obligation to avoid misleading information and having an up to date disclosure (arises the 
importance of the ongoing disclosure of changes in disclosed information). As an example for 
full and precise disclosure, the ongoing disclosure of material information with the Jordanian 
                                                          
1463 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-3 
1464 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 II 
1465 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-3 
1466 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-1 
1467 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-2; a similar requirement under the Jordanian rules is made under the newly enacted 
law addressing the protection of the Arabic language. This law imposes an obligation on public authorities and 
companies to use the Arabic language in its correspondences, communications and records (Article 3 Law on the 
Protection of the Arabic Language of 2015). This rule may be applicable to the language of the disclosure. This rule 
does not prevent the companies from using any other foreign language nonetheless, they are required to attach an 
Arabic translation 
1468 Cass. Com., 7 Avril 2010, n° 09-13972 
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competent authority is provided in a detailed report1469. The preparation of financial documents 
and statements is a crucial process in the dissemination of the information. The documents at 
the level of preparation should consider three main principles of being accurate, precise and 
clear. Meaning full and effective disclosure prepared in accordance with internationally 
accepted auditing principles and standards1470.  
512 Diffusion process. Financial documents and statements in addition to any material 
information having significant impact over the value of the company in the market should be 
disseminated in a complete and effective manner to the public1471 and the competent 
authority1472. This dissemination is made either electronically1473 or through written press1474. 
The listed company has two options in publishing its regulated information; either it diffuses the 
information directly on its website and electronically with the competent authority or indirectly 
through a primary information provider1475. The issuer is considered as complying with its 
disclosure obligation if the electronic dissemination reached the largest possible public in the 
shortest period of time1476. If transmitted to media it provides full information in a manner 
ensuring secure transmission, minimizing the risk of data corruption and unauthorized access, 
and allows total certainty as to the source of the transmitted information. Further if the 
dissemination permits the public to clearly identify the issuer, the purpose of the information, 
and the date and time at which the information were transmitted1477. Listed companies make 
financial disclosure through written press. This disclosure should be at a frequency and in a 
presentation format considered appropriate given the type of issued financial securities, the size 
of the company and shareholder base1478. This disclosure should not be misleading and should 
                                                          
1469 Article 9 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1470 Article 14 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; AMF, Recommendation DOC-2016-09: Financial Statements; Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, 
consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC [2013] OJ L 182/19 (known as the accounting directive) 
1471 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-3 
1472 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-5 
1473 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-5 
1474 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 VI 
1475 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 IV 
1476 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 II 
1477 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 II 
1478 AMF, régl. gén., art. 221-4 VI 
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be consistent with the regulated information disseminated electronically. In addition to the 
periodic and ongoing disclosure, listed companies disseminate their corporate governance 
report1479 in addition to the observations of auditors1480 to the public in a similar manner to the 
dissemination of regulated information1481. This disclosure follows the deposit made with the 
greffe of the Tribunal de commerce.  
513 National dissemination. The disclosure within the sphere of Jordanian rules is also made 
in soft and hard copies yet in a rather different manner. The public dissemination is mandatory 
for the entirety of regulated information, periodic1482 and ongoing1483. The method of 
dissemination is made through written press, electronically by way of email send to securities 
holders or through any means of public diffusion accepted by the JSC1484. On the other hand, 
the dissemination is optional for quarterly reports1485. On an EU level, financial documents are 
provided in a durable medium, by way of website or a paper copy upon the request of the 
investor1486. The methods of dissemination provided by French rules are consistent with the 
concept of durable medium1487. The effective disclosure requires constant accessibility to an 
unchanged reproduction of the information for an adequate period of time for the purposes of 
the disclosed information. EU rules state an obligation to provide investors with financial 
documents free of charge upon their request1488. In France regulated information are stored and 
centralized to be permanently accessible through a dedicated website operated by the 
Directorate of Legal and Administrative Information1489. In Jordan, the JSC provides on its 
general website a heading dedicated to disclosed information by listed companies1490. The 
accessibility is open for recent and ancient publications and communication of listed companies 
                                                          
1479 C. com., art. L. 225-37; C. com., art. L. 225-68 
1480 C. com., art. L. 225-235 
1481 AMF, régl. gén., art. 222-9 
1482 Annual report: Article 5 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; half-yearly report: Article 6.a 5 Disclosure Regulation of 
2004 
1483 Article 8 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1484 Article 43.c JSL of 2017 
1485 Article 43.c JSL of 2017 
1486 Article 75.3 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1487 A means enabling investors to store the addressed information. They remain accessible for future reference 
during an adequate period of time while allowing an unchanged reproduction of the information (Article 2.1 (m) 
UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1488 Article 75.3 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1489 http://www.info-financiere.fr/; C. mon. Fin., art. L. 451-1-6 
1490 http://jsc.gov.jo/public/Arabic.aspx?site_id=2&Lang=1&Page_Id=3424&menu_id2=147  
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for the period of ten years following the date of storage on the French database1491. The 
Jordanian rules do not provide for such archive requirement. It is a matter of internal archiving 
procedure. 
514 Timely disclosure. The dissemination of financial and material information should be 
made regularly and in a timely fashion as provided for in the governing legal rules. Depending 
on the type of disclosed information, the time limit requested for the disclosure also differs. 
Annual reports hold the longest period for disclosure three months following the end of the 
financial year1492. The half-yearly report submitted and made public one month following the 
end of the concerned period1493. The quarterly report is published thirty days following the end 
of the relevant quarter1494. As for the ongoing disclosure, the publication is made immediately 
once the company is informed1495. The question rising in this regard is the following: what 
happens if the listed company does not comply with the time limits provided for the disclosure?  
515 Failure to disclose. The amending transparency directive considers the failure to make 
public regulated information within the set time limit as a breach of the disclosure 
obligation1496; therefore, it provides the competent authority in the MS with a sanctioning power 
over the cases entailing such breach1497. This statement is adopted under French law in the 
financial and monetary code1498, despite the explicit exemption of OEIC from the application of 
the transparency directive1499. The exercise of this power by the AMF is made on several steps. 
                                                          
1491 The period was changed from five to ten in the latest European amendments of the Transparency Directive; C. 
mon. fin., art. L. 451-1-6 
1492 Article 5 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; a longer period is provided in French rules four months (C. mon. fin., 
art. D. 214-31-2) 
1493 Article 6.a Disclosure Regulation of 2004; longer period provided in French rules two months following the end 
of the relevant half (C. mon, fin., art. D. 214-31-2) 
1494 Article 43.a (2) JSL of 2017; they are not mentioned as obligatory in the AMF general regulation nonetheless 
the referral to this form of report is made in the Instruction 2011-19. The publication of this report is required for 
the IC two months following the end of the relevant quarter (AMF, Instr. DOC-2011-19, art. 32.II) 
1495 Article 8 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; rapidly disclosed under French rules (AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-5) 
1496 Article 28.a Amending Transparency Dir. 2013/50 
1497 A ti le .  A e di g T a spa e  Di . / ; Bou ou Keita, L Appli a ilit  Di e te et ‘ t oa tive du 
‘ gle e t MA‘ e  Mati e de ‘ p essio  des Ma ue e ts à la Co u i atio  Fi a i e    Bull. Joly 
Bourse 23 ; AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 21 december 2017, n° SAN-2017-15 
1498 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-  I; “ l ie “alles, Nou elle Affi atio  de l O je tif de P se atio  de l O d e Pu li  
Economique – A P opos des “a tio s Ad i ist ati es P o o es pa  l AMF    Gazette du Palais 24; Cons. 
cons., déc. n° 2017-634 QPC, 2 juin 2017 
1499 Article 1 TD 2004/109 
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First step, a public declaration of the non-compliance. The declaration designates the concerned 
person and the occurring breach. Second step is an order issued by the board of the AMF 
requiring the undertaking after hearing its deposition, to cease the conduct constituting the 
breach in a process known as an administrative injunction1500. Third step is to request a judicial 
injunction to cease the irregularity and remove the effects of the breach1501. A request made by 
the president of the AMF with the president of the Tribunal of Grand Instance of Paris. 
Generally, the AMF can at all times resort to administrative sanctioning pecuniary or not under 
its general sanctioning power previously explained in title 1. As part of indirect investor 
protection, the AMF maintains a list of the companies failing in their disclosure obligation 
accessible on its website. The Jordanian rules do not provide particular administrative actions 
for the failure to disclosure. The failure qualified as a breach of securities rules and redressed 
under the general rules provided in the JSL. The most obvious sanction imposed in this regard 
include the suspension, limitation or annulment of the license post a deposition hearing of the 
licensee in question1502. The lack of specialized immediate measure when facing a failure of 
disclosure affects the value of the financial protection regime provided for investors in the 
securities market. The applicability of the general sanctioning rules is good but not enough. The 
JSC is advised to provide a list of the breaching listed companies on its website. On the other 
hand, the JSC publishes regularly a reminder for listed companies to provide it with their 
disclosed financial information.  
516 Conduct and disclosure. The effectivity and evolution of market transparency influences 
the effectiveness of market discipline. The disclosure alone is not enough to provide the 
intended level of investor protection. Shareholders and potential investors need clearly set rules 
of conduct of IC on the market. Company’s conduct on the market if transparent and clean 
restores the confidence of investors in the market and ensures a well-functioning financial 
market. The following sub-section 2, addresses securities market operation. In the sense, that 
provides practical and legal examples of abusive market practices and the legal means used to 
prevent them. 
                                                          
1500 C. mon. fin., art. R. 621- ; A lie Bellezza, Les Appo ts de la Loi “api  II e  Mati e Fi a i e    
Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé 544  
1501 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-14 II 
1502 Articles 60 & 109 JSL of 2017 
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Sub-section 2: Market conduct 
517 Cleanness and integrity. Markets depend on investors. Investors use markets that they 
trust. If investors believe that the market is manipulated this will lower the chances of them 
seeking this market. To restore and maintain investors’ confidence in the securities market, the 
market should set as its main objective having transparent behavior and outlawing abusive 
market behaviors. This objective is achieved through a regulatory framework that prohibits 
market manipulation and market abuse practices, sanctions such practices and employs 
preventive and detective measures to avoid the rise of such practices within the securities 
market. Fulfilling the disclosure obligation by market participants is a key factor for a 
transparent and clean market yet it is not enough on its own. Particularly the disclosure of inside 
information forms the core component of a well-functioning securities market. Therefore, this 
disclosure requires the existence of a legal obligation and prohibition. An obligation to disclose 
and a prohibition for the unlawful use or disclosure. Inside information alongside other abusive 
actions, negatively affect the securities market. The following paragraphs address main market 
abusive behaviors (paragraph 1) and the regulatory action taken to incumbent their effect 
(paragraph 2).  
§1: Violative Practices on the Market 
518 Definition. Market abuse practices are those conducts holding a violation of the market 
integrity and the collective interest of investors. The conducts have two main natures or 
categories. First insider dealing relating to unlawful use of inside information. The conducts in 
this category hold significant risk and losses partially over investors in the sense creating 
inequality between them therefore violating market integrity. The second category includes 
market manipulation meaning, the behaviors that leads to a modification in the proper 
functioning of securities. Behaviors included in this category do not necessarily hold negative 
impact over the market, yet; their prohibition and prevention is due to an attempt to safeguard 
the confidence in the securities market. These actions do not generally hold a violation of the 
equality between market participants. What these actions do is manipulating the market to orient 
the investment decisions in a specific path.  
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519 Initiated operations. The first category of market abuse practices includes a set of 
behaviors that hold the character of initiation. There is a person that initiates a specific behavior 
that is later qualified as market abusive. The main requirement for the qualification of these 
forms of behaviors are inside information. Inside information as the precise and confidential 
information having an influential nature over the financial value and the realized operation1503. 
It is an information that was not made public, concerns directly, indirectly an issuer, or the 
securities. This information if made public is presumably having sensible effect over the 
concerned securities or their derivatives1504. It is an information that the reasonable investor 
may use as the basis for its investment decision1505. Inside information does not include 
investment recommendations and analysis provided in financial and economic studies1506. The 
question rising in this regard is the following: what are the behaviors qualified as market abuse 
practices and hold an initiative character? The behaviors include three forms of practices that 
are prohibited in the governing securities rules: insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside 
information, and market soundings. In addition to a forth form that is qualified as so under 
national legal rules that is the failure to disclose inside information.  
520 Insider dealing. Insider dealing is defined as the use of insider information. Not any use 
insider dealing requires the use of the information for one’s own account or the account of third 
party by acquiring it or disposing it directly or indirectly, or by way of amending or cancelling 
an order or transaction1507. This form of insider dealing is particularly seen in cases involving an 
informed person such as members of management. Another form of behavior mounts to insider 
dealing is the use of inducements and recommendations referred from an informed person 
recommending this person to engage in insider dealing1508. The recommendation is of disposing, 
or acquiring the information relating to a security or cancelling or amending an already placed 
transaction or order. Jordanian rules do not provide a detailed explanation to the forms of 
behaviors consisting the use of inside information as the MAR does. The law uses the term 
                                                          
1503 Definition provided by the French jurisprudence (Cass. Crim., 26 Juin 1995, n° 93- 81646); AMF Sanctioning 
commission decision of 29 September 2017, n° SAN-2017-08; Anne-Cathe i e Mulle , I fo atio  P i il gi e: 
“e si ilit  de l I fo atio , AMF SAN-2017-08, Revue des Sociétés, 2018 (1), p. 64 
1504 As defined in MAR article 7 
1505 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
1506 Article 2 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1507 Article 8 MAR; Article 105.o JSL of 2017 
1508 Article 8.3 MAR; Article 105.h JSL of 2017 
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‘exploitation’ to address the use of the information. The term is elastic, can be extended to cover 
the disposing and acquiring of information and the exploitation to realize a financial gain 
whether the information related to a security has or not a priory placed order or transaction. 
Nonetheless, the term ‘exploitation’ requires further regulatory interference to lay down a 
satisfying definition. An insider or an informed person principally performs insider dealing.   
521 Insider. Who is the insider? There are three forms of insiders depending on the degree of 
connection to the listed company. Primary, secondary and tertiary1509. A primary insider is the 
person who possesses inside information due to being a member of the administration or 
management of the listed company1510. A secondary insider is the person who holds inside 
information due to its profession or duties or the exercise of employment1511. An example for 
this category are the employees in securities market, agents of the competent authority, an 
investment services provider receiving information from an agent of the competent authority. A 
tertiary insider is any person that does not fall under the first two categories and comes across 
inside information such as having a holding in the listed company or being involved in a 
criminal activity1512. The insider may be a moral or natural person.  
522 Prohibiting insider dealing. Insider dealing is considered a market abuse practice 
prohibited under governing legal rules. The prohibition is for any person that engages or 
attempts to engage in insider dealing or recommends or induces another person to engage in 
insider dealing1513. The prohibition under the Jordanian rules does not include the attempt to 
engage in insider dealing. The law considers as a prohibition the exploitation of the information 
or trading in securities based on inside information1514. The attempt to engage in insider dealing 
came as an inducement to investor protection and market integrity in the regulatory process on 
an EU level. The fact that Jordanian rules do not explicitly state the attempt as an equivalent 
                                                          
1509 Da id Mu esia u, L I fo atio  P i il gi e « exogène » : toute Information Privilégiée doit-elle P o e i  d u  
E etteu    Bull. Joly Bourse 411 
1510 An automatic presumption due to the position these individuals hold (Article 23 Disclosure Regulation of 2004); 
affirmed by French jurisprudence the existence of simple knowledge due to the position (Cass. Crim., 15 mars 
1993, n° 92-82263). A simple prove of delegation of powers is enough to transfer the criminal liability if a market 
abuse practice is in question (Cass. Crim., 19 oct. 1995, n°  94-83884) 
1511 Article 2 JSL of 2017; Article 8.4 MAR 
1512 Article 8.4 MAR 
1513 Article 14 MAR 
1514 Article 105.h,o JSL of 2017; Jo. Co. admin., 5 july 2015, n° 90/2015 
 
291 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
abusive practice does not undermine the protective measure provided in the rules. Yet the 
existence of such prohibition is of good use to maintain market integrity. Nonetheless, this 
prohibition may impose further burden of proof on the part of the investor or the authority when 
challenging the practice qualified as an attempt to insider dealing.  
523 Permitting insider dealing. Another detail that the Jordanian rules disregarded is the 
possibility of having a legitimate behavior not entailing insider dealing. The rules do not 
mention the possibility of proving that a person may have been in possession of inside 
information yet implemented and maintained measures and procedures that ensure that the 
information were obtained in a legitimate course for purposes relating to a position he holds. 
Further established measures that ensures the person responsible for the decision was not in 
possession of the information or proving that the concerned person did not make any 
recommendation or inducement based on the inside information that he holds. These behaviors 
were considered as legitimate and do not entail insider dealing under the MAR1515. 
524 Communication. Unlawful disclosure of inside information is another form of market 
abuse practice entailing the communication of inside information outside the scope of the 
normal disclosure due to the exercise of an employment, a profession or duties1516. The 
unlawful nature arises from performing a prohibited disclosure by any of the categories of the 
above-mentioned insiders. The abuse is qualified with simple communication of the information 
without the need to prove the consciousness of the insider. The market abuse practice does not 
extend to the communication of information that precede the announcement of transactions in 
order to measure the interest of potential investors in this transaction in addition to the 
conditions it entails including potential size and pricing. This communication is known as 
‘market soundings’1517. The control of the circulation of inside information forms part of the 
operational and professional obligations imposed on market participants, particularly in terms of 
                                                          
1515 Article 9 MAR 
1516 Article 105.z JSL of 2017 ; Article 10 MAR 
1517 Article 11 MAR 
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maintaining operational the necessary measures to prevent unlawful circulation of these 
information1518.  
525 Market soundings. Market soundings are introduced in the MAR through an approach 
made by MS. Market soundings may entail the disclosure of inside information. MAR provides 
precautionary measures to be taken by market participant ahead of producing market soundings. 
The disclosing market participants should obtain the consent of the person receiving the market 
sounding to receive inside information, further inform this person that he/she is prohibited from 
using or attempting to use this information in a manner resulting into a case of insider dealing or 
unlawful disclosure of inside information1519. Most importantly informing the person receiving 
the market sounding of the confidentiality of the information and that he/she is obliged to 
maintain this information confidential. The communicated information should be internally 
communicated only through pre-determined reporting channels and on a need-to-know basis1520. 
The Jordanian law do not address this form of information communication. The main aim of 
this European approach is to strengthen the market abuse framework by extending its scope of 
application to new markets, behaviors and platforms. The recently implemented Jordanian 
securities law of 2017 has a similar aim. Yet the law does not provide a regulatory framework 
for such a particular case of disclosure. The reasoning may be in the generality of the existing 
rules that hinder any unlawful disclosure. The prohibitions under the Jordanian rules came 
general and their scope of application may be extended to include market soundings; yet 
implicitly. Eventually market sounding is a form of communication of information if it entails 
inside information and was considered as unlawfully disclosed then it is prohibited and qualified 
as a market abuse practice. If it did not include inside information or included but was disclosed 
lawfully, then the violation does not rise and there is no legal provision prohibiting such form of 
communication. One case example can be given to market soundings under the Jordanian rules 
                                                          
1518 AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 14 December 2017, n° SAN-2017-11 
1519 Article 11.4 MAR 
1520 E“MA, MA‘ Guideli es: Pe so s ‘e ei i g Ma ket “ou di gs  E“MA/ /  of  No e e   < 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2016-1477_mar_guidelines_-_market_soundings.pdf >  
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is the case of disclosure of the intention of the shareholder of an issuer who wishes to acquire 
ten percent of the total capital of the listed company1521. 
526 Market manipulation. Market manipulation is the attempt to interfere with free and fair 
operation of the market by performing activities creating false or misleading appearances on the 
market1522. The activities constituting market manipulation are addressed exhaustively under the 
MAR. The MAR further prohibits the person engaging or attempting to engage in such 
behaviors1523. On the other hand, the Jordanian rules provide two main broad forms of activities 
that in one way or the other implicitly cover similar scope to that of the MAR. These activities 
are not defined under the Jordanian rules as market manipulation practices, they are merely 
considered as prohibited practices1524. Activities entailing market manipulation can be divided 
into three categories. First category covering behaviors relating to securities entailing the 
activities relating to a transaction or order placed such as giving false or misleading signals 
securing the prices of securities, employing fictitious device or using deceptive forms or 
invention1525. This category concerns the attempt to provide a false or misleading image of the 
size and price of trading (there is a presumption of manipulative action or behavior unless it was 
proven that it was carried out for legitimate reasons). The second category involves a 
dissemination of information1526. The third category covers uncompetitive practices1527. The 
Jordanian rules state explicitly the first two categories. Nonetheless, the third category can be 
implicitly covered under the general scope of application of the first category.  
527 Dissemination of information. The second category of manipulative practices include 
the dissemination of information. Information that gives or is likely to give misleading or false 
signals concerning securities or secures or is likely to secure the price of a security including 
dissemination of rumors. Further to the transmission of this information to provide false or 
misleading inputs in relation to a benchmark or any other behavior manipulating the calculation 
                                                          
1521 Article 13 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1522 Farlex Financial Dictionary (Farlex international 2017) 
1523 Article 15 MAR 
1524 Article 106 JSL of 2017 
1525 Article 12.1 (a,b) MAR; Article 106.b JSL of 2017 
1526 Article 12.1 (c,d) MAR; Article 106.a JSL of 2017 
1527 Article 12.2 MAR 
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of such benchmark1528. This activity is conditional to the actual or presumed knowledge of the 
person disseminating the information with false and misleading content. Another form of 
dissemination of information is the case involving a person taking advantage of a regular or 
occasional appearance in the media to cast an opinion over a security. This activity is 
conditional to the person, who has previously taken positions relating to the security in question, 
profits from the impact of the opinion and exists a case of conflicts of interest that was not 
properly disclosed to the public1529. The Jordanian rules provided another general framework for 
this form of activity. They address rumors and information that are misleading or false affecting 
the price of a security or the reputation of the issuer. If the information influence the securities 
or the transaction other than the price, they are governed under the first category. The 
dissemination is general under the Jordanian rules. There is no limit on the form of 
dissemination.  
528 Dominant position. The third category of market manipulation activities include those 
activities securing a dominant position over a security which has or is likely to have an effect of 
fixing prices or creating unfair trading conditions. Buy or selling at the opening or closing of the 
market to influence the decision of potential investors acting based on displayed prices.  
529 Failure to disclose. Disclosure is a core aspect of market transparency and integrity. 
Understanding the impact inside information may have on the market and its participants, the 
securities rules took a regulatory step in addressing this importance by including a mandatory 
imposition to disclose inside information once the company becomes informed with their 
existence1530. In order to provide a level-playing field on the market and avoid any unlawful use 
of this information. The former paragraph addressed the disclosure obligation and sanctioning 
imposed on companies who fail to disclose. This failure include inside information1531. The 
competent authority sanctions this failure administratively and not criminally1532. The Jordanian 
rules do not provide any statement concerning the obligation or the failure to disclose. The 
Jordanian rules distinguish between material information included under the ongoing disclosure 
                                                          
1528 AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 2 November 2017, n° SAN-2017-09 
1529 Article12.2 (d) MAR 
1530 Article 17 MAR 
1531 AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 13 April 2018, n° SAN-2018-03 
1532 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-2 
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obligation and inside information. Material information refers to an information or event 
affecting the investment decision1533. As for inside information, it is a confidential information 
relating to the issuer or the security that may have an effect on the price of the security if made 
public1534. The disclosure obligation and failure to disclose covers merely material information 
mentioned in the former paragraph. No such obligation is provided for inside information. The 
question rising in this regard is the following: how can market abuse practices be controlled? 
Investors’ protection and market integrity requires the existence of a set of measures and 
procedures to counterpart the effects and prevent such practices. The following paragraph 
addresses control measures performed in three different forms prevention, detection and 
deterring. 
§2: Controlling Market Abuse Practices 
530 Prevention. Investors need a clean market they can trust and seek. To guarantee the 
transparency and integrity of the market the securities rules interfere in a regulatory framework 
that impose a series of requirements and obligations on market participants in an attempt to 
prevent the rise of market abuse practices. These impositions form preventive measures. They 
are performed both internally by the listed company1535 and externally by the competent 
authority. They include the disclosure obligation generally1536 and that of inside information1537. 
The disclosure extends to that of suspicious transactions1538. On different setting listed 
companies should maintain and hold at all times an updated and detailed list of insiders1539. This 
list contains the details of every person that has the access to inside information within the 
company including employees, contractors or any person during the functioning of its tasks has 
access to the information, detailing in the list the reasons for including this person in the list1540. 
                                                          
1533 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
1534 Article 2 JSL of 2017 
1535 Oli ia Dufou , E etteu s, “ u isez le T aite e t de os I fo atio s P i il gi es  I te ie  de Ch istia  
“ h i ke DG de l AN“A     Bull. Jol  Bou se  ; L die Boussa d, L'adaptatio  des e t ep ises à la 
réforme des listes d'initiés: les outils i te es au se i e de la p e tio  des d lits et a ue e ts d'i iti s  
  ‘e ue I te atio ale de la Co plia e et de l Ethi ue des Affai es  
1536 Article 4 Disclosure Regulation of 2004; Article 43 JSL of 2017 
1537 Article 17 MAR 
1538 AMF, régl. gén., art. 223-6; Article 16 MAR 
1539 Article 18.1 MAR 
1540 D. Muresianu, n (1509) page 412 
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The list should be communicated to the competent authority. Every person whose name is 
mentioned in the list should provide an acknowledgement of legal and regulatory duties and 
should be aware of the applicable sanctions1541. The insider list should be maintained by listed 
companies for a period not less than five years following the date of its update or its drawing 
up1542. The disclosure obligation is imposed on the persons discharging managerial 
responsibilities1543 and their closely associated persons1544 to disclose in details the transaction 
made to their own account in relation to the securities of listed company they manage1545. A 
close enough obligation is mentioned in the Jordanian rules is the disclosure of share ownership 
and the changes of this ownership1546. This form of disclosure performs a preventive measure 
against market abuse, particularly insider dealing. It is a highly valuable source of information 
to investors1547.  
531 Detection. The detection is as important as the prevention. Detection relates to 
transaction and order already placed or ongoing. Further, it covers the different practices and 
behaviors on the market and in the surrounding spheres. The detection is an external and 
internal control. Both the competent authority and listed companies should establish and 
maintain effective arrangements, systems and procedures to detect any suspicious orders and 
transactions. The listed company should lay down a code of conduct and an internal operational 
policy that its different components comply with. The code of conduct and the internal policy 
address among other things clean operations and take into consideration the interests of 
shareholders. Further, it refers to the necessity to manage risk exposure including operational 
                                                          
1541 Article 18.2 MAR 
1542 Article 18.5 MAR 
1543 Defi ed as a pe so  ithi  a listed o pa  ho is: a e e  of the ad i ist ati e, a age e t o  
supervisory body of that entity; or a senior executive who is not a member of the bodies referred to, who has 
regular access to inside information relating directly or indirectly to that entity and power to take managerial 
de isio s affe ti g the futu e de elop e ts a d usi ess p ospe ts of that e tit  (Article 3.1 (25) MAR) 
1544 Defi ed as a spouse, o  a pa t e  o side ed to e e ui ale t to a spouse i  a ordance with national law; a 
dependent child; a relative who has shared the same household for at least one year on the date of the transaction 
concerned; or a legal person, trust or partnership, the managerial responsibilities of which are discharged by a 
person discharging managerial responsibilities or by a person referred to, which is directly or indirectly controlled 
by such a person, which is set up for the benefit of such a person, or the economic interests of which are 
substantially equivalent to those of such a person’ (Article 3.1 (26) MAR) 
1545 Article 19.1 MAR 
1546 Article 12 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1547 Recital 58 MAR 
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risks1548. Competent authority exercises the detection as part of its supervisory and investigatory 
powers. Clearly seen in, inspection and reviews performed at the domicile of listed companies 
further to the accessibility to the entirety of company’s documentation1549. The cooperation and 
exchange of information performed between the home competent authority and other 
authorities1550. In the process of detecting market abuse practices there must be market 
indicators that qualify a specific behavior as manipulative or not. On an EU level, these 
indicators are set in details in the MAR1551. No such detailed explanation is mentioned in the 
Jordanian rules. Nevertheless, the lack of this explanation does not hinder or prohibit the JSC 
from using the indicators it deems necessary or consulting experts in the qualifying process. 
532 Deterring. The control of market abuse practices requires the implementation of proper 
deterring measures that hinder or contain the negative effects of the practice. These measures 
generally exercised and laid down externally by the competent authority. The deterring measure 
consists of imposing administrative measures and sanctioning1552. Administrative measures 
exist without any prejudice to criminal sanctions existing nationally. The measures include 
requesting the market participant to cease the abusive conduct, redressing the harm by 
disgorging the gained profits from such conduct, withdrawing or suspending the license, 
suspension of the registration of the persons discharging managerial responsibilities, public 
warning and declaration of the infringing person and the type of infringement. These measures 
form part of the discretionary power of the competent authority as explained in the preceding 
title. The competent authority imposes pecuniary administrative sanctions over the infringing 
person.  
533 Pecuniary sanctions. The authority fines the person with two forms of fines. A general 
fine for the infringement of securities rules does not exceed one hundred thousand JOD1553 in 
addition to another fine that is the equivalent to twice the profit gained or the losses avoided yet 
                                                          
1548 Previously addressed in part I 
1549 Article 23.2 MAR 
1550 Article 25 MAR ; this cooperation and exchange finds an example in the MMOU signed between Israel 
Securities Authority and AMF as mentioned in AMF Sanctioning Commission decision of 18 December 2017, n° 
SAN-2017-12 
1551 Annex 1 MAR 
1552 Article 30 MAR; Article 107 JSL of 2017 
1553 The corresponding value in euros April 2018 is one hundred and fifteen thousand and seven hundred Euros 
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does not exceed five times either the gain or the loss1554. The administrative pecuniary sanction 
under the MAR was limited to the second form of fines. Those relating to the profit gained or 
losses avoided if they are determinable. The amount of the fine should be at least three times the 
profit or the loss without having a maximum multiplication. The fines under the MAR differ 
depending on the type of infringement and the market abuse practice further the amount differs 
between natural and legal infringer1555. Both rules have their advantages and disadvantages. Not 
having a cap for the maximum administrative fine can have negative effect on the financial 
situation of the listed company and eventually on its shareholders. Even if shareholders are 
benefiting from the sanctioning. Having two forms of fines can be financially excessive and 
exhaustive on the part of the infringing party for the same previous reasoning. Nonetheless, the 
huge amounts of fines that can be imposed on infringers is a means to deter the concerned 
person from any repetitive behavior and provides a lesson for other market participants or 
components. The intensity of administrative pecuniary sanction under French and EU rules 
finds its reasoning in the scope of the effect market abuse practice may have not only nationally 
in the MS but also on the entirety of the single market. The amounts imposed by the Jordanian 
legislature are satisfying for a market with the size of the Jordanian one.  
534 Imprisonment. In addition to the administrative sanction the securities rules impose an 
imprisonment sanction on the infringing party differing in the period from one market abuse 
practice to the other. The criminal sanctioning is possible alongside the administrative one. An 
approach aiming to strengthening the repressive measures to securities violation and market 
abuse. This may lead to having two sentencing proceedings for the same matter under two 
different systems judicial and administrative leading in some cases to arbitrary sanctioning. This 
issue was specifically witnessed in France. Therefore, French rules provide a system of double 
                                                          
1554 Article 107.a JSL of 2017 
1555 Article 30.2 MAR; infringements involving market abuse practice have pecuniary sanction with a minimum 
amount of five million euros for a natural person and fifteen million euros for a legal person. Infringements relating 
to preventive and detective measures and the public disclosure of inside information have pecuniary sanction with 
a minimum amount of one million euros for natural person and twenty five million euros for a legal person. As for 
i f i ge e ts elati g to ai tai i g a  i side  list a d dis losi g a age s t a sa tio s the  ha e a pe u ia  
sanction with a minimum amount of five hundred thousand euros for a natural person and one million euros for a 
legal person. The French rules provide a pecuniary sanction of ten million euros for the entirety of the mentioned 
infringements or tenfold the profit gained with the ten million as a minimum reference amount (C. mon. fin., art. L. 
465-1) 
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jeopardy applicable to the infringements committed under the securities rules such as market 
abuse practices. This procedure is known as the ‘aiguillage’.  
535 Aiguillage. French solution of aiguillage procedure came into existence post a QPC that 
was filled with the Conseil Constitutionnel. The Conseil Constitutionnel affirmed the 
unconstitutionality of the possibility to accumulate administrative and criminal sanctions and 
proceedings in matters of market abuse for the same person and infringement1556. The basis of 
this decision concerning cumulative sanctions is traced back to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality1557. The necessity allows for matters and behaviors conducted by the same 
person to be subject to different forms of sanctioning as long as different rules are applied 
before their proper jurisdiction. The proportionality when a cumulative sanctioning is in 
question limits the imposed sanction to the maximum amount provided by either forms of 
sanctions administrative or criminal. Other principles come into mind when explaining this 
approach, Non-bis in idem, the power of judged things, the right of defense, presumption of 
innocence and the separation of powers1558. The decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel do not 
refer to the principle of non-bis in idem. Meaning to the possibility of instituting a legal action 
twice for the same cause of action1559. Further, the decision took into consideration the fact that 
administrative sanctions are in fact criminal-law matter due to holding a criminal character 
despite the jurisdiction imposing them1560.  
536 Aiguillage mechanism. The solution addresses two case scenarios. The case of having a 
legal proceeding already in place and the other is the case of the intention to commence a legal 
proceeding1561. If either the public prosecutor for financial matters or the AMF have already 
commenced their legal proceedings, the other is prohibited from commencing a parallel 
proceeding for the same matter. The defining proceeding is the public action to implement the 
                                                          
1556 Cons. cons., déc. n° 2014-453/454 QPC, 18 mars 2015; Cons. cons., déc. n° 2015-513/514/526 QPC, 14 janvier 
2016 
1557 C. Gi estet, Cu ul de pei es et de “a tio s Ad i ist ati e , Cons. Cons., n° 2015-513/514/526, Dalloz 
Recueil, 2016, p. 2428 
1558 C. Gi estet, “a tio s , Co s. Co s., n° 2014-453/454, Dalloz Recueil, 2015, p. 2468 
1559 Oli ie  D i a, Le Fa tô e de ne bis in idem    ‘e ueil Dalloz  
1560 Article 6 ECHR; Grande Stevens and others v Italy (2015) App nos 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10 
and 18698/10 (ECtHR, 04 march 2014); C. Ginestet 2015, n (1558) page 2468 
1561 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 
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sanctions stated in the financial and monetary code by the prosecutor or an official complaint 
was already filed by the AMF1562. In the other case scenario, either the prosecutor1563 or the 
AMF1564 has the intention to launch a legal proceeding. In this case, each of the two should 
notify the other of this intention. Both have a period of two months to decide if they instead 
want to go through with the legal proceeding or they will leave it to the initiator. This case 
scenario grants the initiator a final saying in the whole process of exchange of intentions and 
hinder duplication of sanctions. The fact that the AMF notifies the prosecutor of its intention to 
file the official complaint instead of the latter or vice versa, the prosecutor notifies the AMF of 
his intention to proceed with the action is limited to a final decision made by the initiator within 
a period of fifteen days. Otherwise, the proceeding is transferred from one system to the other. 
The AMF remains in a stronger position to employ its administrative proceedings over the 
infringements involving market abuse. This position is justified by the fact that the prosecutor is 
conditioned in its proceedings to the authorization granted by the general prosecutor of the 
appeal court of Paris1565. Further to the rapidity, administrative sanctioning enjoys vis-à-vis 
lengthy criminal proceedings1566. The general prosecutor after hearing the observations of both 
the prosecutor of financial matters and the AMF issues an authorization or a refusal to authorize 
the prosecutor to go ahead with the public action. The refusal grants the AMF the jurisdiction to 
proceed with administrative sanctioning. As for the civil proceedings filed by a third party in 
relation to an infringement forming a market abuse practice and is being processed either 
administratively or criminally is allowed solely in the case where the sanctioning proceedings 
are held criminally1567.  
537 Jordanian approach. The Jordanian rules do not address a similar procedure. 
Nonetheless, the general legal theory states that private derogates public. The JSL is a private 
law that derogates yet does not prejudice the criminal law. The sanctions and proceedings 
mentioned in the JSL are applicable and fall under the jurisdiction of the competent court 
                                                          
1562 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 al. I 
1563 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 al. II 
1564 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 al. III 
1565 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 al. IV 
1566 Kat i  De ke t, Le hoi  d Aiguillage, u  Bo  Choi ?  i  La Réforme du Contentieux Boursier : Répression des 
Abus de Marché en France et Solution Etrangères (2016) 11 Bull. Joly Bourse 468 
1567 C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-6 al. VII 
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designated in the JSL. The Amman court of first instance is competent in the proceedings 
involving the violation of the securities rules or the decisions issued by the JSC1568, including 
market abuse practices. A conclusion implicitly deducted from the statement mentioned in the 
article imposing both forms of sanctioning pecuniary and imprisonment.  
538 Transition. In the course of addressing indirect control safeguarding shareholders interest 
in IC, the mere transparency is not enough. Transparency is guaranteed through a level of 
accountability for the breach of disclosure obligations in addition to the infringements 
negatively influencing the well-functioning of the company and consequently shareholders. The 
following section B addresses in details this accountability through an illustration of the 
accountable persons and the legally introduced forms of accountability.  
Section B: Accountability for Actions  
539 Definition. Accountability is seen as the obligation of a natural or moral person to 
account for its activities. A given situation where a natural or moral person is responsible for 
their actions or lack thereof and must be able to justify or give a satisfactory reason1569. Further, 
it is the acceptance of the responsibility for one’s activities and disclosing the results in a 
transparent manner. The most obvious synonyms for accountability include answerability, 
liability and responsibility.  
540 Scope of application. Accountability has a limited scope of application. Throughout the 
performance of the activities of the IC, not all the involved persons are accountable for harmful 
actions. The question rising in this regard is the following: who is the accountable person? 
Within the sphere of IC, the accountable person is any person discharging a responsibility. 
Particularly the accountable person includes members of management and auditors. 
Specifically, members of management and auditors who have been effectively appointed 
through a valid decision of appointing. A valid appointing means appointing in accordance with 
the applicable company law rules and relevant provisions of the AOA. Therefore having what is 
called a de jure management. The accountability extends to de facto or shadow management. 
                                                          
1568 Article 107.c JSL of 2017 
1569 Ca idge Ad a ed Lea e s Di tio a  rd edn, 2008) 
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Meaning the case involving a person who no attempt was made to formally appoint him as 
director nevertheless he acts as if he was validly appointed.  The accountability extends 
especially vis-à-vis third party.  
541 Dirigeant de fait. The notion of shadow management or what is called dirigeant de fait 
under French jurisprudence; includes also the person who freely and independently carries out 
management activities on a regular and continuous basis while having a void, an expired or non-
existing appointment deed1570.  
542 Importance. What is the origin of the accountability? The accountability results from the 
breach or infringement of a responsibility, obligation or duty that creates a liable action as a 
main outcome on the part of the accountable person.The importance of the accountability as a 
legal notion is found in its character. It is a form of an indirect control over the performance of 
the IC. Having strict legal rules that state the liability of management and auditors for their 
accountable actions. It is directly linked to the direct control (later addressed in chapter 2). It 
provides shareholders and the company with legal grounds for the enforcement action. This 
indirect control is explained through considering the accountability as a complementary action 
to a pre-existing responsibility or obligation. A character if implemented safeguards 
shareholders’ interest and ensures the proper functioning of the company. Accountability is a 
method to manage risk exposure. Particularly operational risks. Further to managing situations 
entailing conflicts of interest. The importance of the accountability is translated into the 
identification of the misconduct of the management (sub-section 1) further designating whether 
this misconduct mounts to a liable action. If it does what is the nature of this liability (sub-
section 2). 
Sub-section 1: Misconduct by Person Discharging Responsibility 
543 Expectation. When performing their duties and obligations, the persons discharging a 
responsibility (particularly management) are expected to present proper and lawful conduct 
                                                          
1570 Jean-Pierre Casimir et Michel Germain, Dirigeant de Sociétés : Juridique, Fiscal, Social (3rd edn, Groupe Revue 
Fiduciaire 2010) ; Cass. Com., 10 oct. 1995, n° 93-15.553; close to the concept of work of virtue under Jordanian 
general civil law rules (Article 301 Jo. Civil Code) ; Xa ie  Delpe h, Di igea t de fait   571 Juris Associations 
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throughout the course of their term. They should act when there is a duty or obligation in 
question. Therefore, non-compliance with the behavioral expectation results into holding the 
responsible persons accountable for the breach of responsibility or the omission. The 
management has a set list of duties and obligations that they should comply with and perform 
on a personal or collective basis. Nonetheless, the law allows the delegation of powers and 
responsibility. The question rising in this regard is the following: does the delegation include the 
transfer of liability? If the delegation was proven, the principal responsible person may be 
exempted from the liability. The following paragraphs introduce a list of the actions or 
omissions considered as misconduct and resulting in holding the person liable for the outcome 
(paragraph 1). Further to introducing the possible limitation of liability. Meaning exempting the 
responsible person from the liable action due to the existence of specific circumstances 
(paragraph 2).  
§1: Standing to Liability 
544 Source of liability. Directors, managing directors, executive officer, supervisory board 
and the executive board of listed companies are subject to a number of statutory controls. The 
control exemplified in various misconducts and infringements that mount to cases of liable 
actions. Generally, the liability relates to an action owed to shareholders, the company or third 
party (whether public or stakeholders). The accountability in the sphere of listed companies 
covers the company in addition to the persons discharging a responsibility. In this paragraph, we 
address examples of the liable actions addressed in the different governing rules (company law 
and securities law). We deal with these actions in two different categories depending on the 
liable person meaning, company’s and management liability.  
545 Company’s liability. The statement that considers the company as having separate liable 
action than that of its management is statutory debatable. The management acts on behalf of the 
company, operates and represents it. Nonetheless, the management may seek personal gains that 
holds them liable for their misconduct without holding the company liable as is except 
derivatively for their misconducts against third party. For example the Jordanian law considers 
the IC liable before third party (acting in good faith) for the performance of its board and 
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management1571. In this category of liable actions, the law considers the company as personally 
liable for violating company1572 or securities rules. A form of separate violation not necessarily 
resulting out of a misconduct or a conduct of the management practically difficult to envisage. 
These liable actions particularly include any conduct of the company abstaining from keeping 
the records and accounts as required by law, preventing the regular or on the spot audit of 
records1573, and disposing inexact or false records1574. In addition to issuing or trading in 
securities ahead of ratifying the AOA or the effective incorporation of the company or 
performing fictitious underwritings1575.  Exercising any deception or using misleading means in 
relation to the securities or any prohibited conduct1576 and providing portfolio investment 
services without a prior licensing1577. The Jordanian securities rules address the licensee 
(including the IC) separately from its management. Therefore, they state liable actions 
applicable to both the management and the company, yet the liability of the company does not 
entail a presumption of liability of the management1578. May be understood as means to transfer 
the burden of proof rather than addressing a separate liability of the company. This lack of 
presumption replaced the former existing presumption under the former temporary JSL of 2002 
is seen as an attempt of the legislature to provide the management with a larger margin to be 
innovative, take risks and be active in their decisions. These actions include abuse or misuse of 
company’s assets, exercising deception, prohibited activities and misleading, negatively 
influencing the competition in terms of price manipulation or negatively influencing the capital 
market1579, further to including incorrect or misleading information in the documents submitted 
with the securities authority1580.  
546 Management liability. The management is the representative of the company. The actual 
decision-maker. They include members of management, meaning board members and the 
                                                          
1571 Article 156.a JCC 
1572 Article 279.a JCC 
1573 Article 279 JCC 
1574 C. mon. fin., art. L. 232-  issue s lia ilit   
1575 Article 278.a JCC 
1576 Article 105.d JSL of 2017 
1577 Article 47 JSL of 2017 
1578 Article 107.h JSL of 2017 
1579 Article 56 JSL of 2017 
1580 Liable action imposed on both the company and the management under the Jordanian rules (Article 105..a 
JSL); personal liability presumed by the IC under the French rules (AMF, régl. gén., art. 422-65) 
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general manager. Generally, they are expected to act loyally, with care and diligence to fulfill 
the objectives of the company and act in the best interest of shareholders. The powers, duties 
and functions of the management put them in a place of accountability. Operating the company 
is not random. It is a process bestowed with care and loyalty due to all the concerned parts 
company, shareholders and third party. Therefore, the management is held liable for 
misconducts, faults1581 and omissions it commits throughout the operation of the company. The 
main liability in connection with the management of IC is that relating to the exercise of 
portfolio investments. The infringement of the licensing requirements by members of the board, 
general manager or an administrative responsible in the company results in the suspension of 
the license1582. The liability for providing investment services without a prior authorization as 
set in the governing securities rules1583. The liability stands also in relation to capital market 
infringements. The management is liable for market abuse practices. Including liability for 
unlawful disclosure of inside information1584, insider dealing1585 and influencing the 
competiveness in the market1586.  
547 Examples of misconduct. The management in exercising its activities and operating the 
company should comply with the governing legal rules in addition to company’s statute. They 
are held liable for the violation of the law (general liability include non-complying with their 
obligations such as the case of not preparing a management report or not addressing a 
performance inventory1587, further to the case of  failure to disclose the annual and management 
reports to the GA1588 and failing to publish annual reports1589). The breach of the AOA and 
incorporation rules1590. The management is liable for its misconducts. They are liable for the 
abuse of power1591, the misuse of assets1592, negligence and poor management1593, deception, 
                                                          
1581 CA Paris, 10 août 2017, n° 15/17109; Jean-B i e Tap, La Faute de gestio  da s ses tats , CA Pa is , 
n°15/17109,  Revue des Sociétés, 2018, p. 241 
1582 Article 58 JSL of 2017 
1583 C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-1 
1584 Article 158 JCC; C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3 
1585 Article 166 JCC; C. mon. Fin., art. L. 465-1 
1586 Article 56 JSL of 2017; C. mon. fin., art. L. 465-3-1 
1587 C. com., art. L. 242-8 
1588 C. com., art. L. 242-10; C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-3 
1589 C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-5 
1590 Article 137 JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-251 
1591 C. com., art. L. 242-6 al. 4; Article168 JCC 
1592 C. com., art. L. 242-6 al. 3; Article 56 JSL of 2017 
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misleading and prohibited activities1594. The misuse of assets and abuse of power under the 
French rules limited to those performed in bad faith. The bad faith is not presumed the burden 
of proof is left to the claimant on a case-by-case basis (in the criminal liability it is called the 
proof of the intentional or moral element1595). In practice, it is easy to prove bad faith through 
simple presumption related to the position held by the member of management. Abuse of 
confidence is an example of this bad faith such as guarding the rents due to the clients or the 
company1596. Misuse of assets is made contrary to company’s interest such as laying down 
excessive remuneration (for purposes of the criminal liability considered as the material 
element1597). The abuse of power under the Jordanian rules is not conditional to bad faith 
performance. Yet it is limited to the abuse to achieve personal gains and interest or favoring the 
interest or gain of others. This performance should be performed in an unlawful manner and 
results in placing the company in a severe administrative and financial situation or incurring 
significant loss1598.  
548 Acting and omission. The actual misconduct of misuse of assets and abuse of powers is 
put on equal footing with the abstention and omission of actions required by law1599. The 
liability of the management includes conducts entailing embezzlement1600, forgery1601, fraud1602, 
and abuse of credit. The management is also liable for fictitious distribution of dividends1603 and 
false underwritings. In performing the disclosure obligation, the management is liable for 
incorrect or inexact information included in management reports1604, omitting information and 
explanations required by law from shareholders that hide the actual situation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1593 Article 159 JCC 
1594 Article 56 JSL of 2017 
1595 Cass. crim., 2 mars 1983 non publié au bulletin 
1596 Cass. crim., 7 sept. 2003, n° 05-80163 
1597 Cass. crim., 22 oct. 2014, n° 13-81743 
1598 Article 168 JCC; the role of the company controller emerges in this case. As a preventive immediate measure, 
the company controller dismisses the management of the company and appoints a replacement committee to take 
its place. This power under the new rule transferring the powers of the company controller to the JSC is 
transferred to the JSC therefore leaving the Jordanian rules on equal footing with the French ones as they attribute 
such a power to the AMF 
1599 Cass. crim., 13 mars 1972, n° 71-91378; Article 168 JCC 
1600 Limited under the Jordanian rules to public employees (Article 174 Jordanian Criminal Code) 
1601 c. pén., art. 441-1 
1602 When trading in securities (Article 63.c JSL of 2017); c. pén., art. 313-1 
1603 Article 278.a (5) JCC; C. com., art. L. 242-6 (using fraudulent means or lacking an inventory) 
1604 C. com., art. L. 242-6 : this infringement is separate from the publication of misleading information. It consists 
of a separate infringement (Cass. crim., 31 oct. 2000, n° 2000-007197) 
 
307 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
company1605. The management should allow all shareholders and auditors to attend GAMs. 
They are liable for any conduct preventing a shareholder1606 or the auditors1607 from doing so. 
The management should not be interfering in the performance of auditors’ duties. They should 
allow them to exercise their duties without restrictions. Any action preventing the auditor from 
exercising its duties holds the management liable1608. The management should respect the 
incorporation process of the company therefore; they are liable for the trading or issuing of 
shares ahead of the full incorporation of the company or the ratification of its statute1609. This 
liability is similar to that of founding shareholders1610.  
549 Scope of liability. The liability of the management covers the different forms of 
management the IC may undertake1611. In addition to the mentioned liable actions, members of 
the supervisory board under, French rules, hold a personal liability for the faults they commit 
during their term. Further, they may be held liable for the misconducts of members of the 
executive board only if they knew of and did not disclose it to the GA1612. The management has 
a liability regarding abnormal management actions ‘acte anormal de gestion’. This form of 
actions is defined as that action putting an expense or a loss on the company’s part without 
being acted in the commercial interest of the company or without being justifiable by the 
commercial exploitation1613.  An example of this form of actions is granting an advantage to a 
third party and not a preference over other counterparties. Further to selling an asset with a price 
that is inferior to its real value. The main purpose of this form of action is minimizing the 
taxable results or tax evasion. The management in this regard holds the burden of proof to 
justify that its action was performed in the interest of the company and in the course of 
commercial exploitation1614. Liable actions introduced in this paragraph interconnect further 
they can be limited. The limitation in terms of acquiring approvals or waivers. Alternatively, a 
                                                          
1605 Article 278.a (4) JCC; C. mon, fin., art. L. 465-3-2 
1606 C. com., art. L. 242-9 
1607 C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-4 (for example not calling the auditors to attend the meeting) 
1608 C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-4 ; Article 279.c JCC (intentional action) 
1609 C. com., art. L. 242-1; Article 278.a (1) JCC 
1610 Their liability is limited to the incorporation stage of the company. Throughout this stage, they should ensure 
the compliance with the entirety of requirements stated by the governing legal rules (company and securities 
rules); C. com., art. L. 210-8 
1611 C. com., art. L. 242-30 
1612 C. com., art. L. 225-257 
1613 CE, 5 janv. 1965, n° 62099 
1614 CE, 22 Juin 2011, n° 320746 
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limitation in terms of the scope of liability. The following paragraph addresses the different 
forms of limitations. 
§2: Limitation of Liability 
550 Authorization of GA. The liability of the management stands once an infringement or 
non-compliance is activated in terms of an obligation imposed by the governing legal rules or 
the statute of the company. The management may seek an authorization, ratification or waiver 
from the GA to limit the liable action. Company rules differ in treating this form of limitation. 
The French and Jordanian rules do not accord this form of exoneration to the management. The 
French rules prohibit any clause in the AOA that requires prior opinion or authorization of the 
GA for the decisions made by the management or that including a waiver a priori1615. Further, 
they do not take into consideration the decisions of the GA in eliminating or suspending the 
liability for the fault1616. The Jordanian rules consider the possibility of the exoneration and 
waiver of the liability by the GA. Nevertheless, this decision does not exempt from the legal 
prosecution of the board1617. Therefore, the liability stands. The waiver made by the GA is 
limited to the issues the GA was informed of. Hence a similar restriction to the French one. No 
waiver is made a priori. Arguing the liability by the board and using the waiver of the GA, as 
means to eliminate the liability is not possible ahead of the publication of annual and auditor 
reports1618.  
551 Delegation of powers. Another form of limitation of liability is by proving the delegation 
of activity or power. In this case, members of the management do not directly perform the 
misconduct therefore; they should not be accountable for it1619. This is specifically related to the 
notion of presumption of liability. If the governing legal rules presume the management as 
liable for the misconducts and the infringements happening within the company then the burden 
of proof is left to the management to prove otherwise. Therefore, the management may use the 
delegation as a counter argument for the presumption. The limitation in this case is of the 
                                                          
1615 C. com., art. L. 225-253 al. 1 
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1617 Article 157.a JCC 
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criminal personal liability of the member of management. The liability stems out of the general 
principle considering the manager liable for the non-compliance with the legal rules and for the 
entirety of infringements occurring within its company regardless if he was behind the 
infringement. The limitation is in having a manager delegating its powers and the lack of the 
direct connection between him and the infringement. Therefore, in this case it is not possible to 
prove the material element of the criminal liability due to the lack of actual personal act. The 
delegation of powers differs if there is a legal person involved in the delegation. The liability 
cannot be transferred if a legal person is involved. The representative is performing in the name 
and for the benefit of the legal person. Proving the delegation requires the manager to prove first 
the delegation of power related to the committed infringement and the non-participation in 
committing the infringement1620.  
552 Possibility to delegate. The question rising in this regard is the following: is the 
delegation legally possible? Going through company rules, we find no text directly addressing 
the delegation of management powers. The mere delegation addressed under the Jordanian 
company rules is that of the chairman for the representation before competent authorities1621. 
The regulatory silence does not mean that it is prohibited to delegate the powers. The necessity 
to delegation rises in cases where the management cannot solely cover the entirety of the 
activities due to the size or structure of the company or the diversity of its products. The 
management in this case decides to delegate partially its powers instead of ending up being 
liable for conducts it took that put the company in danger or at significant risk due to ineffective 
decisions. A perfect example is given in this case is the outsourcing of activities made by the IC 
to a MC, yet in jurisprudence the delegation made to third party is very restricted in being 
considered as a transfer of liability. The delegation may be restricted or prohibited in the AOA.  
553 Exonerating delegation conditions. The exonerating delegation is conditioned. The 
conditions are set by jurisprudence. The delegation should be made to a subordinate individual 
in the company or the group of companies that holds the required competence (professional 
competence and knowledge in the applicable regulation1622), authority (holding an authoritative 
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position in order to insure the compliance of its subordinates1623) and means1624 (notably 
financial means to execute orders)1625. The delegation for the same activity made to a sole 
person and not spread among different ones1626. This condition finds its reasoning in the 
difficulty this diversified delegation imposes on the proof of the initiative of one of the 
delegates. The delegation is not limited to specific form or category of activities. Nonetheless, it 
should be a total delegation of the entirety of powers. The jurisprudence provided a general 
scope of application for this limitation as long as the governing legal rules do not prohibit such 
delegation1627. Further to having a precise content of the delegation of a specific form of 
intervention1628. French company rules address one special case of delegation of powers consists 
of that authorization provided by the board to the general manager in terms of providing surety 
and guarantees in the name of the company1629. The manager has the full discretion to delegate 
this power to another person within the limits and conditions stated for the initial authorization. 
The delegation limits only the criminal liability as for the civil liability it stands before the 
company for the misconducts in terms of the choice of the delegated person, the performed 
delegation, the attributions or the fact that the manager did not supervise the action1630.  
554 Limited recourse action. The liability stands for a limited period of time. It is not eternal. 
This period set by company rules differs from one country to the other and differs from one 
liable person to the other. Prosecuting and challenging the liability of the management is limited 
to the period of three years following the damaging action or its discovery if it was hidden1631. 
As for the case of qualifying the conduct as a crime, the time limit for the legal action is twenty 
years1632. French jurisprudence considers the publication as the triggering factor and not the 
actual discovery of the fraudulent act1633. The Jordanian rules provides an intermediate period 
for the time limit of the legal proceeding. The liability expires at the end of five years following 
                                                          
1623 Cass. crim., 13 mai 1996, n° 95-83.057 
1624 Cass. crim., 11 dec. 1996, n° 95-85.341 
1625 Cass. crim., 26 mai 1994, n° 93-83.180 
1626 Cass. crim., 23 nov. 2004, n° 04-81.601 
1627 Cass. crim., 11 mars 1993, n°s 90-84.931, 91-83.655, 92-80.773 
1628 Cass. com., 3 juin 1997, n° 94-12.450 
1629 C. com., art. R. 225-28 
1630 Cass. com., 6 fevr. 1962, Bull. civ. IV, n° 80 
1631 C. com., art. L. 225-254 
1632 CPP, art. 7; six years for minor offences (CPP, art. 8) 
1633 Cass. crim., 9 juill. 1996, n° 1996-003580; Cass. crim., 20 fevr. 1997, n° 96-81.613 
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the GAM that ratified the annual budget and the final accounts and statements of the 
company1634. The question rising in this regard is the following: which GAM is the law 
addressing? The meeting addressed in this rule is that following the decision, action or omission 
leading to the liability. The rule do not provide such a precision yet it can be indirectly deduced 
as the triggering factor for the liability. The rule provides a calculation based on a GAM and not 
related to the damage incurred by the actions of the management. GAM triggers the factor of 
knowledge. The time limit falls outside the general rule of time lapse of contractual liability and 
that of the tort.  
555 Transition. This sub-section introduced case examples for the liable action and the 
possible means to limit the liability. To fully benefit from the regulatory imposed accountability 
shareholders, company and third party should understand the basis for the rise of such liability. 
Therefore, an explanation of the structure of the liability. In terms of the behavioral 
requirement, that triggers it in addition to the nature of this liability in order to go through with 
challenging and private enforcement process. The following sub-section addresses thoroughly 
these points.  
Sub-section 2: Structure of Liability of Accountable Person 
556 General rule. The IC, the management and its different organs should comply with the 
best conduct of business practices. Including acting in due devotion and loyalty, with the 
necessary professionalism and independence in the exclusive interest of the company and its 
shareholders. Acting in a manner maximizing their interest and achieving their investment 
objectives on an equal basis, without incurring them any additional excessive costs or while 
guaranteeing personal gains or promising them of such gains in favoring one over the others or 
using manipulative or deceptive means1635. Further providing a concrete proof that guarantees 
their technical and financial organization and means. In addition to guaranteeing the experience 
and care of the management1636. In other words, the management owes a duty of care and 
loyalty. A question rises in this regard. To whom the entirety of management duties are owed? 
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Is it exclusively owed to the company and shareholders, or does the liability extend to cover 
third party?  
557 Destination of duty. Exists a general undisputed principle states that persons discharging 
a responsibility and particularly the management owe their duties directly to the company. The 
duties of the management are also owed to shareholders direct or indirect differs from one legal 
system to the other. It is connected to the source of corporate power or their process of 
appointment, is it shareholders or statute? The company is conceptualized while considering the 
roles of both the management and shareholders in two different ways. First seeing shareholders 
as the source of corporate power and the director as agents who receive the authority to make 
decisions on behalf of the company by way of delegation from shareholders. Alternatively, 
qualifying directors as sui generis actors or fiduciaries who act for the benefit of shareholders 
and, depending on how the interests of the company are defined, the benefit of other 
stakeholders, but whose powers are derived directly from a statutory act of authorization1637. In 
the sphere of the IC, the management is qualified as those actors acting in the best interests of 
shareholders. Management of IC owe their duty to the company while acting in the best interest 
of shareholders (collective interest and not individual). This statement falls under the second 
conception of the source of corporate power meaning the statute. They owe a direct liability to 
both the company and shareholders. Owing the liability differs from owing a duty. Nonetheless, 
when considering the above-mentioned general rule for management conduct we note that they 
owe a direct duty to shareholders by acting in their best interest. Therefore exists a duty of care.  
558 Duty towards third party. The debate is in terms of owing a direct duty of care towards 
third party. The general principle states that the liability of the management is engaged directly 
towards the company and not third party. Reasoned in the autonomy in the legal personality of 
the company and that the management is the mere representative of the company. Company 
rules nonetheless, state a direct personal liability of management towards third party for their 
fault, misconduct and negligence in operating the company1638. This liability holds an 
exceptional character to the general principle1639. The view of the management as a simple 
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representative changed with time. Once the management is attributed the entire operation of the 
company they are the principle decision makers. Their execution and conduct may negatively 
affect or harm third party. Therefore, the law sees them as liable for the indemnification for the 
damage and prejudice they cause. The direct liability envisaged under company rules is limited 
to the fault resulting from the exercise of the management activity and does not include the fault 
separable from the management function1640. As for the personal liability of the management 
towards third party, it concerns the detachable misconduct from the management function. The 
French jurisprudence presented a definition for this form of misconduct resulting in a personal 
civil liability. It is defined as the case of a fault of a particular gravity incompatible with the 
normal exercise of the social functions of the management1641. The Jordanian rules address this 
form of liability merely to adjust the rule of redress from the actual damage to include the lost 
profit1642. 
559 Liability in IC. Shareholders participate in laying down the statute governing the 
performance of the company. This participation is performed in the incorporation level of the 
company. As at later stages, the management derives its duties and functions from the already 
set statutes or those set by law. Therefore, the founding shareholders may be seen as the actual 
shareholders who were the original source of power and duties of management and the 
corporate. The later joining shareholders merely agreed to the existing rules and method of 
governance. Nonetheless, the IC holds an autonomous legal personality that provides its statute 
with binding nature and presents it as the source of power. Shareholders perform mere 
modifications to the AOA at later stages while following the process stated by company rules. 
This does not in any way, undermine the role and the control shareholders have and exercise in 
GAMs especially in appointing members of management. As previously mentioned the source 
of liability and corporate power is the statute of the company and legal rules. Shareholders in 
general cannot tell the management what to do. Law and the AOA state their duties and 
responsibilities. On the other hand, shareholders and the company have expectations from the 
different behaviors of the management. They are expected to act in due care and diligence. Any 
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misconduct or fault result in triggering the liability clause. The following paragraphs 1 and 2 
address respectively the expectation and the nature of the liability. 
§1: Behavioral Expectations of Liable Person 
560 Duty of care. The expected care and diligence of the management in their practices relate 
to a thorough analysis and understanding of the functions they are obliged to perform, and the 
knowledge, competence and skill they are expected to have. In the sphere of the IC, the 
management is expected to hold the necessary knowledge, experience and skill in financial and 
economic matters covering the decisions they are expected to make throughout their term. 
Further, under corporate governance principles the management is expected to provide effective 
and efficient portfolio management. Meaning laying down a risk management policy and 
employing cost friendly mechanisms. Previously in this work, we addressed functions, 
knowledge, competence and skills of management. The function relates to an expectation of the 
performance set by law in the form of a care and diligence and imposing liability when they are 
missed. Further to the expectation of the company and its shareholders of promised outcome. 
The skill, knowledge and competence of the management form important factors in the 
qualification of misconduct. They influence the standard of care legally required by the 
management and the proof of its existence in a said decision or conduct. The duty of care 
addresses one of the main aspects of the agency problem existing between shareholders and the 
company. It aims at ensuring that directors devote sufficient time, care, and diligence to 
managing the company, act only on an informed basis, possess the necessary skills and 
experience to make sound business decisions, and consider the likely outcome of their decisions 
carefully. The behavioral expectation related to the duty of care considers three main elements 
constituting the duty. The duty to monitor, inquire and care in decision-making1643.  The duty to 
monitor and oversee the conduct of the business entails laying down operation policy of the 
company such as that prepared by the board, in addition to the continuous reporting of 
company’s activities (business activity report prepared by the board). The duty to inquire 
meaning following up on the acquired information despite their source and raising cause for 
concern when necessary. This duty is closely linked to the oversight of the management. Duty 
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of care in decision-making in the sense of making informed decision (procedural element) while 
meeting the substantive element (business judgement rule may be used as a standard of care).  
561 Standard of care. Acting in care and diligence requires the management to act in a 
specific manner that does not arise the question of liability for misconducts. This manner is 
known as the standard of care. Meeting this standard eliminates the liability of the management. 
The standard differs from one legislation to the other. There are three approaches used to define 
the nationally required standard of care subjective/objective standard, objective standard, and a 
reduced standard1644. A distinction made based on the level of strictness of the standard.  
562 Subjective/objective standard. The objective/subjective standard establishes an objective 
lower benchmark that has to be satisfied by all directors, notwithstanding their individual skill, 
expertise, or experience. The benchmark is defined with reference to the care exercised by a 
prudent businessman with the knowledge and expertise that can reasonably be expected of a 
person in a comparable situation. However, the required standard is heightened if the director in 
question possesses particular knowledge or experience. In this case, the law expects the director 
to deploy his or her abilities to the advantage of the company.  
563 Objective standard. The objective standard refers to the prudent businessman, similar to 
the objective/subjective standard, but does not explicitly provide for increased expectations in 
light of the individual skills of the concerned director.  
564 Reduced standard. The reduced standard usually starts from an objective formulation of 
the care and diligence that directors are expected to employ. Contrary to the other two 
standards, it allows exceptions that lead to a relaxation of the objective benchmark, such as the 
case of a director lacking the knowledge or experience of an average businessman or does not 
occupy a full-time position on the board.  
565 Nationally adopted standards. The French system adopted the first conception of the 
standard of care objective/subjective. The company rules do not provide an explicit definition to 
the standard of care. The definition and the requirements are found in the jurisprudence. A 
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reasonably careful and diligent director. An objective definition, can be raised if the defendant 
has specific knowledge and experience differs depending on the position of the director and size 
of the company. For example, the care required from the director of a listed company is higher 
than that of the director of a small family-owned business. Directors have been found liable for 
lack of monitoring. Such as the case of the supervision exercised by the board over the general 
manager1645.  The standard of care provided under the French rules considers employing the 
necessary efforts to achieve the set objective (obligation de moyens) contrary to the obligation 
of result. Triggering the liability of the management for not achieving a result is not automatic. 
The law imposes a burden of proof on the claimant to prove that the director did not employ the 
care set by law to achieve the expected result. This standard means that the management does 
not guarantee the result yet employs the efforts and means to achieve it1646.  
566 Jordanian standard. As for the Jordanian rules, they provide as a standard of care the 
prudent businessman in addition to a more strict care envisaged in the care provided for 
personal affairs1647. Both standards are applicable depending on the concept of remuneration of 
the agents1648. Considering the management as paid agents applies the prudent businessman 
standard. On the other hand, if the management is considered as non-paid agents then the level 
of care is elevated to that care provided for personal affairs. If the relationship between the 
management and the company is qualified as, a simple contract of management, (closer to the 
concept provided under French rules) the applicable standard of care is that of the average 
person without being obliged to achieve a specific result1649. Several questions rise in this 
regard: who decides if the standard is met or not? What does the failure to meet the standard 
mean for the management? Does the company or its shareholders have a role in triggering the 
qualification of the standard? Answering these questions requires addressing the possible 
existence of a presumption of liability in the governing legal rules. Further to the impact of the 
presumption on the internal control. 
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567 Presumptions. The available texts and jurisprudence are uncertain in affirming the 
presumption of the misconduct. The presumption transfers the burden of proof from the 
claimant to the respondent. Therefore, proving that the standard of care was not met hence the 
duty is violated. French law considers that the misconduct and fault should be proven. This 
statement puts the burden of proof on the claimant. The claimant proves the existence of this 
fault using the authorized means of proof such as expertise. On the other hand, there is a 
difference between the violations of legal or statutory provisions and other forms of 
infringements. The mere existence of the statutory or legal infringements might be enough to 
presume the fault or misconduct if the management is considered as corporate officer in the 
sense that bestows the agency relationship over the circumstances. Therefore transferring the 
burden of proof to respondent to prove the contrary meaning that he provided the expected care. 
A rebuttable presumption exists under French law that is the presumption of the liability of the 
director for the participation in wrongful decision of the board. The liability stands unless the 
directors proves that he behaved as a cautious and careful director notably by opposing this 
decision1650.  
568 Business judgement rule. In this regard, the US courts invented a rule ‘business 
judgement rule’ that serves as the standard of care and presumes that the director acted within 
the required care1651. This rule provides a higher level of protection and introduces the US 
standard of care as reduced and less restrictive. Interpreted as a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company1652. This rule lays 
the burden of proof on the claimant to prove that the directors violated the conditions of this 
rule. The rule requires a decision that has been made, the director did not have a financial 
interest in the decision, satisfying the procedural element in issuing an informed decision, and 
standard of review for the decision is the rationality. Therefore, the US courts will respect the 
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directors’ business judgment, unless it cannot be “attributed to any rational business 
purpose1653”.  
569 Presumption in Jordan. Under the Jordanian law, the presumption may be understood 
implicitly from the legal text addressing the liability of the management. The law states that the 
collective liability of the management includes the entirety of board members unless the board 
members establish otherwise by proving his opposition in the boards minutes of meeting1654. 
Contrary to this statement, the JSL provides the management of the company with a safe harbor 
in terms of the liability for the infringements of securities rules. The law requires the proof of 
knowledge of the management to arise the liability1655.  This statement transfers the burden of 
proof to the claimant in terms of the infringements of securities rules and not those committed 
in violation of company rules. The lack of an explicit presumption under company rules leads to 
the application of the general rule of evidence stating that the burden of proof is that of the 
claimants1656.  
570 Duty of loyalty. The management is expected to act with care and diligence in addition to 
acting with loyalty towards the company and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty is a moral 
conception imposed on listed companies in the aim to restore and safeguard shareholders’ 
interest in the management. This duty is imposed for the benefit of both the company1657 and its 
shareholders1658. The French jurisprudence affirmed this duty1659. How is this duty interpreted 
and translated in practice? Three main obligations achieve the duty of loyalty averting from the 
abuse of assets and managing the company in the social interest, not competing with the 
company in any manner including incorporating a company with similar objectives or acting in 
a competitive manner against the company1660. Further, to the transparency and disclosure of 
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self-dealing and any agreement entered in a manner arising conflicts of interest1661. This duty 
qualifies the relationship between shareholders and management as an agency relation. Contrary 
to this statement, the French rules do not qualify the said relationship as such. Therefore, under 
tort law clauses in French legal tradition many texts may be particularly suitable for establishing 
such a direct legal relationship. Given that these rules provide for the liability for any damages 
caused intentionally1662 or by negligent or imprudent conduct1663. This duty is closely connected 
to conflicts of interest. The most important conflicts addressed by the duty of loyalty are related 
party transactions (self-dealing) meaning the transactions between the company and its directors 
weather directly or indirectly. In addition to corporate opportunities meaning exploiting inside 
information in a competitive manner. In the sphere of the IC, the management is expected to act 
in the best interest of the company that includes non-disclosure of confidential information and 
non-competition with the company.  
571 Related party transactions. Under the national rules exists the general rule of hindering 
conflicts of interest and not having direct or indirect interests in the transactions performed on 
behalf of the company. Further, the rules address three forms of transactions prohibited 
transactions, transactions entered into outside the normal course of business and transaction 
entered into within the normal course of business. This distinction is particularly provided in 
French rules. Prohibited agreements include loans or guarantees by the company to the 
director1664. The second form of transaction are those entered into not through an ordinary 
course of business directly or indirectly by the management known in France as regulated 
agreements. They are not prohibited yet they require the authorization of the board1665. For 
example, these transactions include the bids or offers of contracting published by the company 
in addition, the management participates in the offers on an equal footing with other 
contractors1666. Another example is signing a guarantee or credit agreements by the general 
manager. The fact that such form of agreements are entered into without priory obtaining the 
authorization of the board does not hold the general manager personally responsible before third 
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party suffering a damage as a result of this agreement. The French jurisprudence considers that 
engaging the company without being authorized does not categorize the action as faute 
separable1667. As for the remaining form of transactions, those entered into at arm’s length and 
in the ordinary course of business, they are permitted and they do not require further 
authorization1668, such as the agreements entered into on a group level. 
572 Transition. The liability stands when a liable action is committed. The question rising in 
this regard is the following: what is next? The following step is qualifying the liability in terms 
of its nature, origin and character. This qualification provides the basis for the direct control 
exercised by shareholders, company and third party. The qualification of the liability further 
explained in the following paragraph 2.  
§2: Nature of Liability 
573 Classification. Holding the management liable in its simplicity as a general concept of 
control is a statement that embeds various questions. What is the legal basis for this liability? 
Under which rules is it reviewed? Does the liability entail a form of redress for the claimant? 
The qualification of the liability should be clear and complete. To qualify the form of the 
liability in question the law provides three main categories. A qualification based on the nature 
of the liability leaving the claimant with a civil or criminal liability. Another based on the origin 
of the liability leaving the claimant with joint, several or solider liability. Lastly a qualification 
based on the character of the liability, which introduces two forms of liability direct and 
indirect. The difference in the chosen qualification has major impact on the financial motive 
behind the action.  
574  Civil vs. criminal liability. The liability is the obligation to answer to one’s actions. In 
the sphere of private law, the liability takes two main forms civil and criminal. They are distinct 
from one another yet they are cumulative and they intertwine. The same person may be liable 
                                                          
1667 Cass. com., 20 oct. 1998, n° 96-15.418; Cass. com., 8 nov. 2017, n° 16- . ; Ca oli e Coupet, Ga a tie o  
Autorisé pa  le Co seil d Ad i ist atio : Quelle ‘espo sa ilit  pou  le Di igea t “o ial?    ‘e ue D oit des 
Sociétés 29 
1668 C. com., art. L. 225-39 
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under both civil and criminal texts1669. Each of the two forms have its set rules that govern the 
consequential procedures following its occurrence. Civil liability has a larger scope of 
application than the criminal one. In practice, it extends to include several domains of the law. It 
has an exclusive general objective that is repairing damages. The civil liability stands without 
the need for an actual legal text that addresses the damage resulting from this liability. On the 
contrary, the criminal liability requires the existence of an incriminating legal text to stand.  
575 Forms of civil liability. Civil liability of the management depends on company rules 
governing it. In its composition, it is similar to the civil liability addressed in the general rules of 
law. The general rule provides two forms of civil liability depending on the qualification of the 
relationship connecting the concerned parties. A contractual civil liability and a tortuous one. 
Which of the two forms of civil liability does the management report to? Answering this 
question differs depending on the reviewed legislation. Both liabilities are similar in terms of 
the composition the difference lies in the complementary consequences1670. Both liabilities 
compose of the damage1671or prejudice (material, physical or moral), fault1672 (intentional or 
unintentional) and the causality link between the damage and the fault (French rules) or the 
damage and the prejudice (Jordanian rules).  
576 Qualifying based on appointing. Under the Jordanian rules there is no explicit text 
qualifying the civil liability of the management as either contractual or tortuous. Therefore, 
when reviewing the legal rules that address this liability we note two different viewpoints. One 
possible qualification of the liability based on the process of appointing the management. 
Therefore, the liability is qualified as contractual based on the agency contract. Another 
qualifies the liability based on the source of management power regardless of the appointing 
procedure. Therefore, the liability is qualified as both contractual and tortuous depending on the 
                                                          
1669 The general manager is held liable under civil liability for faute separable if he/she was condemned criminally 
for such an action (Cass. 1er civ., 14 dec. 1999, n° 97- . ; Pat i e Jou dai , Auto it  de la Chose Jug e au 
Pénal et Responsabilité Civile du Dirigeant Social : la Condamnation Pénale du Dirigeant suffit-elle à Caractériser 
u e Faute Ci ile Pe so elle D ta ha le de ses Fo tio s ?  (2000) 2 RTD civ. 342 
1670 Philippe Le Tourneau, D oit de Respo sa ilit  et des o t ats R gi es d’I de isatio  (11th edn, DALLOZ 
2017) page 481 
1671 Article 256 Jo. Civil Code 
1672 The notion used in French law, the Jordanian law is distinct in its approach as it considers merely the damaging 
conduct; damage is suffered prejudice is repaired 
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claimant and the liable responsible person. These viewpoints introduce different possibilities for 
the qualification. Considering members of the board as the agents and the company as principle. 
Further to taking into consideration, that members of the board are appointed directly by 
shareholders bestows the contractual nature on the civil liability based on the agency contract. 
As for the general manager, he is considered agent of the agent consequently the relationship is 
characterized as agency hence the liability is contractual.  
577 Qualifying based on source of power. In the second viewpoint, the basis of qualification 
is the source of corporate power. It considers the statute and the legal rules as the source of 
management power, further to considering the management as owning direct duty to the 
company as they act as its legal representatives. This consideration qualifies the relationship 
between the company and the management as contractual this includes both members of the 
board and the general manager. As for the relationship of the general manager with 
shareholders, it is qualified as tortuous as he does not in fact owe a direct duty to them. He acts 
in the social interest of the company to achieve its objectives. The legal rule addressing the 
liability of the management does not cover the general manager. The relationship between the 
board and the shareholders is debatable due to the control shareholders exercise over the 
appointing and in laying off the board. Considered as contractual reasoned with the control 
shareholders exercise and the fact that they choose them. Tortuous if reasoned based on the 
statement that considers shareholders as owners of their contribution in the company and not the 
company as a whole.   
578 French qualification. Under French rules, the liability of the directors is subject to the 
special texts addressing this form of liability under company rules and not the general rules of 
civil liability. The liability differs in terms of a standing company or a company suffering from 
a financial difficulty. The civil liability of the management in France is neither contractual nor 
tortuous. A distinctive approach of the French doctrine to address a mere civil liability without 
entering into a more detailed qualification. The non-contractual liability of the board is based on 
a long-standing consideration that the board is a social organ that has no legal personality1673. 
Further to considering the source of power of the manager and members of board as legal texts 
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and not the contract or the performed delegation. Reasoned by the fact that the company is an 
institution and not only a contract. A moral person that has a legal personality, rights and 
powers but cannot in practice express its will and interest. Therefore, law attributes the power to 
the management. As for members of the board and the general manager, they have a legal 
personality that makes them subject to liability. This liability is civil and personal. This liability 
is presumed by jurisprudence for the individual member for the participation in a faulty decision 
unless he/she proves that he/she acted as a diligent and prudent manager1674.  
579 Company’s liability. The company is also liable. It is liable towards third party acting in 
good faith for the actions of its members of management1675. Generally considered as tortuous 
liability for the fault, damage and prejudice incurred by third party. Nonetheless, it is further 
contractual in cases where a contract was entered into with the concerned third party.  
580 Criminal liability. Criminal liability entails an infringement, action or omission 
prohibited by law. It is limited in its scope of application to a legal incriminating text. Its main 
objective is repression. It is not strictly connected to the civil liability they co-exist further to 
existing separately. The criminal liability requires its main elements to stand. Starting point is 
the legal element having a legal incriminating text1676. The criminal liability has two other 
elements material and moral. The material element requires a conduct of the person in question. 
It is not related to the result of the action (committing an action prohibited by law) or omission 
(abstaining from performing an action required by law)1677. The moral element considers the 
will of the conductor. This element addresses the intentional infringement1678. The lack of this 
element does not stand a criminal liability. The actor of the crime and the one held liable is that 
who fulfills the elements of the crime material and moral1679.  
                                                          
1674 Cass. com., 30 mars 2010, n° 08-1784 ; “ophie “ hille , Les Fautes des di igea ts “o iau  i  Jea -Jacques 
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page 753 
1675 Article 156.a JCC; C.com., art. L. 225-35 
1676 C. pen., art. 111-3 ; Article 3 Jo. Criminal Code 
1677 C. pen., art. 121-3; Article 73 Jo. Criminal Code 
1678 Articles 63 & 64 Jo. Criminal Code 
1679 Jo. cass. crim., 23 oct. 2017, n° 2149/2017; Article 75 Jo. Criminal Code 
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581 Standing to criminal liability. The criminal liability stands for both the company and it 
members of management. Even though the moral element traditionally requires a natural person 
to commit it. The company is held criminally liable for its actions and those of its 
representatives and subordinates1680. Whether the actions of the representatives or subordinates 
is performed intentional or unintentionally1681. When the criminal liability of the company was 
first introduced into legal texts it stood if it was explicitly expressed in the governing legal text. 
The rule was that companies cannot be held liable under the text criminalizing all persons unless 
the text explicitly extend to cover moral person1682. Currently the criminal liability of the legal 
person stands without the need for a specifically incriminating text1683. The criminal liability of 
the company is connected to an infringement resulting from a representative or a subordinate. 
This rule covers members of management of the company. The criminal liability of the member 
of management is engaged alongside that of the company for the same infringement as long as 
the member committed the fault for the account of the company1684. For example, the criminal 
liability of members of management stands for actions involving fraud, embezzlement, abuse of 
assets, deception and others1685. The criminally liable actions are mentioned under the general 
rules of criminal law and company rules.   
582 Joint, solider and several liability. Another category of liability is the one based on the 
origin constitutes of several, joint and solider forms of liability. These forms apply solely to 
members of management and not the company. This category addresses the enforceability 
against members of management. It is important for shareholders, company and third party to 
know against whom the liability is enforced. These proposed forms of liability are personal even 
if the indemnification is performed collectively. The several liability is a personal liability 
limited in its framework to the degree of contribution. It is proportional, every member of 
management answers for its liability. Unlike the joint liability that introduces a collective form 
of liability. The enforceability for defaults is then made against the entirety of the members or 
                                                          
1680 Article 74.2 Jo. Criminal Code; C. pen., art. 121-2 
1681 Cass. crim., 28 avr. 2009, n° 08-83.843  
1682 Cass. crim., 18 avr. 2000, n° 99-85.183; Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux 
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1683 C. pén., art. 121-2 
1684 Cass. crim., 29 juin 2016, n° 15-85.523  
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by choosing one of the members that answers for his proportion. Another form of collective 
liability provided in civil law is the solidarity. This form of liability presents every liable person 
as answerable for the total amount of damages on behalf of the remaining involved persons. 
French company rules holds members of the management liable severally and solidary for their 
violation of the legal rules, the AOA in addition to their misconducts in the management of the 
company1686. As for the Jordanian rules they hold members of the management liable severally, 
jointly and solidary towards the company, shareholders1687 and third party1688.  
583 Direct and indirect liability. The character of the liability is of importance. The character 
is related to the possible answerability for the actions. Previously mentioned the main principle 
is that the management owes its duties to the company. They are liable for their misconducts 
and omissions towards the company. This liability is the most obvious form of management 
liability and it is direct. As for the liability towards shareholders and third party it is not 
necessarily obvious neither it is always direct. A direct liability owed by law for shareholders 
does not exist under French company rules. This does not undermine the right of shareholders 
of IC to initiate a legal proceeding collectively or individually against members of the 
management1689. Contrary to this rule, Jordanian rules address a direct liability of management’s 
negligence and failure in performing its functions towards shareholders separate from the 
general liability of members of management that also covers shareholders alongside the 
company and third party. As for the liability towards third party, it is indirect despite the 
statement of the liability mentioned under both French and Jordanian company rules. Generally, 
there is no direct link between members of management and third party. Nonetheless 
management’s actions may negatively influence third party (stakeholders or not). The liability 
towards third party is that of the company for the actions of its members of management1690. 
The personal liability of members of management stands directly before third party only in the 
limits of a misconduct separate from their functions and management activities, if two 
conditions are met; the fault was intentional and of particular gravity incompatible with the 
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normal course of exercise1691. An approach introduced by the French jurisprudence1692. No such 
statement is addressed under Jordanian company rules. Nonetheless, the liability of the 
management outside its functions may stand towards third party according to the general rules 
of tort law if a damage occurs1693.  
584 Transition. Notwithstanding the importance of regulatory addressing the liability and 
obligations of members of management; shareholders of IC look beyond the mere statements of 
the legal rules incriminating or questioning the conducts and actions of members of 
management. Shareholders want to exercise a degree of direct control that permits them to 
prevent damaging decisions and actions further to repairing the possible occurring damage. The 
exercise of the direct control is dependent and complementary to management performance of 
the duties and obligation stated by law. The question rising in this regard is the following: how 
is the direct control performed? Is it exclusive to shareholders? The following chapter 2 answers 
thoroughly these questions.  
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1693 Article 256 Jo. Civil Code 
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Chapter 2: Direct Control 
585 Focus of direct control. Who should make decisions for a corporation? Moreover, how 
should decisions about who makes decisions be made? These fundamental governance 
questions motivate much of corporate law, as regulators seek to strike a sensible balance of 
power between managers, shareholders, and other players in the corporate system. The obstacle 
for shareholders’ governance and control is coordination, communication and gathering. The 
role of an activist shareholder rises in this regard. Activist shareholder may seek to gather 
shareholders in order to lobby and make a change in the operation of the company. In practice if 
this activist shareholder does not own a significant share capital then the likelihood of him 
succeeding is minimal unless this shareholder is ready to bear the total bill for the change. What 
shareholders generally seek is to file a request to include an item on the meeting agenda. They 
employ their voting rights in the interest of all the members of the company and promote their 
own1694. “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction” Newton third law. This 
famous scientific rule is similar in its essence to the legal rule applied in cases of violation and 
breach by management. Management owes a duty to shareholders, company and third party. 
Particularly shareholders rely on the statements of management. Management statements may 
entail breaches of their duties and obligations1695. They may result in losses on the part of the 
company, shareholders or third party. In legislation, directors are responsible for losses they 
cause voluntarily or byway of negligence or omissions. Shareholders should have the right to 
claim the redress for damages resulting from this violation whether they incurred the prejudice 
directly or derivatively, collectively or individually1696. A redress outside of financial collateral 
arrangements in cases of insolvency and liquidation1697. This arises the question of burden of 
proof of the negligence or intention. In most cases it is the claimant’s responsibility to prove the 
loss, its extent and that, it resulted out of a management behavior1698. Direct control focuses 
globally on all the components of the company. It is not limited to the limits of shareholders’ 
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rights and control. It addresses private enforcement exercised by shareholders as its key 
element. Nonetheless, it extends to the autonomous control the company exercises over its 
proper functions. The following sections address respectively these two elements. 
Section A: Private Enforcement 
586 Definition. Enforcement is the act insuring the obedience or observance to something1699. 
Shareholders’ private enforcement is a form of intervention in the decision-making process and 
its post legal consequences. Meaning permitting them to exercise direct control over the 
functioning of the company. Enforcing shareholders right in the sense that allows them to 
initiate and make use of the rights attributed by law. The enforcement generally relates to the 
opportunity to initiate a legal proceeding once a right has been violated.  
587 Strengthening enforcement. Investors’ confidence that company’s managers, members 
of board, or even controlling shareholders will protect the capital they provide from misuse and 
misappropriation is an important factor in the capital market. Members of management and 
controlling shareholders may have the opportunity to engage in activities favoring their own 
interest over that of the remaining shareholders. In the process of investor protection and 
safeguarding shareholders’ interests, a distinction is made between ex-ante and ex-post 
shareholders’ rights1700.  
588 Place of shareholders’ control. Between shareholders and members of management, 
much of the struggle is played in three main dimensions: vote, lawsuit and sale. Shareholders 
appoint board members who then appoint a general director that share with them the operation 
of the company. The decision-making on daily basis is vested with this organ. If shareholders’ 
are not satisfied with the board, they remove them in the following election cycle. Shareholders’ 
who cannot remove may seek to file a lawsuit claiming a harm for the violation of securities 
rules or duties set in company rules. Shareholders who see no chance for a lawsuit or find it 
long and costly decide to sell or redeem their shares. The main dimensions covering the 
relationship gathering the management and shareholders are based on rights attributed by law or 
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by statute to shareholders allowing shareholders to enjoy and employ their attributed rights is 
the main concern of private enforcement. In legal texts in the process of protecting investors of 
the capital market an investor protection association or fund is put in place. The aim of this 
association or fund is to ensure that investors are effectively and justly reimbursed for the 
damages they incur. By providing defense services such as the investor defense association 
addressed under French securities rules. This association has as an explicit statutory objective 
defending investors of financial products including shareholders’ associations formed under 
company law rules1701. Alternatively, reimbursement plans such as the investor protection fund 
established under the JSC. It provides investor protection against bankruptcy or liquidation of 
the intermediary1702. This protection explicitly excludes shareholders of the involved 
company1703.  
589 Transition. The question rising in this regard is the following: how do shareholders 
enforce their rights? Shareholders employ their rights on different levels. In this section, 
enforcement is linked to both levels of exercise of shareholders’ power the enforcement on an 
ex-ante (sub-section 1) and ex-post (sub-section 2).  
Sub-section 1: Ex-Ante Governance Tactics 
590 Advantages. Ex ante is a Latin term means ‘before the event’ refers to future events, such 
as future returns or prospects of a company. It is a forward looking. It asks questions such as; 
what effect will this rule have in the future? It is associated with welfare and policy1704. When 
connected to the rights and exercises of shareholders refers to rights and powers shareholders’ 
possess as means to control the decision-making process a priori particularly, in cases where no 
violation to the attributed rights took place. They are rights that strengthen the enforcement 
power of shareholders ahead of a violation. In one way or another considered as preventive and 
preemptive to infringements and an approach to strike the balance between management and 
shareholders. The question rising in this regard is the following: where are ex ante rights found? 
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Set internally by shareholders or management in statute or internal policies or regulatory 
imposed in the governing legal rules. Addressing these rights is an attempt to achieve good 
corporate governance in a manner providing equitable treatment of all shareholders. In this 
regard, ex-ante rights are crucial to protect minority shareholders especially, in cases of 
takeovers, merger and related party transactions.  
591 Disadvantage. Ex-ante rights are not always considered as effective good corporate 
governance mechanisms. A main down side to ex-ante governance is the case where key players 
(mainly controlling shareholders or members of management) strive to enact structural rules 
that may tilt the resolution of future disputes in their favor. Such as shareholders enacting 
limitations and restrictions in the statute of the company, or board members laying down 
policies that allow them to minimize litigation fees or permits forum shopping1705.  
592 Transition. Ex-ante rights consists mainly of preemptive rights that lay down measures 
taken a priori by shareholders throughout the operation of the company (paragraph 1). In 
addition to, a right granted particularly to shareholders of the OEIC. Open for employment at all 
times not necessarily used on an ex-ante basis yet mostly used this way. It is the right to request 
share redemption (paragraph 2). 
§1: Preemptive Rights and Measures 
593 Focus of rights. In order to provide shareholders and investors with an atmosphere where 
they easily practice their rights; the legal rules and the AOA provide preemptive rights and 
measures that shareholders engage in to be closer to the operation of the company and have a 
closer eye on the performance of the management. These rights exemplified in GA powers 
further to those powers with the possibility to be individually exercised.  
594 Collective direct control. Shareholders forming the GA exercise collectively a set of 
rights through GAMs. The exercise is on an ex-ante basis with forward looking1706. We noted 
that the most essential right of shareholders is voting. They are enabled to exercise this right 
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through the participation in GAMs. Shareholders’ participation in GAM is achieved through 
facilitating the participation. Corporate governance principles suggest casting votes in GAM by 
way of proxy, telecommunication (video calls), or correspondences (postal or email). The actual 
influence and control shareholders exercise is made directly through the decisions taken in 
GAM. Those decisions that affect the composition of the board, question or supervise their 
performance. The question rising in this regard is the following: how can shareholders control 
GAM?  
595 Controlling GAM. The key power of shareholders is in their communication and 
gathering. Their participation in GAM should be concrete and effective in the sense that present 
them as decision-makers and having binding power not mere advisory body who happens to 
collectively, own the business. Previously addressed in part I that convening a GAM is a power 
granted to the board on general terms and exceptionally can be convened by shareholders. This 
exceptional power feeds the control of shareholders as it grants them similar power as that of 
the board. Better practice of control requires small-qualified share ownerships to make such a 
request. Shareholders’ control is exercised through dynamic participation in GAM meaning, 
enabling shareholders to have a say on the content of the meeting’s agenda. In the sense that 
allow them to ask questions, being communicated the relevant financial information beforehand, 
in addition to being able to add a point on the agenda. As previously mentioned the agenda and 
the financial documents are prepared and communicated respectively by the board. This control 
of the form and process of the meeting is closely linked to the right to decide and make 
influential decisions. Therefore, shareholders vote during GAM on priory made or initiated 
management decisions and policies. Further, they vote on the election and removal of board 
members. The most important factor of the voting on decisions and policies is that entailing a 
say-on-pay and related party transactions.  
596 Say-on-pay. The say-on-pay differs from one legislation to the other. It may be a mere 
advisory role of preset policies by the board or binding in terms of actual vote over the 
attributed amounts. The two approaches are addressed in the new European shareholders’ rights 
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directive1707. They address the direct control of shareholders on management remuneration 
through approved policies in GAM. Further opting to less restricted measure in allowing the 
company to apply remuneration policies previously rejected by the GA under a condition to 
provide a revised version in the following GAM1708. An approach to encourage long-term 
shareholder engagement. Management remuneration plays a key role in aligning the interests of 
shareholders and management and ensures that members of management act in the best interest 
of the company1709. The French legislature ahead of implementing the new amendments 
suggested by EU directive on shareholders’ rights took a stand to counter excessive and 
unexplainable remuneration umbrellas that directors of listed companies enjoyed in the past 
years. The legislature decided to implement a strict regime of say-on-pay1710. Close enough to 
the suggested European regime yet stricter. The French regime provides two forms of voting on 
management remuneration ex-ante and ex-post vote1711. 
597 Ex-ante vote. An ex-ante vote forward looking over the policies of remuneration 
therefore, a binding positive vote over the principles and criteria of the entirety of elements 
constituting the remuneration including fixed, variable, exceptional, and all the advantages1712 
of all natures transferred or attributed within the scope of management functions. This vote 
includes the totality of the members meaning the general manager, president and assistant 
director (Directeur Général Délégué)1713, chairman and members of the supervisory board1714.  
598 Ex-post vote. An ex-post vote backward looking over the transfers of the previously 
performed functions and the modification of the existing collectively approved policy. This vote 
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is limited to variable and exceptional elements transferred to members of management 
conditioned to a vote in an OGAM1715. This ex-post vote excludes the attributions made to the 
management such as stock options.  
599 Qualifying national approaches. The French approach is seen as pre-emptive 
implementation of the European directive, a manner transforming the say-on-pay into a real 
decide-on-pay1716. Jordanian company rules do not address a similar form of direct shareholder 
control on the remuneration policy. The say-on-pay in Jordan as previously established is 
limited to consulting the prepared policy and the attributed amounts without having an actual 
binding vote over the amounts or principles of attribution neither ex-ante nor ex-post. A detailed 
statement of the remuneration prepared by the board and provided to shareholders for review 
ahead of the GAM1717. The proposed amending bill of the Jordanian company rules does not 
address the remuneration of the management and particularly the control shareholders may have 
over this issue. On the other hand corporate governance regulation1718 and the JSL1719 address 
the necessity to appoint a nomination and remuneration committee that lays down remuneration 
and financial attribution policies. The committee consists of non-executive board members, 
allows for a level of internal control yet granted to the management and not directly to 
shareholders. It is a drawback to good corporate governance on the Jordanian level as the 
existence of such a control provides shareholders with a pressuring mechanism to orient 
management performance in company’s interest.  
600 Exercising voting right. The voting right of shareholders provides them with a level of 
control over major decisions taken by the company. Exemplified in requiring qualified 
majorities usually in EGAM. The perfect example is decisions involving merger and 
acquisition1720, takeover, selling of shares and related party transactions1721. Further to pre-
                                                          
1715 C. com., art. L. 225-100 
1716 Alai  Piet a osta, “a  o  Pa : The Ne  F e h Legal ‘egi e i  Light of “ha eholde s  ‘ights Di e ti e II  
(Oxford Business Law Blog, 30 November 2017) < https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/11/say-
pay-new-french-legal-regime-light-shareholders-rights-directive > accessed 18 December 2017 
1717 Article 143 JCC 
1718 Article 8.b Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
1719 Article 46 JSL of 2017 
1720 French doctrine and jurisprudence addresses the issue of whether merger is considered as a transformation of 
the company from one form to the other and therefore should the general rule of unanimous vote be applied in 
terms of merger (C. civ., art. 1836). Considering the merger as increasing the engagement of shareholders. This 
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emptive rights in relation to shares. Meaning having new issues, increase or decrease of capital, 
major changes in percentages of ownership. These actions affect the rights of shareholders 
particularly their percentage of ownership, voting rights and possibility of share dilution due to 
new issues. Provided in the aim of protecting minority shareholders against abusive controlling 
shareholders1722. Shareholders control the sale of shares due to the fear of takeovers, they seek 
this control rather than controlling the new issues as the disclosure obligation provides a degree 
of protection and a form of indirect control.  
601 Data accessibility. A main question rises in this regard: do shareholders of IC have the 
right to access and review the records and documents of the company? Moreover, if it is 
possible to access the information, can they access the data whenever they deem necessary or a 
prior request directly or a court order is required. The accessibility of company’s data granted as 
a right therefore forming a level of direct control. French rules grants the entirety of 
shareholders the right to be communicated the data of the company. This data includes the 
annual report, list of board members, management and auditors reports to be submitted with the 
GA, texts and proposed decisions, inquiries concerning board candidates, global certified 
amount of highly paid persons1723. The list, deprived shareholders from the right to be 
communicated the inventory and the list of current acceptable transactions (those that do not 
require a prior authorization). Shareholders under French rules also have a permanent 
communication right. In terms of being enabled to request the mentioned documents, minutes of 
GAMs and the presence sheet for the past three exercises1724. As for the list of shareholders, a 
separate right is provided for its review. The right is granted to shareholders to access the list 
and request its access. It is limited to fifteen days ahead of the GAM1725. It is a right open to all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
statement was affirmed by the French cour de cassation nonetheless not in terms of the SA (Cass. com., 19 dec 
2006, n° 05-17802). Form mere legal terms merger differs from transformation. Merger involves two or more 
companies while the transformation involves a unique company that holds its legal personality throughout the 
transformation. Hence merger of a Plc. in France requires the decision of an EoGAM; AbdelKarim Osman, 
L Op ation de Fusion est-elle Co sid  Co e T a sfo atio  de la “o i t  A so e  Village de la Justi e,  
Fevrier 2016) < https://www.village-justice.com/articles/operation-fusion-est-elle,21517.html > Accessed 21 
December 2017 
1721 Article 175.a JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-96 
1722 IOSCO Te h i al Co ittee, P ote tio  of Mi o it  “ha eholde s i  Listed Issue s  Ju e 2009 page 5 
1723 C. com., art. L. 225-115; the right of shareholders does not cover the individually paid amounts and advantages 
to the persons included in this article 
1724 C. com., art. L. 225-117; AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-39 
1725 C. com., art. L. 225-116 
 
335 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
forms of GAMs. The list may be made available at the headquarters of the company, or the 
place of intended assembly meeting, electronic medium such as having a screen showing the 
list1726 while making it possible for shareholders to produce copies if they deem so.  
602 Jordanian approach to accessing data. The Jordanian rules provide a similar right with 
slightly different conditions and prerequisites. The access rights is open to the public and 
shareholders yet on different terms. Accessing the publically made information including that 
submitted with the company controller is open for review by both shareholders and the 
public1727. The difference lies in granting shareholders the right to produce copies of the 
submitted documents freely without a prior court order as the public does. As for unpublished 
data, it is accessible for shareholders following a court order1728. Shareholders’ list is treated 
differently under the Jordanian rules. Despite being submitted with the company controller, they 
are not accessible by shareholders of the OEIC. They are prohibited from reviewing the list as a 
rule of law unless stated otherwise in the AOA1729. Shareholders of OEIC have a special right 
that allows them to leave the company any time they wish without having to pass by the stock 
exchange to exchange their shares for cash. This right to redeem shares is employed directly 
with the company (further illustrated in paragraph 2). 
§ 2: Share Redemption 
603 Definition. Redemption is repurchase as of something sold1730. In the sphere of the IC, it 
is the act of the issuing company repurchasing its stocks at the net asset value per share1731. 
Share redemption is a request made by shareholders of OEICs in an attempt to cash themselves 
out of the company. It is a right exercised at any time as long as the company’s liquidity permits 
such repurchase and the scope of application is met. Share redemption is neither a strict ex-ante 
nor ex-post right. It is a right that may be included under either forms of shareholders’ rights. It 
provides shareholders with a direct control, as it is continuous and not limited to specific time 
limit. They decide when to redeem the shares and there is no hierarchal requirements or 
                                                          
1726 C. com., art. R. 225-90 
1727 Article 274.b JCC 
1728 Article 274.a JCC 
1729 Article 209.b (6) JCC 
1730 Collins Dictionary 2014 n (1250) 
1731 Farlex Dictionary n (1522) 
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authorizations needed to exercise this right. Shareholders invest in the company and once they 
see they reached their peak financial return or they no longer see a benefit or interest in 
remaining shareholders they redeem their shares in exchange for cash.  
604 Buyback vs. redemption. Share redemption differs from share buyback. Despite 
consisting of a process of repurchase by the company of its previously issued shares, the origin 
of this repurchase and its basis differs from one case to the other. Buyback is the repurchase of 
the company of its own shares1732. Buybacks reduce the number of outstanding shares. 
Redemption is an exchange for cash upon the request of shareholders. Redemption is not 
performed to increase the holdings of the company unlike buybacks that allow the company to 
regain a majority status. Buybacks require the company to comply with the process set in 
securities rules including repurchasing at market value unlike share redemption the conditions 
are set by the company and repurchase is based on NAV.  Share redemption may be abusive to 
the company as it may risk undervaluation of the shares as for buyback, undervaluation, maybe 
the motive. In buybacks repurchase is performed at the lowest prices possible in order to reissue 
the purchased shares at a higher price later on when the market is corrected. The major 
difference is having a repurchase performed directly by the company and for its own interest 
and another performed by the company upon a request and for the benefit of the concerned 
shareholder. 
605 Scope of application. The redemption request is not random. The company should meet 
the set legal conditions in performing this request. This right is limited in its scope of 
application to two main categories of conditions. The first limitation is in terms of the form of 
company the shareholder forms part of. The second limitation is procedural. Only shareholders 
of OEIC have the right to redeem their shares at any time without needing to go through stock 
exchanges1733. Unlike those holding shares in closed-end investment companies where no such 
                                                          
1732 Theo Vermaelen, Share Repurchases (Now publishers 2005) page 7 
1733 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7; Article 209.b (4) JCC 
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right exists1734. This right is a bonus for shareholders of OEIC. The procedural limitation is 
connected to several aspects that leads to one key point ‘liquidity’.  
606 Liquidity. Share redemption expects the company to have enough liquidity to be able to 
repurchase the shares. If the liquidity of the company cannot handle this redemption then the 
repurchase is suspended. Shareholders when making such a request should choose a good 
timing where the company is in hold of a sufficient amount of liquid assets. The liquidity’s 
importance in terms of the OEIC relates to its capital nature. OEIC has a variable fluctuating 
capital. Therefore, requesting a redemption requires having enough cash to repurchase the 
shares in addition to being able to evaluate and calculate the repurchase price. The governing 
securities rules require the IC to have a minimum liquidity or a minimum amount of capital in 
order to maintain the redemption right acceptable at all times. If the amount of liquidity or 
capital becomes inferior to that set by law, force of law suspends the repurchase of shares 
automatically1735. The minimum capital requirement for French IC is three hundred thousand 
euros. As for the Jordanian IC, required to maintain a minimum liquidity that allows it to 
execute redemption requests the commission’s council lays down regulations that illustrate the 
calculation of the percentage of the required liquidity1736.  
607 Suspending redemption. The company may suspend share redemption autonomously. 
Members of management of the IC may decide to suspend share redemption when exceptional 
circumstances exists and the interest of shareholders and the public requires such suspension1737. 
An example of these circumstances is the risk of reaching an amount of capital inferior to the 
minimum required by law if a redemption request is executed. Further, having a significant 
number of redemption requests, or losing share value on the market if share redemption is 
performed. Another example is the risk of threatening market integrity, or the company being an 
owner of a large percentage of its shares. For similar circumstances, the company may choose to 
lay down a cap for share redemption1738. This limitation of the scope of application of share 
                                                          
1734 Joh  Mo le , Colle ti e B a di g a d the O igi s of I est e t Fu d ‘egulatio s     Vi gi ia La  a d 
Business Review 341 
1735 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-21 
1736 Article 47 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 
1737 C. mon. fin., art. L. 214-7-4 
1738 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-20-1 
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redemption right is temporary and cannot be considered as prerequisite in company’s statute. 
The cap limitation should be disclosed in accordance with disclosure rules stated by law. The 
disclosure is made with the securities authority and the public. Share redemption is connected to 
professional obligations requested in securities rules such as risk management and hindering 
conflicts of interests. In the sense that share redemption may result in favoring one shareholder 
over the other or puts the company at higher level of risk exposure due to redemption 
execution1739. The AMF sanctioning commission affirmed this connection1740.  
608 Calculation of NAV. The repurchase is executed based on the net asset value per 
share1741. A question rises in this regard: what is NAV? It is the value of entity’s assets minus 
the value of its liabilities. Assets include total market value of the company. This value consists 
of the investments prices at the closing price of the day the NAV is calculated, cash and cash 
equivalents and any accrued income. The liabilities consist of total expenses, short and long-
term liabilities of the company. They further include management and operational expenses, 
auditing expenses, staff salaries, and marketing expenses. The NAV per share is calculated by 
dividing the NAV over the outstanding shares of the IC.  This basis of calculation differs than 
that used in ordinary transactions. International accounting standards require companies to 
calculate the value of their shares that disclosed in the financial statements based on the fair 
value1742.  
609 Fair value vs. NAV. Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid 
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date1743. Why would fair value be replaced by NAV? In specific cases, NAV is used instead of 
fair value where it is difficult to determine a fair value for an asset, if there is no active market 
for trading the asset. Therefore, NAV is used as a practical expedient. As for CIS, NAV is their 
fair value. It is the equivalent to the fair value recommended by international accounting 
standards. Reasoned by the obligation imposed by securities rules over IC to calculate this value 
                                                          
1739 Isa elle ‘iassetto, ‘a hat des Pa ts d u  OPC pa  u  aut e OPC et ‘espe t des O ligatio s P ofessio elles des 
“o i t  de Gestio  de Po tefeuille    Bull. Joly Bourse 90 
1740 AMF Sanction Commission decision of 30 october 2014, n° SAN-2014-21 
1741 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-123; Article 209.b (4) JCC 
1742 IFRS 13; IAS 1 
1743 IFRS 13 
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on a daily basis in addition to disclosing it to the public and not merely communicate it to 
concerned investors1744. To guarantee daily and consistent calculation of the NAV, securities 
rules impose an obligation on the part of the IC to lay down internal policies and procedures to 
perform the calculation1745, to evaluate the securities it holds in accordance with the NAV on a 
daily basis while confirming with the conditions set in the prospectus1746. The IC is further 
obliged to publish the NAV of its issued securities on a daily basis particularly for the IC that 
admits its shares for negotiation on regulated markets1747. If not then the publication is made at 
least two times per month. The calculation of the NAV is closely related to the information 
stated in the prospectus. As it identifies the reference calendar in addition to the conditions and 
periodicity of calculation1748. 
610 Transition. Ex-ante rights are not sufficient on their own. No matter how much national 
rules try to strengthen them to avoid ex-post measures. Ex-post measures are fruitful once a 
liability stands. Their exercise and employment has prerequisites and conditions that should be 
met. To some extent, they are stricter in their scope of application than ex-ante rights. Following 
sub-section illustrates ex-post rights attributed to shareholders of IC.  
Sub-section 2: Ex-post Rights 
611 Focus. What does an ex-post right consist of? An ex-post right is backward looking. It is 
usually associated with fairness. It asks questions including who acted wrongfully and who 
acted well? Whose rights were violated? Ex-post right, allows redress once a right has been 
violated1749. It depends on the strength of enforcement available in national regulatory 
frameworks. It is the key component of private enforcement. The focus of ex-post rights are 
violation and liability. The equation resulting into the activation of ex-post right consists of the 
right owed to shareholders, company or third party, the duty of members of management and 
                                                          
1744 Natio al P ofessio al “e i es G oup, A Look at Cu e t Fi a ial ‘epo ti g Issues  PWC,  Ju e  < 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/in-depth/us2015-11-investments-using-nav-removed-from-fv-
hierarchy.pdf > Accessed 27 December 2017 
1745 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-24 
1746 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-25; JSC issues a regulation identifying the calculation and its related requirements 
1747 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-124 
1748 AMF, régl. gén., art. 411-123 
1749 ‘ei ie  K aak a  & H u  Pa k & “te e  “ha ell, Whe  a e “ha eholde s “uits i  “ha eholde  i te ests   
82 (5) George Town Law Review 1733 
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the violation of both. The ex-post right is employed once the liability of members of 
management stands. It allows stakeholders to put a cause of action and claim redress. The 
question rising in this regard is the following: where do stakeholders seek their redress? To 
answer this question the following paragraphs address two forms of claiming redress. First form 
urges seeking courts to compensate the incurred damages (paragraph 1), and the second 
provides an alternative dispute resolution process (paragraph 2).  
§1: Cause of Action 
612 Reason for enforcement. Shareholders and stakeholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for the violation of their rights and interests. The concerned legal system 
opens the door for stakeholders including third party to seek redress yet in limited terms. 
Opening, the redress largely may result in excessive litigation. Therefore comes the approach of 
legislations to strengthen ex-ante rights in order to hinder litigation risks. In addition to the 
standards and rules that transfer the burden of proof to claimants in a manner protecting 
members of management against abusive proceedings. The questions this paragraph aims to 
answer are the following: who, how and where.  
613 Who, how, where. Who initiates the action? How is the action initiated? Where is it 
filed? The governing legal rules generally address three forms of stakeholders. Shareholders, 
company and third party1750. The liability of members of management stands towards the three 
of them, consequently they are permitted to initiate a litigation with the competent court. The 
action may be held collectively or individually, criminally or civilly. The focus of this 
paragraph and the provided forms of actions are shareholders of IC.  
                                                          
1750 C. com., art. L. 225-251; C. com., art. L. 225-252; Articles 157 & 160 JCC; the Jordanian company rules grants 
the company controller the right to file a liability action in the same context as the company and shareholders 
(Article 160 JCC). The reasoning behind such a right is not clear. The closest explanation for such a right is granting 
the company controller a direct control over the company in terms of legal pursuit for violations of company law 
rules. The question rising in this regard is the following: Is this right transferred alongside other functions of the 
company controller to the JSC confirming with article 111 JSL of 2017. Initiating a liability action does not in legal 
terms fall within the scope of supervisory and organizational functions. It is a public enforcement action therefore; 
we believe that such right does not transfer to the JSC. JSC remains in position of its right to initiate a legal action 
for the violations of the JSL 
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614 Collective vs. individual action. The difference between the exercises of either form of 
action lies in the number of claimants and the claimed prejudice. Collective action embeds the 
concept of collectivity meaning multiple or single claimant seeking a collective prejudice. In the 
sense that destines the action to the repair of damages incurred by the company and not that 
personally incurred by the claimant. The personal prejudice is claimed in a separate individual 
action. The collective action even if exercised ‘ut singuli’1751, is a derivative indirect action 
initiated by shareholders in the aim of obtaining a redress for damages incurred by the company. 
Under French rules, this form of action is limited to claims related to management functions and 
filed against members of management and not third party contractors1752. The reasoning finds its 
place in the in-existing direct interest of shareholders in third party contracts with the company. 
The damage resulting from this form of contracts or third party misconducts is incurred directly 
by the company1753. There is no direct relation between shareholders and third party. 
Nonetheless, shareholders may seek to repair personal prejudice in a different form of action 
according to civil law rules. Therefore, the redressing action against third party is filed directly 
by the company.  
615 Conditions of liability action. The liability action shareholders’ file is conditioned. Two 
main conditions one addresses the prejudice subject of the claim and the other relates to the 
character of the claimant. The collective civil action requires the pre-existence of interest in the 
form of a character. Meaning being a shareholder when initiating the action. The right to initiate 
a liability action claiming the entirety of the damages incurred by the company ceases once the 
total shares are sold or redeemed1754.  Unlike members of management where they may be 
prosecuted and held responsible even after the end of their term1755. The general rule designates 
the right to file this action to shareholders. Nonetheless, in the sphere of Plc. where the law 
                                                          
1751 In the sense that every shareholder has the right to request the entirety of the prejudice and damage incurred 
 the o pa  i  its i itiated i il lia ilit  a tio  agai st e e s of a age e t; B u o Do de o, E e i e Ut 
“i guli de l A tio  “o iale et Ast ei te    Bull. Joly Sociétés 122; Cass. com., 8 mars 2016, n° 14-16.621; Cass. 
com., 21 juin 2016, n° 14-26.370 ; Didie  Po a hia, A tio  “o iale ut-si guli , ass. Co ., °s 14-16.621 14-26.370, 
Revue Droit et Patrimoine, 2017, p. 66 
1752 C. com., art. L. 225-252 
1753 Cass. com., 19 mars 2013, n° 12-14.213  
1754 Cass. com., 26 janv. 1970, n° 67-14787  
1755 Cass. com., 15 nov. 1983, n° 82-14.719  
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permits the creation of associations and groupings of shareholders1756, this grouping may file the 
lawsuit on behalf of its members. The second condition is claiming the redress of company 
damages resulting from a fault committed in the sphere of management activities1757. If a 
shareholder initiates a liability action based on the violation of criminal law rules governing 
fraud or deception the action then falls outside the scope of the social collective action and is 
considered an individual action1758. Nonetheless, the action ut singuli may be filed before 
repressive jurisdiction meaning criminal courts for infringements or fault committed by 
members of management during the exercise of their mandate1759.  
616 Distinction shareholder and third party actions. The collective action even if filed 
individually is strictly granted to shareholders of IC. Third party stakeholders cannot file such a 
direct action to request such a redress. Their direct liability action is limited to faults separate 
from the functions of management. The CA of Versailles addressed in one of its decisions this 
distinction while applying the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation in limiting the direct 
liability of members of management towards third party to the separable fault1760. The collective 
action addressed in this paragraph focuses on financially stable companies and does not include 
those in financial difficulty meaning those undergoing a liquidation process. For the latter exists 
another form of collective procedure taken against members of management for insufficient 
capital1761.  
617 Direct or derivative action in Jordan. The Jordanian rules do not address a collective or 
individual action in their detailed composition as provided in the French rules. The Jordanian 
rules grant the right to file a lawsuit to any shareholder. They choose if they file the legal 
proceeding collectively or individually. The Jordanian rules are silent in terms of the requested 
damages. Do they request the redress of personally incurred damages or those incurred by the 
company? Meaning do they file a direct legal action or a derivative one? When referring to the 
relevant legal text we note that members of board and the chairman are responsible for 
                                                          
1756 C. com., art. L. 225-120 
1757 CA Paris, 31 mars 2000, RJDA 2001, n° 43   
1758 Cass. crim., 10 oct. 1963, n° 61-94.203  
1759 Cass. crim., 19 oct. 1979, n° 77-92.742 
1760 CA Versailles, 17 janv. 2002, n° 2000-7792  
1761 C. com., art. L. 651-2, 3; Article 159 JCC 
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redressing the damages resulting from their misconducts and violation of the governing 
rules1762. The statement is general the damages may be incurred personally by the shareholder or 
the company. As for the liability for the lack of care and diligence in managing the company, by 
either the board or the general manager, it is strictly owed to shareholders1763. Then the resulting 
damage is limited to that of shareholders unless the company goes under liquidation. Following 
this explanation, a direct action is filed for the lack of care and diligence and mostly derivative 
for the violation of the rules or misconduct in managing the company. Nonetheless, the 
Jordanian jurisprudence introduces the legal action for repairing the damages as a strict right for 
the company despite the explicit content of the legal text that grants the right to shareholders1764. 
The jurisprudence in a recent decision affirmed that the action filed by shareholders is 
derivative therefore considering the requested redress is that for the damages incurred by the 
company and not that personally incurred by the concerned shareholder1765.  
618 Direct individual action. Shareholders may individually seek their personally incurred 
prejudice as a result of management misconduct. This misconduct or the fault does not have to 
be separable to the functions as the case of third party. Further, it is not limited to significant, 
intentional and particular gravity form of exercise that is incompatible with the normal 
functioning of the management1766. As an example for personally incurred damage is the 
inaccurate accounts and information provided by the management that were the basis for 
maintaining shares or the investment decision in newly issued shares1767. Therefore, 
shareholders suffer a loss of a chance to invest in another portfolio more retainable. Another 
example is the increase or decrease of capital changing the value of held shares (share dilution) 
further to, damages incurred by investors for the sale of securities (including shares)1768. 
                                                          
1762 Article 157 JCC 
1763 Article 159 JCC 
1764 Jo. cass. civ., 18 feb, 1987, n° 125/1987  
1765 Jo. cass. civ., 13 jan. 2011, n° 3663/2010  
1766 Cass. com., 9 mars 2010, n°s 08-21547 08-21793  
1767 Right given under the Jordanian securities rules to any investor without limiting the scope of application of the 
term investor (article 108.b JSL of 2017) 
1768 Article 108.a JSL of 2017 
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619 Company initiator. The collective action does not prohibit the company from initiating 
the civil action directly1769. If such decision is taken then shareholders right to initiate the action 
ceases as long as we consider the action filed by shareholders as derivative. Further, the 
company is the legally permitted claimant in actions concerning third party damages. Third 
party actions are held against the company, as it is responsible for the actions of its members of 
management towards third party acting in good faith1770; except for those liabilities relating to 
the fault separable from management functions under French rules. Such civil action is held 
individually and directly against the concerned member of management. 
620 Criminal action. The criminal action is a public action for the application of 
sanctions1771. The criminal action may be related to a civil action in terms of the damages 
caused by the committed infringement or crime. The criminal action is initiated by the state 
(namely prosecutor or its delegated judicial officers). Nonetheless, the victim of the committed 
criminal infringement may initiate the criminal action. Therefore, company or shareholders may 
file this form of action before criminal courts. The criminal action held for the infringement of 
company law rules, securities or general criminal law rules1772.  
621 Transition. Ahead of seeking courts, shareholders and investors may decide to settle the 
disputes outside of courts through alternative dispute resolutions. In terms of listed companies 
the competent securities authority handles the dispute that arise with investors and shareholders. 
The authority provides an internal dispute settlement in the form of a prior-litigation dispute 
settlement plan exemplified mainly in a complaint handling process. The following paragraph 2 
addresses this settlement plan.  
§2: Alternative Investor Dispute Settlement 
622 Complaint handling. Corporate governance requirements stresses on the necessity to 
access to justice how it should be made cheaper and shorter. A long discussion on an EU level 
took place to address and endorse the necessity to harmonize an extra-judicial dispute resolution 
                                                          
1769 Article 160 JCC 
1770 Article 156 JCC 
1771 CPP, art. 1 
1772 Philippe Bonfils & Eudoxie Gallardo, Droit Pénal des Affaires (2nd edn, LGDJ 2016) 
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channels in order to boost consumers’ confidence in the market1773. The aim of alternative 
dispute resolution is to provide consumers and investors with effective, inexpensive, simple and 
swift extra-judicial dispute resolution methods1774. Shareholders of IC require an efficient and 
effective complaint handling and redress procedures. The legal systems provide different 
approaches to prior-courts problem settling. The French rules followed the recommendation of 
the OECD and implemented EU law by creating an ombudsman office at the AMF1775. The 
office provides amicable dispute settlement for those disputes arising between investors (retail 
or professional) and issuers or intermediaries. The JSC on the other hand put in place a 
complaint handling committee1776. It reviews the submitted complaints and issues 
recommendations in order to control the violation to capital market regulation. The two 
approaches differ in their conclusion. Nonetheless, they both aim to support investor protection 
and provide a free of charge and confidential problem settling procedure. They both introduce 
an independent and impartial body in charge of the resolution. The difference lies in the 
decisions or opinions issued by either of them. The ombudsman provides non-binding rapid 
recommendations through a process executed in accordance with law and equity1777. The 
ombudsman provides a mediation process therefore requiring the consent of both parties1778. 
The main advantage of this mediation is suspending the limitation period for legal actions1779. 
The recommendation of the ombudsman is not subject to legal recourse before administrative 
courts1780. The complaints committee under the JSC reviews the complaint and refers its 
recommendation to the council of the JSC in order to undertake the necessary measures and 
                                                          
1773 Co issio , Recommendation on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-Of-Court 
Settlement of Consumer Disputes  (Recommendation) COM (1998) 257 final OJ L 115/31; Commission, 
Recommendation on the Principles for Out-Of-Court Bodies Involved in the Consensual Resolution of Consumer 
Disputes  ‘e o e datio  COM   OJ L / ; Co issio , Co u i atio  on Widening 
Consumer Access to Alternative Dispute Resolution  COM   fi al 
1774 Directive  2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC 
(Directive on consumer ADR) [2013] OJ L164/63 
1775 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-19 ; the ombudsman of the AMF considered an ADR entity according to article 4.1 (h) 
Consumer ADR Dir. 
1776 Foundations for complaints handling under its updated version of 2012 
1777 Generally three months following complete submissions of both parties 
1778 Some specialists do not consider the dispute settlement process provided by the ombudsman as a form of 
mediation. This view is due to reasons relating to the proposals the ombudsman issues at the end of the process. 
Generally, in mediation no such proposals are provided 
1779 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-19 al. 4 
1780 CE, 18 oct. 2006, n° 27-7597 
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impose proper sanctions. The approach differs in its core content. The recommendation of the 
committee is binding once approved by the council forms part of the supervisory competence 
the JSC enjoys over its subjects. Unlike the ombudsman where the process seems more 
privately oriented and a means to cheaper access to justice despite being non-binding.  
623 Settlement prerequisites. Both approaches state prerequisites that should be met by the 
complainant. They both require the preparation of a detailed and clearly written complaint 
endorsed with supporting documents submitted in accordance with the form provided by the 
authority. In this regard, the ombudsman requires from the investor to state its targeted 
settlement be it cancellation, execution or compensation in which case an estimation of the 
incurred damages should be provided. Ahead of filing this complaint, the ombudsman expects 
and stresses on the necessity of a prior action to be taken against the listed company, to have 
contacted the listed company before hand with the problem and a negative or unsatisfying 
response was issued or no response at all was received within two months following the 
communication1781. Both the ombudsman and the committee request the response or comments 
with supporting documents of the company mentioned in the complaint to be communicated to 
them within a period not exceeding two weeks for the committee and obligatory response for 
the ombudsman (consent of both parties is obligatory otherwise the amicable settlement is 
suspended). Both the ombudsman and the committee look into complaints that entail issues 
falling within the scope of jurisdiction of the related authority, meaning in matters involving 
disputes in securities and relating to securities markets and not those relating to insurance or 
banking matters1782. The committee in JSC stresses on complaining of a transaction that was 
executed or not, not more than a year ago1783. Both further require that no legal proceeding is 
put in place regarding the same complained issue. Both approaches provide the investor with a 
complementary problem solving. The investor and the company retain their right in initiating a 
legal action at any time.  They respect the confidentiality of the procedure1784. The submitted 
documents with the ombudsman cannot be referred to before courts unless both parties consent 
to their use.  
                                                          
1781 AMF website < http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Le-mediateur-de-l-AMF/Le-mediateur-mode-d-
emploi/Procedure? > 
1782 AMF, ‘appo t de M diateu  de l AMF   A il  page  
1783 JSC website < http://www.jsc.gov.jo/News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?Type=P&lang=1&Site_ID=2&NewsID=489 > 
1784 AMF rapport médiateur, n (1782) page 37 
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624 Civil liability insurance. In a different alternative approach guaranteeing a priori the 
redress of the damages incurred by the company and consequently those of shareholders, is a 
civil liability insurance. It is legally acceptable and normal under French rules that members of 
management when exercising their professional activities in the name and for the benefit of the 
company to be covered with a civil liability insurance. The question rising in this regard is the 
following: who covers the costs of this insurance? Logically, the company takes care of the cost 
of insurance. The paid amount does not enter into the annual report; it is strictly connected to 
the exercise of functions and is not connected to the personality of the manager1785. It is a right 
for the member of management and a duty on the part of the company1786. Another question 
arises: why is it a duty and a right? Based on the theory of representation, members of 
management exercise their functions in the name, and for the benefit of the company, and not 
for their own personal gain. When the liability is put in question, the search focuses on the 
functioning of their duties and not their personal exercise. The insurance in this case covers 
merely their professional exercise as representatives and not the personal one. Therefore, the 
liability this insurance covers stands towards third party for the activities exercised in the name 
of the company1787. This insurance is not considered as part of the advantages granted to 
management; it is seen as a necessity rather than an advantage1788. No such right or duty is 
addressed explicitly under the Jordanian rules1789. General civil law rules allow the civil liability 
insurance1790. Adopting such approach, may impose further operational costs on the part of the 
company. Nonetheless, on a long-term basis it provides a source of redress for the damages 
incurred by the company as a result of the misconduct of the management.  
625 Transition. This section addressed direct control exercised mainly by shareholders of the 
IC. The direct control is further exercised directly by the company over its proper activities and 
practices. This control takes the form of an internal review of transactions and conformity with 
                                                          
1785 ANSA, Questio s ‘elati es au  ‘ u atio s, A a tages et I de it s de D pa t Desti es au  Ma datai es 
“o iau  et Di igea ts Ap es La Loi du  Juillet  Co it  Ju idi ue, ° -060 [2005]) 
1786 Comité Juridique du 1er octobre 2003, communication n° 04-005 
1787 Ale is Co sta ti , De Quel ues Aspe ts de l Assu a e de ‘espo sa ilit  Ci ile des Di igea ts “o iau    
7 RJDA 595 
1788 ANSA report 05-060, n (1785) 13 
1789 Obligatory for auditors (Article 26 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003) 
1790 Article 922 Jo. Civil Code 
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the governing legal rules. The following section B addresses thoroughly this internal auto 
control. 
Section B: Internal Auto Control 
626 Origin. Traditionally in corporate history, a function of internal control was assigned to 
the AOA. It specifies the objective of the company and the purposes for which the company was 
established. Any action that went beyond the AOA was considered unenforceable. Today in 
modern corporate conceptions, purposes and restrictions of powers and the value of the AOA 
have changed. Companies exercises go beyond the limited statements of its AOA. The modern 
approach of corporations is more lucid. Companies function within their main objectives 
framework yet they adapt to changes and requirements of the market in which they operate. 
Therefore, a contemporary notion of internal control came into the light to replace the 
previously existing conceptions.  
627 Importance. To guarantee shareholder and investor protection, it is necessary to 
guarantee the internal overview of the IC1791. Particularly, by laying down adequate internal 
control mechanisms. Internal control is that exercised directly by the company over its proper 
functions through legal control bodies that review the financial situation of the company in 
addition to controlling its compliance with the applicable legal rules. The internal control is of 
great importance as it provides shareholders and investors with an overview of company’s 
situation and the risks it is subject to. The importance of the internal self-control finds its setting 
in ensuring that financial reports and other related information disseminated by the company are 
accurate and present a complete picture of the position of the company. The dissemination is 
regulated as previously addressed in this title. Ensuring an effective monitoring procedure is put 
in place to control the dissemination; the applicable legal rules oblige companies to appoint an 
external auditor in order to control its accounts and the course of its activities. Most corporate 
governance codes extend the concern of the effectiveness of internal control to impose an 
obligation to create an audit committee that plays an intermediate role between auditors and 
members of management. The committee is considered a support body that helps the board 
                                                          
1791 Recital 10 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-58 
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fulfil their duties (further addressed in sub-section 1)1792. Providing a strong and efficient 
investment atmosphere in which investors have confidence and are willing to seek, companies 
should comply with the applicable laws and regulations within the jurisdiction in which they 
conduct their business. Therefore, they organize and structure a compliance function in order to 
confirm with national legal requirements (further illustrated in sub-section 2). 
Sub-section 1: Auditing Function 
628 Legal audit. Shareholders interest and investor protection requires greater level of 
transparency, objectivity and independence of the persons performing statutory auditing1793. 
Therefore, the question of auditors’ oversight arises alongside increasing the minimum level of 
convergence with respect to auditing standards. Enhancing investor protection requires 
strengthening the powers attributed to competent authorities carrying out the public oversight. 
Hence, conferring adequate powers such as investigatory and sanctioning powers. Further 
enforcing shareholders’ powers regarding the direct control they may exercise over the 
functioning of auditors. Such as employing their voting rights in the nomination and removal of 
auditors. Most importantly is laying down deterring and preventive measures that control 
infringements of applicable rules. Audit is closely connected to management functions. Mainly 
conducted over the decisions of the management that eventually have a financial aspect to them 
and are pointed out in the financial statements and the accounts the company keeps. The role of 
auditors is a following step to an efficient and well-organized board. Meaning presenting the 
board with sufficient number of independent non-executive members that may undertake key 
role in essential areas such as hindering conflicts of interests and participating in supportive 
committees such as nomination, remuneration and audit ones. These committees provide 
recommendation to the board ahead of making their decisions. They play the role of a fresh 
third eye. This sub-section addresses the structure of the audit body in terms of its composition, 
role and functions (paragraph 1). Further, it addresses the oversight over the practices of 
                                                          
1792 Co issio , ‘e o e datio  o  the ‘ole of No -Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and 
o  the Co ittees of the “upe iso  Boa d  ‘e o e datio  COM   OJ L /  
1793 Means an audit of annual financial statements required by national law or requested voluntarily by the 
company (article 2 as amended by Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts [2014] OJ 
L 158/196 ) 
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auditors including their accountability before shareholders and the company and their 
positioning in the pyramid of audit structure (paragraph 2).  
§1: Structure and Duty of Auditing Body 
629 Composition. The auditing body composes of two main sub-categories internal and 
external bodies. Internal including the persons appointed directly by the company as employees 
(internal accountant) or a supporting body to the management (audit committee). External body 
referring to an independent body appointed directly by the GA (external auditor) or an 
independent supervisory authority (national council for auditors’ oversight). These bodies 
interconnect through control exercised from one body over the other. The external auditor 
reviews the accounts of the company and supervises the activity of the internal accountant. The 
auditing committee has an essential role in the nomination of the external auditor and course of 
activity. The national council controls the practices of the external auditor and interconnects 
with the audit committee. The detailed composition of each one of these bodies lies at the heart 
of their distinction. The applicable legal rules discuss this composition except for that of the 
internal accountant; left internally to the discretion of the company.  
630 External auditor. The external auditor is the person responsible for executing statutory 
audit1794, takes the form of an individual auditor1795 or an audit firm1796. GA appoints the 
external auditor1797, through an OGAM1798. The audit committee has a vital role in the 
nomination process of the external auditor. The committee submits a recommendation to the 
board or supervisory board in two-tier management, for the appointment of the external auditor 
containing at least two choices of auditors while justifying its preferred one1799. The committee 
ensures that the candidates hold the required qualifications, independence and meet the 
                                                          
1794 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-22 
1795 C. com., art. L. 822-1-1; article 22 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1796 C. com., art. L. 822-1-2 
1797 Article 192 JCC; C. com., art. L. 823-1 
1798 Article 171 JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-228, Article 34 Collective Investment Regulation of 1999 with limitation on 
the nomination for companies that has a public interest and trade their shares on regulated markets. The 
nomination may be made by the board 
1799 Article 7 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of Listed Companies of 2017; Article 16 Regulation (EU) 
No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding 
statutory audit of public-interest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC [2014] OJ L 158/77 
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conditions set by law for the practice of the audit profession. External auditors are considered 
agents of shareholders in the eye of the Jordanian company rules1800. Under French rules, their 
main connection with shareholders is them ensuring that shareholders are treated equally 
throughout the practices of the company1801.  
631 Conditions of auditors. The main condition for the nomination as external auditor is 
holding the necessary qualification1802. In the sense of holding the necessary technical and 
professional knowledge in auditing. This requirement is guaranteed by the national council 
when approving the registration of the auditors on the list of licensed auditors1803. The second 
most important condition and continuous obligation is being independent. Independent in the 
sense of not being a shareholder of the company he is about to audit, not being a founding 
shareholder of the audited company, further to not having a relation (partnership or 
employment) with members of management of the company1804. In addition to not being a 
member of the board, not having exercised an administrative, financial or consulting position in 
the audited company1805, not holding an interest in the audited company1806 in addition to the 
prohibition to trade in the shares of the audited company1807. In other word, the external auditor 
should hinder situations entailing conflicts of interest. To ensure this independence the 
securities authority impose disclosure obligations on the external auditor1808. The auditor is 
bound by strict rules of confidentiality and professional secrecy for the information and 
documents they come across throughout the exercise of their activities1809.  
                                                          
1800 Article 199 JCC 
1801 C. com., art. L. 823-11 
1802 Article 17 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1803 C. com., art. L. 822-1; Article 5.e Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1804 C. com., art. L. 822-10; Article 197 JCC 
1805 C. com., art. L. 822-13 where the auditor was a former employee or a director at the audited company, he/she 
cannot be an external auditor before five years following the end of its terms with the audited company; C. com., 
art. L. 822-12 for reversal situation where an external auditor wishes to take on a position at the audited company 
it is permitted three years following the end of their term as auditors  
1806 C. com., art. L. 822-11 III; Article 197 JCC 
1807 Article 203 JCC 
1808 C. mon. fin., art. L. 621-22 ; Article 200 JCC ; Recitals 80 & 82 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 ; Article 106.1 UCITS Dir. 
2009/65; Article 14 Reg. 2014/537 
1809 Article 102.1 UCITS Dir. 2009/65; C. com., art. L. 822-15; Article 202 JCC 
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632 Role of auditor. The main role of external auditors is exercising control over the 
activities of the company1810. Meaning reviewing and controlling its financial statements and 
accounts, its internal financial and administrative control systems, verifying its assets, reviewing 
the decisions of the GA and the management in addition to exercising any other activities or 
functions that the proper practice of their profession permits1811. Auditors follow the 
internationally accepted auditing standards in their practice1812. To effectively execute their role 
the external auditor certifies the financial statement of the company1813 further he/she issues a 
report1814. The report is addressed to the GA1815 certifies that the auditor had access to all the 
necessary information and documents that allows him to produce his/her opinion and 
recommendation1816. Further, that the company keeps its records and accounts regular in 
conformity with the applicable legal rules, most importantly certifying the exactitude of the 
financial statements and accounts of the company and includes his/her observations1817.  
633 Audit committee. The audit committee is a special committee created at the heart of listed 
companies to perform a supporting role to members of management and guarantee the internal 
control1818.  Audit committee has a decisive role to play in contributing to high quality statutory 
audit through reinforcing the independence and technical competence of members of this 
committee by imposing qualification and professionalism requirements over the majority of its 
members. The committee is created by the board of the company and falls under its control and 
responsibility. The audit committee exclusively composes of non-executive or supervisory 
directors. At least a majority of its members should be independent. Independence is an 
essential necessity for effective internal control. Jordanian corporate governance regulation 
                                                          
1810 C. com., art. L. 225-218; AMF, règl. Gén., art. 212-15 
1811 Article 193 JCC; C. com., art. L. 823-10 
1812 C. com., art. L. 821-13; Article 193.b JCC 
1813 C. com., art. L. 823-9; Article 73 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1814 C. com., art. L. 225-235; Article 193.z JCC; Article 10 Reg. 2014/537 ; Article 28 Audit Dir. 2006/43; AMF, règl. 
Gén., art. 411-37 
1815 Additional reports are addressed under EU rules. They include an additional report submitted with the audit 
committee and another submitted with the supervisors of the audited company (limited to companies with public 
interests); Article 11 & 12 Reg. 2014/537 
1816 The opinion of the external auditor in the report includes one of the following recommendations: certifying the 
accounts, certifying with preservations or non-certification and returning the accounts to the board while including 
a reasoning for the refusal (Article 195.b JCC); Article 19 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
1817 Article 195.a JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-235; AMF, règl. Gén., art. 411-36 
1818 Article 6 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017; C. com., art. L. 823-19; Article 46 JSL of 2017; 
Article 15 Disclosure Regulation of 2004 
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limited the minimum number of members to three. As for the French rules they do not precise 
an exact minimum number nonetheless from the context of the legal text addressing this 
committee we note that the minimum number is two. Members of the audit committee should 
have relevant background and experience in finance and accounting for listed companies 
appropriate to company’s activities1819. Further, they should bound with rules of 
confidentiality1820.  
634 Functions of audit committee. The main function of the audit committee is ensuring the 
effectiveness of the internal and external audit function1821, in particular by making 
recommendations on the selection, appointment, reappointment and removal of the auditors and 
internal control positions. Further, it monitors the responsiveness of management to its findings 
and recommendations. The audit committee reviews the reports issued by both forms of 
auditors, especially in terms of the application and following of proper auditing standards and 
measures in a manner respecting the size and activities of the company.  
635 Exemption from audit committee. In terms of the IC, the EU legislation sees that CIU 
should be exempted from the obligation to have an audit committee1822. The reasoning behind 
this exception is taking into account the objective of the IC. It functions merely for the purpose 
of pooling assets. The appointment of an audit committee is seen inappropriate. UCITS in the 
view of the EU legislation operates in a strictly defined regulatory environment and are subject 
to specific governance mechanisms such as the depository control. The depositary may replace 
the functions of the audit committee. Its main role is safe-keeping the assets of the UCITS in 
addition to ensuring that the transactions of the UCITS are carried out in accordance with law 
and the incorporation of the undertaking1823. French company rules exempted the IC from the 
obligation of the special committee1824. The Jordanian rules do not provide for such an 
exemption. The IC is obliged such as other Plc. to put in place this committee. The applicability 
is understandable, as the depository under the Jordanian securities rules does not function in the 
                                                          
1819 C. com., art. L. 823-19 II; Article 6 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
1820 C. com., art. L. 823-21 
1821 C. com., art. L. 823-19 II; Article 7 Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
1822 Recital 25 Audit Dir. 2006/43 
1823 Article 32 UCITS Dir. 2009/65 
1824 C. com., art. L. 823-20 3°  
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same sense as the one addressed in French rules. Further, the IC under the Jordanian rules does 
not enjoy a complete, strict and effective regulatory framework due to being subject to the same 
rules as Plc. with minimal exceptions.   
636 National council. Another important composition of the auditing structure is the 
nationally designated competent authority or body, in charge of the regulation and oversight of 
external auditors and audit firms. Under French rules, the designated competent authority is the 
Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C)1825. The Jordanian rules designate the 
Higher Commission for Auditors’ Profession1826. The difference between the two designated 
authorities is the legal personality. The H3C is an independent public authority meaning holding 
a legal personality and financial and administrative independence1827. As for the higher 
commission, no such character is attributed. The two authorities differ in their composition. In 
terms of the number of their participating members. The H3C constitutes of fourteen members 
in addition to a president1828. The members include four judges (including a member of the cour 
de cassation as president), president of the AMF, president of the ACPR, general director of the 
public treasury, university professor qualified and specialized in legal, economic and financial 
issues, four qualified individuals in financial and economic matters in addition to two 
auditors1829. The auditors should have ceased their practice three years preceding their 
nomination for this position1830. The ministry of justice appoints a government commissioner 
for consultative vote1831. The higher commission composes of twelve members and the minister 
of industry and trade as president. The members include the minister of finance, president of the 
JSC, governor of the central bank, president of the Jordanian insurance commission, president 
of the Jordanian audit bureau, company controller, president of the auditors’ association, a 
                                                          
1825 C. com., art. L. 821- ; AN“A & othe s, Guide su  la fo e de l Audit L gal   < 
https://www.middlenext.com/IMG/pdf/Guide_reforme_de_l_audit_juillet_2016_vf.pdf > Accessed 3 January 2018 
1826 Article 4 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1827 C. com., art. L. 821-1 
1828 Appointed for a term of six years 
1829 C. com., art. L.821-2 
1830 C. com., art. L. 821-3 
1831 C, com., art. L. 821-4 
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professional in auditing or accounting appointed by the president, a faculty member specialized 
in accounting and three legal accountants appointed by the board of the auditors’ association1832.  
637 Role of national council. Members of the national competent authority should bound 
with rules of professional secrecy for the information and documents they come across 
throughout their term1833. The main mission of the national authorities is approving the 
registration or licensing of legal auditors and accountants1834. The authority adopts deontology 
norms for the practice of the profession and quality of internal control1835. The authority defines 
the main framework and orientation of the control therefore it puts in place regulatory and 
organizational texts1836. It follows the evaluation of the market in terms of adopting auditing and 
accountant standards1837. Further in the process of globalizing investor protection and 
guaranteeing best auditing practice the authority cooperates with its counterparts1838. To ensure 
the level of technical competence of the auditors the national authority puts in place the 
necessary actions to provide continuous professional education plans1839.  
638 Auditing association. The last composition of the auditing structure of the IC. A 
nationally created association for auditors. It holds the entirety of the registered auditors as its 
members. It looks after the interest of its members and protects the traditions and morals of the 
profession1840. The association is delegated partially the functions of the competent 
authority1841. It enjoys a legal personality and financial and administrative independence1842.  
639 Importance to shareholders. Since auditors are agents of shareholders of the IC, in 
Jordanian law, their function is of great importance to shareholders. Through their reports, 
shareholders deduce a general overview of the financial standing of the company. Further, they 
                                                          
1832 Article 4 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1833 C. com., art. L. 821-3-3 
1834 Higher Commission creates a licensing committee (Article 5.b Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing 
Profession of 2003) 
1835 C. com., art. L. 822-16 
1836 Article 5.o Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; C. com., art. L. 821-1 5° 
1837 Article 5.a Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; Article 27 Reg. 2014/537 
1838 C. com., art. L. 821-1 9° 
1839 Article 5.h Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; C. com., art. L. 822-4 
1840 Article 8 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; C. com., art. L. 821-6 
1841 C. com., art. L. 821-1 al. II 
1842 Article 7 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; C. com., art. L. 821-6 
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become informed of the misconducts and infringements conducted within the company. The 
fact that the report of the auditor presents a negative recommendation grants shareholders the 
chance to request the board to rectify the situation or referring the matter to the company 
controller in order to appoint an expertise to settle the problem1843. It is a form of indirect 
control exercised by shareholders. Shareholders’ and the company require greater level of 
protection as auditors may be dishonest and seek to hide certain transactions or infringements to 
benefit members of the management, themselves or third party. The practices of auditors should 
be controlled. Therefore, the applicable legal rules introduce two levels of oversight over the 
exercises of auditors, internal and external control further illustrated in the following paragraph 
2.  
§2: Auditors’ Oversight 
640 Internal control of auditors. Oversight exercised by internal organs of the audited 
company, includes the audit committee (if the IC is not exempted), shareholders and the 
company. The audit committee makes recommendations to the board in relation to the selection, 
appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor. The committee monitors 
external auditor’s independence and objectivity. In particular, the level of fees paid by the 
company, and other related regulatory requirements. Keeps the nature and extent of non-audit 
services under review, based inter alia on disclosure by the external auditor of all fees paid by 
the company. Further preventing any material conflicts of interest from arising. The committee 
should set and apply a formal policy specifying, the types of non-audit services which are 
excluded, permissible after review by the committee, and permissible without referral to the 
committee. Shareholders and the company exercise the control in terms of the liability auditors’ 
hold towards them, in addition to the right to request the audit by shareholders and board 
members1844. 
641 Auditors’ liability. The statutory control covers auditors of the company. Company rules 
state a list of proper conduct and misconducts resulting from the performance of auditors’ 
activities. Members of the audit body are subject to specific liability rules and a standard of care 
                                                          
1843 Article 196 JCC 
1844 Article 275 JCC; C. com., art. L. 225-231; Cass. com., 14 fevr. 2006, n° 05-11822 
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(obligation of means and results, a reduced standard) in light of their position and/or expertise in 
addition to that of the board of directors for approving the related transaction or the misreported 
accounts1845. Auditors share with the manager and the board of the company the liability for 
financial difficulties of the company if negligence or failure of proper performance is 
proven1846. Auditors under the Jordanian rules considered as agents of shareholders1847. The GA 
directly elects them1848. Auditors are held liable for misconducts resulting out of performing 
their functions including the faults or failure to properly perform1849. Further, the auditor is held 
liable for issuing or ratifying inaccurate or incorrect financial statements1850, in addition he is 
liable for ratifying or issuing of financial statements not confirming with the accepted auditing 
standards1851. The information that the auditor comes across throughout its performance may 
hold confidential information. The auditor is prohibited from disclosing this information to 
shareholders or third party. Any unlawful disclosure made by the auditor in this regard holds 
him liable for the occurring damage1852. Auditors should avert from situations involving 
conflicts of interest1853. They are prohibited from dealing directly or indirectly with the shares of 
companies’ they audit. They are held liable for the incurred damage if such dealing is 
performed1854. Auditors, under French rules, are held liable before the company, shareholders 
and third party for damages resulting from their fault or negligence in performing their 
functions1855. This liability is limited to the information and disclosures made within their term. 
Their liability is personal. Meaning they are not responsible for the actions of the management 
unless they knew of such, conduct and they failed to report this misconduct either to the 
competent authority1856 or in their report for the GA1857.  Auditors are liable for fraudulent 
excessive estimations of share value1858.  
                                                          
1845 A ti le  JCC; Didie  Po a hia, Co issai e au  Co ptes  Dalloz  pa ag. 424  
1846 Article 159 JCC 
1847 Article 199.a JCC 
1848 Article 192.a JCC 
1849 Article 201 JCC 
1850 Article 278.a (4) JCC; Article 44 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; C. com., art. L. 
820-7 
1851 Article 105.c JSL of 2017 
1852 Article 202 JCC 
1853 C. com., art. L. 822-11 
1854 Article 203 JCC 
1855 C. com., art. L. 822-17 
1856 Article 200 JCC 
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642 Sharing liability with management. Auditors may be considered as accomplice in the 
misconducts and violations of the management1859.  For example in the case of abuse or misuse 
of company’s assets if the auditor hides, while being informed, the misuse and reports to the GA 
the legitimacy of the operations1860. They may face secondary action by members of the board 
in order to share a larger portion of the damages by arguing that the auditors are more liable. 
Auditors’ liability also stands for the same time limits provided for management1861. The 
difference between the two lies in the starting point for the calculation of the period. Being 
responsible for the control of the reports and financial statements of the company the calculation 
of the mentioned period begins with the publication of the accounts. The French jurisprudence 
considers the publication as the triggering factor and not the actual discovery of the fraudulent 
act1862.   
643 Auditors’ civil liability. Auditors’ liability is qualified as contractual under Jordanian 
company rules by explicitly stating that they are agents of shareholders within the limits of their 
functions1863. Their liability towards the company may be qualified as either tortuous or 
contractual. Contractual in considering the relation connecting them with the company as 
contractual close enough to employment contract. Tortuous when considering two main legal 
texts first the text explicitly considering them as agents of shareholders and not the company, 
second is the text addressing their liability towards the company as it provides as basis for 
damage compensation, two concepts that belong to tortuous liability under general civil law 
rules redressing the actual incurred damage and the missed profit1864. The contractual liability 
accepts the actual damage as basis for redress1865. Again, under French rules the rules do not 
address a specific form of civil liability. The auditors are responsible for the fault and 
negligence towards both the company and third party1866. The form of civil liability of auditors 
was addressed by French jurisprudence. Some court decisions referred to the general rules of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1857 C. com., art. L. 822-17 al. III 
1858 General liable action applicable to auditors (C. com., art. L. 242-2); Cass. Crim., 12 avr. 1976, n° 1976-096115  
1859 Article 278.b JCC 
1860 Cass. Crim., 19 mai 1999, n° 98-83.587 
1861 C. com., art. L. 822-18 
1862 Cass. crim., 9 juill. 1996, n° 1996-003580; Cass. crim., 20 fevr. 1997, n° 96-81.613 
1863 Article 199 JCC 
1864 Article 201 JCC  
1865 Jo. cass. civ., 29 mar. 1983, n° 768/1982; Jo. cass. civ., 10 may 2001, n° 332/2001; Article 363 Jo. Civil Code 
1866 C. com., art. L. 822-17 
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tort1867 and others referred to the liability as contractual1868. When considering the actual 
terminology used in the governing legal text we find that it addresses a civil professional 
liability. A liability for damages and negligence in the sphere of the profession and for the 
exercise of functions. Therefore, this stipulation departs from the classical view of the liability 
as tortuous or contractual to a larger concept of a civil liability connected to a profession1869.  
Auditors’ liability is limited to the several and joint forms1870. Criminal liability stands also for 
auditors1871. 
644 Independence and control. The management should not be interfering in the 
performance of auditors’ duties. They should allow them to exercise their duties without 
restrictions. Any action preventing the auditor from exercising its duties holds the management 
liable1872. As for shareholders’ control over auditors extends to removal and replacement of the 
external auditor upon their request. The request is conditional. The two requests differ in their 
reasoning. Revocation of auditors is made for a fault committed by the concerned auditor. It is 
not limited in time to a specific period1873. As for the récusation or replacing it is limited in its 
scope of application to newly appointed auditors, where a suspicion arises concerning their 
independence such as the case of conflicts of interest, or other characteristic without requiring a 
prior fault or violation. Shareholders holding not less than five percent of the share capital have 
the right to request to courts for “récusation” of one or more of the auditors’ in term1874. Further 
shareholders may request the termination of the term of the auditor for fault or impediment1875. 
Replacing an auditor generally is not permitted in Jordan before the end of the term. 
Exceptionally the replacement is permitted yet conditioned; to be performed after the end of the 
                                                          
1867 Cass. com., 6 oct. 1992, n° 90-21.011; cass. com., 18 mai 2010, n° 09-14281 
1868 CA Paris, 30 juin 1994, n° 93/8424 et n° 93/13113 
1869 Jean-François Barbiéri, Responsabilité Civile des Commissaires aux Comptes (Francis Lefebvre 2017) page 9 
1870 Article 201 JCC 
1871 Article 280 JCC; C. com., art. L. 820-5; C. com., art. L. 820-7; Augustin Robert, Responsabilité des Commissaires 
aux Comptes et des Experts Comptables (Dalloz 2011) page 165 
1872 C. mon. fin., art. L. 573-4 ; Article 279.c JCC (intentional action) 
1873 C. com., art. L. 823-7 
1874 C. com., art. L. 823-6 
1875 C. com., art. L. 823-7 
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financial year unless the auditor is incapable to perform its activities for any reason then the 
replacement during the course of the financial year is permissible1876.  
645 External control of auditors. An external body to the company that provides an audit 
quality assurance reviews exercises external control of auditors1877. It ensures that the external 
auditor is practicing the profession in an adequate quality framework1878. The H3C exercises 
such a control over the auditors of companies with public interest such as the IC1879. As for 
other companies, national auditors’ association performs this control1880. The participants in the 
audit quality assurance should hinder any situations entailing conflicts of interest1881. Quality 
assurance should be independent in accordance with a system laid down by the competent 
authority. This external control is granted to the minister of industry and trade under Jordanian 
company rules following a request made by the company controller1882. No such control is 
granted to the higher commission. Neither does the auditing profession law grant such a right of 
controlling the audit quality of external auditors to auditors’ association. The control of the H3C 
extends to investigatory1883 and disciplinary powers (pronouncing disciplinary sanctions)1884 and 
appellate review for the decisions taken by regional disciplinary commissions1885. The higher 
commission for auditors’ profession takes the role of a first stage appellate body for the 
challenges of the decisions issued by the board of auditors’ association1886. The sanctioning 
committee1887 created within the structure of the auditors’ association imposes disciplinary 
sanctions1888. The higher commission does not pronounce sanctions. It merely approves the 
decision of the disciplinary committee previously approved by the board of the association and 
                                                          
1876 Article 32 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1877 Article 26 Reg. 2014/537 
1878 The JSC has the power when it deems necessary to appoint another than that appointed by the company on 
o pa s e pe se, i  o de  to pe fo  pa ti ula  audits a ti le  Li e si g ‘egulatio  of ; a ti le  
Licensing Bylaw of 2018)  
1879 C. com., art. L. 821-9 al. I 
1880 C. com., art. L. 821-9 al. II 
1881 C. com., art. L. 821-10 
1882 Article 276 JCC; this right does not transfer to the JSC in accordance with the rule transferring the 
organizational and administrative duties of the company controller to the JSC (Article 111.a JSL of 2017) 
1883 C. com., art. L. 821-3-1 
1884 C. com., art. L. 821-1 7°; C. com., art. L. 824-1,2; disciplinary sanctions are challenged before the CE (C. com., 
art. L. 824-14) 
1885 C. com., art. L. 821-1 8°; C. com., art. L. 824-9 
1886 Article 5.d Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1887 Article 34 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
1888 Article 36 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003 
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solely for decisions involving annulment of the license or the permanent removal of the 
registration of an auditor1889.  
646 Transition. The first level of guarantee to shareholders is having an effective and 
efficient statutory audit. The following level of protection is having a properly functioning 
company that complies with the applicable legal rules and its professional obligations. In the 
sense, that hinders any violations and infringements that incur the company and its shareholders 
material and immaterial costs and damages. The following sub-section 2 introduces the 
compliance function as a form of internal direct control of company’s activities and function.  
Sub-section 2: Compliance Function 
647 Focus of compliance. Collective investment industry has different actions and functions 
that need to be adhered to by ICs. They should ensure that their functioning is performed in 
accordance with the mandates and consistently interpret the relevant legislations1890. Operating 
a business that is based on risk management and in most cases invests lifetime savings of 
individuals requires the apprehension of misconducts such as insider trading. Rules were created 
to ensure the compliance with professional obligations and the imposed internal monitoring on 
the operation process. Compliance is a form of internalized law enforcement1891 that provides 
better shareholder protection. If functioning effectively replaces other forms of enforcement 
activities especially those exercised by the state. It is an essential internal control activity that 
coexists next to its cousins risk management and governance. IC establishes and maintains a 
compliance function in addition to effective operational measures that guarantee continuous 
compliance with the applicable legal and industrial rules. Compliance function is a form of 
internal control exists alongside the audit function and does not replace it. The two functions 
belong to the same category of control yet they are independent and separate from one another. 
                                                          
1889 Article 37 Law Regulating the Practice of the Auditing Profession of 2003; decisions involving sanctioning 
(article 37) or relating to licensing (article 23) are challenged before administrative court; Jo. co. admin., 14 march 
2016, n° 543/2015; Jo. co. admin., 20 dec. 2015, n° 383/2015  
1890 Colle ti e I est e t Ma age s’ < http://www.asisa.co.za/_docs/Chapter%202.pdf > accessed 6 August 2014 
1891 Geoff e  P. Mille , The Co plia e Fu tio : A  O e ie  [ ] NYU La  & E o o i s Wo ki g Pape s 
393/2014 < http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=nyu_lewp > Accessed 13 January 2018 
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They should be separate to ensure that the compliance function is subject to independent 
review1892.  
648 Role of compliance. Compliance function has as its main role reasonably ensuring that 
the company complies with the applicable regulations. If integrated into the business culture, it 
empowers the responsible for compliance to fulfil their missions. As for audit, it is uniquely 
independent and objective due to its reporting structure. It monitors and evaluates company’s 
internal control environment in terms of adequacy, efficacy and effectivity. Despite their 
separation, they coordinate effectively, through leveraging a common language of risks and 
control. For example in Jordan, particularly internal audit and compliance function are not 
separate. In the sense that corporate governance regulation grants the audit committee both 
functions internal audit and compliance1893. The rule does not limit the compliance to the 
regulations governing the audit profession; it extends to include the entirety of applicable rules. 
They both represent control components of a company’s structure. If an effective program 
emphasizes their function then a reduction of incidence of abuse is achieved. In the preceding 
sub-section, we addressed the audit function. The following paragraphs address the composition 
and structure of the compliance function in terms of its basic structure and source of obligation 
(paragraph 1) and its responsible individuals (paragraph 2).  
§1: Common Structural Framework of Compliance 
649 Compliance theory. The goal of compliance is to incentivize or force a control system 
inside the company that has practical effect of reducing wrongdoing that otherwise have a 
positive expected value1894. Compliance is a tradeoff of costs and benefits. In the sense that if 
the company complies with its regulatory obligations and requirements while achieving the 
lowest operational cost possible and fulfilling the benefit of the regulation then it reduces its 
legal risk and therefore offers a stable investment environment for current and future investors. 
The theory of compliance addresses companies’ legal risk. Meaning the risk resulting from non-
                                                          
1892 A gela Gillis, I te al Audit s. Co plia e   Ma   < https://www.schneiderdowns.com/our-thoughts-
on/risk-advisory-Internal/internal-audit-vs-compliance > Accessed 13 January 2018 
1893 Article 7.d (4) Jordanian Corporate Governance Regulation of 2017 
1894 Do ald La ge oo t, Cultu es of Co plia e     A e i a  C i i al La  ‘e ie   < 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/PL?key=EIFVk > Accessed 13 January 2018 
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compliance or irregularities with regulatory requirements. Legal risk opens the door for 
litigation based on liability and redress of damages and losses. A stage companies wish to avoid 
to save their reputation and maintain a stable financial standing in the market. The basic theory 
states that if law imposes the right mix of detection and sanctions, then companies are likely for 
this sole reason have an incentive to take a step to reduce their legal risk. Companies play by the 
book but not when playing by the rules is performed in an overly legalistic regulation where 
compliance is too costly and the regulation is too complex to know and understand. Particularly 
this relates to the current state of the art in companies’ liability system. Companies are 
responsible for the actions of their agents and members of management. Liability incentivizes 
companies to employ compliance measures in order to avoid unnecessary payments and 
operational risks. The balance between the compliance obligation and the liability is found in 
the individual forms of liability addressed under securities and company rules. They put the 
company in a more beneficial position. As they can place adequate (in the eyes of the law) 
compliance policy and procedures that may exempt them from liabilities relating to inefficient 
compliance function and transfer the liability to the concerned person.  
650 Compliance system design. Compliance is a system of policies and controls adopted to 
deter violations of the law and to show competent authorities that such a preventive step is 
taken1895. General compliance systems address the overall conduct of the business and includes 
all forms of misconducts. They operate by increasing the overall enforcement resources in a 
manner, ensuring the apprehension either prior or post the violation. Compliance organization 
begins at the authorization or licensing stage of the company1896. Companies choose a system 
design and structural framework to their compliance function. There are two general national 
systems of compliance1897. A system focused on a command approach; appointing a compliance 
officer to perform quality control of each designated level at the operational stage. In addition to 
                                                          
1895 Mi ia  He hle  Bae , Go e i g Co po ate Co plia e    Bosto  College La  ‘e ie   < 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/bclawreview/pdf/50_4/02_baer.pdf > Accessed 13 January 
2018 
1896 Article 8-1 AMF I st u tio  P og a e d A ti it , O ligatio s des P estatai es de “e i es d I estisse e t et 
Notification de Passeport DOC-2014-01 ; Article 7.a (bis) Licensing Regulation of 2005 ; article 5.a/bis Licensing 
Bylaw of 2018 
1897 Wo g Te k Ko , Co plia e Fu tio  i  Fi a ial I stitutio s  [ ] IFA“T Fi a ial < 
http://www.ifastnetwork.com/ifastverve/home/articles/iFAST-Compliance_Function.pdf > Accessed 13 January 
2018 
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a system focused on a values approach or called norm-based compliance. In this system, the 
general concept is generating ethical norms within the company. In the sense that empowers the 
persons of the company with the ability to tell their responsibility to comply with the regulations 
related to their field. Meaning increasing the deterrence if the company is permitted to discipline 
its employees for violations that do not mount to legal ones yet they violate the generated social 
norm. The question rising in this regard which of the two systems yields greater benefits to the 
company?  
651 Beneficial system. The first proposed system might be costly and less beneficial on the 
long term as no compliance culture is generated. Further this system faces problems of incentive 
especially for outsider officer. As for the second system, it is seen as yielding greater benefit on 
the long term. The concept behind this system is in training the employees for compliance 
ethics. They are relied upon to do their job while conforming to regulatory obligations and 
requirements. In this system, employees take complete responsibility to comply with rules. It 
becomes a part of their daily functioning such as fulfilling any other regulatory requirement. To 
function properly, this system requires financial and promotional motives and incentives. 
Therefore promoting compliance culture.  
652 Compliance culture. Compliance culture has made its way into common legal discourse 
as describing a goal and a maker1898. This culture sees departmentalization as not the answer to 
compliance. It sees the solution in a globally spread culture across the company. The state of the 
art for nationally adopted compliance system leans towards the first proposed system as the 
compliance culture is difficult to achieve. Regulations address the obligation to set up a 
compliance function while providing a general framework for its missions and duties. The 
detailed component and structure is left to the discretion of the company. Nonetheless, national 
rules address trainings of compliance procedures. It is the beginning of compliance culture. 
Education through effective communication with different components of the company to 
ensure their understanding of their compliance commitment1899. Further, the rules address the 
necessity to comply with the regulatory requirements for the main organs of the company such 
                                                          
1898 D. Langevoort 2017, n (1894) page 937 
1899 Do ald La ge oo t, Mo ito i g: The Beha io al E o o i s of Co po ate Co plia e ith La     
Columbia Business Law Review 71 < http://heinonline.org/HOL/PL?key=DJJAo > Accessed 13 January 2018 
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as members of management and auditors. The rules hold them liable for the lack of compliance. 
This approach is an attempt to develop a compliance culture on the long run. For the moment, 
national systems seek to profoundly establish the compliance as a necessity and an inseparable 
part of the internal organization of the company. Compliance in this approach is embodied in 
management duties including the responsibility to safeguard the company from illegal activities.  
653 Compliance and disclosure. There is a historical link between the development of 
compliance and the growth of financial reporting and internal control mechanisms. Company 
law extends the compliance beyond the duty of management by including codes of best 
practices, regulatory statutes and other norms. The regulatory requirements translate into 
internal codes of conduct that advice employees to comply with legal rules and assists them to 
seek the competent organ in the company if they are unsure of the rule or they fear a violation 
occurred. The aim of these codes is to minimize company’s civil and criminal liability using an 
ethical norm instead of a legal deterring method therefore, using a direct monitoring strategy in 
terms of having a standard hierarchal review of behaviors and performance. In securities 
systems the compliance function is sometimes attributed to the responsible for economic 
productivity supervision and evaluation. In some systems, board members may be allowed to 
exercise the role of the compliance officer or participate in the compliance process. This mix 
generates conflicts of interest especially if the participant is driven by financial motives rather 
than the greater good of the company. 
654 Compliance function obligation. Complying with applicable rules by market participants 
is guaranteed through deterring texts imposing liability for their violation, in addition to 
obliging companies to comply with applicable legal rules. The obligation requests the company 
to establish and maintain operational adequate policies, procedures and measures to detect risk 
of non-compliance with professional obligations; while taking into consideration nature, 
importance, complexity and diversity of the activities provided by the company1900. This 
obligation does not stop at merely placing a policy and procedures. The obligation extends to 
establishing and maintaining a compliance function at the heart of the organizational structure 
                                                          
1900 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313- ; it is the oa d s issio  to la  do  the ge e al poli  of the o pa  i ludi g 
taking the necessary measures that guarantee compliance with applicable rules and regulations in addition to 
adopting a compliance guide (Article 66 Licensing Regulation of 2005) 
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of the company1901. The function should be exercised independently to fulfil two main missions. 
The first mission addresses regular control and evaluation of the adequacy and efficacy of the 
implemented policies, procedures and measures, further to evaluating and controlling ongoing 
redress actions for the violations of the company and its concerned persons1902 of their 
professional obligations. The second mission is providing advice and assistance to the 
concerned person in charge of the investment services to comply with his professional 
obligations1903.  
655 Compliance Function conditions. In order to have an efficient and adequate compliance 
function the company should meet the conditions set by law. The function should enjoy 
authority, resources, expertise and access to all necessary information1904. In addition to, 
designating a compliance officer responsible for the operation of the function and issuing 
compliance reports1905. If a concerned person (including members of management) participates 
in the compliance function, he/she should not be attributed the control over services and 
activities he/she controls (guaranteeing the necessary level of independence). Most importantly, 
the remuneration granted to concerned persons participating in the compliance should not 
compromise their objectivity. Companies may derogate from the mentioned conditions of 
independence and remuneration if they prove that nature, importance, complexity and diversity 
of company’s activities present these conditions as excessive and if the compliance function in 
place remains efficient despite the derogation1906. Worth to be mentioned that the Jordanian 
rules do not address the actual term ‘compliance function’ the rules explain a compliance 
procedure (envisaged in the compliance guide), and the compliance officer responsible for the 
compliance of the company and its staff. Not mentioning the actual term does not undermine the 
attempt of the legislature to insist on the importance of compliance. Nonetheless, the fact that 
such function does not explicitly exist as is, leaves the compliance process in the hand of an 
                                                          
1901 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 
1902 Includes the MC (AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 al. II). This statement is of importance in cases of delegation of 
functions where the company does not transfer its liability but merely its functions 
1903 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 2°; duty of the compliance officer under the Jordanian rules (Article 68.c (4) 
Licensing Regulation of 2005); appointing compliance officer with no explanation of his/her duties in article 18 
Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1904 This condition is fulfilled for the benefit of the compliance officer under Jordanian rules (article 68.h Licensing 
Regulation of 2005) 
1905 AMF, règl. Gén., art. 313-7 
1906 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-3 al. II 
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individual and not a team. Therefore, this arises operational risk and possible failure of 
performance due to the limited language of the text. The risk is related to the size, complexity 
and diversity of the provided activities. The internal organization of the company is left to the 
discretion of the board. This loose attribution may be the solution for the gap in the compliance 
obligation text. The company may decide to set up internally a compliance function or a 
department within its organization, in addition to the role of the audit committee in the 
compliance process. The question rising in this regard is the following: who are the key players 
in a compliance function?  
§2: Key Players in Compliance Function 
656 Nomination obligation. In order to permit the compliance function to perform its 
missions in an appropriate manner and with the necessary independence, the IC fulfills a list of 
conditions including nominating a compliance officer1907. This officer is assigned and is in 
charge of ensuring that, the company complies with its regulatory requirements and internal 
policies. In other words making sure that the company plays by the rules. Several questions rise 
in this regard: who is this officer? Who is responsible for its appointment? What is he 
responsible for? 
657 Qualifications of compliance officer. National legal rules provide a list of conditions the 
compliance officer should comply with ahead of receiving his official post. Due to the 
importance of compliance function within the life of the financial company, the person holding 
the position of a compliance officer is expected to hold certain level of technical knowledge and 
experience. Compliance officers deal with different industries depending on the objective and 
activities of the company. Regarding the IC compliance officers, they should hold the necessary 
professionalism to deal with financial and investment regulations and services. In order to 
ensure this qualification, national securities authorities require the candidates for the post of 
compliance officer to undertake a qualification exam organized and managed by the 
                                                          
1907 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-3 2°; Article 68.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 18 Licensing Bylaw of 2018 the 
article does not refer to the form of registration required to the compliance officer as it no longer distinguishes 
between administrative and technical registration 
 
368 Part II: Controlling the Performance of Invesmtment Companies 
authority1908. This exam forms part of the greater obligation of acquiring a professional 
status1909 from the securities authority ahead of commencing the attributed missions1910. The 
national authority verifies that the candidate meets the remaining conditions alongside the 
qualifying exam. The conditions include knowledge of professional obligations the company is 
subject to, a university qualification (under Jordanian registration rules) and the honorability of 
the concerned person1911. The authority further verifies that the company making the request for 
the professional status of its compliance officer meets its compliance function conditions. The 
professional card issued by the AMF for the benefit of the compliance officer of an IC includes 
two main parts; compliance and internal control (type RCCI1912). Most importantly, compliance 
officer should hinder any possible situations entailing conflicts of interest between its functions 
as compliance officer and other missions attributed to him1913. This is mostly seen in cases were 
a concerned person (example a member of management, agents of the company, an employee or 
an individual exercising an externalized function1914) is involved in the compliance process such 
as being a member of the compliance team.  
658 Responsibilities of compliance officer. Compliance officer is responsible for three main 
missions in charge of the compliance function, permanent control and periodic control1915. 
Responsible of the compliance function meaning; ensuring that the company maintains and 
establishes operational procedures, policies and measures and an efficiently and independently 
exercised compliance function. The compliance function consists of permanent and regular 
control ensuring that the company, its different organs and employees confirm with professional 
                                                          
1908 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-38; Article 45.b Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 20.a Licensing Bylaw of 2018; the 
exam organized by the AMF composes of interviews with a jury that refers its decision to the AMF the e a s 
modality and organization is set in an AMF instruction DOC-2006-09). The jury states in its decision whether or not 
the candidate holds the required qualifications and fulfils the requested conditions (AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-42 
(for employees of the company), AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-44 (for externalized compliance)) 
1909 Professional card under AMF general regulation and technical registration under the licensing regulation of JSC 
1910 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-4; AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-29; Article 68.a Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 18 
Licensing Bylaw of 2018 a mere registration with no distinction if it is administrative or technical 
1911 Non conviction; AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-39; Article 45.b Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 20.a Licensing 
Bylaw of 2018 
1912 Responsable de Conformité et du Contrôle Interne 
1913 Article 68.d Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1914 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 II 
1915 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-66 
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obligations and the applicable rules and regulations1916. The permanent regular control is 
divided into different duties1917. They include achieving clear understanding of company’s staff 
and management of the financial services provided by the company, proposing compliance 
guide (confirming with internal control mechanisms, a Jordanian imposed duty), deliver 
compliance training, provide advice and recommendations on regulatory issues, and certify the 
supervision of registered individuals and investigating any possible violations1918. Further to, 
evaluating on a regular basis the adequacy and efficiency of the implemented compliance 
policies and procedures, the redress the company owes as a result of ongoing liability actions, 
assisting the concerned persons responsible for investment services in confirming with their 
professional obligations1919, in addition to controlling and evaluating internal control 
mechanisms1920, risk control and management1921. The Jordanian rules address the duties of the 
compliance officer as part of a main regular control. The rules do not refer to any possible 
periodic control in the framework presented by the AMF rules.  
659 Periodic control. Periodic control is not obligatory for all forms of investment services 
providers. The company choses to establish and maintain a periodic control function1922 distinct 
and independent form the permanent one. The creation of such a function relates to the 
appropriateness and proportionality regarding the nature, importance, complexity and diversity 
of activities provided by the company1923. The responsibilities included in the periodic control 
includes establishing and maintaining operational a periodic control program that examines and 
evaluates the adequacy and efficacy of systems and mechanisms of internal control. Further to, 
issuing recommendations following the performed examination, verifying that these 
recommendations are respected and submitting reports to the management. The periodic control 
is an internal control. It is not limited to the compliance with regulatory requirements. It 
                                                          
1916 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-66; AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 I; Article 68.b Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1917 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-64 
1918 Article 68.c Licensing Regulation of 2005; no explanation of the duties of the compliance officer are mentioned 
in the Licensing Bylaw of 2018  
1919 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-2 
1920 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-58 
1921 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-53-2; AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-53-7 
1922 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-67 
1923 AMF, règl. Gén. art.313-62 
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concerns other internal control mechanisms implemented by the company1924. It concerns 
specifically a well and precisely modeled organizational structure. Including a clearly aligned 
hierarchal composition and the distribution of functions and responsibilities. This clearly 
defined organization ensures that relevant persons are informed with procedures they should 
follow in order to guarantee an efficient, effective and faultless exercise of responsibilities. 
Periodic control is prior step to the permanent. It concerns the incorporation period of the 
company in addition to newly hired persons. As mentioned the Jordanian rules do not explicitly 
address the two forms of control. The closest obligation of the compliance officer to the 
periodic control is that concerning the development and execution of trainings to the registered 
personnel of the company1925. This training aims to spread the knowledge of the applicable rules 
and regulations in addition to the measures of internal control. Another close link to the periodic 
control is a compliance guide the licensing rules address. The IC should provide it as part of the 
licensing application conditions. The regulation address this guide as the means through which 
the company guarantee an internal control over the licensed activities1926. Finally the obligation 
the licensing regulation imposes on the board of the company and not the compliance officer to 
lay down general internal policies of the company that designate the allocation of 
responsibilities in a manner achieving administrative and financial control1927. The compliance 
officer prepares compliance reports and submits them with the board1928.  
660 Outsourcing compliance. ICs may choose to outsource their compliance function1929. As 
we previously mentioned in part I, the IC may choose to outsource partially or entirely its 
functions to a MC. The same rule applies to compliance function. In an approach to guarantee 
the utmost independence of the compliance function or compliance team members. 
Alternatively, if the IC does not hold the qualified human or financial resources to comply with 
this obligation on its own and with the limits and conditions set by law.  
                                                          
1924 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-54 
1925 Article 68.c (3) Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1926 Article 7.a (bis) Licensing Regulation of 2005; article 5.a/bis Licensing Bylaw of 2018 
1927 Article 66.a Licensing Regulation of 2005 
1928 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-7 
1929 AMF, règl. Gén. art. 313-44 
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661 Part II Conclusion. Every exercise or activity coming from the company impacts one-
way or the other its shareholders. This exercise is not random. It is regulated internally and 
externally through regulatory requirements and obligations. To guarantee the proper functioning 
of the company a form of supervision is continuously exercised over its activities. The source of 
this supervisory environment is both internal and external. Internal in the sense that permits the 
components of the company to possess such a supervisory character. External in the form of 
public enforcement. These components exercise their authority separately yet they interconnect 
and cooperate on different organizational and operational levels. The connection addressed in 
this part is in terms of an IC legally incorporated and duly authorized or licensed to provide 
collective investment services in securities. An IC that exercises its proper functions and does 
not outsource them to a MC. Control activities eventually affect shareholders. The role of the 
competent authority in the performance of the IC is crucial. The competent authority plays a 
role of control over control. Competent authority ensures market integrity and restores investor 
confidence in the market.  
662 The first step is the internalized enforcement of the company. A control that stems out of 
the company. Internally born and raised. In the form of compliance with regulatory 
requirements especially by members of management, yet globally affecting the staff and agents 
of the company. The compliance function may not be enough if standing alone. Compliance and 
risk management intertwine and depend on each other. Compliance and risk management are 
forms of internal control used pre and post executions. To some extent they form a preventive 
measure. Especially if compliance design is rather cultural than a costly measure based on a 
policy and a functional team. Post transactions and throughout the exercise avails the 
importance of the audit function. Ensuring the financial standing of the company and that 
equality and adequate treatment is provided to all shareholders. Internal control closely relates 
to the performance. Meaning a management that fulfils its function in an effective and faultless 
manner. A management that complies with its legal obligations and prevents misconducts and 
violations. The role of shareholders in this equation avails at two extreme stages. Early ex-ante 
stages in employing their voting rights or later ex-post stages particularly when a misconduct 
occurs. Their control relates also to performance. The most important argument that should be 
mentioned in this regard; is having a supervisory mechanism that is not excessively costly or 
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legalistic for companies. Neither should the mechanism provide competent authorities with 
excessive supervisory powers that suffocate the normal performance of companies. Therefore, 
regulatory assessment usually have a cost benefit analysis to them. Nonetheless, this thesis 







663 The main question this work tried to answer is the level of shareholders protection 
provided in OEICs. In answering this question the thesis studied the degree of existing 
provisions regulating the IC and those addressing shareholders’ protection under the Jordanian 
rules. The IC is in fact regulated under the Jordanian rules. This form of company exists under 
Jordanian company rules. To which extent this regulation is considered sufficient, adequate and 
thorough is our main concern. Throughout the work we referred to the Jordanian governing 
rules mentioning more or less their existence and their level of adequacy to the requirements of 
portfolio management, market integrity and investor protection. While at the same time taking 
into consideration the reference French model. Therefore, this work performed a thorough 
assessment of the state of the world of the Jordanian OEIC regulatory framework in the light of 
shareholders’ interests. The aim of this assessment is to decide whether the existing provisions 
are sufficient on their own or a legislative movement should be put in place. The existing legal 
rules governing the IC in Jordan cannot be defined as entirely specialized or general. IC 
governing rules have one main source: the rules governing public limited companies. The IC is 
seen as a separate company than the usual Plc. Nonetheless, its existence should be consistent 
and conforming with Plc. rules except for minimum exemptions mentioned in company and 
securities law, which aimed to respect the particularity of this form of company yet failed in 
providing a strong and thorough regulatory framework due to major dependence and reliance on 
Plc. rules. The legal assessment performed in this work is merely academic and text based 
analysis as in practice the IC is not common in Jordan. No actual record of a registered IC can 
be found with the Jordanian company controller. Therefore, the consistent application of the 
rules governing the IC could not be assessed.  
664 The rules governing the IC lack the exclusivity that such company form generally 
requires. The generality of rules does not harm yet in terms of the IC, negatively affects 
investors’ confidence in this form of company as an investment decision problem solving and a 
safe access to financial markets. The Jordanian rules are not mature enough to host an actively 
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managed IC. The essence of the rules lack a more concise legislation that thoroughly and 
exclusively address the regulatory framework of ICs following the footsteps of French and 
European legislatures. We see that a regulatory reform is due in this regard. This reform 
introduces a filling for the gaps general company and securities rules are suffering from, a 
solution for the challenges this form of company imposes and prospects, detection and 
preventive measures for future potential crises, conflicts and risk management.  
665 As a conclusion for this thorough analysis, this work proposes a legislative intervention 
in the form of a bylaw to be issued in accordance with article 100 of JSL of 2017. This bylaw 
complements securities and company rules and follows the principle of consistency, respect and 
adequacy of the regulatory practice. The bylaw includes rules governing issuing, trade and 
redemption of IC shares, capital requirements, information included in the AOA, the content 
and form of the prospectus, management structure, composition and conditions, in addition to 
those rules that define the organization and control of IC’s activities and performance. 
Complying with securities rules, preceding the official adoption, and entering into force of this 
bylaw, the draft should be disseminated to the public to permit them to provide their comments 
and opinion on its content and design in addition to study the impact it may have over their 
business or future investment decisions. The commission should take the feedback of 
stakeholders and public into consideration as the draft passes into the law-making process. 
666 For reasons relating to the composition of the securities law and hierarchy of norms 
within the Jordanian legal system the following proposal draft excludes particular issues from 
its scope of reforming framework. They include the structure of the JSC. It was mentioned in 
this work that the JSC council composition is rather small when compared to other boards of 
securities commissions in other countries. This composition may be left as is yet preferably it 
should be restructured to be composed of a bigger number of members while guaranteeing 
effective representation from the central bank and the insurance commission. Therefore, the law 
should explicitly address the cooperation between the different competent authorities of 
financial segments. The proposed bylaw does not address the necessity to create an ombudsman 
within the JSC as was recommended by the OECD. The key role of the Ombudsman is in 
providing alternative dispute resolution and settlement process for securities related disputes for 
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those arising between investors and licensees of the commission. The newly implemented JSL 
of 2017, in article 111.a, transfers organizational and supervisory functions generally granted to 
the company controller and the minister of industry and trade as part of their supervisory power 
over incorporated companies, to JSC. The JSC council exercises the powers of the minister and 
the president of the council exercises the powers of the company controller. For purposes of the 
proposed bylaw, this matter was excluded for two main reasons; the bylaw regulates particularly 
the IC and does not entail any amendments or modifications to the JSC. Furthermore, this 
transfer addresses generally public limited companies and private limited companies that trade 
their shares on markets and not particularly the IC. Nonetheless, this issue is significant to the 
IC and the JSL should provide a clear definition to the scope of transfer and the scope of 
included functions. The proposed bylaw further excludes defining a competent court in matters 
relating to the decisions of the ASE that are not qualified as securities’ related decisions such as 
membership issues.  
667 The bylaw further excludes the matter of presumptions and burden of proof. The 
securities law transfers the burden of proof to the claimant in matters involving members of 
management and securities law infringements. The JCC on the other hand, needs to state an 
explicit presumption instead of having to apply the general rule of burden of proof provided by 
the law of civil procedures. The law should provide a presumption of members of management 
knowledge or engagement in the infringing action. The presumption induces efficient 
performance and provides a form of legal control and broader shareholder protection.  
668 Issues relating to the prospectus are addressed in the proposed bylaw. A higher level of 
investor protection could be achieved if the JSL states clearly and explicitly the obligation to 
submit the prospectus with the commission and disseminating it to the public. An obligation of 
this form presents the failure to execute it as an infringement of securities rules.  
669 Company law rules should explicitly state the nature of the relationship between 
shareholders and board, shareholders and general manager, shareholders and third party 
contractors of the company, shareholders and the company, the relationship between the 
company and the formers, and that between the company and auditors. Is it direct or indirect? 
The law should qualify the liability as contractual or tortuous.  
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670 A final proposal is governing risk management in securities law. Corporate governance 
regulation of 2017 is the sole legal text referring to risk management. The text is incomplete. 
The JSL should dedicate a part to explain risk management, the policy that should be put in 
place, the responsible person for its preparation, implementation and content, identifying the 
forms of risks listed companies are subject to, and introducing evaluation and methods of 
calculation of global risk exposure. The legal text should consider risk management and 
evaluation as an inseparable part of the prospectus, and company disclosures. Following this 






Investment Company By-law for the Year 2018 
Issued by virtue of article 100 of Securities Law no. 18 of 2017 
 
Article 1: Scope of Application 
A. This By-law shall be called “Investment Company By-law for the year 2018”. It shall enter 
into force as of the date of publication in the official gazette.  
B. This by-law shall be exclusively applicable to Open-end investment companies as for 
closed end investment companies they are not covered in the scope of application of this 
bylaw unless otherwise indicated in the text.  
Article 2: Definitions 
A. Whenever mentioned in this By-law the following terms shall have the meaning attributed 
to them hereunder, unless indicated otherwise in the relevant text:  
1) Commission: Securities Commission 
2) Council: Council of the Securities Commission 
3) Regulated Market: Amman Stock Exchange or any other authorized multilateral 
system, which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-
party buying and selling interests in securities in a way that results in a contract. 
4) Collective Investment Undertaking: the undertakings for collective investment in 
securities. They take two main forms fund whether open or closed end and 
company whether open end or closed end. 
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5) Investment Company: the public limited company with sole object of portfolio or 
collective investment of securities operating on the principle of risk spreading. It is 
the company whose shares upon the request of shareholders may be redeemed or 
repurchased. 
6) Open-end Investment Company: a public limited company with a variable capital, 
established with a sole object of collective investment in securities, operates based 
on the principle of risk spreading, whose shares are redeemed at their net asset 
value anytime upon the request of shareholders.  
7) Competent Authority: the body responsible for the enforcement and implementation 
of the rules stated in this by-law. This term includes the Commission, the Regulated 
Market, the depositary center and the company controller.  
8) Statute: articles of incorporation of the company and its constitution. It constitutes 
of articles of association and memorandum of association. 
9) Investment Adviser: means any person moral or natural who, for compensation, 
engages in the activity of advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular 
activity, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. 
B. Unless otherwise indicated in the text or when contradicting with the essence of this by-law 
the terms not defined in this bylaw and have their proper definition mentioned in Securities 
law, company law or any other related legislation retain the meaning assigned to them. 
Article 3: Incorporation 
A. The Investment Company is incorporated as a public limited company with the sole object 
of collective investment in securities with minimum seven founding shareholders.  It takes 
two main forms regarding its capital structure: open and closed end. The Investment 
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Company is subject to the general rules governing public limited companies unless 
otherwise stated by law.  
B. The Investment Company complies with the incorporation procedures set for public limited 
companies. Notwithstanding minimum capital requirement and threshold indicated in 
company law further to that mentioned in the licensing regulation and licensing bylaw the 
open-end investment company adheres to this requirement merely for the purposes of 
incorporation. This requirement ceases once the company commences the exercise of its 
activities. Nonetheless, the open-end investment company is expected to maintain at all 
times a minimum liquidity of three hundred thousand Dinars, in order to be able to execute 
shareholders’ share redemption requests.  
C. The Investment Company registers with the company controller following obtaining a 
preliminary approval from the Commission. The company controller establishes 
Investment Companies Registry for this purpose.  
D. The Commission issues the preliminary approval within a period not exceeding thirty days 
following the submission of the complete registration application. The refusal of the 
Commission should be reasoned and it is contestable within sixty days before 
administrative courts. If the commission fails to issue a decision within the set timeframe, 
the applicant company has the right to contest the negative decision before administrative 
courts following a written request submitted with the Commission. The response of the 
commission to the written request should be issued within a period not exceeding fifteen 
days of its submission. The time lapse of this period without a positive answer permits the 
applicant company to contest this negative decision before administrative courts within the 
following thirty days. 
E. When submitting the registration application with the company controller the Investment 
Company attaches its articles and memorandum of association, including but are not 
limited to the information mentioned in article 92 of company law no. 22 for the year 1997. 
The Statute of the company should indicate the name of a licensed or registered investment 
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advisor responsible for the management of company’s investments. Further, the company 
submits the initial capital deposit certificate.  
F. The Investment Company should fulfill the underwriting of its shares within a reasonable 
period in a manner that does not represent the company as inactive or hinders its financial 
licensing.  
Article 4: Financial license 
A. The Commission should license the Investment Company ahead of exercising its financial 
services yet following its registration with the company controller.  
B. The Investment Company is licensed as an investment manager in accordance with the 
rules laid down in the licensing regulation of 2005 and that of the licensing bylaw of 2018.  
C. The Investment Company fulfills the licensing conditions at the date of application in 
addition it is obliged to maintain these conditions valid at all times otherwise the license 
may be subject to annulment.  
D. The conditions of the financial licensing include but are not limited to the following: 
1) Submitting a licensing application with the Commission including but not limited to 
the information and documents mentioned in article 7 of the licensing regulation of 
2005 and article 5 of the licensing bylaw of 2018.  
2) Having a minimum incorporating capital of one million Dinars. If the Investment 
Company choses to include in its main object other financial services then the 
minimum accepted capital, should not be less than the accumulation of minimum 
capitals required for the involved services.   
3) Justifying the existence of expertise and competence in the chosen members of 
management. This justification forms part of the professional registration and 
examination of senior staff and management conducted post licensing. Furthermore, 
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the applicant justifies acquiring technical competences and expertise in terms of 
software and communicational equipment.  
4) Paying preliminary licensing and renewable license fees set by the Commission.  
5) Providing an unconditional financial guarantee. The guarantee should not exceed 
the amount of two hundred and fifty thousand Dinars for investment management 
services.  
6) Submitting a program of activity oriented to provide sufficient financial background 
on the applicant company and its components. The program constitutes of the form 
of management self or outsourced, the authorized securities within the scope of 
activity of the applicant and the targeted investors within its scope (retail or 
professionals). In addition to collective management strategies (asset allocation, 
stock picking, directional risks), compliance and internal control guide and 
investment process (including conflicts of interest policy). The program addresses 
instruments valuation, data retention and record-keeping organization, financial 
information (preliminary assumptions for companies under establishment, 
development assumptions) in addition to a forecast of financial statements. The 
applicant Company should provide as part of its activity program an Anti-Money 
Laundry and Terrorist Financing risk policy.  
E. The commission reviews the application and issues its licensing decision sixty days 
following the submission of a complete application. This period becomes two weeks if the 
applicant Investment Company is comparable to another recently licensed reference 
company within the past eighteen months. The comparability is in terms of having the same 
management company for both applicant and reference companies, the reference company 
was not subject to major modification since its licensing and sharing similar investment 
strategy, functioning rules, and Statute and risk profile. 
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F. The silence of the Commission concerning the licensing application fifteen days following 
the submission of a written request inquiring on the result of the application at the end of 
the review stage is translated into an automatic licensing of the applicant company.  
G. The Commission issues two forms of decisions relating to financial license approval or 
refusal. The decision should be communicated and notified to the applicant in a timely 
fashion by postal services in addition to an electronic copy. The notification includes a 
reasoned refusal or a restricted or non-restricted approval. The approval should contain the 
number of license, which should be indicated at all times in the correspondences of the 
Investment Company.  
H. Commission licensing decisions whether negative or positive are subject to contestation 
before administrative courts. 
I. The financial license expires annually on December 31. It is renewed annually upon the 
request of the licensee thirty days preceding the said date. The commission issues its 
decision of refusal or approval to renew the license maximum twenty-one days following 
the submission of a complete application, supported with a justification of payment of 
licensing fees. The silence of the Commission following the lapse of this period results in 
the automatic renew of the license.  
J. The Commission enjoys supervisory, investigatory and disciplinary powers as indicated in 
the securities law no. 18 for the year 2017. Regarding the financial license the Commission 
may suspend, restrict or revoke it. The suspension of the license is temporary and used as 
preliminary preventive measure. The restriction is having a conditional license. The 
restriction ceases to exist once the condition is fulfilled. The revocation of the license takes 
several forms: withdrawal upon the request of the licensee, withdrawal due to not making 
use of the license within six months following the licensing without a justification or 
annulling the license due to incorrect information or infringement of securities rules.  
Article 5: Exercise of activities  
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A. The Investment Company choses whether to personally exercise its activities or outsource 
them to a management company. The choice of outsourcing is limited in its scope of 
application to collective investment services, risk management and compliance function. 
The Investment Company cannot outsource the entirety of its activities. The same rules of 
incorporation and licensing apply to the management company. Nonetheless, the 
management company may be incorporated as a limited liability company. The 
management company is subject to the supervision of the Commission and the company 
controller. The management Company may externalize or delegate its activities to another 
body. This delegation and/or externalization does not transfer the responsibility of the 
management company before the Investment Company to the delegate. 
B. The transfer of organizational and supervisory powers of the company controller to the 
Commission do not extend to management companies.  
C. The management company should guarantee its independence and fair treatment further it 
should disclose any potential or existing interest with the delegated powers and activities.  
D. The management company prepares a monthly report detailing its performance. A copy of 
this report should be submitted with the Commission.  
E. Preceding the trade of shares on Regulated Markets Investment Company undergoes the 
following stages: 
1) Registration with the company controller following prior approval by the 
Commission according to article 98.a of Securities Law for the year 2017 and 
article 7.h of company law for the year 1997.  
2) Financial licensing following the rules set in licensing regulation of 2005 and 
licensing bylaw of 2018. 
3) Regulated Market membership according to Internal Bylaw of the Amman Stock 
Exchange of the year 2004. 
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4) Registration of shares with the Commission in accordance with article 3 of issuing 
regulation of 2005. 
5) First issue of shares through initial public offering or private offering according to 
issuing regulation of 2005. 
6) Membership in depositary center complying with article 80 of securities law of 
2017 and securities deposit center membership internal bylaw of 2004. 
7) Registration of issued shares with the depositary center according to article 79 of 
securities law of 2017.  
8) Listing the issued shares on the Regulated Market according to listing regulation of 
2016.  
9) Trading shares on the market. 
Article 6: Investor information  
A. The issue of Open-end Investment Company shares is performed through a public offering. 
Potential future investors, shareholders and the public are communicated a prospectus in 
both electronic and hard copy forms. The prospectus should be submitted with the 
Commission and disseminated unless the Commission decides otherwise. The prospectus 
should be in Arabic. Exceptionally accepted in English as long as an Arabic translation is 
attached. For purposes of interpretation, the Arabic version is the officially recognized one. 
The language of the prospectus should be understandable and clear for retail and 
inexperienced investors in a manner that does not present the prospectus as overly 
technical.  
B. The issuer company attaches a key investor information document that provides a 
summarized content of the prospectus prepared on an A4 page in a readable font and size. 
The paper should be printed in black ink with possible use of other colors for highlighting 
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as long as they do not exceed 15% of the size of the document, form a source of distraction 
or hinder the proper reading of the document. This document is considered a pre-
contractual agreement. The content should be precise, complete and clear. It is 
communicated in a durable medium whether electronic or hard copy. It constitutes of key 
information that permit investors to reach an informed investment decision and be able to 
compare it across the market. Key information consist of five minimum requirements: 
objectives and investment policy, past performance, risk and reward profile, costs and 
charges, and practical information relating to the prospectus and additional information. 
The key investor information document follows the same language and publication 
requirements as the prospectus.  
C. Both the prospectus and key investor information document should be provided free of 
charge and whenever requested by the investor or shareholder.  
D. The Investment Company should comply with its ongoing and periodic disclosure 
obligation. Failure to disclose, inaccurate, misleading or ambiguous disclosure results in 
holding the company liable for the infringement of securities rules.  
Article 7: Management composition 
A. A board of director and a general manager manages the Investment Company. The board 
consists of not more than nine members. They appoint among them a chairman to be the 
president of the board. The general manager should be an independent individual and non-
board member.  
B. Shareholders elect board members as set in article 132-company law of 1997 and following 
the proposal of the election and remuneration committee. The board according to article 
153 company law of 1997 appoints the general manager. Board members and the general 
manager may be reelected for equivalent terms.  
C. The composition of the board should respect gender equality representation; age limits 
representation, independence, expertise and professionalism. Not more than third of the 
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board should compose of members over 70 years old. The minimum female representation 
in the board is third the members. The elected board members should be independent and 
respect the maximum number of board membership set in article 146-company law of 
1997. Board members should not hold shares in the Investment Company unless otherwise 
stated in the Statute. Minimum two board members should not be shareholders at the 
moment of election. The fact that the company decides to grant the member a percentage of 
shares as a form of remuneration does not result in losing the membership. Nonetheless, the 
percentage should not be significant.  
D. Members of the board, general manager, its delegates and senior administrative staff should 
undergo a professional registration process with the Commission. The process consists of 
an examination and evaluation of their expertise, knowledge and background in collective 
investment related issues. The examination is made in two different stages written exam 
and an interview. The Commission creates an internal examination committee composing 
of experts and professionals in financial, securities and economic fields. The committee 
decides on the content and frequency of the examination and composition of the examining 
jury.  
E. Convening board meetings is performed in accordance with article 155 company law of 
1997. The attendance and voting in board meetings is made personally, by way of 
representation, video, or conference call. Board members can mandate their vote to another 
member of the board with the limit of one mandate per member. The representation is 
limited to four times per financial year per member even if the mandated member changes 
during the financial year. Members of board who fail to attend board meetings for more 
than four times without a valid justification submitted maximum forty-eight hours 
following the meeting or without a valid mandate lose their membership and should be 
replaced immediately.  
F. The general manager should participate in board meetings unless otherwise indicated in the 
Statute.  
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G. Complying with corporate governance regulation of 2017, the board establishes permanent 
support committees including but are not limited to risk management committee, audit 
committee, election and remuneration committee and corporate governance committee.  
H. The board, if not otherwise delegated, creates a compliance function consisting of a 
compliance officer and supporting team. The function should be independent and cooperate 
with the audit committee in order to create a compliance culture within the company. The 
compliance function prepares trainings and compliance policy. Further, the function draws 
up non-compliance detective and deterring measures and legal risk management. 
I. The board draws up conflicts of interest policy. 
J. The board lays down a risk management policy. 
K. The board prepares management and corporate governance reports including a risk 
exposure evaluation. They form part of periodic disclosure. They should be communicated 
to shareholders whether a general assembly meeting is due or not.  
L. General Manager is responsible for the daily performance of the company. He/she should 
cooperate with the board in the decision-making process. The discretion of the general 
manager is indicated in its appointing deed. 
M. The board, general manager and senior administrative staff are held liable for the attempt to 
engage and engaging in the infringement of securities and company law rules such as 
insider dealing, market manipulation, abuse of company’s assets and unlawful disclosure of 
inside information.  
N. For purposes of inside information, the proof of legitimate possession of inside information 
and that legitimate measures and procedures where used to obtain this information 
exonerates from insider dealing. 
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O. The Investment Company subscribes to a civil liability insurance for the professional 
performance of its general manager. The company undertakes the expenses of this 
insurance.  
Article 8: Share redemption 
A. Shareholders in Open-end Investment Company have the right to request to redeem their 
shares at their net asset value.  
B. The Open-end Investment Company executes redemption requests without any delay.  
C. The Open-end Investment Company calculates and discloses its net asset value on a daily 
basis. The net asset value per share is calculated by dividing the net asset value over the 
outstanding shares of the Investment Company. 
D. For purposes of this Bylaw net asset value means the value of entity’s assets minus the 
value of its liabilities. Assets include total market value of the company. This value 
consists of investments prices at the closing price of the day the net asset value is 
calculated, cash and cash equivalents and any accrued income. The liabilities consist of 
total expenses, short and long-term liabilities of the company. They further include 
management and operational expenses, auditing expenses, staff salaries, and marketing 
expenses.  
E. The company may suspend share redemption if it justifies that it is at a risky level of 
liquidity. Meaning, if such request is executed the company risks having asset liquidity 
below or at the limit of the minimum required liquidity by law. Further, the company may 
decide to suspend share redemption if it justifies that the redemption may have a significant 
negative impact on its market value or if the execution of the redemption request results in 
having the company as majority shareholder.  
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F. The Commission for the same reasons provided for auto suspension may suspend share 
redemption. Further, the Commission may suspend share redemption if it suspects a 
negative impact on the transparency or integrity of the market.  
Article 9: Shareholder protection 
A. Notwithstanding the rules exempting the management of the Investment Company from 
convening general assembly meetings unless a board election is due and article 172 of 
company law of 1997, the board should convene at least one annual general assembly 
meeting. Shareholders directly or represented by their association, holding not less than 
10% of share capital, have the right to file a request with the company controller to 
convene an extraordinary general assembly meeting. Shareholders holding not less than 
20% of the share capital directly or represented by their association have the right to file a 
request with the board to convene an extraordinary general assembly meeting.  
B. The exercise of voting rights in and attendance of general assembly meetings should be 
accepted by ways of proxy, postal vote and telecommunication.  
C. Shareholders holding not less than 5% of the share capital present in general assembly 
meeting should have the right to add items on the meeting’s agenda.  
D. Shareholders have a say-on-pay regarding the remuneration of members of management. 
This control exemplified in an ex-post and ex-ante binding voting rights. It covers board 
members, chairman, senior administrative staff, general manager and its delegates. 
Shareholders vote on the remuneration policy laying down the remuneration framework. 
Further, shareholders vote on the remuneration report indicating the allocated remuneration 
to the aforementioned members of management and administrative staff.  
E. Shareholders of the Investment Company should be allowed to be grouped in associations 
that represent them in general assembly meetings, before courts and the Competent 
Authority. The voting right the shareholder association exercises represent the 
accumulation of the shares represented in this association. The representation by the 
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association should be limited to three general assembly meetings per year. The association 
can file liability actions on behalf of its represented shareholders or petitions with the 
competent authority. On the other hand, the plaintiff in the liability action remains the 
group of member shareholders and not the association as it has no legal personality.  
F. Shareholders enter into an agreement when creating the association whereas this agreement 
does not have any legal value before third party. It is binding before members of 
management and remaining shareholders. The agreement should not entail any rules 
violating the Statute of the company, the governing legal rules or providing member 
shareholders with any form of immunity or privileges. Shareholders provide the 
Commission and the company controller with a copy of this agreement where it is 
considered as part of the company’s documents open for review solely to shareholders and 
in post members of management.  
Article 10: Coordination between competent authorities 
A. Competent Authorities responsible for the implementation of this bylaw should coordinate 
and communicate among them in order to safeguard shareholders’ interest, provide the 
necessary level of investor protection and ensure market transparency and integrity.  
B. The coordination and communication include but is not limited to: exchange of 
information, mutual representation in board meetings with consultative character and 
entering into a memorandum of understanding in order to regulate the flow of data and its 
sensitivity. The coordination guarantees that every authority effectively and efficiently 
exercises its powers and functions and provides a level of integration of external 
governmental oversight.  
C. Competent Authorities should coordinate and communicate with other sectors of the 
financial system such as banking and insurance on a similar level to that requested between 
them.  
Article 11: Transitional provisions 
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A. The collective investment regulation of 1999 no longer applies to Investment Companies. 
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